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Post by Admin on Aug 15, 2023 23:59:03 GMT -5
Administrator note
Theonomy Is An Important Issue as it addresses vitally Important issues in the life of any Christian. This Thread will list articles against, and for Theonomy.If held in an improper manner it can do damage to the Christian life, and the life of the churches. If ignored, we can forfeit our rights to secular authorities and also do damage to our Christian life and tendency. I am offering up articles both for and against this topic.
One of the articles listed here, the author taunted others suggesting no one had answered him.[T.David Gordon.]
Ken Gentry has provided such an answer in his book Covenantal Theonomy, A response. Let's try and take a fresh look at the issue as some present day men are doing. Many of our postmillennial brothers are doing just that.
Some of the links have been posted out of order, sorry about that, but I am trying to post thought provoking materials.
Why is Theonomy Unbiblical?
by Tom Hicks | Apr 12, 2021 | Civil Government, Covenant Theology, Law, New Testament, Old Testament
Before critiquing theonomy, we need a good definition. Some people today who use the word “theonomy” don’t mean anything more than “God’s law” because the etimology of the word theonomy is “theos” which means God, and “nomos” which means law. They only want to affirm that God’s law is supreme over man’s law. And they’re right about that. God’s transcendent moral law is the norm that norms all norms. Governmental laws should always be consistent with God’s law and human law must never violate God’s law.
But in this post, I’ll be using the word “theonomy” in a more technical sense, which is rooted in the historic usage of the term. Theonomy, in the technical sense, teaches that Old Covenant judicial laws are the universal moral standard of civil law for all Gentile nations. The basic presupposition of theonomy is that God gave the judicial law to the nation of Israel as a universal law of perfect justice for all nations because it is a perfect reflection of God’s own moral character. Some of the most prominent early proponents of this kind of theonomy include Greg Bahnsen, Rousas Rushdoony and Gary North. For a discussion of “general equity theonomy,” see here.
I’m convinced that theonomy is unbiblical for a number of reasons.
1. Theonomy has a flawed hermeneutic of Old Testament priority.
Theonomy arrives at its conclusions by insisting that particular Old Testament laws persist, unless they are specifically abrogated by the New Testament. But this reads the Bible improperly. Theonomy’s hermeneutic is consistent with paedobaptism, which says that since the New Testament does not abrogate the Old Testament inclusion of infants, then infants must be given the sign of baptism. Theonomy is also consistent with the Old Testament priority hermeneutic of dispensationalism, which teaches that the promises God made for Israel cannot be typologically fulfilled in Christ and the church, but must be literally fulfilled in national Israel. But theonomy’s hermeneutic isn’t consistent with the hermeneutic of New Testament priority.
It is true that earlier revelation is vital for understanding the context of later revelation. In that sense, earlier revelation is logically prior to later revelation. But sound hermeneutical principles recognize that later revelation has interpretive priority over earlier revelation. Therefore, when later Old Testament texts explain earlier parts of the Old Testament, we should pay close attention to what the later texts say and allow them to explain and draw out implications of earlier Old Testament texts, making explicit what was only previously implicit. Similarly, when the New Testament explains Old Testament passages of Scripture, the New Testament has priority of interpretation over the Old Testament.
If the New Testament says an Old Testament passage has a particular meaning, we should assign that meaning to the Old Testament passage. The same is true of New Testament letters, which explain the earlier life and work of Jesus Christ in the Gospels.
This is nothing other than what Augustine taught when he said, “The New is in the Old concealed; the Old is in the New revealed.” The light of revelation is brighter as we move toward the end of the Bible (Louis Berkhof, Principles of Interpretation, pp. 54, 133, 135, 137). Berkhof says, “The New Testament is implicit in the Old, so the Old is explicit in the new” (135). And “The more perfect revelation of the New Testament illumines the pages of the Old” (137-138).
This isn’t really any different from the way we read any book by a single author. We allow the later parts of a book to interpret the earlier parts of the book. Orthodox theology is rooted in the idea that the one true God authored the whole of the Scriptures. Thus, we should pay close attention to His intended meaning in light of His explanation of His own Word.
2. Theonomy does not account for the fact that Gentile nations are not and never were under the Old Covenant.
The laws peculiar to the Old Covenant do not bind Gentile nations. Gentile nations are under natural law, which is the work of the moral law written on the hearts of all human beings. Romans 2:14 says, “For when the Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature, do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts.”
When God judged the Gentile nations in the Old Testament, He never judged them for violating Old Covenant judicial law. Rather, He judged them for violating His moral law, as summarized in the Ten Commandments (Jerermiah 46-51; Ezekiel 25-32; Amos 1-2; Obadiah; Jonah; Nahum; Habakkuk 2 – a taunt song against the Babylonians for violating God’s moral law; Zephaniah 2).
3. Theonomy doesn’t properly account for the fact that the Old Covenant as a whole, together with all of its laws, has been abolished.
Numerous passages of Scripture teach that the Old Covenant has been fulfilled and abolished with the coming of Christ and the establishment of the New Covenant.
Hebrews 7:12 says, “For when there is a change in the priesthood, there is necessarily a change in the law as well.”
Hebrews 7:18 says, “A former commandment is set aside because of its weakness and uselessness.”
Hebrews 8:13 says, “In speaking of a new covenant, he makes the first one obsolete.”
Hebrews 10:9 says, “He abolishes the first in order to establish the second.”
Ephesians 2:14-15 says that Christ “has broken down in his flesh the dividing wall of hostility, by abolishing the law of commandments and ordinances.”
To be clear, the moral law, which is summarized in the Ten Commandments, has not been abolished. The moral law is rooted in God’s own eternal moral character and is part of the image of God in human beings. Moral aspects of Old Covenant law can never be abolished because they are rooted in nature, not merely in a covenant. But the positive laws of the Old Covenant have been abolished. Theonomy does not properly account for this fact.
Rich Barcellos correctly notes, “The New Testament clearly abrogates the whole Old Covenant, including the Decalogue, as it functioned within the Old Covenant, and yet borrows from its documents as the basis for New Covenant ethics (see for instance 1 Cor. 9:9-10; 14:34; 2 Cor 13:1; Eph 6:2-3, and many other texts)” (In Defense of the Decalogue, p. 68).
4. Theonomy doesn’t acknowledge the existence of positive law in contrast to moral or natural law.
This is related to numbers 2 and 3 above. Natural law is law that people know innately. Romans 2:14-15 is clear that God writes the work of His natural law on the hearts of all men, and Romans 2:21-24 shows that natural law is summarized in the Ten Commandments. Natural law is nothing other than the reflection of God’s moral character in human beings who are made in His image.
Positive law, on the other hand, is law that God posited by way of special revelation in a particular covenant. No one would have known that they ought to obey positive law, unless it had been revealed to them in a biblical covenant.
To give you an example of the distinction between natural/moral and positive law, consider Adam in the Garden of Eden. Adam knew by nature not to worship false gods, not to steal, not to murder, etc. He knew these laws because he was made in the image of God. But Adam would never have known not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, if God had not revealed and commanded that positive law to him in the covenant of works.
To give you another example, Abraham knew by nature that it was wrong to lie to Pharoah about Sarah being his wife. God never had to tell Abraham that lying was wrong because all images of God know it’s wrong to lie, even if they suppress that truth in unrighteousness. But Abraham would never have known that he had to be circumcised except for the fact that God revealed that law to him and commanded him to be circumcised in the covenant of circumcision. Natural law is known innately, but positive law would never be known apart from covenantal revelation.
Natural or moral law transcends all covenants. It’s immutably rooted in the nature and character of God and also in human nature. Fallen human beings suppress their knowledge of natural law, which is why we need Scripture to reassert and clarify it. But even fallen human beings are not completely ignorant of natural law. Positive law, on the other hand, is covenantal, must be specially revealed to be known, and serves a particular purpose within the covenant in which it is given. When covenants change, positive laws change, but moral or natural law does not.
Theonomy does not grasp this crucial distinction. The judicial laws of the Old Covenant are not transcendent moral or natural law, but positive laws, which God commanded in the Old Covenant for a particular reason.
5. Theonomy does not account for the fact that the judicial laws of Israel were only to be practiced in the land of Canaan.
It’s impossible to separate Israel’s judicial law from the land of Canaan. The Old Covenant law was given to the Old Covenant people, who were to keep the law in the Old Covenant land. Deuteronomy 4:14 says, “And the LORD commanded me at that time to teach you statues and rules that you might do them in the land that you are going over to possess.”
To give one example, consider the law of the parapet. Deuteronomy 22:8 says, “When you build a new house, you shall make a parapet for your roof, that you may not bring the guilt of blood upon your house, if anyone should fall from it.” This judicial law, which is based on blood-guilt, only makes sense because the land of Israel is holy. According to the Old Covenant, blood-guilt defiles the land and results in the expulsion of the people. Deuteronomy 19:10 warns that if blood guilt comes upon the land, the guilt of blood shall be shed upon the people.
While there is certainly an element of perpetual moral law (general equity, “do not murder”) in the law of the parapet, the law itself could only be practiced in the land of Canaan, which is the case for all Old Covenant judicial law.
6. Theonomy misunderstands the reason for the death penalties in Old Covenant judicial law.
Before discussing the death penalty in Old Covenant judicial law, it’s important to understand that the covenant of common grace establishes the death penalty for murder. The death penalty for murder is part of universal moral law. In Genesis 9:6, the Noahic covenant of common grace says, “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image.” That is a transcendent moral principle: the punishment must fit the crime. It is lex talionis, which is the “law of the same,” often expressed as “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” It refers to equal weights and measures in justice. So, the death penalty for murder is moral law.
But other Old Testament death penalties are tied to Old Covenant worship. The term “devoted to destruction” or “devoted to the ban” (Hebrew: cherem) involves the death penalty, and it is connected to the purity of the land, holy war, and Old Covenant worship.
Deuteronomy 13:12-16 says:
“If you hear in one of your cities, which the Lord your God is giving you to dwell there, that certain worthless fellows have gone out among you and have drawn away the inhabitants of their city, saying, ‘Let us go and serve other gods,’ which you have not known, then you shall inquire and make search and ask diligently. And behold, if it be true and certain that such an abomination has been done among you, you shall surely put the inhabitants of that city to the sword, devoting it to destruction, all who are in it and its cattle, with the edge of the sword. You shall gather all its spoil into the midst of its open square and burn the city and all its spoil with fire, as a whole burnt offering to the Lord your God. It shall be a heap forever. It shall not be built again.”
This is saying that if a city comes under the influence of idolaters, there is to be a careful inquiry, and if it’s found to be true that the city is under the influence of idolaters, then the whole city is to be put to death, together with the cattle.
This law is not simply a matter of moral justice. Verse 16 says that the city becomes a “whole burnt offering to the Lord your God.” It’s an offering to God. This is a law about holy war and Israel’s possession of the holy land. It’s a kind of ceremonial purification.
It also anticipates Judgment Day. The New Testament seems to teach that the death penalties of the Old Covenant are types of eternal condemnation.
Hebrews 10:28 says:
“Anyone who has set aside the law of Moses dies without mercy on the evidence of two or three witnesses. How much worse punishment, do you think, will be deserved by the one who has trampled underfoot the Son of God, and has profaned the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified, and has outraged the Spirit of grace? For we know him who said, “Vengeance is mine; I will repay.”
In other words, under the Old Covenant, the penalty for breaking the law was physical death. But the corresponding doctrine of the New Testament is eternal condemnation for those without Christ.
So, the death penalties of the Old Testament are associated with Israel’s unique place in redemptive history. I’m convinced that scholars have shown that all of the death penalties of the Old Covenant are based on the distinctive purposes of the Old Covenant. I recommend Vern Poythress’s book, The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses, which illustrates this very well. I don’t agree with everything in that book, but it is a good resource to have.
Due to their special character, therefore, it would be unjust to apply Old Covenant death penalties in a Gentile nation. It was perfectly just for Israel to put people to death for all sorts of reasons because God has the right to command the death of any sinner, and He commanded the death of many sinners via the Old Covenant for reasons that were unique to that covenant. But we have no right to implement such penalties in Gentile nations.
Furthermore, the death penalties of the Old Covenant are reflective of the fact that it is a “work for the right to inheritance” covenant. Leviticus 18:5 says, “You shall therefore keep my statutes and my rules; if a person does them, he shall live by them: I am the LORD.” But the new covenant gives the inheritance by grace, not by works. Galatians 3:12-13 denies this works principle under the gospel, “But the law is not of faith, rather, ‘the one who does them shall live by them.’ Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us — for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree.’”
7. Theonomy does not account for the fact that the Old Covenant law was intentionally severe to preserve the line of promise.
The nation of Israel was largely an unbelieving nation. The people needed a severe legal system to chasten them and to preserve them as a nation until Christ would come from them. The severity of Old Covenant judicial law is especially evident in the liberal use of the death penalty. The death penalty was prescribed for false-worship and apostasy (Deut 13:6-11; 17:5), blasphemy (Lev 24:10-16, 23), sabbath-breaking (Num 15:31-36), rebellious sons (Deut 21:18-21), fornication (Deut 22:20-23), adultery (Lev 20:10-11), homosexuality (Lev 20:13) and many other sins. These are very heavy penalties.
Galatians 3:19 explains one of the reasons for such laws: “Why then the law? It was added because of transgressions, until the offspring should come to whom the promise had been made.” Similarly, Galatians 3:24-25 says, “So, then the law was our guardian until Christ came, in order that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a guardian.”
Scripture is saying that the severe Old Covenant law was given because of the sins of the people of Israel. It was given to them as a nation, to chasten them, and to act as a deterrent for outward sin, and to keep them from destroying themselves, until Christ came from them.
The Jerusalem council discussed the fact that some wanted the church to practice circumcision. Acts 15:10 says, “Now, therefore, why are you putting God to the test by placing a yoke on the neck of the disciples that neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” The covenant of circumcision, and the Old Covenant as a whole, was a heavy legal yoke. Those who try to impose it upon Christians or Gentile nations are heaping a heavy burden upon them. Now that Christ has come, there is no reason for it. The yoke of the Old Covenant has been fulfilled and abolished with the coming of Christ.
8. In each case, when the New Testament applies one of the judicial laws of the Old Covenant, it applies the law’s general equity to the church, and never to the government of a Gentile nation.
This is important because of the hermeneutical principle of New Testament priority. The New Testament teaches us how to interpret and use the Old Testament, which means we need to pay attention to how the New Testament applies Old Covenant judicial laws. You will never find a single New Testament example of an Old Covenant judicial law being applied to a Gentile government.
For example, 1 Timothy 5:17-18 says, “Let the elders who rule well be considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in preaching and teaching. For the Scripture says, ‘You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain,’ and ‘the laborer deserves his wages.” “Do not muzzle the ox while it treads out the grain” is a judicial law that comes from Deuteronomy 25:4. But here, Paul applies the law’s general equity (do not steal) to paying pastors properly in the church. He does not apply it to a Gentile government.
Another example comes from 1 Corinthians 5:13, where Paul is discussing church discipline, and he says, “Purge the evil person from among you.” That’s a judicial law from Deuteronomy 13:5, 17:7, 12, and many other places. In the Old Covenant, “purging the evil person from among you” referred to the death penalty. But in the New Covenant, that judicial law is applied to church discipline, not to the civil death penalty.
So, if we allow the New Testament to teach us how to interpret Old Covenant judicial laws, then we will think of their general equity first as applying to the church, not primarily to Gentile civil governments.
9. To sum up, theonomy’s central mistake is believing that God gave the judicial law of Israel as a universal norm of societal justice for all nations.
Certainly, the moral law of the Old Covenant is a universal norm for all nations. And we ought to use the Old Testament to help us understand God’s moral law. But the positive laws of the Old Covenant had many different functions according to Scripture, and all of them were bound to the unique objectives of the Old Covenant.
As we have seen, the judicial law was tied to the land, to ceremonial worship, and to the preservation of Christ’s line of promise. Some of the judicial laws were simply designed to create a distinct culture for Israel that separated them from the nations. Others were about preserving family lines for the sake of property and inheritance. But all of the positive laws of the Old Covenant were related to the typological character of the Old Covenant and/or to its unique cultural situation and place in redemptive history.
In conclusion, theonomy, in the technical sense of the term is not a biblical idea. Scripture itself refutes the theonomic position, such that in fact, theonomy is not in favor of God’s law at all, but adds to the good law of God positive covenantal precepts that were designed to expire with the coming of the Lord Jesus.
While this article has been a critique of Theonomy, and I have not outlined a positive biblical theology of civil government, the Second London Baptist Confession of Faith, chapter 24, provides a wonderful framework for civil government. I wrote an exposition of that chapter here: What is the role of civil government?
For another good resource on Theonomy see this article by Brandon Adams.
Tom Hicks
Tom serves as the Senior Pastor of First Baptist Church of Clinton, LA. He’s married to Joy, and they have four children: Sophie, Karlie, Rebekah, and David. He received his MDiv and PhD degrees from The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary with a major in Church History, emphasis on Baptists, and with a minor in Systematic Theology. Tom is the author of The Doctrine of Justification in the Theologies of Richard Baxter and Benjamin Keach (PhD diss, SBTS). He serves on the board of directors for Covenant Baptist Theological Seminary and is an adjunct professor of historical theology for the Institute of Reformed Baptist Studies.
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 0:04:37 GMT -5
Have you noticed this vision of Christianity in the public square that seems muscular, confident, even brashly triumphalist? It is tired of Christianity’s never-ending losses in the culture war. It rightly criticizes the decadence, perversion, and irrational norms of secularism and understands that under the guise of “neutrality,” secularism has become the functional god of this age. The only way for cultural sanity to be restored is for Christians to truly grasp the lordship of Jesus Christ and unapologetically assert his authority over every part of life, even government.
This vision may seem new if you’re younger than 40, but it is not. What we’re seeing is the rebirth of Christian Reconstruction or its more applied form, Theonomy.
Christian Reconstruction or Theonomy?
As T. David Gordon notes in a 1994 essay, Christian Reconstruction and Theonomy overlap considerably yet bear distinction. Christian Reconstruction refers to the broader theological and cultural program of uniting culture more explicitly to Christian moral foundations. Theonomy, on the other hand, seeks to apply the civil law of the Mosaic covenant to contemporary civil government. Theonomists wish for civil government not only to take its directions from Christianity, but also to craft specific law in the shadow of Old Testament Israel.
Reconstructionism refers to a broadly cultural movement; Theonomy refers to a particular hermeneutical approach. Because all Theonomists are implicitly Reconstructionist, critiques of both Christian Reconstruction and also Theonomy will go hand in hand under the category of Theonomy.
Theonomy seeks to apply the civil law of the Mosaic covenant to contemporary civil government.
Predominantly a movement within 1970s–’80s Presbyterianism, Theonomy significantly influenced broader conservative evangelicalism on such matters as political engagement and the rise of homeschooling. It championed strict biblical orthodoxy, limited government, close family relations, and free-market economics.
Several figures are associated with Theonomy, among them Rousas John Rushdoony and Greg Bahnsen. Books such as Rushdoony’s three-volume The Institutes of Biblical Law and Bahnsen’s Theonomy in Christian Ethics are just a few examples of the literature that birthed the movement. David Chilton and Gary North are also key proponents. Though organizations exist to promote it, Theonomy today is less a concrete movement than a mood and mode of engagement.
Theonomy, which simply means “God’s Law,” is not necessarily one thing. Various strands and arguments comprise it, and proponents disagree on some matters. And to be clear, anyone who believes in Christianity ought to believe God’s law is the greatest law against which everything else is measured. Moreover, everybody—Christian or not—is living according to some ultimate authority. Theonomists are right to point out the inescapability of authority and to criticize the “myth of neutrality” that smuggles secular assumptions into government and law. There can be common cause with many of Theonomy’s protests.
Theonomy as a theological program believes that civil law should follow the example of Israel’s civil and judicial laws under the Mosaic covenant. The refrain “By This Standard”—commonly echoed in Theonomic circles—is meant to demonstrate the necessity of looking to God’s Word alone as our highest authority for structuring all aspects of social life. Again, there’s much to appreciate in the criticism that jettisoning scriptural authority will cause society to degenerate into moral anarchy. When man rejects God’s Word, man will put himself in God’s place.
Theonomy today is less a concrete movement than a mood and mode of engagement.
General Equity Theonomy believes all persons and institutions are subject to God’s law generally. Rushdoonian Theonomy desires all civil legal systems to adhere to the Mosaic covenant’s judicial laws specifically.
The use of Scripture is inseparable from Theonomy’s understanding of eschatology and the relationship between the church and civil order. Under a (typically) postmillennial account of history, the kingdom of Christ is said to take gradual dominion over the kingdoms of the world as Jesus’s disciples bring his lordship to bear over every sphere of life. Scripture measures all standards of righteousness. Rulers should seek to apply not just the principles of natural law but also the particularities of Israel’s civil law.
“The Abiding Validity of the Law in Exhaustive Detail” is a chapter title in Bahnsen’s book that captures Theonomy’s use of the law. As he writes in the preface to the second edition of Theonomy in Christian Ethics, “The civil precepts of the Old Testament (standing ‘judicial’ laws) are a model of perfect social justice for all cultures, even in the punishment of criminals.”
Though the jurisdictions of church and government remain separate in Theonomy, both are under God’s authority for civil righteousness, which is enclosed in the Old Testament. Thus, Old Testament penology remains especially relevant to solve moral and criminal wrongdoings today.
The hermeneutic used to make such an application assumes the abiding authority of the Mosaic law and would lead to executing people for a multitude of sins and crimes in our contemporary context.
Theonomy Is Not the Solution
There are serious criticisms of the movement—criticisms so severe that Theonomy should be repudiated as an evangelical framework for understanding the mission of the church and the relationship between civil and sacred, eternal authority and spiritual authority.
There are criticisms so severe that Theonomy should be repudiated as an evangelical framework.
In sum, the error of Theonomy is that its hermeneutic stretches beyond the Bible’s understanding of its own authority. From this mistaken hermeneutic comes serious distortions, with drastic consequences for the church’s role in fallen political orders.
Theonomy is a facile hermeneutic that channels an eschatology of triumph. Historically undesirable, it instrumentalizes religion, blurs church-state relationships, and jeopardizes religious dissent. And it proves unnecessary because of how other covenants showcase the benefits of common grace and natural law.
Rather than become mired in interpretive problems amply demonstrated by many conservative scholars elsewhere, the simplest observation to make about Theonomy as a hermeneutic is that it misunderstands the relationship between the old covenant and the new covenant—which leads to misapplications today.
It correctly stresses a continuity in the original moral force behind Israel’s civil law. It overlooks, however, the covenantal discontinuity in applying and enforcing the particulars of Israel’s civil law, especially since theocratic Israel’s expiration. God’s purposes with Israel were unique in design compared to his relationship with other nations.
The laws God laid down with Israel were meant to enforce and protect the exclusivity of that relationship. Israel thus played a singular role that other nations aren’t called to replicate down to the level of their judicial laws.
Believing that Israel’s civil law serves as a model for contemporary civil government, Theonomy tends to downplay the moral law’s existence predating Israel and Ten Commandments. But murder, for instance, wasn’t permissible until the sixth commandment prohibited it. It was wrong from the beginning (Gen. 1; 4; 9) because it destroys an image-bearer of God. It is rooted in who God is and his purposes for creation, as revealed from the very beginning.
The eternal law, evident in the natural law, comes to be expressed in divine law. While the Decalogue is, I believe, a timeless representation of natural law, its contents existed before they were formally codified. Theonomy gets hung up on the form and practice of the commandments as they functioned in the Israelite theocracy and how they apply today. But this approach mistakenly places the onus of the law on a particular time and place, rather than the law’s moral substance, which predates Israel.
The Ten Commandments remain relevant today, especially considering that the New Testament affirms nine of them. Moreover, Theonomy is notorious for wanting to apply civil penalties today. This isn’t to say that Israel’s penal system was wrong (of course it wasn’t), but that Theonomy wrongly tries to apply what was unique to the Israelite theocracy. The hermeneutic is thus static, wishing to copy for today what Scripture considers, in the full sweep of redemptive history, to be temporary.
Wrong Theological Posture
Other problems relate to theological posture. Martin Luther expounded on the differences between a “theology of glory” and a “theology of the cross.” The former is a theology of enthronement and triumph; the latter a theology of suffering and loss. Theonomy is, fundamentally, a theology of glory.
Theonomy is, fundamentally, a theology of glory.
Whether explicit or not, Theonomy implies that the church’s faithfulness is measured by the culture’s adoption of Christian norms. It may make temporary peace with being on the margins, but on the whole it isn’t a theology that speaks to the church on the margins.
What does Theonomy have to say right now to the church in China or Iran? It is an over-realized eschatology with a static view of culture that will disappoint its supporters and make them grow ever strident in their resentment toward culture. A more accurate assessment of history understands culture as buffeted by times of both victory and defeat. To pick either victory or defeat as the litmus test for the church’s mission in society is to subject oneself to either utopia or despair.
A Christian’s posture toward the world must simultaneously embrace both glory and the cross. Inhabiting this paradox is understandably complex, but it gives us a proper perspective to see that the church’s mission throughout various societies can look very different depending on the societal context.
It’s debatable whether Theonomy desires a formal unity of church and state. Doubtless, though, church and state work in unison to promote each other’s interests. With intention, they mutually reinforce and consolidate one another’s authority. This can be both good and bad. It is bad when religion becomes the government’s handmaiden, or vice versa; good when the government enables the gospel to be proclaimed freely (1 Tim. 2:1–2).
Though medieval Europe was not strictly Theonomic, the first thing to learn about strong unity between church and state is how undesirable it is. A nostalgia that looks with longing on “Christendom” erases the bloodiness that resulted from church and state working in tandem. Absent from history is a tradition of church-state unity that was good for the church’s purity or religious dissent.
The allure of moral, religious, and cultural uniformity cannot come at the expense of religious freedom. A baseline of religious liberty is essential. Unless all religions receive equal recognition under the law, one religious group will set whatever exacting standards it desires as the basis of membership and participation in society.
Whether Catholic versus Protestant or Protestant versus other Protestant, one group is always tempted to exclude based on some religious criteria. As a Protestant, I shudder thinking about many of John Calvin and Martin Luther’s attitudes toward the state’s involvement in religion. Baptists did not fare well as religious minorities under the reign of church-state union, and I have no longing to return.
As a Protestant, I shudder thinking about many of John Calvin and Martin Luther’s attitudes toward the state’s involvement in religion.
Theonomy is right to criticize our society’s lawlessness. But the alternative it proposes presupposes a Christian society that does not exist and, where it once did, did not contain the theological coherence to perpetuate itself.
And if Theonomy is right and history is working toward the telos of a Christianized society, why does precisely the opposite seem to be the case? Is Christ’s church less faithful because Western culture is increasingly pagan? What if the Lord uses difficult moments to prune? What results from a reciprocating relationship between church and state, however, is the husk of civil religion and the kernel of saving faith instrumentalized for cultural cohesion.
Theonomy Cannot Build a Just Society
But what about standards of morality for society? How can society continue unless God’s Word receives the respect it is due?
On the one hand, no society can obtain this level of regeneracy, since all societies are penultimate and face judgment. Aside from the kingdom of God, no culture lives up to the standards of God’s Word. Does this mean we’re left with autonomy and human reason alone to guide our lawmaking? No. Every sound principle emanating from just human law participates, unwittingly, in both the natural law and also the eternal law. Rejecting Theonomy does not discount the fact that rightly ordered secular law can overlap with divine law.
As J. Budziszewski writes, “Government enforces those parts of the divine law that are also included in the natural law, such as the prohibition of murder.” The argument for overcoming moral lawlessness is not Theonomy, but arrangements that better accord with the creation pattern God has ordered and continues to uphold in the Noahic covenant, natural law, and Scripture (2 Tim. 3:15–17).
God’s Word is indeed supreme—every person and culture owes it ultimate allegiance. To make that declaration, though, we must understand how God’s Word functions in the civil sphere outside the church’s direct jurisdiction. Rather than the Mosaic covenant, a better starting ground for political reflection is the covenant of creation and the Noahic covenant as upheld in the full witness of Scripture. And given what these covenants offer, Scripture highlights the intelligibility of nature and reason as self-attesting witnesses to God’s authority in the structure and design of his world. This necessarily includes the moral law (Ps. 19:1–3; Rom. 1:32; 2:15).
Fallen reason, however, obscures our understanding of the moral law and obscures God’s creation ordinances—which is why revelation is required for true moral righteousness to surface in society. What’s necessary is special revelation in the form of understanding creation ordinances, not the application of the Mosaic covenant.
While revelation is indeed supreme, the arena where those norms are proclaimed and the method for how they’re proclaimed needs careful attention. Expecting leaders to mediate divine commands sounds nice where there is cultural homogeneity, but that is not the world in which we live. Theonomy rests on the assumption of religious minorities being made second-class citizens. Nowhere in the New Testament are the governing authorities tasked with expounding God’s Word as the source of judicial standards.
Nowhere in the New Testament are the governing authorities tasked with expounding God’s Word as the source of judicial standards.
No state can long persist in moral rebellion; nor does the New Testament’s pattern for the state rely on special revelation for its legitimacy. Christians must inhabit this uncomfortable tension. Government is a legitimate enterprise that can yield justice even apart from its leaders submitting to special revelation. Paul suggests this is attainable in Romans 13—and he does so without relying on the Mosaic covenant. Speaking biblically and even historically, it is possible for pagan rulers to rule justly (even if their understanding of justice lacks full coherence). Where this occurs, we should be grateful and see this as evidence of God’s common grace in the world.
Within natural law, then, Theonomy ends up being unnecessary. Why? No biblical evidence suggests society can only obtain just conditions if a religious consensus is secured. Of course it’s desirable for religious consensus to exist, but to make that the standard of justice means that justice will always be elusive (and in fallen, penultimate societies, it is).
This is why God has given a natural law, which predates the Mosaic covenant and offers a better foundation for morality without that covenant’s specificity. We don’t need Israel’s civil law to inform us that such things as murder or bestiality are wrong. The covenant of creation mediated through natural revelation tells us this.
Again, Theonomy insists on applying the Old Testament’s penal code to today. But a better use of the biblical storyline grasps that modern nation-states are to pursue a just order and prudentially wise criminal sanctions—which is why, for example, it’s fine to imprison for offenses that Scripture prohibits without executing the offenders. We can look to other covenants in Scripture, such as the creation and the Noahic covenants, to arrive at a system of morality required for society—without believing that societies are just only insofar as they mimic Israel.
As David VanDrunen’s work on the Noahic covenant has demonstrated, God promises to uphold the structures of creation “while the earth remains” (Gen. 8:22); and he will do so through natural law and common grace, even if obscured. If this provides us no assurance of cultural domination, so be it. We’re called to be the church of Christ, not the chaplain to Christendom.
We’re called to be the church of Christ, not the chaplain to Christendom.
Discord, pain, and cultural strife will result from nations casting off religious constraints. Still, God didn’t determine the legitimacy of nations based on whether they enjoyed a shared religious consensus. Again, while it would be great for society to be united around Christian ideals and for government to reflect those commitments, nowhere in the New Testament is a government’s legitimacy tied to its acknowledgment of true religion.
Proclaiming the Gospel’s Power
In a well-intentioned effort to protect biblical sufficiency, Theonomy stretches the concept beyond biblical recognition. It yields a grasp of Scripture more focused on casuistry than redemptive drama.
It would be right for a Theonomist to read this essay and ask, “But what if the nation, on the whole, experiences another awakening that produces a predominantly Christian nation? What then?”
The answer is not to enact a theonomic agenda. The answer, to quote my denomination’s confession, is that “a free church in a free state is the Christian ideal, and this implies the right of free and unhindered access to God on the part of all men, and the right to form and propagate opinions in the sphere of religion without interference by the civil power.”
We are not discipling nations for the sake of political hegemony. Satan would be content with a moral nation animated by the values of civil religion if those values eclipse the scandal of the cross. We are discipling nations to glorify Christ and to see obedience in every domain of life. Yes, that includes those who occupy government. But just government is not the object of our mission; it is a byproduct of transformed consciences adhering to the natural law, not submitting to the Mosaic law.
Satan would be content with a moral nation animated by the values of civil religion if those values eclipse the scandal of the cross.
American culture seems irreparably broken and perverse. We are a nation in moral rebellion against God’s creation and Word. No wonder Theonomy is tempting and attractive right now—it provides an easy adhesive to fix America’s problems. Let me suggest, though, that turning toward a just society doesn’t begin with installing parapets on our roofs (Deut. 22:8). We look not for culture to be redeemed, but for the redeemed to speak prophetically to the culture as only the church can: through the power of the gospel.
The irony of Theonomy is that its proponents, in theory, promote strict free-market capitalism as the logical result of its tenets. In practice, however, Theonomy relies on a subsidy of the state’s backing. It practices a form of welfare assistance by looking to the state for the legitimacy of its enactments. A theological system that seems incapable of existing apart from state sanction is not a system confident in the church’s structure or mission as laid out in the New Testament. It might demand free-market economics, but what results is statist theology.
If we reject the Theonomic approach to Scripture and culture, does that mean we have less reverence for Scripture’s inspiration, authority, and sufficiency? By no means. The dispute is over how those concepts are applied in this redemptive-historical era—an era marked by unbelief. God’s Word is indeed all-sufficient and the final authority against all counterfeits. The question we have to contend with, though, is how to understand the task of cultural apologetics when the Bible itself is rejected.
Andrew T. Walker is associate professor of Christian ethics at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary and a fellow with the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He is author of the forthcoming volume Liberty for All: Defending Everyone’s Religious Freedom in a Pluralistic Age (Brazos Press, 2021). You can connect with him on Twitter.
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 0:10:50 GMT -5
The Faculty Discussion of Theonomy
By Dr. Greg Bahnsen
On Monday afternoon, July 17, 1978, the faculty [Reformed Theological Seminary, Jackson, MS] met with me to discuss my book, Theonomy in Christian Ethics. The book had been criticized previously by some faculty members, but now everyone was to have read the book and come together for a scholarly discussion of the issues raised in it. At least one representative from each department brought prepared, written criticisms or critical questions with him. I was to answer them extemporaneously. However, the faculty would not allow me to tape-record the meeting, even upon the condition that the tape would not be audited by anyone except upon faculty approval. The critical questioning and my answers are rehearsed below. Because the chairman continued to limit my replies (which seemed inappropriate to me, given the meeting was called to hear my reactions and evaluate my stand) I was forced to omit relevant material from time to time. Where I have supplied such below, it is marked with an asterik*. The criticisms are numbered below [FACULTY], with my answers indented [BAHNSEN]. Occasionally, when a question or topic was repeated by another faculty member, I have combined them into one entry in the list below.
FACULTY:
You have not abided by the basic hermeneutical rules, for you attempt to establish the meaning of plhrow in Matthew 5:17 on the basis of English dictionaries, rather than by checking Greek synonyms.
BAHNSEN:
The bottom of page 66 explains that the English authorities are consulted in order to find the dynamic equivalent of the contrasting pair of words in the Greek text. The meaning of the Greek word is surely not found in the English dictionaries. But to translate properly and preserve the original contrast in Matthew 5:17 between kataluw and plhrow, one must have an adequate grasp of both the original and the language into which the translation is made. The suggested meaning for plhrow is substantiated on independent grounds.
FACULTY:
Investigation of the Hebrew word for "confirm, establish" in the Old Testament, and consultation of its equivalent in the LXX, shows that the Greek word to be expected in Matthew 5:17 would be isthui (or related forms).
BAHNSEN:
The goal of exegeting Matthew 5:17 was not to establish the Hebrew and LXX equivalents, but to understand the text as given (in terms of its own context). The reason why Jesus used the more connotive world "fulfill" (in the sense of ratifying, confirming) instead of the mundane isthui is explained on pages 64, 71-72 of the book. Christ not only confirmed the law, but He restored it to the full measure of its meaning over against Pharisaical perversions.
FACULTY:
It was a crucial oversight on your part to omit checking Kittel's Wordbook and the argument set forth by Delling about plhrow in Matthew 5:17.
BAHNSEN:
Delling's argument from Kittel is rehearsed and rebutted on page 64 of the book.
FACULTY:
In looking at the meaning of plhrow in the New Testament you go to many verses elsewhere, but you do not consult the many references in the remainder of Matthew's gospel.
BAHNSEN:
The point of investigating usage elsewhere in the New Testament was to demonstrate that the word takes the sense of "confirm" in the Koine of the period. This sense is perfectly consistent with the other uses of the word in Matthew as well, although the full sense is broader than legal confirmation (the specific sense in 5:17).
FACULTY:
The emphasis in Matthew 5:17 is upon the "I have come…" - upon Jesus.
BAHNSEN:
This is readily granted, but it does not affect the argument. The point is that Jesus Has come with no intention of abrogating the law. The emphasis upon His person and advent surely does not falsify what He says about the status of the law in relation to His coming.
It should be noted here, given the discussion of "fulfill" in Matthew 5:17, that the theological argument of my book in no way depends upon the specifying sense of "confirm" that I have suggested. The relevant point is that Jesus denies that His coming abrogates the Old Testament law in any detail. That premise is foundational to my argument - whatever you think prhrow specifically means. It cannot take the sense of abrogating the law, or else the verse becomes self-contradictory.
FACULTY:
You are wrong to say that genhtai in Matthew 5:18 cannot be translated as "fulfill" (page 78), given the pattern of fulfillment in Matthew's gospel. Moreover, due to your imposed theological system, you put the word in the past tense.
BAHNSEN:
The meaning of this word is irrelevant to my argument. However, what I have said is reflected din numerous commentaries. * genhtai is an extremely common and colorless Greek verb; to infuse it here with theological overtones calls for extensive evidence that has not been offered. The past tense is simply to give a smoother reading, along with other commentators; it has nothing whatsoever to do with my theological system - much less with an imposed one.
FACULTY:
You say that panta has no antecedent (page 80), but the antecedent is iota en. This affect the interpretation of the passage.
BAHNSEN:
I will have to recheck the Greek since it is not before me now. *The antecedent would, according to your suggestion, not simply be iota en, but also h mia keraia (viz. "one iota or one horn"). However, the latter is feminine, and both terms are singular. Since panta is neuter and plural, there is an obvious disagreement in number and gender to overcome. Moreover, one cannot break the parallelism (syntactic and semantic) between "until heaven and earth pass away" and "until all things come to pass" without come conjunction relating the separate phrases to each other - which is quite absent in the Greek text altogether. The point remains that no detail of the law will be invalidated until the end of the world.
FACULTY:
There is a difference between the earlier (O.T. phase) period of Jesus' ministry and the later period when Jesus has completed the work of redemption. The statement in Matthew 5 would still be the Old Testament, earlier period - thus somewhat altered later on.
BAHNSEN:
*There is no textual evidence of this. Jesus said that the "law and prophets" were until John (the Baptist); obviously He saw His ministry completed as part of the New Testament order (cf. Luke 4 and Isa. 61). Further, in Matthew 5 he covers the entire interadvental age, from His coming (v. 17) to His coming again (when heaven and earth pass away, v. 18). So His resurrection, ascension, etc. have not affected the validity of the law of God.
FACULTY:
You see a historical basis for the ceremonial laws which affects the way in which they are followed today (fulfilled in Christ finally). Why could not the same be said of the case laws?
BAHNSEN:
That is what I say. The case laws are given in terms of the culture of Israel in that historical period. We are not bound to reenact the ancient culture of Israel (e.g., axheads, oxen, railings on roofs) but to observe the moral principles which are taught in terms of these historical examples. The accomplishment of redemption changes the way in which we observe the ceremonial law, and the change of culture and times alters the specific way in which we observe the case laws. The "cases" are different, but the same moral principles apply.
FACULTY:
The case law might be viewed as implementing and protecting the religious and moral core of the law. Jesus would be concerned to defend the value of the moral law, but not the case law tradition (in the same sense as oral tradition).
BAHNSEN:
The difficulty here is that Jesus and Paul both appealed authoritatively to the case laws of the written Old Testament, without apology or any indication that this was an exception to the general rule. The case law is upheld in the New Testament; e.g., Paul cites the Old Testament in saying "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox as he treads" - he takes the principle about Old Testament oxen and applies it to New Testament Christian ministers.
FACULTY:
But Paul said that the church did not have to pay him after all; so the law was not binding.
BAHNSEN:
Paul's foregoing of his pay as an act of charity would have been baseless and meaningless if the church did not legally owe it to him in the first place. The law established their obligation, and then Paul willingly gave way from his rights.
FACULTY:
The Sabbath is a good test case for any doctrine of God's law in the New Testament.
BAHNSEN:
I agree. Nobody has written a thoroughly convincing study of this tough question. My approach calls for distinguishing moral and ceremonial aspects of the Old Testament Sabbath legislation. I would like to tackle this issue sometime and work it through. Theonomy says very little about it. *I think any Reformed treatment will in some way need to parallel distinctions I have utilized in my book.
FACULTY:
In Matthew 5:17 you equate "prophets" with legal stipulations; yet the rest of Matthew's gospel shows Christ embodying the prophecy of the Old Testament, where the point is obviously not the ratifying of the law.
BAHNSEN:
In the Sermon on the Mount Christ is expositing the law and our moral obligation, not fulfilling explicit prophecy - as most commentators observe. His reference to "law and prophets" is a reference to the entire Old Testament canon, not legislation and predictive prophecy per se; it is the law found throughout the Old Testament that He confirms. Prophecy is not the topic of concern in Matthew 5, although it certainly is elsewhere in Matthew's gospel. Context is determinative.
FACULTY:
I am not at all sure what you mean by "law" throughout the book; it includes so many things (e.g., goals, rules, guidance, blessing, punishments). Definition of terms is lacking (cf. M. Hill's review), so that the ceremonial law can be "confirmed," and yet not literally observed today. Yet you shudder at Hodge using the same distinction in another regard.
BAHNSEN:
"Law" is simply a divine imperative. There is nothing esoteric about my basic conception' it is whatever God tells us to do. Hill's review simply says that some linguistic token which separates the laws which are confirmed yet not outwardly observed from those which are confirmed and followed is necessary (i.e., he suggests "subjective observance" and "objective observance" as I recall). I do not think a technical vocabulary is necessary, but there is nothing to prevent it. The important thing is that our exposition is understood by the reader, and Hill obviously understood what I meant. *Hodge offered no such distinction with respect to the civil laws of the Old Testament, as far as I can tell in reading him.
FACULTY:
What do you mean by "latent antinomianism: and who does it apply to?
BAHNSEN:
The phrase is used technically, not emotively. According to page 309 of the book, it applies to all who rationalize away God's obligations in our lives. More specifically, I clearly say on pages 308-310 (even using italicized words here) that a latent antinomian is one who endorses the law of God in general, and then without clear scriptural warrant or exegesis looks to himself to determine the extent of his obligation. Thus not everyone who disagrees with my thesis is a latent antinomian; for instance, John Murray was surely not one, for he offered exegetical arguments for his conclusion that some laws are not to be followed today. I disagree with his arguments, but respect his theological method. Others disagree on the basis of something other than biblical teaching; latently, that is antinomianism.
FACULTY:
You use of Scripture is abhorrent. Your use of sola scriptura disturbs me, giving the impression that the Bible is to be isolated from general revelation. Your interpretations are based on a static, linear view of Scripture. Your approach is biblicistic and proof-texting. You obscure the discontinuity between the testaments and have no historical understanding of biblical theology. You give the impression that we can live by scriptural revelation (e.g., criticizing Kline). [At least four times faculty members said the book was biblicistic and proof-texting in it method.]
BAHNSEN:
Such criticism calls for specifics before it could possibly be answered. In what way(s) am I static and biblicistic? What does such a charge even mean? *No concrete evidence of such things has been given whatsoever; these are, as they stand, simply emotive charges without specification or proof. I do affirm sola scriptura as authoritative in theology (*and special revelation does govern our approach to general revelation, not vise versa), and I do believe in proof-texting in theology. We are obligated to show where and how our teaching in the church comes specifically from God's written word. Of course we cannot use texts out of contexts, but nobody has shown that I am in the habit of doing so. All biblically-oriented Christians and theologians would want to say as much. I do not criticize Kline for going to general revelation (the Hittite treaties, etc.), but for doing so excessively and making extrascriptural outlooks determinative in interpreting the Bible. Others have made similar criticisms (e.g., Palmer Robertson).
FACULTY:
You use a linguistic-analytical system and impose it on the Bible, even though you criticize Kline for going to general revelation.
BAHNSEN:
I do not criticize Kline for going to general revelation. I believe that general revelation is clear and authoritative today also - but it cannot be abused (e.g., Kline's excessive use of extrascriptural material to interpret Scripture) and appealed to against the clear teaching of the Bible. I do not use a linguistic-analytical system, for there is no such thing. Further, the method of linguistic analysis is not pervasively used in the book - as any secular philosopher would testify. The book is exegetical and theological; analysis is merely a tool in the service of these ends.
FACULTY:
I do not see your system as socially adequate. The Puritans made a mess of thing in society.
BAHNSEN:
Well, we disagree on our evaluation of the Puritans, even though I do not agree with everything they did (*see the appendix in the book on John Cotton). *Every law-code in this county traces back historically to the Puritan codes which drew heavily on the Old Testament law. Most of the blessed elements of our current social-political system are the fruits of our Puritan heritage.
FACULTY:
The book ignores the progressive character of revelation and does not take into consideration the redemptive-historical question. It does not understand biblical theology and obscures the discontinuity between testaments.
BAHNSEN:
*Again, these sweeping charges are offered without any specification, clarification, or substantiation from my book. The biblical-theological question of discontinuity and redemptive history is addressed throughout the book; it informs the questions raised and answered. Indeed, at least three chapters are given explicitly to the redemptive-historical issue: chapters 6, 8, 9. The book clearly states the anticipation/realization differences between covenants; it condemns those who follow shadows (OT) rather than the Savior (NT). It evidences throughout a sensitivity to the progress of revelation and redemption. Thus these criticisms are mistakenly put. I do not ignore biblical theology; I simply come to different conclusions with it than the critic. But the critic has offered no specific evidence to fault my biblical-theological work and conclusions. Not one concrete criticism. The difference between the testaments is hardly obscured; not one reader of the books has ever shown clear, definable, specific oversights of discontinuity recognized by the Reformed churches.
FACULTY:
There is a danger in resting a whole ethical system upon one single text.
BAHNSEN:
My ethical system is not dependent upon Matthew 5:17-19 exclusively. The same premise of the law's exhaustive validity today can be, and is, argued on other theological and exegetical grounds (e.g., chapters 5-8, 11-12). Indeed, the argument of the book can be sustained without appeal to Matthew at all, much less to one passage in Matthew.
FACULTY:
Not one single commentator would agree with your interpretation of Matthew 5. And elsewhere when the book cites authorities, it cites those who do not agree with the position of the book.
BAHNSEN:
*The interpretation offered of Matthew 5 has many supporters who agree with what I identify as the thrust of Jesus' teaching, as chapter 2 evidences by citing extensively (here the exact translation of plhrow is irrelevant). I do not quote other authors except to the degree that they agree with the specific premise being set forth at the time. They are not cites as supporting every detail or conclusion of my thesis. Thus what scholarly injustice has been done? The example offered (Calvin and Vos on pp. 56-57) illustrates this. I don not cite them as supporting the overall thesis, but the limited point being made in the context - as rereading the pages involved shows. Whether such authors have been consistent with the premises on which we agree or not, is another question altogether.
FACULTY:
The book is guilty of a crusading spirit (even though not intended by the author). It speaks of those who teach slackening of even the least commandment as least in the kingdom, and it says we are to have hot indignation toward those who break the law. We are not to tolerate disobedience, but rebuke it. How can this position live at peace with those who stand against it in the Reformed tradition?
BAHNSEN:
*See pp. 84-85, 475-478. There it becomes evident that these remarks are quotations from the Bible and exposition thereof. One cannot apologize for the statements of Scripture or cut them out of the Bible because they might step on some toes. John Murray makes precisely these same points in his Principles of Conduct (e.g., pp. 151-154), and yet he is not charged with a "crusading" spirit. We who disagree of the extent of the law's validity and application can still agree that disobedience is not to be tolerated, even though the set of commands to be obeyed is larger and smaller. The issue of the law's extent is not a personal one, but an exegetical one. For instance, while disagreeing with Murray's arguments, I have not the slightest disrespect for the man and his stature as a theologian. In my book I say that "I aim to demonstrate" something (xiii), and that " I am defending what I take to be the biblical position" respecting ethics. The reader is clearly alerted to the apologetical tone of the book (xv, p. 36), and throughout I take up objections and other points of view (e.g., ch. 2-4, 14-22), thereby indicating that I have much to demonstrate and overcome. I "intend" to counter dilemmas and "hope" to be successful (p. 32). The clear statement of p. xiv is: "the present study leaves a great deal to be explored and discussed in Christian ethics, as well as extensive room for disagreement…." Moreover, I encourage the reader to examine the treatise with "Bible in hand" so that my thoughts can be better evaluated against the word of God (xv). I recognize that some elements of the book are in this day uncommon and perhaps startling (xvi). An apology (defense) of them is necessary. This is hardly the spirit of an intolerant crusader. If those on the faculty missed this modest attitude and confused apologetical defense for intolerant crusading, then it must be equally recognized that nobody outside of the faculty has to my knowledge taken the same offense to the spirit of the book. *Indeed, John Frame wrote in the Presbyterian Journal: "This book performs a great service. It takes the whole controversy out of the 'shouting' stage and presents solid arguments which must be soberly discussed."
FACULTY:
This is an entirely new point of view which has no support in the history of theology outside the minor exception of the New England Puritans. This view of the judicial law is out of accord with church confessions, commentaries on the Westminster Confession, and the statements of notable theologians . So Theonomy is out of accord with the Reformed consensus.
BAHNSEN:
The Westminster Confession - just like many of the quotations distributed - says that the "general equity" of the judicial law is "required" today. This means that the moral principle illustrated and applied in the case of the Old Testament is binding, while the particular historical application is not binding as such today. (For example, we may not need to put up railings around our roofs today, but we are responsible to place a fence around our backyard swimming pool - in both instances to protect human life.) That the Westminster divines held this view of the case laws (judicial law of Moses) is more than clear from the direct statements they made elsewhere, as well as the vocabulary and writings of the Puritans of that period. That the Westminster divines held that the moral principles of the laws outside the Decalogue (*which they called the "summary" of our moral duty, not the full extent of its content) were still binding in the New Testament age is obvious from their proof-texting of the Larger Catechism in the exposition of the sins and duties covered by the Ten Commandments. Therefore, Theonomy is not a stranger to reformed theology. It is a basic point of view held by many reformed writers in the past, whether or not is has continued in popularity. Those who appeal to the "Reformed tradition" here are usually not aware of how they have to gerrymander that tradition to make their point. Moreover, many of those who have written about the judicial law in the past leave much to be desired in their theological exposition. For instance, Peck is cited in this sheet that was distributed. Yet Peck is easily faulted for logical inconsistencies, absence of exegetical support for his premises, inadequate moral evaluations (e.g., polygamy was tolerated in the Old Testament because it is not evil per se, and because of the uncivilized status of the people - even though he elsewhere says that the judicial law demands too high a standard of holiness for other historical nations), and arbitrariness (as a Southern theologian, he said that the judicial laws expired - with the exception of those about slavery). Further, we must note that even if the New England Puritans were the only ones who endorsed the civil ethic of Theonomy (e.g., John Cotton), they can hardly be considered a minor exception. There impact and importance are tremendous in terms of historical influence. Finally, not only can other Reformed theologians of the past be cited in support of the basic approach of Theonomy, but this question is really quite irrelevant to the theological work and argument of my book. Jesus indicted the Pharisees for honoring their traditions, only thereby to make void the word of God. In the end my task as a moral theologian is to be true to God's written word. That is where the argument must center and be decided, not in church history.
FACULTY:
Kuyper traced the use of the theocratic penalties of Israel in the modern day to the Roman Catholic church, and to the inquisition. [Paper on Kuyper's views distributed.]
BAHNSEN:
If that is meant as a criticism of Theonomy, it must be pointed out that it commits the logical fallacy known as the genetic fallacy. The fact that something was endorsed by the Roman Catholics says nothing about its validity (e.g., for all I know, roman Catholics of the period agreed with God's law that it is wrong to trip blind men and curse deaf men). More importantly, we must remember that the Roman church did not separate church and state in a proper way, as I would. Therefore, what Kuyper was criticizing was not my thesis at all. The version of "theocracy" I propound is not Romanist.
FACULTY:
No, Kuyper was writing against those in his own Reformed church in Holland who held your views.
BAHNSEN:
Well then, that at least establishes that my view has not been confined to the minor exception of the New England Puritans.
FACULTY:
J. B. Shearer wrote that a "theocracy" requires some medium of communication between God and the people - e.g., a prophet. If you believe in a closed canon (no continuing revelation today), how can you aim to establish a theocracy?
BAHNSEN:
On pp. 427-432 of my book I explain that there are numerous versions of what is meant by the word "theocracy" (*Shearer's is discussed on p. 431). If someone means by "theocracy" that there must be some continuing revelation then we do not aim to establish a theocracy (in the given sense). However, that is not morally relevant to the continuing validity of God's written law. Israel was obliged to honor and obey the law of God, whether or not a prophet was currently available and speaking. Likewise, even with the cessation of revelation today, we can be required to honor the written law of God. The word "theocracy" has not argumentative bearing on the question.
FACULTY:
Give your response to the following specific laws of the Old Testament and how they could be observed today.
BAHNSEN:
I will be glad to do so. However, please remember that the thesis of Theonomy is not dependent upon the specific exegesis and understanding of each law of the Old Testament - as I say on p. xiv. Theonomy argues for the general thesis of the law's validity, not for any particular understanding of the particulars of the Old Testament commandments. Indeed, I say that there is presently plenty of room for disagreement on such questions. So do not let my answers here affect you evaluation of the argument for general validity of the law and our accountability for understanding and obeying it.
FACULTY:
Israel was to destroy all the heathen places of worship occupying the land.
BAHNSEN:
This was not a standing law, but a positive law to Israel on that occasion. It does not justify our destroying pagan temples in the United States. However, Israel was to prohibit the external following of heathen religions - just as the Westminster Larger Catechism tells us at the second commandment that the sins forbidden include "tolerating of a false religion." *Every government must forbid certain religions (e.g., Satan worship and child sacrifice, refusal to administer medical aid with Jehovah's Witnesses or Christian Science practitioners). Today many elements of the Christian religion are violated by the government; in a Christian state, heathen religions would be likewise jeopardized.
FACULTY:
Deuteronomy 17 shows that the high court in Israel had the presence of Levites. So apparently there was no separation of church and state after all.
BAHNSEN:
This objection is answered on pp. 403ff. In the book. Not all Levites were priests in the temple. Others were experts in the law - like teachers today. Such Levites were in the court for the obvious purpose of helping it to understand the written requirements of God in a particular case. This was not church interference in the authority of the state.
FACULTY:
Can an obedient nation today really expect to experience the blessings promised to Israel (cf. P. 445)?
BAHNSEN:
Yes. The law of Moses is upheld as a model to the nations in Deuteronomy. Proverbs promises that righteousness exalts a nation.
FACULTY:
What about the law governing determination of virginity by the "tokens of virginity." How can the punishment of a guilty bride be reconciled with the New Testament teaching on forgiveness and reconciliation?
BAHNSEN:
I have seen many interpretations of this passage, but I am still unsure of its exact meaning. However, as Van Til has taught us, there should be no external judges of God's word (such as tradition, culture, our personal feelings on what is reasonable, etc.). Unless there are internal indications in the Bible that this law is not binding today, then we should not stand back and judge it according to our own feelings and tradition. If God commands it, then so be it. The question is not whether I like it, but whether God requires it. Whatever this law requires, it does not need to be "reconciled" with the New Testament doctrine of forgiveness (*as though the wrathful God of the Old Testament had been superseded by the loving God of the New Testament). The Old Testament was replete with the teaching of forgiveness, love, reconciliation, etc. If the law as consistent with such Old Testament teaching (*which obviously it was), then it is likewise consistent with the New Testament teaching on the same subject.
FACULTY:
Why were homosexuals punished in the Old Testament, but not lesbians?
BAHNSEN:
I do not believe that such was the case. The law is couched in language applying to the male form of this perversion, but it equally applied to females. (*This literary characteristic is typical of many Old Testament laws.)
FACULTY:
How can one possibly think that the levirite marriage should be kept today?
BAHNSEN:
I don't know. I do not believe that it is an abidingly valid institution. The law regarding it was given to insure a family's inheritance in the promised land. Since that land was typological of the coming kingdom of Christ (of which we have the inheritance down-payment already, with the Holy Spirit in our hearts), the laws regarding inheritance in Palestine expired with the land's significance (that is, in the New Testament).
FACULTY:
Deuteronomy 13 calls for the annihilation of an entire town for apostasy. Yet it was never applied in Israel. How can it be binding today?
BAHNSEN:
The fact that it was never obeyed in Israel says nothing whatsoever as to the moral obligation Israel had to obey it. The details of its current day application are not clear to me; again, this is something calling for study (*not a priori dismissal).
FACULTY:
Why do you use the phrase "older" covenant throughout the book?
BAHNSEN:
Simply to stress the unity of the one covenant of grace. There is no special or esoteric significance. I could as well speak of "old covenant."
FACULTY:
There is probably a hermeneutical difference that explains why the entire Reformed consensus is against you.
BAHNSEN:
Well, the entire Reformed consensus (if there is such a thing) is not against me (see above). But I do not believe that there is any overt difference between my hermeneutical principles and those of the general reformed church. *Not one specific instance, illustration, or substantiation has been offered. Without evidence of such an alleged difference, there is nothing to give answer to. Basic Reformed hermeneutics drives me to my conclusions, unless it can be shown otherwise. What rules or procedures do we not share? What is the evidence that I have not followed basic hermeneutical rules that all Reformed men endorse? We do not differ in the rules (*unless someone is asking for a change in the rules of the game late in the ninth inning, when the game does not appear to be going in their favor). We differ in the conclusions to which those rules and the text of Scripture drive us.
FACULTY:
You argue that the ceremonial laws are confirmed, and yet not literally followed today. Why couldn't the same argument be offered for not following the penal sanctions today? It seems to me to be an oversight on your part not to take that possibility into account.
BAHNSEN:
That argument is explicitly posed and then answered in my book, pp. 449ff. Speaking of the penal sanctions, the subhead on the page reads, "Parallel to the Ceremonial Law?"
FACULTY:
The old Testament calls for bringing those who commit capital crimes to the civil magistrate when we know of their offenses. How would that apply today? Can you illustrate what your position would have been like in the New Testament?
BAHNSEN:
A current application would be the guilt of those people who (as in New York City a few years ago) witnessed violent crimes on the street outside their windows, but would not become involved. They should have responded to the "hue and cry" and assisted in the apprehension of the criminal, having him brought before the bar of justice.
Since I believe that the apostle Paul held the views I set forth, I think we can take him as an example of how this thesis would be followed in the New Testament. It is important to see how Paul separated the church and state in his treatment of law-breakers. In the Corinthian church Paul spoke of forgiven criminals worshipping and being received; this should guide the outlook of today's pastor in ecclesiastical relations. However, when Paul addressed the question of the civil magistrate (e.g., "and avenger of wrath against evildoers," the "minister of God" or a "man of lawlessness") and capital punishment ("if I have done any of these things of which I am accused, I refuse not to die"), he strongly endorsed the civil use of God's law to deter crime and promote social righteousness. The church is a ministry of mercy to sinners, while the state is a minister of social justice.
FACULTY:
Since Paul persecuted Christians prior to his conversion (e.g., the execution of Stephen), but did not persecute Jews after it, did not his conversion affect his attitude toward capital punishment?
BAHNSEN:
His conversion certainly brought him to see that the Christians were not legally executed according to the Old Testament law, and indeed that he had misconstrued the law's proper use in such a matter of religious diversity (matters of the heart) in a pagan society (where the community was not committed to the law of God, as in Corinth, etc.). He came to see the guilt of his unlawful use of the law. But I do not believe that he changed his attitude toward the law of God and its righteous demands.
FACULTY:
Your way of doing theology in Theonomy suggest that it is very individualistic, having no place in the church.
BAHNSEN:
The place of the covenant community in ethics is stressed in my course.
FACULTY:
Your sweeping generalizations about modern theologians in chapter 1 is unfair to them (e.g., Bonhoeffer's famous statement; neo-orthodoxy said to reduce "Thus saith the Lord" to "It seems to me").
BAHNSEN:
We obviously differ in our interpretation and evaluation of these modern theologians. My book only takes them up by way of introduction and example; it is not a treatise on modern theology. But what I say there can be fully defended, I believe. Bonhoeffer's secularization is evident in the quote, and neo-orthodoxy does in fact remove from us any identifiable word of God in history.
FACULTY:
Are some laws more important than others?
BAHNSEN:
Yes. Luke 11:42 speaks of the "weightier matters" of the law.
FACULTY:
Is there more than one kind of "theonomy"?
BAHNSEN:
Yes. There are many doctrines pertaining to God's law today.
FACULTY:
Can you name a Reformed theologian who is not pro-nomian?
BAHNSEN:
To the extent that a theologian opposes the law of God he is departing from a Reformed distinctive. Therefore by definition there could be no Reformed theologian who was not in some sense pro-nomian. However, clearly some claim the title of "reformed" today who are working toward the weakening of our obligation to God's law.
FACULTY:
In its emphasis on every jot and tittle of the law, and its endorsement of the Jewish civil code, Theonomy represents a new legalism and Judaizing.
BAHNSEN:
Attention to detail is required by our Lord Himself. *Because God loves us in such a specific and detailed way, He lays down laws for many detailed areas of our lives; because we love Him, we attempt to follow all His blessed law. *This is not Judaizing (see chapters 4, 10 and appendix 1), but the grateful response of the redeemed to their Creator and Savior. In Principles of Conduct, John Murray says: "Too often the person imbued with meticulous concern for the ordinances of God and conscientious regard for the minutiae of God's commandments is judged as a legalist, while the person who is not bothered by the details is judged to be the practical person who exemplifies the liberty of the gospel. Here [Matt. 5:19] Jesus is reminding us of the same great truth which he declares elsewhere: 'He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much, and he that is unjust in the least in unjust also in much' (Luke 16:10). The criterion of our standing in the kingdom of God and of reward in the age to come is nothing else than meticulous observance of the commandments of God in the observance on the part of others" (p. 154). *Murray also says that anyone who is uncomfortable with detailed attention to every specific of God's law is not at home with the teaching of Jesus. Legalism is combated by Theonomy in chapter 3 and throughout (see index). Attention to detail is required by the Savior (Luke 11:42); it is not legalism.
FACULTY:
Theonomy minimizes love in the New Testament.
BAHNSEN:
This is a sweeping accusation without specification or substantiation from the book. The subject of law and love is discussed many times in the book (*see index). The book insists on observing the Lord's command to love God and neighbor. In my course I also stress that love brings about the positive application of what is forbidden in the law; for instance, the law forbids taking innocent human life, but love requires that we go in the other direction and do all we can to promote the life, health, and well-being of our neighbors. Theonomy in no way minimizes the necessity of love in Christian ethics; love is the fulfilling of the law Jesus said. *Unless some evidence can be given to define and prove this charge, it is simply baseless and rests on a misunderstanding of the biblical teaching regarding love and law. Old Testament law ought not to be opposed to New Testament love. After all, the love commandments of the New Testament are actually quotations from the Old Testament!
FACULTY:
Theonomy does not interpret the Old Testament by the New Testament, the law by the gospel, or the obscure by the clear.
BAHNSEN:
This charge can hardly hold up in the face of the fact that the thesis of Theonomy is drawn for an exegesis of Matthew 5:17-19, where the Savior in the New Testament interprets for us His standing to the law of the Old Testament. It is precisely so that the gospel will interpret the law that I go to that explicit passage. *This charge is simply a misrepresentation of the book and fails to take into account its pervasive manner of argumentation throughout. The New Testament is always allowed the final word in interpreting the standing of the Old Testament law (see, e.g., chapters 2-12, 19, appendix 1).
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 0:13:53 GMT -5
July 4, 2022
Stephen Wolfe
Classical Reformed Theonomy
Editor’s Note: This is part 4 in our Lyceum Disputation series considering the nature and validity of theonomy. Stay tuned for further installments. As with all our work, the London Lyceum publishes a range of viewpoints to encourage thinking.
I. Introduction
Theonomy has been the target of criticism for decades, and here we go again. From my experience, Christians are drawn to theonomy because it offers a seemingly coherent and actionable basis for Christian political activism and a positive, distinctively Christian vision for political order. I admit that I’m partly sympathetic to these people, given what is on offer in Reformed political theology. On one side, we have the neo-Kuyperians who tend to affirm forms of political liberalism, either explicitly or implicitly; and while many of them may be uncomfortable with recent social developments, their principles hardly seem able (nor do the Kuyperian seem willing) to confront or effectively “engage” these developments. On the other side, we have modern renditions of two-kingdoms theology, which purport to be historic. Two kingdoms theology was indeed the standard position among Reformed thinkers until the 20th century; I do not question that, and I hold to what might be called a classical Presbyterian version of the kingdoms. But it is hard to take seriously the argument that David VanDrunen has corrected the “inconsistency”[1] latent in hundreds of years of Reformed political theology and that resolving that inconsistency just happens to give us a political theology that comports well with the Post-World War II consensus of values (multiculturalism, anti-nationalism, anti-nativism, maximal religious liberty, and secularism). Christians of a certain disposition, upon seeing the ever-updating pride flags waving in the public square, might find Second-Table-Onlyism, shaped with an exilic ethos, a bit wanting.
We can further sympathize with those choosing theonomy because the theonomists were right about the trajectory of the West. They were right about the foolishness of overemphasizing the commonness of the “common kingdom.” The theonomists were right that Western culture was decadent and degenerate and that it would only get worse and become explicitly hostile to Christianity. They were right that the drift of modern Reformed political theology points to passivity and quasi-Anabaptism. Where but theonomy would Christians turn for some resolve?
This essay will present an alternative to both modern two-kingdoms theory and modern theonomy on civil law. It is not a novel position; it is (in my view) the historic Reformed view on civil law. The classical Reformed position on civil law is theonomic in a way: all just civil law derives from God’s law. The moral law of God—which is creational (or natural), universal, and immutable—grounds all true law for human society. And, as I’ll show, this law even grounds distinctively Christian civil law such that a body of law, as a whole, can be Christian. The primary intent here is to present the classical view of civil law—one that is consistent with the Reformed tradition—that appeals to the assertive spirit of theonomists and those who are drawn to it.
II. Law in General
God made man a reasonable creature, and so God placed man under a moral law. The moral law is a rule to life, for by it man achieves his natural ends. Reason is that faculty by which man discerns this law and judges what must be done and must not be done. Cicero famously wrote that “law is the highest reason, rooted in nature, which command things that must be done and prohibits the opposite.”[2] The reason of man permits him to discern and understand both the laws of his nature and why those laws are good for him.
We can proceed with a definition of law:
Law is an ordering of reason by an appropriate lawgiver for the good of the community.
This definition of law is true of all types of law: eternal, natural, and civil (or human). An ordering of reason is a public dictation of judgment for others by an authority who judges for the common good.
The natural law is an ordering of reason, consisting of moral principles that are innate in rational creatures, given by God, who is the author of nature. The natural law applies to every sphere of human life, not merely civil life; it is comprehensive. But being a set of universal principles, it requires particular applications according to the sphere in which one is acting and according to the circumstances of that sphere. The natural law orders family life, for example, providing its form, structure, and end, but natural principles require application by the familial authority to direct it to its end. No two families are exactly the same as to the specific judgments on what conduces to their good, yet both can, despite their varying judgments, achieve the end of family life.
Natural law prescribes universal principles and universal conclusions from those principles. As Reformed theologian Franciscus Junius (1545—1602) writes:
We call principles those that are known in themselves, are immovable, and (as the scholastic call them) are indemonstrable…just as, for example, “God exists,” and in life is “preserving our existence, our species, and justice.” We call common conclusions, however, those things that natural reason, with the light of nature leading the way, constructs from the principles, such as, for example, that God must be worshipped, and our life, our species, and the supports of justice must be cared for.[3]
These conclusions are universal and are the ground for action, but they are not prescriptive of action in themselves. They require a reasoning subject to make particular determinations (or applications) concerning concrete action. Determinations are practical decisions on what to do or not do, given the circumstances; and these can be individual, familial, civil, and ecclesiastical determinations. Junius, for example, discusses Deuteronomy 22:8, which requires one to “make a railing for your roof.” This is a determination (given by God) that follows from a principle and its subsequent conclusion, namely, “no one must be injured” and “nothing that could injure anyone may be built,” respectively.[4] The determination that roofs ought to have railings is suitable only if roofs in the community are designed or used in such a way that they might be hazardous. Most single-family homes today do not require railings, for ordinarily roofs are not hazardous. Though this determination is no longer relevant, the principle and conclusion remain valid, and building codes (which are determinations) recognize the same principle and conclusion.
Since every sphere of life is under natural law and natural law requires particular applications, it follows that every sphere of life requires a suitable authority, with a suitable power, to make determinations. For this reason, God has granted specific types of power by which the authorities of each sphere make judgments. The nature of each sphere dictates the species of power required. These powers and their differences are not arbitrary, but arise from the nature of each sphere.
III. Civil Law
Ordering of Reason
Civil determinations are civil laws. Now, civil laws are necessary for civil society because households in combination create problems of collective action that individuals and households cannot effectively resolve on their own. Put differently, social life apart from civil law creates gaps in judgment of what to do and what not to do. We have natural epistemic limitations, and so civil society requires rules of action for proper coordination. Absent these rules, we would unintendedly frustrate each other’s activities and ends. Imagine, for example, a community with cars that also lacks traffic laws. Without common rules, we would be unable to effectively coordinate our actions, even with the best intentions. This is why, as 16th century reformer Henry Bullinger (1504—1575) wrote, “[civil] laws undoubtedly are the strongest sinews of the commonweal.”[5] Civil laws coordinate our activities, making possible a collective life.
Since civil law is a species of law in general, we can define civil law as:
an ordering of reason, enacted and promulgated by a legitimate civil authority, that commands public action for the common good of civil communities.
Civil law is the outward and official expression of public judgment. Public judgment is simply the conclusion of the civil authority’s reasoning about suitable public action for the common good. Civil law is the enacted and promulgated form of public judgment, and so civil law is the outward and official expression of the civil authority’s reasoning about suitable action for the common good.
Civil law commands the outward man not from an authority in and of itself. Its authority, as Junius states, “proceed by reason from those other preceding laws,” namely, the natural law.[6] Hence, it is a derived authority, and so laws are just only if they command what proceeds from God’s natural law. This derivative character is precisely why such laws bind our conscience to them. As Aquinas said, “[human] laws…have the power of binding conscience, from the eternal law whence they are derived [via natural law].”[7] However, a purported law that does not order according to reason is no law at all. That is to say, unjust laws are not laws, properly speaking, and so they do not bind the conscience to obedience. This position—expressed famously in Latin as lex iniusta non est lex— was affirmed from Cicero to Augustine through Aquinas to classical Protestantism. Zacharius Ursinus said, for example, that law “commands that which is upright and just, otherwise it is no law.” [8] Though this raises questions of tyranny and civil disobedience, the important point here is that civil law, when true and just, is neither arbitrary, nor has its force from the will of the magistrate alone; rather, it orders civil life in accordance with a higher law and has its force from that higher law. In this way, the magistrate mediates divine civil rule, as the one who determines appropriate action from natural law principles.
An important principle of civil law is that its reach is limited to things that the other spheres of life cannot effectively regulate to the common good. The individual, family, society, civil associations, and churches have primacy in ordering the things concerning their own spheres. Thus, civil law should not take from families, churches, and individuals what each sphere can best determine for itself. Still, there is much left for civil law to accomplish.
Civil Command
Civil command, being the command of magistrates, is what gives civil laws their life and force; it supplies the imperative to the judgment. Though civil command is backed by penalties for non-compliance, it is not inherently a coercive power. Reformed theologian Hermann Witsius (1636—1708) correctly wrote:
It is not the rigor of coercion that properly constituted a law, but the obligatory virtue of what is enjoined, proceeding both from the lawgiver, and from the equity of the thing commanded, which is here founded on the holiness of the divine nature, so far as imitable by man.[9]
Civil law is, after all, an ordering of reason; it is right practical reason. Since you should always follow right reason, you should always follow (just) civil law. Public judgment is both necessary for living well and natural for man to obey. Thus, civil command is not inherently coercive, for man is naturally willing to be directed in life from a civil authority. In our postlapsarian world, coercion has become a crucial element of civil command, for (given the state of man) only by threats of punishment can civil government adequately achieve its original end. It brings sinful man into compliance with the conditions for commodious civil life.
The correlate of civil command is civil obedience. The basis for obedience is not persuasion as to the specific reasons of any law, but deference to the lawgiver. Deference is necessary because private persons cannot determine many of the actions necessary for the common good, and most people will not be able to sufficiently judge the reasons for every action required of them. Thus, the motivating basis for obedience is deference to the lawgiver, who occupies a civil office obliging him to make judgments for the whole. The reasons for the action are the ultimate ground of obedience, but the act of deference presumes that sufficient reasons formed the lawgiver’s judgment. Obeying civil commands, therefore, is acting according to reason (when the commands are just), even though one may not fully comprehend the reasons for the action.
Deference does not require absolute obedience nor eliminate the possibility of just disobedience. The command is not itself the ultimate ground of action. Deference is simply the presumption that the lawgiver has good reasons for his judgments—the presumption that you are being ordered according to reason. But the absence of good reasons can become apparent to many in the community, either by examining the substance of the required action or its consequences. Our first impulse should be deference, but we are not helpless, amoral, non-rational beings, unable ever to judge the substance and consequences of our actions. Hence, just disobedience is still possible; deference can and ought (at times) to be suspended.
Righteous and Good Laws
Though natural law is a universal law, you cannot derive from it a universally suitable body of civil law. Bodies of law will vary in content based on peculiarities of geography, commerce, the people’s character, religious diversity, and numerous other types of circumstances. Some laws will be present in all or most civil societies, such as prohibitions of murder. These are universal because they are so close to human nature that they will not alter with changes in circumstances. But many laws are indeed based in circumstances and thus particular and mutable.
To understand why they are mutable, we should think of civil law in terms of principle, means, and end. The principle is ordering civil life in accordance with natural law principles and circumstances, and the end is a commodious, quiet, and godly life. The principle and end are immutable, for they are rooted in human nature and hence universally true for all civil orders, regardless of circumstance and moral integrity. The means, however, are mutable and vary, for their suitability is contingent on circumstances. The means are civil judgments concerning outward action. Civil law must order the community to its end in light of circumstances and in accordance with natural law. But since circumstances can change, so too can laws. Zanchi writes that civil laws that “are enacted for circumstances of place, time, and personality, cannot be eternal and unchangeable because their circumstances can change.”[10] Over time, some existing laws become ineffective and unnecessary; the reasons for them cease. They become laws in name only.
All just laws are both righteous and good. They are righteous when they inherently accord with the natural law; the commanded action is good in its substance. But being inherently righteous says nothing about their suitability for any given people. As Junius writes, “things that are absolutely and intrinsically good sometimes become evil in certain circumstances.”[11] Laws that oppose libel and slander are righteous, according to the 9th Commandment, as a means to protect reputations and to encourage honesty. But if these laws permit the adjudication of any perceived slight, the law itself would likely promote a litigious society and do harm. Consider also a law that permits unlicensed fishing on government land. It is intrinsically righteous and it may be good as well, if the fisherman are few and do not exploit the lack of regulation. But if the number of fishermen increases or abuses arise, this law can result in harm. Junius said that “there is a place in which a good or indifferent thing is rendered evil because it is out of place.”[12] Thus, all righteous laws are only potentially just. They must also be good laws. That is, they must suit the circumstances and conduce concretely to the common good. It follows, then, that all good laws are righteous laws, for nothing inherently opposed to the natural law could be good for man, but also that righteous laws are good laws only when suitable to the circumstances. This is why the magistrate cannot rubberstamp a ready-made divine civil code; he must apply discernment and prudence to determine appropriate public action. This also explains why civil law will differ from place to place—they must be suitable to the habits, characteristics, heritage, geography, and other particular features of each people.
Though good laws require human determination, they are nevertheless from God, not only providentially but also in root and mode: They follow from God’s natural law (root) and are promulgated and enlivened by God’s servant, the civil magistrate (mode). Therefore, we can say with Demosthenes that “all law is a gift of God.”[13] A just body of civil law is from God. It is, in this sense, theonomic.
The End of Civil Law
The end of civil law is the common good of the civil community. The common good is common in that it refers to good conditions of the whole. Civil law aims at the common good by seeking to establish and cultivate social conditions in which each part of the whole is afforded the opportunity and encouraged to procure the complete good. Any body of law that, as a whole, orders the people to commodious temporal life and eternal life in Christ is a Christian body of law.
III. Civil Law in a Christian Commonwealth
A Christian commonwealth is an entity that acts upon civil society via civil law for the people’s earthly and heavenly good. A civil government is Christian not when it declares itself Christian but when it orders a Christian people via law to their complete good. This includes laws concerning the peace and good order of the instituted church, which administers the chief good. Thus, action, not declaration, makes a commonwealth Christian.
Not every particular civil law of a Christian civil government is distinctively Christian. Indeed, most are simply human; they concern human things. After all, the foundational principles of all civil societies, even Christian ones, are universal, human principles, and Christians are fully human. As Junius rightly states:
For to the extent that we may be Christians, we do not cease being humans, but we are Christian human beings [homines Christiani]. So also we must state that therefore we are bound by Christian laws, not that we are consequently released from human ones.[14]
A Christian commonwealth, therefore, enacts many laws that (considered separately) pertain in object and end to man as man, not as a Christian. But these laws are Christian as parts to a Christian whole. That is, they belong to a totality of law that is Christian, for a Christian body of law orders to the complete good—it orders one to both earthly and heavenly good. We can say, then, that every law that pertains to man as man is indirectly or mediately Christian when it belongs to a body of law that, as a whole, is Christian.
Junius continues:
For grace perfects nature; grace does not, however, abolish it. And therefore with respect to the laws by which nature itself is sustained and renewed, grace restores [restituit] those that have been lost, renews [instaurat] those that have been corrupted, and teaches [tradit] those that are unknown.[15]
Grace has three functions vis-à-vis nature: it restores what was lost at the fall; it renews what the fall corrupted; and it teaches what is above nature. These functions constitute the general operations of grace in the world, and the Christian human being is a product of these functions of grace.
By the grace of God, Scripture contains both natural truths and supernatural truths—the latter consisting mainly of the adventitious and exclusive means to eternal life. Since Scripture contains the natural law (in inscripturated form), Scripture can and ought to inform our understanding of the natural law, the common good, proper determinations for civil law, and the means to heavenly life.
No civil law can be fundamentally derived from a supernatural principle (i.e., an adventitious principle or a principle of grace). Civil society is fundamentally a human order and is ordered according to principles of human nature. Nevertheless, the basis for a civil law can be a supernatural conclusion that follows from a natural principle interacting with supernatural truth. For example, if civil government ought to support and defend the spiritual administration of true religion (a natural principle), then civil government ought to support the spiritual administration of the Christian religion (supernatural conclusion). Why? Because the Christian religion is the true religion (a supernatural truth). This syllogism demonstrates that civil laws can be distinctively Christian and yet grounded in a natural principle. Commonwealths can enact distinctively Christian laws that serve Christian ends. Enacting Sabbath laws, for example, follows not from a principle of grace, but from a principle of nature—that civil government ought to order outward conditions for the good of man, including the highest good.
A Christian body of law remains an ordering of reason, despite the fact that some laws are distinctively Christian (and thus above reason, in a way). Since we have the full revelation of God, the telos of natural reason is Christian truth. To worship the true God means worshipping the Triune God; the Triune God is the end of sound reason. Since we have Scripture, sound reason no longer terminates at natural religion. Therefore, civil laws that are distinctively Christian (though rooted in natural principles) order the community in reason. Indeed, a Christian body of law is a complete body of law and an expression of complete reason; and though a non-Christian body of law can contain many just laws, it is nevertheless incomplete, when considered as a whole.
The Law of Moses
The Mosaic law is, as Junius states, a “perfect example” of law, for it is divinely prescribed law, and God prescribes for man only what is good and true. For this reason, “it is necessary to praise the law of Moses above other human laws because it proceeds from that legislator whose reason is most perfect,” says Junius.[16] But although the Mosaic law is of divine origin, the law in itself, in substance, shares the same classification as other examples of civil law—it is one possible body of law that “proceed from the immovable principles and general conclusion” of the natural law. The Mosaic law is not above natural law; it is a perfect application of it.
Put differently, although the Mosaic law is specifically different than all other bodies of law with regard to types of content, it still belongs to the same genus as all bodies of civil law. Essential to that genus is that all laws ought to be both righteous and good. The Mosaic law was a perfect body of law for the Jewish people not simply because God declared it to be perfect, but because it was actually perfect. It was, according to God’s natural law, both righteous and good, and it was good because it perfectly conduced to the common good of the Jewish people in their circumstances, if obeyed. But it is not thereby a suitable body of law for all nations, for every nation’s circumstances are different; it would not be good for every nation. For this reason, as the Reformed tradition has almost universally affirmed, the Mosaic law, taken as a whole, is not binding on all nations, even Christian nations. Yet because the Mosaic law perfectly follows from the natural law (albeit suited for a certain people), it can serve as a guide or source of law for all nations. The Mosaic law, therefore, remains relevant to all civil polities.
The “ancient” division (as Calvin called it) of the Mosaic Law divides it into moral, ceremonial, and civil (or political) law. The moral law refers to “nothing else than the testimony of natural law, and of that conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men.” This law is itself divided under two heads: we are to “worship God with pure faith and piety [and] to embrace men with sincere affection.” Calvin has in mind the two tables of the Decalogue. The moral law is immutable and universal and serves as the ground for the other two types of law, which are mutable and particular. The ceremonial laws were, as Calvin said, a “tutelage” for the people of God until the Lord “was fully to manifest his wisdom to the world, and exhibit the reality of those things which were then adumbrated by figures.”[17] For this reason, they are “deadly,” as Augustine said, for they foreshadowed what was to come, and in their practice one denies Christ.[18]
The civil law of the Mosaic law did not in itself foreshadow Christ and so did not undergo a change as to their righteousness—they are, in other words, not deadly. But they are dead; they are “no longer living in such a way as to obligate,” says Junius. He continues, speaking of civil law in general: “In circumstances it undergoes as many changes as possible, and varies according to time, place, person, deeds, modes, causes, and supports—in the past, the present, or the future—as well as in public and private matters.” In other words, whether any civil law is good depends on circumstances, which requires the discernment and prudence of man. Calvin writes, “each nation has been left at liberty to enact the laws which it judges as beneficial.”[19] Nothing about this disparages the Mosaic law—a law of God. It is a perfect example of law. But it is not a universal body of law.
Some civil laws in the Mosaic law are universal in a way. But they are universal because they are necessary for any just and commodious human society. Indeed, such laws are a part of the Mosaic law precisely because their absence would make the law imperfect; and God, being good, could not create anything but perfect law. These laws include punishing “reprehensible” crimes, requiring capital punishment.
Though not universally suitable, the civil laws of Scripture provide certainty as to their inherent righteousness. They are, therefore, morally permissible in civil law, and the closeness of circumstances aid in determining whether any of them is suitable. However, permissibility does not necessarily entail suitability.
The fear of “human autonomy” in determining suitable law, which many theonomists express, is understandable but misplaced. Although civil law is a sort of self-given human law—for the civil magistrate deliberates and determines it—the law still must be in accord with God’s immutable law, and every civil law is binding only if it is derived from God’s law and conduces to the end of that law. Hence, just civil law, even when determined by man, is both theonomic and, in a sense, autonomic. The magistrate enacts and enforces laws of his own design, though only as a mediator, a sort of vicar of divine civil rule.
IV. Conclusion
Though much more could be said, this is sufficient to outline an alternative approach to civil law. This alternative is not new, in my view, but the standard position in the Reformed tradition, at least until the 20th century. But we can still call it theonomic, for any true body of law must be derived from God’s law. Furthermore, this view permits a Christian body of law—one that, as a whole, orders the people to heavenly life in Christ. Perhaps we can call this view classical Reformed theonomy. Hopefully, these distinctions will appeal to theonomists who are rightly unsatisfied with the options currently available in the Reformed world today.
Stephen Wolfe (PhD, Louisiana State University), is a 2021-2022 Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the James Madison Program at Princeton University. His doctoral dissertation is on the continuity and discontinuity of American political thought between the Puritan settlements in the 17th century and the American founding in the 18th century. His primary research interest is Protestant political theory. He and his wife Megan have four children.
[1] David VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought (Grand Rapids: W. M. Eerdmans Publishing, 2010), 199.
[2] Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, I.18.
[3] Junius, The Mosaic Polity, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2015), 46.
[4] Junius, Mosaic Polity, 77.
[5] Henry Bullinger, The Decades of Henry Bullinger (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2004), II.339.
[6] Junius, Mosaic Polity, 55.
[7] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II.96.4.
[8] Ursinus, Corpus doctrinae christinae (Heidelberg, 1616), 583. Zanchi similarly states that “If natural law is indeed the measure for human laws, then it is also the rule for human actions. Therefore just as every action that does not agree with natural law is sinful, so, too, is every human law.” See Girolamo Zanchi, On the Laws in General, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra (Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2012), 30-31.
[9] Hermon Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, trans. William Crookshank (London: T. Tegg & Son, 1837), 1.3.6.
[10] Zanchi, On the Laws in General, 38.
[11] Junius, Mosaic Polity, 135.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton I, 1.16.
[14] Junius, Mosaic Polity, 38.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Junius, Mosaic Polity, 95.
[17] Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 4.20.15.
[18] “The ceremonial part…at this time has generally passed away and no longer obligates human beings.” Junius, Mosaic Polity, 141.
[19] Calvin, Institute, 4.20.15.
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 10:00:46 GMT -5
"What Kind of Morality Should We Legislate?" By Dr. Greg Bahnsen
PE076
The Biblical Worldview 4:10 (October, 1988) © Covenant Media Foundation, 800/553-3938
"What Kind of Morality Should We Legislate?"
By Dr. Greg Bahnsen
To the surprise of the secularists all around us, the 1980s have demonstrated that bible-believing Christians expect to have a voice in the political arena. In the 1960s we were told that ours is a "post-Christian" era where ethical absolutes must give way to situational morality. In the 1970s, if the media gave attention to any "Christian" political option at all, it was given to "liberation theology," an odious mixture of Marxist ideology and Biblical phraseology. Who could have ever expected, then, the widespread revival of interest in a specifically Christian -- a Biblically guided -- approach to politics which has been activated in the 1980s, evident everywhere from a Bible-thumping presidential candidate to the pro-life and anti-homosexual forces to the Coalition on Revival and American Vision.
Unbelievers have openly expressed their dismay. That should not astonish us. It is characteristic of unbelievers to rage against Jehovah and His anointed King, wishing to cast off any bonds of political servitude to Jesus Christ. Psalm 2 explicitly tells us as much (verses 1-6). The gospels illustrate this same political rage. The chief priests bolstered the crowd's demand for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ by insisting "We have no king but Caesar" (John 10:15). The Apostle Paul's experience points to this same political fury. He taught that Jesus was "King of kings" (1 Timothy 6:15) -- the primary political king under whom all earthly leaders, "the powers that be," are ordained as "ministers of God" (Romans 13:1-7). For this viewpoint he was run out of Thessalonica, daring to teach "contrary to the decree of Caesar" by saying "that there is another king, Jesus" (Acts 17:7).
Secular, unbelieving opinion has always antagonistically raged against any approach to politics which is subject to the Biblically revealed word and direction of Jesus Christ. So the dismay of many in our society to the revival of specifically Christian politics today is not surprising. The astonishing thing is that some professing Christians should concur with them! But sadly that is what we find in a recent issue of the Fundamentalist Journal (July/August 1988), in a well-meaning but theologically confused article by Norman Geisler, entitled "Should We Legislate Morality?" His answer is yes, but he stumbles badly over the question of what kind of morality we should legislate. Geisler is adamant that "The Bible ... is not normative for civil law." I propose that we examine and seriously evaluate that amazing proposition.
Preliminary Misconceptions
Dr. Geisler's article is aimed quite specifically at the "Reconstructionist" theological perspective, calling it a "religious extreme" which is to be as carefully avoided as the opposite extreme of secular relativism. It is Geisler's hope to find some middle ground in politics -- a "just government" which is neither relativistic nor "religious," with a moral basis for civil law which is not the special revelation of God in the Bible. This is Geisler's primary and predominating misconception, a conceptual and theological misunderstanding which underlies and flaws his entire thinking on the subject. Jesus, our King, precluded any room for such middle ground: "He that is not with Me is against Me" (Matthew 12:30). "Now therefore be wise, O ye kings: Be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve Jehovah with fear ... Kiss the Son, lest he be angry and ye perish in the way" (Psalm 2:10-12). Given this divine dictate, political neutrality toward Kind Jesus is an impossibility. We shall return to the primary error in Geisler's article later.
In addition to Geisler's fundamental misconception, there are a number of preliminary misconceptions expressed in his article which we should address. Dr. Geisler has here disqualified himself as a critic of Christian reconstruction for the simple reason that he will not accurately portray what the reconstructionist truly believes and advocates. He contents himself with misrepresenting reconstructionist convictions and then knocking down a straw-man.
For example, inappropriate and emotive expressions like "chilling legalism" -- the view that salvation is based on law-works -- are tossed before the reader by Geisler without cautious concern for definition or even a shred of substantiating evidence. All reconstructionists believe we are saved by grace through faith, so that no man can boast (Ephesians 2:8-9). Geisler ambiguously pins "the reinstitution of the Old Testament legal system" on reconstructionists, without differentiating between the "system" understood as the old covenant administration (with its sacrifices, priesthood, favored people, geography, etc.) Reconstructionists simply try to adhere to the teaching of Jesus that His coming did not abrogate even "the least commandment" in the (Old Testament) Law and Prophets (Matthew 5:17-19).
Misrepresenting The Facts
Geisler also says things about reconstructionists which are nothing short of slanderous, for instance that they "aim to set up their own postmillennial kingdom without Christ." This is not even close to anything resembling the truth. Reconstructionists have no interest in "their own" kingdom at all, much less one that is "without Christ.." We glorify the King of kings who has come into history and, by His own saving power demonstrated in the resurrection and ascension, established for Himself the promised kingdom, having been granted all authority in heaven and on earth so that all men might bow before Him and submit to Him as Lord over all. In so doing, we say nothing but what the Apostles themselves declared (read it for yourself in Matthew 28:18-20; Luke 22:29; Romans 1:4; 1 Corinthians 15:27-28; Ephesians 1:20-22; Philippians 2:9-11; Hebrews 1:3, 8-9; 2:7-9; Revelation 1:5; 17:14). Reconstructionism simply pursues the Lord's prayer: "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth" (Matthew 6:10) -- simply lives in terms of the Hallelujah chorus: "The kingdom of this world has become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ" (Revelation 11:15).
This is not the first time that Dr. Geisler has used the unfair tactic of maligning his reconstructionist opponents. In Moody Monthly for October, 1985, Geisler offered "A Premillennial View of Law and Government," where (again) his shots at reconstructionist thinking were aimed at nothing but a straw-man. Let me illustrate personally. Geisler claimed that I hold to capital punishment for drunkards, when I maintain exactly the opposite in my book, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Craig Press, 1977, p. 213), where this is seen as a ceremonial law which was unique to Israel. Geisler claimed that postmillennialists hold that the church should assume Israel's sword for establishing the kingdom, when I maintain exactly the opposite in my book, By This Standard: The Authority of God's Law Today (Tyler, TX: I.C.E., 1985, pp. 9, 166, 322), where biblical warrant for the change from old to new covenants is cited.
Dr. Geisler alleged that postmillennialism is a humanist attempt to overlook man's depravity and "bring in the Millennium without divine intervention," when I maintained exactly the opposite in the Journal of Christian Reconstruction (Winter, 1976). The issue is not whether God must intervene, but how He does so to bring the millennium -- in military might (premillennialism) or by the Spirit working through the word (postmillennialism).
Irresponsible criticism which rests upon misrepresentation is always a falling short of the mark for us as Christians. Dr. Geisler's criticisms of reconstructionist thought are simply futile because they do not first pause to portray accurately the position he wishes to oppose. Reconstructionists oppose what he falsely calls "reconstructionism" as much as he does! We can thus safely ignore his critical remarks. But what about Geisler's own political conceptions? Let's diagnose his proposed alternative to the reconstructionist viewpoint.
An Amazing Proposition
In his Fundamentalist Journal article, Dr. Geisler proposes that "The Bible may be informative, but it is not normative for civil law." Why would a fundamentalist committed to the authority and inerrancy of God's holy Word say such a thing? Is it because the Bible is totally silent about just civil laws? The Bible says a great deal about political ethics, from the laws of Moses through the Proverbs to the Epistles of Paul and the Book of Revelation.
What Is Normative?
Why, then, is this body of revealed material not "normative" for believers? Is it because only certain parts of the Bible carry divine authority? That opinion can hardly stand up in the face of Paul's categorical declaration that "every Scripture" (denoting the Old Testament for Paul) is "profitable for instruction in righteousness" (2 Timothy 3:16). If the man of God is to be "thoroughly equipped for every good work," he cannot discount any part of God's revealed word (v. 17). If any opinion, practice, or precept in the political domain is to count as "good," then the Scriptures equip us for it. Indeed, when Paul spoke of dealing with murderers, sexual offenders, perjurers and the like, he spoke with apostolic clout, saying "we know that the law [the Mosaic law] is good" (1 Timothy 1;8). The author of Hebrews took it as an unquestionable assumption that the law of God is "steadfast," providing a "just recompense of reward" for every transgression or offense with which it deals (Hebrews 2:2).
So we ask again, why would Dr. Geisler propose that the Bible is to be deprived of its normativity when it comes to civil law? Is it because God is no longer concerned for social justice or because the Lordship of Jesus Christ does not extend to politics? The Bible would lend no credence to such ideas at all. Christ is there recognized and confessed as Lord over all -- over all mankind and over all areas of life. The first and great commandment tells us so: You are obligated to "love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your mind." (Matthew 22:37). John Murray rightly observed that "the law of God extends to all relations of life. This is so because we are never removed from the obligation to love and serve God. We are never amoral. We owe devotion to God in every phase and department of life" (Collected Works, vol. 2, 0. 78). Peter reminds us that a holy God demands that His people "be holy in all manner of living" (1 Peter 1:15). We may not legitimately withhold from the Lord Jesus Christ any aspect of our lives -- even political thinking and action -- because our "every thought" is expected to be brought into "captivity to the obedience of Christ" (1 Corinthians 10:5). In Him are deposited "all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge' (Colossians 2:3) -- even the treasures of political wisdom.
To neglect the normativity of the Bible's extensive teaching regarding political ethics is seriously to curtail the authority of the Bible and to reduce the universal scope of Christ's rule as Lord. All things were created for His service (Colossians 1:16). He justly expects all nations to observe whatsoever He has commanded (Matthew 28:18-20). On the great and final day He will judge all men according to their every deed (2 Corinthians 5:10). He is the ruler over all nations (Psalm 22:28) who has been granted all authority on earth (Matthew 28:18) -- thus "the ruler of the kings of the earth" (Revelation 1:50. He is "head over all things for the sake of the church" (Ephesians 1:20-22) and punishes those who dare to act lawlessly (Matthew 13:41). His law therefore binds all men in all places in all aspects of their lives. He is "Lord over all" (Acts 10:36), the "Lord of lords and King of kings" (1 Timothy 6:15).
So we return to our crucial question: Why would someone like Dr. Geisler who is committed to full Biblical authority and inerrancy propose such a questionable notion as that the Bible is not normative for civil law? At one point he answers that this "would be a violation of the First Amendment" of the U.S. constitution -- which only impeaches his proficiency as a legal historian (as various teaching materials from American Vision or the Rutherford Institute would indicate). But Dr. Geisler is a better Christian than this. Even IF the First Amendment forbade the enactment of Biblical civil laws (which it does not), the Christian would still be bound by loyalty to the King of kings to prefer God's commands to human obstacles. "Let God be true though all men are liars" (Romans 3:4). The Apostles knew very well that "we must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29).
Is the Bible Silent?
So there is only one reason left to Dr. Geisler if he refuses to honor the normativity of God's revealed word (the Bible) for civil law. He must argue that the Bible itself does not teach that it is normative for civil affairs. How does he attempt to establish that? With reasoning which is thoroughly, embarrassingly specious. He claims that the civil laws of the Old Testament, for instance, were never addressed to anybody but the Jews. "Nowhere in the Bible are Gentiles ever condemned for not keeping the law of Moses," he says (mistakenly). Those laws were only for Israel, according to Geisler's thinking. "God no more holds today's governments accountable to His Divine Law to Israel than present residents of Massachusetts are bound by the Puritan laws at Plymouth". The fallacious nature of this reasoning ought to be obvious. God revealed His word, in every case, to particular people in particular historical circumstances, but He fully expects that revealed word t be light to all mankind. By Geisler's reasoning, the moral injunctions revealed through Paul to the Romans are only binding on the ancient city of Rome in the days of the New Testament. Paul wrote to Ephesian children to "obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right" (Ephesians 6:1). Using Geisler's logic, this divine imperative applies to only the youth of ancient Ephesus! This kind of argumentation is ethically absurd.
An Unbiblical Premise
Furthermore, Geisler's premise that the Mosaic law was meant only for the ancient Israelites is directly refuted by the repeated teaching of Scripture itself. The premise is simply a false (even if common) preconception that cannot be verified by a reading of the Biblical text.
At the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy, when Moses exhorted Israel to observe God's commandments, he clearly taught that the laws divinely revealed to Israel were meant by the Law-giver as a model to be emulated by all the surrounding Gentile nations:
Behold I have taught you statutes and ordinances even as Jehovah my God commanded me, that you should do so in the midst of the land whither ye go in to possess it. Keep therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples, that shall hear all these statutes and say, Surely this great nation is there that hath statutes and ordinances so righteous as all this law which I set before you this day? (Deuteronomy 4:5-8).
The manifestly righteous requirements of God's law should be followed by all the peoples -- not simply by Israel. In this respect, the justice of God's law made Israel to be a light to the Gentiles (Isaiah 51:4).
God never had a double standard of morality, one for Israel and one for the Gentiles (cf. Leviticus 24:22). In His ethical judgments, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Romans 2:11). Accordingly, God made it clear that the reason why the Palestinian tribes were ejected from the land was precisely that they had violated the provisions of His holy law (Leviticus 18:24-27) -- a fact which presupposes that the Gentiles were antecedently obligated to obey those provisions. Accordingly, the Psalmist could condemn "all the wicked of the earth" for departing from God's statutes (119:118-119).
"Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is a disgrace to any people" (Proverbs 14:34). Accordingly, the Old Testament prophets could repeatedly excoriate the Gentile nations for this transgressions against God's law (e.g., Amos, Habakkuk, Jonah at Ninevah). Accordingly, Isaiah looked forward to the day when the Gentile nations would stream into Zion, precisely that God's law would go forth from Jerusalem unto all the world (Isaiah 2:2-3).
Of course, there were many unique aspects of Israel's national experience, important discontinuities between Israel and the pagan nations. Only Israel as a nation stood as such in an elect, redemptive, and covenantal relation with God; only Israel was a type of the coming kingdom of God, having its kingly line specially chosen and revealed, being led by God in holy war, etc. But the relevant question before us is whether Israel's standards of political ethics were ALSO unique -- embodying a culturally relative kind of justice, valid for only this race of men. From Psalm 2 it is evident that they were not. David calls upon all the kings and judges "of the earth" to serve Jehovah with fear and kiss His Son (verses 10-12).
Gentile magistrates have no exemption from God's just demands as revealed in His holy law. Accordingly, speaking of the kings outside of Israel, David declared in the longest psalm extolling the law of God (Psalm 119) that he "would speak of [God's] testimonies before kings and not be put to shame' (v. 460 -- which clearly assumes the validity of that law for such nontheocratic kings. The personified Wisdom of God declared: "By me kings reign and princes decree justice; by me rulers govern, and nobles, ALL the judges of the earth" (Proverbs 8:15-16). As Paul later taught in Romans 13:3, all rulers (Jewish and Gentile alike) are to be a "terror to the workers of iniquity" (cf. Proverbs 21:15). And how did Paul define the "evil" which magistrates are to punish? According to the Law of God! (vv. 88-10).
All political rulers, even those outside of the Jewish nation, are morally bound to the political requirements of God's law. We can see this by the fact that the most evil political ruler imaginable, "the beast" of Revelation 13, is negatively described as substituting his own law for that of the law of God, figuratively written upon the forehead and hand (vv. 16-17 in contrast to Deuteronomy 6:8). Those who oppose this wicked ruler are, by contradistinction, twice described as believers who "keep the commandments of God" (12:17; 14:12). Paul's condemning title for this wicked ruler was precisely "the man of lawlessness" (2 Thessalonians 2:3), indicating his guilt for repudiating the law of God in his rule.
Is Natural Revelation Morally Abbreviated?
The only defense left to Dr. Geisler at this point is to resort to the baseless idea that a wedge can be driven between the just requirements revealed in the Bible and those revealed in natural revelation -- that is, to hold that civil government should not be guided by the morality of the Bible, but instead by "God-given moral rules called Nature's laws." Distinguishing between the moral content of special revelation and the moral content of natural revelation (as though the latter is merely a parallel subsection of the former), Geisler maintains that "God ordained Divine Law for the church, but He gave Natural Law for civil government."
Nothing like this dichotomy (and truncating of natural revelation's moral content) can be found in the teaching of the Apostle Paul, however. The Apostle teaches that even pagans who do not have the advantage of the specially revealed law ("oracle") of God (Romans 3:102) nevertheless know the just requirements of that law since they are inescapably revealed through the created order and human conscience (1:18-23; 2:14-15). They know the holiness and justice of the living and true God well enough that they are guilty for not worshiping Him aright in any area of their lives; thus God's wrath is revealed from heaven "against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (1:18) -- against all transgressions of His righteous law (cf. 7:7, 12).
Paul says nothing to suggest that there is a difference in the moral content of these two revelations, written and natural. The written law is an advantage over natural revelation because the latter is suppressed and distorted in unrighteousness (Romans 1:18-25). But what pagans suppress is precisely the "work of the Law" (2:14-15). Natural revelation communicates to them, as Paul says, "the ordinance of God" about "all unrighteousness" (1:29,32). Because they "know" God's ordinance, they are "without excuse" for refusing to live in terms of it (1:20). What the law speaks, then, it speaks "in order that all the world may be brought under the judgment of God" (3:19). The is ONE law order to which all men are bound, whether they learn of it by means of natural revelation or by means of special revelation. God is no respecter of persons here (2:11). "All have sinned" (3:23) -- thus violated that common standard for the "knowledge of sin" in all men, the law of God. (3:20).
The Primary Error
With Geisler's theologically faulty view of natural revelation (or natural law) in mind, we can understand how his article commits its primary conceptual error: the attempt to enunciate a moral standard for civil government (contrary to secular humanism) but one which is Not religious (contrary to reconstructionism). He asks what kind of laws should be enacted by the State, "Christian laws or Humanistic laws?" He immediately answers: "Neither. Rather, they should simply be just laws. Laws should not be either Christian or anti-Christian; they should merely be fair ones."
What is naively presupposed by that statement, though, is that we can establish a common conception and standard of "justice" (or "fairness") apart from reference to a religions commitment -- without gaining that moral standard from the philosophical worldview within which we work, whether it be atheistic, deistic, pantheistic, cult, Christian, or whatever. But this is nothing but an illusion -- the illusion of religious neutrality in making moral decisions. Humanists and Christians do not agree as to what constitutes "justice"; neither do Hindus and naturalists, etc. These fundamental disagreements do not arise because advocates of one worldview or the other have made intellectual errors (of fact or logic) which are readily correctable. They disagree precisely because of the irreconcilable conflict in their fundamental religious (or philosophical) commitments.
Geisler is simply playing a game with words when he advocates a "just government" instead of a "religious government." There is no religiously neutral concept of justice that could make sense out of this distinction. When men claim to be relying on natural reason (or even "natural law" gained from the world), they endorse grievous moral conclusions -- such as Dr. Geisler's early condoning of abortion under some circumstances! (Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, Zondervan, 1971, pp. 220-223). But even more important and relevant to Geisler's hypothesis about political ethics, those who claim to be following natural reason or natural law still do not end up concurring with each other over the most elementary political issues -- as the history of both philosophical opinion and political theorizing illustrates.
Conclusion
In the political sphere Dr. Geisler has made an unwise (and hopefully unwitting) tradeoff. He has traded the Christian religion's conception of political morality for the religious conceptions of political morality advanced by the "natural man" who cannot receive the things of the Spirit (1 Corinthians 2:14). Dr. Geisler has traded the special revelation of God's one moral will for a "natural revelation" which is suppressed and distorted in unrighteousness (Romans 1:18). And in so doing he has politically traded the divine King, the Lord Jesus Christ, speaking clearly in the Bible for "Caesar," a human lord who speaks according to his own view of natural revelation. Dr. Geisler has consigned those who accept these tradeoffs to tyranny and arbitrariness in civil government -- as history repeatedly shows us. The truly Christian alternative, even in politics, is to abide in the revealed word of Jesus Christ. Then shall we know the truth which makes us free indeed (John 8: 32-33).
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 10:25:01 GMT -5
A Reformed Alternative to Theonomic Ethics | Sam Waldron
by Sam Waldron | Oct 13, 2022 | Theonomy?
*This series is a republication of lectures written by Dr. Waldron near the end of the 1980s. This is Part 7 of a series titled “Theonomy: A Reformed Baptist Assessment.”
For Part 1, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/theonomy-a-reformed-baptist-assessment-sam-waldron/
For Part 2, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/the-sources-of-theonomic-development-sam-waldron/
For Part 3, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/the-challenges-of-critiquing-theonomy-sam-waldron/
For Part 4, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/understanding-the-supposed-theocratic-kingdom-sam-waldron/
For Part 5, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/the-historical-background-of-theonomic-ethics-sam-waldron/
For Part 6, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/a-biblical-refutation-of-theonomic-ethics-sam-waldron/
I.) A Reformed Defense of Religious Liberty
1.) The Theonomic view of the Separation of Church and State Refuted
It is a misconception to think that Theonomists reject the separation of the church and state. They do, however, to say the least, define the separation of church and state differently than it is normally defined in our day either by secularists or Christians. In fairness to Bahnsen his view of the separation of church and state is not novel, but may claim to be typical of Calvin, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the earlier Reformed tradition. Bahnsen argues
Therefore, an investigation of the Older and New Testaments reveals that they both separate the functions of the state from those of the church; however, they both maintain also the authority of God over church as well as state. In the era of the New Testament this means that the sword of the state is under moral responsibility to the law of God without being confused with the sword of the church. The state has recourse to capital punishment as a penal sanction, but the church’s severest punishment is that of excommunication. . . The state does not operate in the name of the Redeemer or as an organized expression of the redeemed community. However, this does not mean that the state is not morally responsible to God and His justice. . . The point, then, is that church and state can be separated with respect to function, instrument, and scope and yet both be responsible to God. . . the law does not grant the state to enforce matters of conscience (thus granting “freedom of religion”), but it does have the obligation to prohibit and restrain public unrighteousness (thus punishing crimes from rape to public blasphemy). The state is not an agent of evangelism and does not use its force to that end; it is an agent of God, avenging His wrath against social violations of God’s law. If one’s outward behavior is within the bounds of the law he has nothing to fear from the civil magistrate-even if one is an idolater, murderer, or whatever in his heart.”[1]
Let there be no misunderstanding of Bahnsen’s position. In his ideal state “public” blasphemy, idolatry, sabbath-breaking, apostasy, witchcraft, sorcery, and false pretension to prophecy would be subject to civil penalties up to and including the death penalty.
Bahnsen’s views at this point are characteristic of the views of Christian Reconstructionism as a whole. It would be easy to multiply quotations which would evince this with reference to both North and Rushdoony. One practical illustration of this view is North’s remark that Christians should work to get the tax exemptions of “liberal” churches lifted (denied). [2]
It is obvious that in any theonomically organized state religious liberty would be constantly threatened by the civil government. If a civil government feels itself responsible to judicially penalize, public sabbath-breaking, apostasy, heresy, and blasphemy, then religious liberty is in real jeopardy.
2.) The Biblical View of the Separation of Church and State Defended
a.) The Presumption of Such a Separation
We begin again here by reminding ourselves of the redemptive history of the Theocratic Kingdom. With the expiration of the partially restored Theocratic order in A. D. 70, all civil authority ceased to be Theocratic in the sense in which we have defined that word in these lectures. God is no longer the unique king of any civil entity. No nation is now mandated to adhere to a divinely revealed civil order. While the moral principles enshrined in the laws of the Old covenant remain authoritative, no nation is bound to the detailed, civil order of Old Testament Israel. Add to all of this the destruction of the Temple as the earthly throne of Yahweh and one must also conclude that no longer are church and state a united entity. The redeemed community no longer has a civil structure. Thus, the divine establishment of the Gentile civil authorities means that the separation of the civil and ecclesiastical institutions in human society is now God’s preceptive will. The alteration of this order will be signaled only by the return of Christ. Thus, the separation of church and state is assumed and commanded by the Lord Jesus Christ when he directed that we should “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22:21).
b.) The Arguments for Such a Separation
Many arguments could be brought forward in defense of religious freedom or soul liberty. I will only mention two:
(1) Dictating religious belief and worship is not the task or function of the state. It is outside the sphere of the civil authorities.
The state is to preserve civil justice and peace and protect men from violence to their bodies or property. This is the teaching of the Bible (Rom. 13:3, 4; Mt. 22:21; I Tim. 2:2; 1 Pet. 2:14; Ps. 82:1-4, 58:2, Deut. 4:27; Gen 6:11, 12, 9:5, 6; Ps. 72:14, Ezek. 7:23, 45:9; Prov. 21:15, 24:11, 12, 29:14, 26, 31:5).
Men may and do differ as to religious belief without disrupting the peace or offering violence to others. The weapon of the civil authority is the sword. Swords are not good weapons, they are not even the right weapons, with which to mold or rule men’s consciences. Civil authority rules mens’ bodies, not their souls (Neh. 9:37).
(2) For a state to dictate religious belief or worship inevitably requires the State to rule the church or the church to rule the state. Since the Bible teaches the sphere-sovereignty of both the state and the church under God, to require the state to restrain violations of the first table of the law necessarily violates the teaching of Scripture.
The Westminster Confession of Faith in its original form is the best illustration of this. In chapter 23 and paragraph 3 it states:
The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven: yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.
In Chapter 21 and paragraph 4 of this original edition of the Westminster Confession provided similarly that
…for their publishing such opinions, or maintaining of such practices, as are contrary to the light of nature, or to the known principles of Christianity (whether concerning faith, worship, or conversation), or to the power of godliness; or, such erroneous opinions or practices, as either in their own nature, or in the manner of publishing or maintaining them are destructive to the external peace and order which Christ hath established in the Church, they may lawfully be called to account, and proceeded against, by the censures of the Church, and by the power of the civil magistrate.
How can the state do such things without seriously compromising the church’s sovereignty under God? Without making the church a slave of men? It can’t!
3.) The Objection to Such Separation
A serious objection must now be addressed. Isn’t the civil authority to rule according to the Word of God? If so, how can it allow religious freedom? Must it not, therefore, enforce the first table of the law? If God forbids idolatry, for instance, must not the state also forbid and penalize idolatry and, therefore, proscribe Mormonism, Islam, Hinduism, and, indeed, any religion which does not profess to worship the Christian Trinity?
Here a crucial distinction must be enunciated. It is certainly true that civil authority is subject to the Word of God, but this does not mean that it is the duty of the civil authority to enforce every part of God’s Word with his own authority. Several illustrations will make this clear.
Eph. 6:4 requires, “And you fathers bring up your children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.” Is the civil magistrate required to enforce this. No! Why? Because the Word is not his authority? No! But because He is not a Father. Note also the exhortations to pastors in I Pet. 5:2. Should the civil magistrate enforce this? No, because he is not a pastor. John Murray well says,
Since the civil magistrate is invested with this authority by God and is obliged by divine ordinance to discharge these functions, he is responsible to God, the one living and true God who alone has ordained him. The magistrate is, therefore, under obligation to discharge the office devolving upon him in accordance with the revealed will of God. The Bible is the supreme and infallible revelation of God’s will and it is, therefore, the supreme and infallible rule in all departments of life. The civil magistrate is under obligation to recognize it as the infallible rule for the exercise of civil magistracy.
It must be recognized, however, that it is only within his own restricted sphere of authority that the civil magistrate, in his capacity as civil magistrate, is to apply the revelation of God’s will as provided in Scripture. It is only to the extent to which the revelation of Scripture bears upon the functions discharged by the state and upon the performance of the office of the civil magistrate, that he, in the discharge of these functions, is bound to fulfil the demands of Scripture. If the civil magistrate should attempt, in his capacity as magistrate, to carry into effect the demands of Scripture which bear upon him in other capacities, or the demands of Scripture upon other institutions, he would immediately be guilty of violating his prerogatives and of contravening the requirements of Scripture.
The sphere of the church is distinct from that of the civil magistrate….What needs to be appreciated now is that its sphere is co-ordinate with that of the state. The church is not subordinate to the state, nor is the state subordinate to the church. They are both subordinate to God, and to Christ in his mediatorial dominion as head over all things to his body the church. Both church and state are under obligation to recognize this subordination, and the corresponding co-ordination of their respective spheres of operation in the divine institution. Each must maintain and assert its autonomy in reference to the other and preserve its freedom from intrusion on the part of the other.[3]
Why is the civil magistrate not to enforce the “first Table of the Law”? Because he is somehow not subject to the Word of God? No! Because it’s not his job!
4.) The Limits of Such Separation
Are there limits to religious freedom? When anyone’s religion disrupts civil justice or peace and threatens violence to others, then it exposes itself to the legitimate action of the state and must be restrained. Moloch Worship, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ refusal of blood transfusions for their children, and abortion are several examples of religiously held “rights” which should not be permitted.
II.) A Reformed Hermeneutic of Mosaic Law
How are we to tell which laws in the Old Covenant we must obey as Christians and which we need not obey?
This is the pressing question. In rejecting the alternative of Theonomy we have not settled this serious and practical issue. It is incumbent upon a treatment like this to provide some direction on this question. This is, however, a massive matter. The following is offered only as a general outline of the proper approach to this question.
1.) General Premises
a.) The Old Covenant is the most concentrated Biblical revelation of law and the central Biblical revelation of moral law.
The NT does not reveal, but rather assumes a system of ethics (Matt. 7:12; Luke 18:18-20; Rom. 13:8, 9; 1 Cor. 14:34, 35; James 1:25; 2:8-12; Jn. 1:17.)
b.) We must distinguish between the Old Covenant law as a temporary covenant and a permanent revelation.
Compare Heb. 8:13 with Eph. 6:1f; Gal. 3:19f. While the Old Covenant as a temporary covenant no longer binds us, as a permanent revelation of God and His moral law it does bind us.
Thus, we cannot answer the question with either of the two, extreme, (and superficial) answers. There is the answer of Dispensationalism. This is that nothing in the Old Covenant per se binds the Christian. There is the opposite answer, that to which Theonomy tends. This is that everything in the Old Covenant binds the Christian. According to the New Testament both of these answers are too facile. Some things do and some things do not bind us. We must be able to tell the difference.
c.) The moral law revealed in the Old Covenant has already been revealed to every man because its demands are written in his heart by creation. Man, therefore, by nature has certain ideas about right and wrong.
Cf. the following passages Rom. 2:14, 15 (The law mentioned in this passage is clearly according to the context the law given at Sinai.); 1 Cor. 11:13-15.
This natural revelation–granted–is suppressed by man’s depravity. Thus, a written revelation is necessary to make God’s demands clear to sinners. Yet, this means that no man approaches the question of his ethical duty as a blank slate. He approaches the question with a basic knowledge of that duty which barring his sin should guide him in sorting of the Old Covenant laws! Only his sin prevents this!
d.) Anything not abolished in Christ remains as the Christian’s duty.
Compare the exposition Matt. 5:17, 18. The Old Covenant was temporary because it was preparatory and pointed forward to Christ. Anything that was not at least in principle abolished by Christ was obviously not part of its temporary character. Examples of such temporary aspects of the Old Covenant are multiplied in the New Testament.
–The priestly and sacrificial laws (Hebrews 7-10).
–The dietary laws (Acts 10, 11 with Mk. 7:19).
–The judicial laws as part of the civil state of Israel (Luke 21:20-24; Acts 6:13-15; Heb. 8:13; 9:18-22; 10:1)
Obviously anything re-affirmed in the New Covenant by Christ or the Apostles is law for the Christian, but it is not necessary for a law to be explicitly reiterated. As long as it is not abolished by Christ, it remains in force.
Problems remain, of course, even after stating this premise. This is epitomized by the phrase used above, “at least in principle.” There are still gray areas. Hence other rules of thumb are necessary. This brings us to certain more specific guidelines.
2.) Specific Guidelines
a.) Any ordinance present from creation has abiding relevance for the Christian.
Any point at which the Mosaic regulations deviate from a creation mandate they obviously are part of the temporary aspects of the Old Covenant. Note Matt. 19:1-10. What originated at creation must endure as long as creation itself is not altered (Matt. 5:17, 19, Luke 20:34-36).
b.) Any law which is part of the Ten Commandments is permanent.
It is common in our day to raise an objection against the distinction between the moral and ceremonial dimensions of Old Covenant. It is argued that the Old Covenant was a unit and did not distinguish between one law and another. The Jews, it is said, could not have guessed which laws were moral and which ceremonial. We believe, however, that this distinction was made very plainly for the Jews. Who made the distinction? God did! God clearly distinguished the Ten from the rest. How?
–By speaking the Ten Commandments alone with his own voice
–By writing them alone with his own finger
–By writing them alone in stone, rather than a book
–By putting them alone in the ark of the covenant
In these ways at least God clearly distinguished one part of the Old Covenant law from the rest.
c.) Any law which the Gentiles as well as the Jews were obliged to obey is thereby revealed to be part of the natural law written on the heart of all men.
The obligation of the Gentiles to obey God presupposes a revelation informing them of their obligation. Since the Gentiles did not have special revelation, such laws must have been part of the general revelation of God’s law written on their hearts by creation. This perspective enables us to answer the question, Are the laws of Leviticus 18 for us? Cf. Lev. 18:6-23 and note particularly Lev. 18:1-5, 24-30. Clearly these laws do bind Christians. This is confirmed by the assumption of Paul in 1 Cor. 5:1f. that these laws obliged and should have been plainly understood by all the Corinthians.
3.) Test Cases
Two test cases will serve to show the relevance of the premises and guidelines mentioned above in discerning the abiding relevance of Old Testament laws to ourselves. The first case will be a positive example, the second a negative. Again, it is necessary to remind the reader that this treatment is intended only as simple sketch, showing the main lines of thought to be followed in discerning Old Covenant laws
a.) The Positive Example: The Sabbath
The weekly sabbath is a well-known crux of scriptural ethics. But the things mentioned above provide a straightforward answer as to its relevance for the Christian. It is a creation ordinance. It is part of the Ten Commandments. It obliged Gentiles dwelling among the Jews, at least, (Exod. 20:8-11). Thus, in terms of each of the three specific guidelines mentioned above the sabbath qualifies as abidingly relevant for the Christian.
Question is, of course, raised by many with reference to certain of the premises mentioned earlier. Some argue that the sabbath was abolished by Christ on the basis of passages like Col. 2, Gal. 4, and Rom. 14. Others argue that the Sabbath was not part of the law of nature. Each of these arguments has only partial validity.
It is true that the precise day of the week and even the length of the week is not part of the content of the law of nature. The most that can be said is that natural reason might anticipate that the appointed day of worship would not be much more or much less than one in seven. However, that God must be worshiped, worshiped corporately, and, thus, that a specified time must necessarily be appointed for that worship and appointed by God himself–all these things seem clearly a part of the law of nature to this writer. The true case seems to be that the law of the Sabbath is a mixed commandment; part natural and part positive. The implication of this must be noted. The positive part of the commandment could be changed, while the natural law underlying it embodied in a new institution. As a matter of fact, this is precisely what the biblical data indicates did happen. This brings us to the second issue raised above.
It is not necessary to deny that the seventh day sabbath was abolished by Christ or that this is the reference of, for instance, Col. 2:16, 17, though many fine exegetes have done so. It is simply necessary to distinguish the sabbath as a dictate of natural law from the sabbath as a positive law. That is to say, we must distinguish between the sabbath as a moral principle and the sabbath as a positive institution. As a positive institution, it is abolished. As a moral principle, it is re-incarnated in the Lord’s Day. It re-emerges in the Christian observance of the first day of the week. It is simply fallacious and hopelessly superficial to make Col. 2:16, 17 the first, last, and only statement of the Bible on the subject of the sabbath. It is downright wrong to ignore all those considerations mentioned above which lead directly to the conclusion that the sabbath is a moral principle abidingly relevant in all ages. It is impermissible to ignore and isolate all that the New Testament teaches regarding the first day of the week (Rev. 1:10, 1 Cor. 16:1, 2, Acts 20:7, 2:1, Jn. 20:1, 26).
b.) The Negative Example: the Year of Jubilee
In contrast to the sabbath day the sabbath year is on the basis of the principles enunciated above clearly not abidingly relevant for the Christian. It is not a creation ordinance, not a part of the Ten Commandments, not obligatory for Gentiles, (Lev. 25:39-55), and fulfilled and abolished by Christ (Lev. 4:16-19, 21:20-24.) both because it points to Christ’s work and because it was a civil law of Israel.
Conclusion
Are there not still gray areas? Yes and we must seek for greater light to discern and do God’s law of liberty. In the meantime such obscurities make us thankful for the fact and remind us that we are saved by grace and not the works of the law!
[1]Ibid, pp. 426, 427
[2]Gary North, The Theology of Christian Resistance, A Symposium, ed. by Gary North, (Tyler, TX, Geneva Divinity School, 1983), p. 64.
[3]Murray, Collected Writings, vol. 1, pp. 253, 254.
Sam Waldron
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 11:17:53 GMT -5
I. The Scriptural Claims of Theonomic Ethics
A. The Centrality of Matt. 5:17-20 in Bahnsen’s Defense of Theonomy
Paul B. Fowler has documented what should be obvious to any reader of Greg Bahnsen’s Theonomy in Christian Ethics. Bahnsen’s exegesis of Matt. 5:17-20 is the centerpiece of the entire book.
[1] Bahnsen himself writes:The locus classicus pertaining to Jesus and the law is Matthew 5:17-20; in this familiar section Jesus speaks openly of his relation to the law of the Older Testament, the status of that law, and what the response of His disciples should be to that law. The theonomy of true kingdom righteousness is the heart of His teaching here.
[2] Bahnsen, thus, devotes 48 pages of concentrated exegesis to the opening of this key text. Fowler notes that the entirety of Theonomy in Christian Ethics is organized around this key text and its exegesis.
Note the organization of Dr. Bahnsen’s book, Theonomy. Chapter 1 is the Introduction. Chapter 2 is his exegesis of Matthew 5:17-20, entitled: “The Abiding Validity of the Law in Exhaustive Detail.” In this chapter he concludes that in Matthew 5 verse 17 the validity of the Old Testament Law is confirmed, verse 18 confirms the validity of all the jots and tittles of the Old Testament Law, and verse 19 confirms the validity of meticulous observance by Kingdom citizens of the least details of the Old Testament Law. He captions his chapters 1 and 2 in the Table of Contents, “The Thesis.” Chapters 3 and 4 have the caption: “Misconceptions of the Thesis Eradicated.” Then Dr. Bahnsen proceeds to develop the rest of his book around his interpretation of Matthew 5:17-20.
[3] Fowler is certainly correct when he concludes: “Thus, if it could be shown that Dr. Bahnsen’s interpretation is incorrect, or even tenuous at crucial points, his thesis would be come suspect.”
[4] B. The Interpretation of Matt. 5:17-20 in Bahnsen’s Defense of Theonomy
Many inadequacies in Bahnsen’s exegsis of Matt. 5:17-20 have been discussed by various writers.
[5] In the interests of brevity and simplicity the critique given here will organize itself around the single major flaw in that exegesis, his interpretation of the word, fulfill (ðëçñoù), in Matt. 5:17. Very simply put, Bahnsen asserts that the meaning of this word in the passage is to confirm or establish.
[6] He, then, proceeds to argue that, since v. 18 is speaking of every jot and tittle of the law, Jesus in this passage asserts that he came to confirm, establish, or restore to full authority the law of God in exhaustive detail. This is the thesis that Bahnsen bravely undertakes to explain, vindicate, and defend in the rest of his work. Bahnsen concludes, “Jesus, the awaited Messiah, rectifies the fallen standard of the law; he confirms its exhaustive details and restores a proper conception of kingdom righteousness.”
[7] C. The Misconception of Matt. 5:17-20 in Bahnsen’s Defense of Theonomy
Under this heading seven inadequacies in Bahnsen’s interpretation of the key word, fulfill, in Matt. 5:17 will be identified. These four inadequacies will also provide a framework in which to suggest the proper understanding of the key word and the passage.
1. The Inadequacy of the Lexical Evidence
The first inadequacy in Bahnsen’s treatment of “fulfill” is the inadequacy of the lexical evidence for the meaning of confirm. Fowler points out, “It may be noted that Arndt and Gingrich, the major New Testament Greek lexicon which devotes over two full pages to ðëçñoù, “to fulfill,” does not even list “to confirm” (or “to establish,” to ratify”) as a possible nuance.” Fowler’s footnote reads as follows:
F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 676-678. This lexicon actually gives several possible nuances of ðëçñoù in Mt. 5:17, one of which is: to bring to full expression=show it forth in its true meaning.” This is not the same as Dr. Bahnsen’s “to establish as valid.” Recent editions also include within parentheses Dalman’s view “to confirm,” but this view is deliberately not included as generally accepted as possible.
[8]nFurther corroborating the lexical inadequacy of Bahnsen’s interpretation is the consistent, terminological distinction between words meaning confirm and words meaning fulfill in the Bible. Fowler has investigated this and discovered that …
The main Hebrew and Greek terms for “to confirm” are ___ and `éóôçìé (and cognates). The main Hebrew and Greek terms for “to fulfill” are À__ and ðëçñoù. The Hebrew term for “to confirm” (___) is never rendered in the LXX by the Greek term for “to fulfill” (ðëçñoù). Nor is the Hebrew term for “to fulfill” (À__) ever rendered in the LXX by any of the cognate forms of the Greek term for “to confirm” (`éóôçìé). There is a legitimate distinction between “to confirm” and “to fulfill” in both Hebrew and Greek. Dr. Bahnsen’s attempt, therefore, to fuse the two meanings of “to confirm” and “to fulfill” is certainly to be questioned.
[9] 2. The Inadequacy of the Interpretive Alternatives
A second inadequacy of Bahnsen’s exegesis is that the interpretive alternatives to his own position which he provides are partial. To be specific, while he lists five other possibilities for the meaning of “fulfill” (puts to an end, replaces, supplements, intends to actively obey, enforce), he does not even mention the most prominent contextual usage of the word,
[10] the fulfillment of divine promises. Says Fowler:
… it is strange that Dr. Bahnsen does not even mention the most prominent use of ðëçñoù (“to fulfill”) in Matthew: of divine predictions and promises being fulfilled. As we will see below, it is this technical usage of Christ being the Messianic fulfillment of the Old Testament promises that holds one of the keys for interpreting ðëçñoù (“to fulfill”) correctly.
[11] This thought brings us to a third and crucial inadequacy of Bahnsen’s interpretation of this key word.
3. The Inadequacy of the Consideration of Context
It is rather shocking after reading Bahnsen’s lengthy treatment of the meaning of ðëçñoù (“to fulfill”) to open up a Greek concordance and examine the other usages of the word in the Gospel of Matthew. Bahnsen’s exegesis of “fulfill” manages to completely ignore the paramount consideration of the way this word is used in other places in the same book of the Bible. This neglect is all the more inexcusable because the word is used 15 other times in Matthew with great consistency.
[12] It will be well to let these uses speak for themselves.
1:22‑-“Now all this took place that what was spoken by the Lord through the prophet might be fulfilled …”
2:15‑-“…that what was spoken through the prophet might be fulfilled…”
2:17‑-“Then that which was spoken through Jeremiah the prophet was fulfilled …”
2:23‑-“that what was spoken through the prophets might be fulfilled …”
3:15‑-“Permit it at this time; for in this way it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness.”
4:14‑-“… to fulfill what was spoken through Isaiah the prophet …”
8:17‑-“in order that what was spoken through Isaiah the prophet might be fulfilled …”
12:17‑-“in order that what was spoken through Isaiah the prophet, might be fulfilled …”
13:35‑-“so that what was spoken through the prophet might be fulfilled …”
13:48‑-“and when it was filled, they drew it up on the beach”
21:4‑-“Now this took place that what was spoken through the prophet might be fulfilled”
23:32‑-“Fill up then the measure of your fathers.”
26:54‑-“How then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that it must happen this way?”
26:56‑-“But all this has taken place that the Scriptures of the prophets may be fulfilled?”
27:9‑-“Then that which was spoken through Jeremiah the prophet was fulfilled …”
Twelve of these fifteen occurrences clearly use “fulfill” with reference to the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy. In these the Scriptures are viewed as a prophetic word destined to find its fulfillment in the coming of the Messiah. In the three other passages, the overtones of eschatological fulfillment may also be discerned in different ways. Matt. 3:15 speaks of the baptism of Jesus as fulfilling all righteousness. However this is exactly to be understood, it certainly speaks of Messianic fulfillment and salvation. Matt. 13:48 uses the word in a kingdom parable. The filling of the net with fishes also has the connotation of eschatological fulfillment. Matt. 23:32 also alludes to eschatological fulfillment by way of the coming of Israel’s sin to full measure. This fulfilling of Israel’s sin is the backdrop of the predictions of the destruction of Jerusalem and the final end contained in the following two chapters, Matthew 24 and 25.
If, then, the paramount consideration of the contextual usage of “fulfill” is allowed to have any impact on the exegesis on Matt. 5:17, it forces us to recognize there the idea of eschatological fulfillment and redemptive-historical movement. It is this idea that is absent from Bahnsen’s understanding. It certainly fails to make any meaningful impact on his exegesis. Simply to confirm or establish the law is merely to reaffirm its original integrity (in exhaustive detail, as Bahnsen likes to say). There is no sense of eschatological fulfillment or redemptive-historical movement in this.
Bahnsen’s only reply to this massive array of contextual evidence is to appeal to the immediate context Matt. 5:17. He makes the point that in Matthew 5:19ff. Jesus is speaking of the commandments of the law being fulfilled and proceeds to expound some of the more important of these commandments and order men to obey them.
[13] This point is well-taken. The immediate context of Matt. 5:17 certainly must be taken into account. It certainly indicates that included in the fulfillment of the law and the prophets is the exposition of their true meaning and application to Christ’s disciples. This element cannot be eliminated from the fulfillment of which v. 17 is speaking. Thus, when House and Ice speak of sweeping modifications of Old Testament law with reference to divorce, oaths, and the lex talionis and hold out the possibility that the law will be abrogated by the coming of Christ, they fail adequately to grapple with Bahnsen’s position or the context of Matt. 5:17.
[14] Yet it is equally wrong for Bahnsen to ignore the use of “fulfill” in Matthew and the redemptive-historical movement it introduces into Matt. 5:17. The entire Matthaean context of this text teaches that the law and the prophets are moving toward messianic fulfillment. Clearly, this does not mean the abrogation of its moral precepts and principles. Matthew 5 makes this plain. Yet it does mean, as Bahnsen himself admits, that the ceremonial precepts of that law are brought to their fulfillment and, thus, superseded by the work of Christ. This dimension of fulfillment is clearly in the background of Matt. 5:17.
There are, furthermore, contextual indications in Matthew 5 itself which point to the idea of eschatological fulfillment. The repeated use of the verb, “I came,” by the Lord Jesus in v. 17 puts His mission at the center of that verse. Fowler comments:
Jesus’ use of çëèov (“I came”) emphasizes His mission, and strongly suggests that Jesus viewed His task as actualizing in His life the will of God made known in the law and the prophets. He has come in order that God’s Word may be completely fulfilled, in order that the full measure appointed by God Himself may be reached in Him.
[15] The phrase, “until all is accomplished,” found in v. 18 also brings out this emphasis also. The verb used here is also used in Matt. 1:22 the first occurrence of ðëçñoù in Matthew. That text says, “Now all this took place that what was spoken by the Lord through the prophet might be fulfilled …” The words, took place, translate the same Greek verb ãévoìáé as the words, is accomplished, translate in Matt. 5:18. This association provides added weight to Fowler’s suggestion (in agreement with many other commentators) that there is parallelism of thought between verses 17 and 18. He illustrates that parallelism this way:
17- I have not come to destroy (the law or the prophets) but to fulfill.
18- One jot or one tittle (from the law) shall never pass away until all things come to pass
Thus understood the two verbs ãévoìáé and ðëçñoù are parallel in meaning in a way similar to Matt. 1:22. The implication is that the phrase, “until all is accomplished,” speaks of the fulfillment and completion of the redemptive-historical process recorded in the Old Testament Scriptures.
Another contextual indication of the idea of fulfillment is in the exposition of the law given by the Lord Jesus in this chapter. It is clearly misguided with House and Ice to see our Lord’s intention to be that of introducing “sweeping modifications of three important institutions of the Mosaic Law (i. e. divorce‑-5:32; oaths‑-5:34; talion‑-5:39) …”
[16] There is no modification of these Old Testament institutions in this chapter, if its is rightly interpreted. In the case of oaths he must not be understood as outlawing all oaths because so to understand Him is to make Him condemn (among other things) the oaths taken by the Apostle Paul under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (Rom. 1:9; 2 Cor. 1:23). In the case of divorce and the lex talionis Jesus does not object to the Old Testament laws, but to their misapplication to personal ethics.
It is, therefore, wrong to speak of Jesus introducing sweeping modifications into the Old Testament law in Matthew 5. This does not mean, however, that Jesus here is merely confirming and reaffirming the Law. Rather, he must be seen as accentuating the personal requirements of the law and applying the law to the new redemptive-historical circumstances of His people. Fowler properly remarks:
Is Jesus then merely repeating the Old Testament Law?
Is He simply confirming that the Old Testament theocracy needed to be reestablished?
No, and this is the critical point. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus consistently frames the principles of His kingdom in terms of the new form of the Kingdom He has come to establish. For example, the law about murder in the Mosaic legislation was sufficient for the civil realm. But it was certainly not sufficient for the personal realm. …. The law about divorce was added by God to guard against an excessive divorce rate in Israel. In Jesus day, however, the Pharisees had turned its civil purpose around so that in their personal lives they could find a reason to get a divorce.
In conclusion, the Sermon on the Mount is introducing us to the principles of the Kingdom Christ came to establish. Christ is accenting the personal, not the civil realm. He is reapplying the moral law to the Kingdom He came to establish and is not concerned to confirm the continuing validity of the theocracy. Christ’s application of the jots and tittles of the law is both radical and practical. …. As Herman Ridderbos has observed, these formulations of Christ have “no other aim than the fulfillment of the law revealed by God to Israel.”
[17] 4. The Inconsistency of the Further Explanation
Clearly, Bahnsen has raised all sorts of questions for himself by maintaining that Matthew 5:17 teaches the confirmation of the law of Moses in exhaustive detail. Specifically, he has raised very problematic questions about the subject of the ceremonial law. Bahnsen remarks at the outset of his chapter on the subject in Theonomy:
About this point the question may have arisen, what about the laws in the Older Testament dealing with sacrifices, the temple, etc.? According to the foregoing thesis, every jot and tittle of the Lord’s law is binding upon God’s people in all ages. Does this mean that New Testament Christians are required to observe the Older Testamental ritual?
[18] Bahnsen’s answer to this question often surprises the novice. Though he has stated with absolute-ness and unqualified emphasis, the abiding validity of the law in exhaustive detail throughout his book, yet at this point he responds ambiguously, “The answer to this question is yes and no.”
[19] Bahnsen explains his ambiguity in the succeeding sentences:
Yes, Christians under the New Covenant are still responsible to offer blood atonement for their sins and tend to the obligations of the temple, etc.; however, we must be mindful of the fact that the way or manner in which Christians do these things under the new Covenant is not identical with the Older Testamental observation of the ritual and ceremony.
[20] This answer of Bahnsen to the abiding validity of the ceremonial law certainly permits the question, Has Bahnsen really avoided contradicting himself by it? I do not believe he has. In reality Bahnsen is caught on the horns of a dilemma which he cannot resolve. If he stresses the abiding validity of every jot and tittle of the law of Moses, then there really is no way to reconcile this with the language that he himself uses of the coming of the New Covenant. Listen to him:
The Levitical priesthood, representing the Mosaic system of ceremonial redemption, could not bring perfection and so was intended to be superseded (Heb. 7:11., 28). The people of God were subjected to a law or principle of ceremonial redemption with reference to the priesthood, says the author of Hebrews, but when Jesus instituted a change in the priesthood (for He was of the tribe of Judah, not Levi) the ceremonial principle was altered as well. This was inevitable because the ceremonial priests remained powerless to effect the perfect inward cleansing required. The former commandment with reference to ceremonial matters was set aside, then, in order that God’s people might have a better hope, for the ceremony was imperfect and kept men at a distance from God (Heb. 7:18f.). The commandment which was annulled was “a commandment with respect to the flesh” … This law made nothing perfect …
[21] One can scarcely believe that the repeated references to the imperfection, superseding, changing, alteration, setting aside, and annulling of the ceremonial law come from the same man who has argued that Jesus confirmed every jot and tittle of the law. Has not Bahnsen written, “The law is a transcript‑-a writing out of the details‑-of God’s moral perfection (Matt. 5:48; Psa. 19:7). As such, then, the law can no more be changed, abrogated, or improved upon than can God’s perfection …”?
[22] Mr. Bahnsen will have a difficult time reconciling these two statements to the plain Christian.
But there is another horn to this dilemma. If Mr. Bahnsen is serious about allowing for the spirit and not the letter of the ceremonial law to count as its abiding validity, then he has raised serious questions about the subject of the judicial law.
On what grounds does he place the judicial law on the side of the moral as literally valid, instead of on the side of the ceremonial law as figuratively or spiritually valid?
Why may we not argue for a similar fulfillment of the judicial laws and penology of the Theocracy in the New Testament church and in the judgments of the eschaton? Fowler has well-asked:
Finally, if we are agreed that certain particulars of the ceremonial laws were altered due to the coming of Christ and His fulfillment of them, and if we are agreed that these altered particulars are included in the jots and tittles of the law, then why would not the same alteration be true with regard to the particulars of the judicial law of Israel? For the laws of the church-state of Israel were altered as a result of the coming of Christ and His setting up a new form of Israel as a church-body. Would not then the civil laws for Israel as a Theocracy have to be restated and altered to apply to the new form of Israel as the body of Christ?
[23] Clearly, if (in spite of Bahnsen’s interpretation) Matt. 5:17 allows for redemptive-historical fulfillment with regard to ceremonial law, then it may also somehow allow for redemptive-historical movement with reference to judicial law. These realities in themselves suggest that Bahnsen’s understanding of the passage is inadequate. They also indicate that Matt. 5:17 is wholly inadequate to bear the weight which he makes it bear in his system. If Matt. 5:17 allows for the annulling and setting aside of ceremonial law (to use Bahnsen’s terminology), then it may be consistent with the expiration of the judicial law. Thus, it cannot support the distinctive thesis of Theonomic Ethics.
II. The Biblical Rebuttal of Theonomic Ethics
A. The Framework of This Rebuttal
Here I am referring to the overview of the redemptive history of the Theocratic Kingdom provided before. We have seen two things which create the greatest presumption that the judicial law has expired. First, we have seen that the judicial law‑-the specific and detailed civil order specially revealed by God‑-was an essential part of the unique relation of God to the kingdom of Israel. Second, we have seen that the Theocratic kingdom perished under the curse of God and that it his preceptive will and divine ordination that the Gentile kingdoms should now hold civil power over the people of God. There is, therefore, no reason to think that laws which were part of a unique and peculiar order which no longer exists in the world today should bind nations today. This is, of course, the reasoning of the Westminster Confession itself, “To them also he gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the state of that people, not obliging any now by virtue of that institution”.
B. The Elaboration of This Rebuttal
Dennis E. Johnson writing in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique entitles his chapter, “The Epistle to the Hebrews and the Mosaic Penal Sanctions.” He emphasizes that some of the most important teaching on the relevance of the judicial law for Christians is provided in this letter.
Only a few specific references to the Mosaic penal sanctions are found in the New Testament. Below I will argue that among the most significant of these are the passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews that compare and contrast the Mosaic penalties to the judgment awaiting those who repudiate the new covenant inaugurated by Christ. A brief survey of the other New Testament references to the penalties of the Law of Moses will, I believe, demonstrate how important the passages in Hebrews are.
[24]The primacy of the teaching of Hebrews will become clear in the following elaboration of the biblical rebuttal of Theonomic Ethics.
1. The Obsolescence of the Judicial Law
Hebrews is important because it teaches that the judicial law of Israel is obsolete and is, therefore, no longer obligatory upon Christians. This may be gleaned from Heb. 9:19 which speaks of the book of the covenant which contained the judicial law of Israel. Permit me to open up this passage by asking and answering two questions about the book of the covenant mentioned in this text.
What was the content of the book of the covenant? The book of the covenant was the epitome or summary of the judicial law of Israel. Notice the language, “when every commandment of the law had been spoken by Moses.” This is a reference to Exodus 24:1-3. In this passage Moses recounts to the people the laws which God gave him on Mount Sinai after the announcement of the Ten Commandments had been concluded. In Exodus 20:21 and 22 we are told that Moses approached the thick cloud and that God proceeded to speak to Him. The content of this divine revelation is found in Exodus 20:22-23:33. Even a cursory reading of these chapters will show that their focus or primary content is upon the judicial law of Israel‑-not upon the Ten commandments which were written separately and exclusively on the tables of stone.
[25] While the book of the covenant may have included the Ten Commandments, and while it did contain (arguably) some ceremonial laws (Exod. 20:18-26), it is clearly viewed as the comprehensive summary or epitome of the judicial law. Exodus 24:3 uses comprehensive language, “all the words of the Lord and all the ordinances”. Heb. 9:19 picks up on this comprehensive language “when every commandment of the law had been spoken by Moses”.
[26] Our second question brings us to the practical importance of this text.
What is the present status of the book of the covenant? It has passed away. What cannot be avoided in this passage is the expiration of the book of the covenant and with it the judicial law. The significant thing about this mention of the judicial law of Israel is that it comes in a context which equates it with the first or Old Covenant (Heb. 9:18). The same context has for its theme the thought that the Old Covenant is obsolete and ready to disappear because it was imposed only until a time of reformation (Heb. 8:7, 13; 9:10; 10:1). It is impossible to avoid the clear teaching of Heb. 9:19 that the book of the covenant, the summary of the judicial law of Israel, has expired. This teaching is, of course, completely antithetical to Theonomic Ethics.
2. The Relevance of the Judicial Law
There is at least an important element of truth in Dennis Johnson’s remark that, “Ultimately the New Testament must be our guide in determining how the various categories of commandments in the Law of Moses function as God’s authoritative Word to the post resurrection church.”
[27] Though Theonomists may scruple at the word, ultimately, surely no one can deny that the way in which the New Testament itself utilizes the judicial law of Israel is of intense interest on this subject.
Since the book of the covenant as part of the first covenant is obsolete and has now passed away, it might be concluded that it is completely irrelevant for the Christian. This very Epistle to the Hebrews manifests the superficiality of this conclusion. In two significant passages it makes clear reference to the Mosaic penal sanctions (Heb. 2:1-3; 10:28-31). In both passages the penal sanctions of the judicial law are seen as pointing typically to the destruction of those who apostatize from salvation in Christ.
These passages, however, are consistent with the previously seen obsolescence of the judicial law. While as a civil code binding the present conduct of the people of God, it is obsolete, the judicial law also fulfills the shadow function of the Law (Heb. 10:1-3). Its penal sanctions are not intended as the norm of the now-present Gentile kingdoms. Rather, they point to the judgments which shall accompany the restoration of the Theocratic Kingdom at Christ’s return.
As Dennis Johnson points out in the book referred to earlier, this use of the judicial sanctions is related to the other application of the judicial law in the New Testament. The judicial law is also cited in relation to the judgments which the spiritual kingdom of Christ in the church now executes to maintain the purity of the church. Corrective church discipline properly executed foreshadows the ultimate judgment of the apostate in the day of judgment (1 Cor. 5:1-13. Dennis Johnson remarks:
But it is noteworthy that Paul seals this discussion with a formula quoted from the Mosaic penal sanctions: “Expel the wicked man from among you” (v. 13; see Deut. 17:7, 12; 19:19; 21:21; 22:21, 24; 24:7). His wording follows that of the Septuagint so closely that his intent to appeal to this Old Testament formula is unmistakable. In the Deuteronomy contexts this formula, whenever it appears, refers to the execution of those committing deeds “worthy of death” …. Paul applies the same terminology to the new covenant community’s judging/purging act of excommunication….
[28] Dennis Johnson’s conclusion about the New Testament data is certainly justified.
The question whether the penal sanctions should also instruct the state as it is charged to administer justice to persons within and without God’s covenant is not explicitly addressed in the New Testament …. The New Testament’s minimal direction to governmental officials does not support the view that the Mosaic penalties should be enforced by noncovenantal governmental structure on a noncovenantal people.
The Theonomic use of the Mosaic judicial law, it must be concluded, must be rejected. It ignores the clear teaching of the New Testament as to the obsolescence of the judicial law. It obscures the proper relevance of the judicial law to the church, the visible and spiritual kingdom of Christ, in its attempt to apply it to non-Theocratic civil governments.
On the other hand, the traditional Reformed view is clearly a suitable framework within which to understand the New Testament references to the judicial law. Its assertion of the expiration of the judicial law with the passing of the Theocracy is vindicated by Heb. 9:19. Its continuing relevance for Christians by way of its general equity is illustrated by its use in the New Testament in reference to matters of church purity and eschatological judgment.
[1]Paul B. Fowler, God’s Law Free From Legalism, pp. 60f. This unpublished manuscript has been most helpful to me in this treatment of Matt. 5:17-20.
[2]Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics, p. 39.
[3]Fowler, loc. cit., pp. 60 and 61. Fowler goes on to give examples of how in chapters 9, 16, and 22 and in the concluding sentences of the book Bahnsen refers back to Matthew 5:17-20.
[4]Fowler, loc. cit., p. 62
[5]See beside Fowler House and Ice pp. 103ff. in Dominion Theology: Blessing or Curse; R. Laird Harris in his review article on Theonomy in Christian Ethics in the Covenant Seminary Review 5, (Spring 1979): pp.1-15.; Bruce K Waltke in “Theonomy in Relation to Dispensational and Covenant Theologies” an article in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, pp. 80ff.
[6]Bahnsen, loc. cit., pp. 67-70.
[7]Bahnsen, loc. cit., p. 86.
[8]Fowler, loc. cit., p. 64
[9]Fowler, loc. cit., p. 69.
[10]Bahnsen, loc. cit., pp. 52, 53.
[11]Fowler, loc. cit., pp. 66, 67.
[12]“Fulfill” occurs a 16th time in Matt. 27:35 if the textual variant found in the Textus Receptus is followed. The usage there is consistent with the others found in Matthew, “that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet.”
[13]On pp. 60 and 61 of Theonomy … Bahnsen alludes to the idea of fulfillment of prophecy saying, “… the context of Matthew 5:17 indicates that ðëçñoù refers to Jesus’ work as a teacher. There are no allusions to predictions of the Older Testament …”
[14]House and Ice, loc. cit., pp. 104-112. The reference to the sweeping modifications of the law in the Sermon on the Mount is the language of Randy Gleason who House and Ice are quoting approvingly. House and Ice also suggest on p. 112 that Jesus is intent on showing his disciples their need of His righteousness in the Matt. 5:21-28. The doctrine of forensic righteousness, while biblical, is foreign to the import of Matthew 5 which is speaking of the hearts and practical lives of believers.
[15]Fowler, loc. cit., pp. 73, 74.
[16]House and Ice, loc. cit., p. 105.
[17]Fowler, loc. cit., pp. 91 and 92.
[18] Bahnsen, loc. cit., p. 207.
[19]ibid.
[20]ibid.
[21]Bahnsen, loc. cit., p. 208.
[22]Greg Bahnsen, The Presbyterian Journal, “The Authority of God’s Law,” vol. 37, no. 32, p. 11.
[23]Fowler, loc. cit., p. 89.
[24]Dennis E. Johnson writing in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, ed. by W. S. Barker and R. W. Godfrey, (Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 1990), “The Epistle to the Hebrews and the Mosaic Penal Sanctions,” pp. 177, 178.
[25]This is admitted by Theonomists. Cf. James Jordan’s The Law of the Covenant: An Exposition of Exodus 21-23 (Institute for Christian Economics, Tyler, 1984).
[26]This means that the we must distinguish the perspective of Hebrews where the law is equated with the book of the covenant and the perspective of Romans where the law is primarily the Ten Commandments. Equate the law with the book of the covenant and it is proper to speak of its passing away as Hebrews does. Equate the law with the Ten commandments and the emphasis must be on its abiding validity as it is in Romans. The law in general and as an economy has passed away. The law specifically as the Ten commandments cannot pass away. In this way Heb. 9:19 may be safeguarded from Antinomian misuse. See below on a Reformed hermeneutic of the Mosaic Law.
[27]Dennis E. Johnson, loc. cit., p. 191,
[28]ibid., p. 181.
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 11:45:15 GMT -5
Theonomy: A Reformed Baptist Assessment. Pt.4
Understanding the Supposed “Theocratic Kingdom”
I.) The Nature of the Theocratic Kingdom
Any treatment of the Theocratic kingdom confronts itself, first of all, with the task of defining the term, Theocracy. Its etymology is not in doubt. Etymologically, it is “God-rule.” One dictionary recognizing its native, civil context, properly defines it as “the rule of a state by God or a god …” Theologically, however, defining this word is much more difficult. Let me attempt to do so briefly by means of four assertions.
A) Yahweh is in a unique sense king of Israel.
There is nothing startling in God’s claim to be king. As Creator, He is Sovereign of all (Ps. 74:12f., 93:2, 103:19f.). But it is not merely this general dominion that the term, Theocracy, designates. It is specifically God’s kingship in Israel that is the proper starting point. This meaning of God’s kingship pervades the Old Testament and is a prominent characterization of His peculiar relation to Israel (Ps. 44:1-8 esp. v. 4, Ps. 68 esp. v. 24, and Isa. 41:21). Yahweh is even viewed as the commander of Israel’s army (Exod. 12:41, 17:8-16, Num. 10:35, 21:14, 23:21).
Yahweh’s assumption of kingship over Israel is related to the Exodus period in Israel’s history and, most specifically, to the covenant-making at Sinai (Exod. 19:5, 6; Ps. 10:16; Deut. 33:1-5). The reference in Deut. 33:1-5 is to the covenant meal with Israel’s leaders in Exod. 24:1-11. Oehler comments, “The Patriarchs called Him Lord and Shepherd, and it is not until He has formed for Himself a people by bringing Israel up out of Egypt that He is called, Exod. 15:18, “He who is King forever and ever.”[1]
The natural conclusion that one might draw from all of this is that God would occupy the place human kings occupied in other nations (Judges 8:23; 1 Sam. 8; 12:12; 2 Chr. 13:8). This explains the apparent defect in the Mosaic, civil order that no definite office of executive power is appointed at the Exodus period. Oehler comments, “The Mosaic Theocracy presents the peculiar phenomenon of being originally unprovided with a definite office for executing the power of the state.”[2]
The words of McPheeters form a fitting transition to the second assertion.
If the foregoing be a correct account of the idea expressed by the word “theocracy” and particularly if the foregoing be a correct account of the Old Testament representation of God’s relation to, and rule in and over Israel, it follows as a matter of course that the realization of such an idea was only possible within the sphere of what is known as special revelation. Indeed, special revelation of the Divine will, through Divinely chose organs, to Divinely appointed executive agents, is itself, the very essence of the idea of theocracy.”[3]
B) The direct promulgation by special revelation of a specific and detailed civil order is, then, characteristic of the Theocratic order. It is, of course, precisely this divinely revealed civil order that is often in mind when the term, Theocracy is used.
It is interesting in light of the formal assumption of kingship over Israel by Yahweh at Sinai that the giving of this civil law-order occupies a prominent place in the Sinaitic covenant. This becomes clear in all sorts of ways. Deut. 33:1-5 specifically mentions as part and parcel of Yahweh’s kingship “the law that Moses gave us, the possession of the assembly of Jacob.” The contextual reference to the to the law as the possession of “the assembly of Jacob” is a reference to Israel as a formal, civil (as well as religious) entity. Thus, the judicial law is included. The Exodus account confirms this. Immediately after the speaking of the Ten words by God Himself in Exod. 20, but before the ratification of the covenant by blood and the covenant meal in ch. 24 there intervenes the promulgation of the divine, civil law-order of the Theocratic kingdom in chapters 21-23. These chapters epitomize this order. Note Heb. 9:19: “When Moses had proclaimed every commandment of the law to all the people, he took the blood . . .” This statement must mean that, though this civil law-order is later expanded, Exodus chapters 21-23 are its epitome. Deut. 4:5-8 also refers to this order. In this passage it is clear that pre-eminently the civil order is in view. This is clear, first of all, from the fact that it is Israel as a nation-a civil order-contrasted with the other nations which is in view. Further, the terms, “statutes and judgments,” are distinguished in Deuteronomy from the covenant itself (The covenant in this context is essentially the Ten Commandments.) and clearly refer to the detailed civil order to be followed in the land (Deut. 4:12-14, 5:1-3 with 5:30-6:3). This civil order was one of the glories of Theocratic Israel. Isa. 33:22 confesses, “For the LORD is our judge, the LORD is our lawgiver, the LORD is our king; He will save us.”
C) A third characteristic of the Theocracy is the union of church and state in the Theocratic kingdom. Fairbairn marks this idea out as the key idea of the Theocracy:
First, then, in respect to the true idea of the theocracy–wherein stood its distinctive nature? It stood in the formal exhibition of God as King or Supreme Head of the commonwealth, so that all authority and law emanated from Him; and by necessary consequence, there were not two societies in the ordinary sense, civil and religious, but a fusion of the two into one body, or, as we might express it from a modern point of view, a merging together of Church and State.
. . . And this is simply the idea embodied in the Jewish theocracy; it is the fact of Jehovah condescending to occupy, in Israel, such a center of power and authority. He proclaimed Himself “King in Jeshurun.” Israel became the commonwealth with which He more peculiarly associated His presence and His glory. Not only the seat of His worship, but His throne also, was in Zion–both His sanctuary and His dominion.”[4]
Many aspects of the civil law of Israel corroborate this observation. There were civil penalties for religious defection to idolatry and the frequent involvement of the priests and Levites in civil matters (Num. 5:15f., 35; Deut. 19; 21:5). Ceremonial and national restrictions with strong religious overtones were placed upon entrance into the assembly of Israel (Deut. 23:1-8). The seat, center, and focus of both the civil power and the religious worship in Israel were identical. The ark of the covenant in the holy of holies was the throne of Jehovah (1 Sam. 4:4; 2 Sam. 6:2; 2 Kings 19:15; 1 Chr. 13:6; Ps. 80:1; 99:1; Isa. 37:16). This is not surprising. It was in the Tabernacle and later in the Temple that Yahweh dwelt with His people, Israel. If Yahweh was the king of Israel, it follows that the temple must have been His throne (Num. 10:35, 36; Ps. 11:3; Isa. 6:1f.; Ezek. 43:7; Jer. 3:16; 17:[5]). Even the identity of Israel as at one and the same time a “kingdom of priests,” Exod. 19:6, points to the identity of the civil and ecclesiastical establishments since it attributes both royal and priestly status to the “holy nation.”[6]
All this is not to say that there is not an element of separation between the civil and ecclesiastical establishments in Israel. We must not forget the strict separation of the royal and priestly offices. The king and the priest were never to be the same in the Theocratic kingdom (1 Sam. 13:8-14). This points to the ultimate inadequacy of the Old Testament institutions to fulfill the Theocratic ideal. It leaves the uniting point of the Theocratic kingdom even in its fullest Old Testament development in the person of Yahweh. Only in the new age would such inadequacy and imperfection be removed. Of the one who perfectly united the divine and Davidic kingships, it is written: “Behold, a man whose name is Branch for He will build the Temple of the LORD. Yes, it is He who will build the Temple of the LORD, and He who will bear the honor and sit and rule on His throne. Thus, He will be a priest on His throne and the counsel of peace will between the two offices.” (Zech. 6:12, 13)
D) The fourth and concluding perspective in our definition of Theocracy is the Davidic fulfillment and mediation of the Theocratic kingdom.
Though it might have seemed from what we have said previously that a human king in Israel would be a contradiction of the Theocratic ideal, the Old Testament plainly reveals that the divine kingship is vested through the Davidic covenant in the Davidic kings. David’s son and heir is adopted by Yahweh as His son and heir (2 Sam. 7:14; 1 Chr. 17:14; Ps. 89:26-29; 2:2-7).
This point might be vastly illustrated. I can only point you to the plainest evidence. Deut. 17:14-20 contemplates without condemnation the possibility that a human king would be appointed to implement the civil order revealed by Yahweh, King of Israel. The Chronicler has for one of his themes the idea that Yahweh’s kingship is now exercised through the Davidic dynasty. 1 Chr. 17:14 lays the foundation for the development of this theme in its record of the Davidic covenant itself. Through Nathan Yahweh says of David’s son, “But I will settle him in My house and My kingdom forever and his throne shall be established forever.” 1 Chr. 28:5 records the second inauguration of Solomon as king. “Then Solomon sat on the throne of the LORD as king . . .” 2 Chr. 13:8 records Abijah’s speech to Jehoram and all Israel. While Abijah’s historical account may be slanted, the theology of v. 8 is unimpeachable. “So now you intend to resist the kingdom of the Lord through (in the hands of) the sons of David.”
One point must be carefully noted in conclusion. By the Davidic Covenant the Theocratic Kingdom was united to the line of David and the city of Jerusalem (Ps. 78:67-72). The Theocracy was concentrated into God’s choice of David and Zion. It is for their sakes that Judah is spared time and again (1 Kings 11:11-13, 32, 34, 36; 14:21; 15:4; 2 Kings 8:19; 19:34; 20:6). It is in David and Zion that God’s unique kingship over Israel is exercised, that God’s specially revealed civil order is maintained and that the union of the civil and ecclesiastical (the royal and the priestly) institutions are epitomized.
There are certainly aspects of this attempt at a biblical definition of the Theocratic Kingdom which are amenable to Theonomic thought. The promulgation of a specific and detailed, civil law and the union of the ecclesiastical and civil spheres are to be noted in particular. Yet already questions are raised about the relevance of all this for Christians today by features of this definition. First, the idea of the Theocracy is limited to the unique reign of Yahweh over the nation Israel. May the law-order given to them in consequence of this unique, redemptive-historical relationship be extended to all nations and all time? Second, the Theocratic Kingdom is fulfilled and is made concrete through the Davidic Covenant in the reign of David and His sons in Jerusalem. With no divinely authorized son of David reigning on earth and with the earthly Jerusalem long ago destroyed, what is the relevance of such a Theocratic Kingdom for ourselves? This question brings us to a second, major issue with regard to the Theocratic Kingdom.
II.) The Disruption of the Theocratic Kingdom
The data so far presented permits the following definition of the Theocracy. The Theocracy is the nation of Israel as constituted by the institutions and blessings of the Sinaitic and Davidic covenants made with them by Yahweh, their king. The destruction of the Theocracy implies, therefore, nothing less than the destruction of the nation of Israel. It implies the removal of the peculiar institutions and blessings granted to Israel under the Sinaitic covenant and the Davidic covenant. The land, the laws, the temple, the Davidic dynasty, Zion, all are removed in the destruction of the Theocracy.
The disruption of the Theocratic kingdom is a phenomenon which, of course, cries out for an explanation. That explanation is written large across the face of the Old Testament. The blessings of the Sinaitic and Davidic covenants are removed, because the conditions of those covenants have been violated.
Deuteronomy‑-wise in the experience of Kadesh Barnea‑-forecasts the eventual breaking of the Sinaitic covenant by Israel, Deut. 29:25 records the answer to the question, “Why has the LORD done thus to this land?” (v. 24) It is, “Because they forsook the covenant . . .” Therefore “the LORD uprooted them from their land.” Deut. 31:14-22 contains Yahweh’s prophecy that Israel “will forsake me and break My covenant,” “spurn Me and break My covenant,” and they will be “consumed.” (v. 16, 17, 20) The accuracy of this forecast is vindicated in Jeremiah who uses the imagery of divorce (3:1-8, 31:31, 32) and rejected silver (6:27-30) to teach the formal renunciation of Judah in the Exile
The relevant Old Testament literature also records the violation of the Davidic covenant and lays the demise of Judah squarely at the feet of the house of David. Jeremiah specifically denounces the abuses of the Davidic king. The striking thing about these denunciations is the way in which the conduct of the king determines the future of Judah. Jer. 21:11, 12 urges the king to further civil righteousness in order to avoid the wrath of God upon the nation. Jer. 22:1-5 makes the execution of civil justice and the protection of the poor from oppression by the king the determining factor in whether Judah will experience the blessing or the curse. 2 Kings 23:26, 27 relates the ultimate destruction of the city and the temple immediately to the abuses of Mannasseh, the king. The account of the last four Davidic kings reverberates with the reversal of the Davidic blessings. Each king does evil in the sight of Yahweh (2 Kings 23:31, 32, 36, 37; 24:9, 24:19). The temple is plundered twice before its ultimate destruction (2 Chr. 36:7, 10, 18). At least three deportations depopulate the land and the city of Jerusalem (2 Kings 24:10-16, 25:11, 12, Dan. 1:1-7). Finally and climactically, the city and the temple are leveled and the last king of the four hundred year Davidic dynasty is led blind and childless to Babylon.
What must be clearly emphasized in all of this is that the disruption of the Theocratic kingdom was the preceptive will of God. It was no longer God’s revealed will for the people of God to give their political allegiance to a the theocratic, civil order. One of the most striking illustrations of this epochal alteration in the preceptive will of God for the civil conduct of His people is found in Jeremiah’s unprecedented call to fall away or apostatize to the king of Babylon (Jer. 21:8-10; 37:13-15; 38:1-28). This call to fall away is followed up with the advice of Jer. 29:1-7 where the Jews are told to pray for and seek the welfare of the city where they are exiled.
The very theme of the book of Daniel is to emphasize the perspectives which must guide the people of God in this new political situation. One might almost think of Daniel 2:37 as stating one of its main thrusts. It is intended to teach the legitimacy of Nebuchadnezzar’s rule. The terms, kingdom, power, strength, and glory, themselves imply the idea that not mere power, but actual authority has been divinely granted to Nebuchadnezzar.[7] The frequent repetition of this theme in Daniel 4:36, 37, 5:18, 19 also implies this. The parallel use of this terminology in Dan. 7:14, 22, 27 of the kingdom of God also suggests this point. Also relevant is the allusion in Dan. 2:37 to Ps. 8:6-8 and through it to Gen. 1:26, 27 noticed by several of the commentators.[8] This ties Nebuchadnezzar’s rule to the image of God and thereby establishes its validity.
The authority of Gentile kingdoms lasts longer than the initial 70 year period of exile. The restoration after this exile is largely symbolic and does not restore the independence of Judah. The authority given originally to Nebuchadnezzar is passed on to the Gentile kingdom which rule over the Israel of God till the second advent of Christ. This is suggested by the imagery of Daniel 2 and 7. The four Gentile kingdoms (and the number four may have a symbolic significance beyond its admittedly literal significance) are seen as one entity. One awesome symbol of civil authority in the hands of man represents them all. The symbolism of Daniel 2 and 7 reveals, however, that the authority of these Gentile kingdoms is only provisional. Its termination comes when God restores the kingdom to the Son of Man and the saints of the Most High (Dan. 2:44; 7:13, 14, 22, 27). This is a prophecy of nothing less than the restoration of the Theocratic kingdom.
In the meantime the Apostle Paul states what is the preceptive will of God for His people. In Rom. 13:1 he says, “Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God.” The rich redemptive-historical backdrop of this statement is not often appreciated. For it was of the Roman Empire, the fourth and iron kingdom of Dan. 2, of which Paul was originally speaking. The four Gentile kingdoms of Dan. 2 include ultimately all non-Theocratic civil authority ruling over the people of God till the end of the age and the dawning of the Theocratic kingdom. To that authority Paul requires that Christians give submission.
III.) The Restoration of the Theocratic Kingdom
It is the timing and character of the eschatological restoration of the Theocratic Kingdom which must here be addressed. Among evangelical and conservative interpreters of Daniel a sharp cleavage exists on the timing of the coming of the kingdom prophesied in Daniel 2 and 7. In general it is fair to say that Dispensational, Pre-millennial commentators hold to a future restoration associated with the second advent of Christ. Anti-chiliasts and some Pre-millennialists have held that the kingdom of God promised in ch. 2 and 7 came in the events associated with Christ’s first advent.[9] A growing number of evangelical scholars are committed to a synthesis of these views at least insofar as their general perspective regarding the coming of the kingdom.[10] These scholars recognize a tension in the New Testament regarding the coming of the kingdom: an “already” and a “not yet” in the coming of the kingdom. They believe the kingdom prophesied in the Old Testament unfolds itself in two successive stages.
It is in Matthew–the “Jewish” gospel–the gospel of the son of David, in which the term, kingdom, occurs 55 times and the term, king, occurs a further 23 times, that this subject receives its clearest treatment. It is, further, precisely from Matthew that one would expect the clearest teaching on the restoration of the Theocratic kingdom.
It is in Matthew 13 and its seven, great parables of the kingdom that the issue of the coming of the kingdom is most pointedly addressed. Each of these seven parables assumes in one way or another that the coming of the kingdom takes place in two stages. The parable of the tares is, however, most pointed in this regard (Matt. 13:24-30, 37-43). The Kingdom of God comes in two stages. It will come as the eschatological harvest, but it must for that very reason come first as seed-time. Extraordinary as the thought must have seemed to the Jewish mind, until the coming of the eschatological harvest, good and evil men will co-exist in the world in the time of the Kingdom. Astonishingly, the coming of the Kingdom does not mean the immediate destruction of the wicked. The Messiah comes first as sower then as harvester. It is not his will that the wicked be immediately destroyed.
Ridderbos says,
The issue between the servants and the landlord is not the question who is to execute the separation, nor what kind of separation it is to be, but when it will happen. Though the servants desire to carry out an immediate separation, the landlord determines that it shall be postponed till the day of the harvest, for–thus he tells his servants–you might pull out the wheat in gathering the tares….
….Since the kingdom comes like the seed, and since the Son of Man is first the sower (vs. 37) before being the reaper (vs. 41) the last judgment is postponed. The delay is implied in this difference. Whoever sows cannot immediately reap. The postponement of the judgment is determined by the modality of the kingdom of God that has already come with Christ.[11]
Ladd remarks,
The meaning of the parable is clear when interpreted in terms of the mystery of the Kingdom: its present but secret working in the world. The Kingdom has come into history but in such a way that society is not disrupted. The sons of the Kingdom have received God’s reign and entered into its blessings. Yet they must continue to live in this age, intermingled with the wicked in a mixed society. Only at the eschatological coming of the Kingdom will the separation take place. Here is indeed the revelation of a new truth: that the Kingdom of God can actually come into the world, creating sons who enjoy its blessings without effecting the eschatological judgment.[12]
Applying this framework to the interpretation of Daniel and the restoration of the Theocratic kingdom, one obtains the result that a tension exists between the “already” and “not yet” aspects of the restoration of the Theocratic kingdom.
It is possible to construct an impressive argument for the present restoration of the Theocratic kingdom. The motifs of the Davidic covenant find affirmation in many different ways in the NT. David’s son has now been exalted and now exercises all authority in heaven and on earth (Matt. 28:18-20; Eph. 1:20-22; Acts 2:34-36; Rom. 1:3, 4). He reigns in Jerusalem (Gal. 4:26; Heb. 12:22-24). There he occupies David’s throne (Acts 2:30, 31). There is the full unification of the throne of God and of David. He occupies the throne of God himself (Rev. 3:21, 5:1-13) in the temple of God (Heb. 8:1-6).[13] Yet all of this finds its focal point in heaven (Phil. 3:20; Gal. 4:26; Heb. 12:22f.). The NT insists that “we do not yet see all things subjected to him.” (Heb. 2:8f.; 1 Cor. 15:20-28). Premillennialists have been right to insist upon an earthly reign. The meek will inherit and reign upon the earth. (Matt. 5:5, Rev. 5:9, 10) The restoration of the Theocratic kingdom means security under the Davidic king for the people of God (Jer. 23: 5, 6; 33:14-18; Ezek. 34:20-25; 37:24-28). This is by no means the lot of the people of God in the present, evil age (2 Tim. 3:12, Acts 14:22).
Thus it is that we may speak of the heavenly and spiritual inauguration of the Theocratic kingdom. Yet we must never forget that there is an external, earthly manifestation of this kingdom which is crucial to it and is yet to come. This the older anti-Chiliast writers tended to miss or neglect.[14]
Now we come to the crucial, practical upshot of all this. When one is speaking of civil authority, one is speaking of a very earthly and external issue. It is, then the perspective of the “not yet” that is regulative in relation to the subject of civil life. As to earthly, civil authority the Theocratic kingdom is not yet. The eschatological re-gathering of (new) Israel awaits (Mt. 8:11, 12; 24:29-31; Lk. 13:29). The Gentile kingdoms may yet require our submission, because the “times of the Gentiles” continue till the end of the age, a reference to the period of the supremacy of the Gentile powers of Daniel (Luke 21:24).[15] The new Jerusalem in its earthly manifestation is not yet (Rev. 21:1-7). Jesus, Paul, and Peter command submission to Daniel’s fourth kingdom (Matt. 22:15f.; Rom. 13:1f.; 1 Peter 2:13f.). Jesus refuses the offer of civil authority in the days of his flesh (Luke 12:13, 14; Jn. 6:15).
The conclusion must be that in its political and civil dimensions the Theocratic kingdom is not yet on earth. The Church finds itself in a continuation of the “times of the Gentiles” and for this reason the Christian’s duty to the Gentile kingdoms is similar to that of post-Exilic Israel.
IV.) Practical Implications:
The implications of this overview of the destruction and restoration of the Theocratic Kingdom for issues relating to the Christian Reconstruction movement are manifold.
A) The commonality of post-Exilic Israel and the Church in terms of their Relation to Civil Authority.
The data brought forward in this study supports the conclusion that substantial unity and continuity exists between post-Exilic Israel and the Church in the matter of their relation to the Gentile kingdoms. The church as the New Israel inherits Israel’s relation to Gentile authorities and feels their power both in its human and bestial dimensions. C. F. Keil sees the matter clearly, “Accordingly the exile forms a great turning-point in the development of the kingdom of God which He had founded in Israel. With that event the form of the theocracy established at Sinai comes to an end, and then begins the period of the transition to a new form, which was to be established by Christ . . . “[16]
The recognition of the development of a new continuity between Israel and the Church at this point in redemptive history must not disguise the remaining discontinuity. There was a typical and partial restoration of the Theocracy under the Medo-Persian Empire. While Judah was no longer a kingdom, it was a province of the Persian empire and, thus, a civil entity. Within these limitations the Theocratic civil order continued to be enforced with civil penalties and the union of the church and state remained. The NT makes clear that the Church is not in continuity with this partially restored Theocracy (Matt. 21:33-46; Acts 7:1-53 with 6:8-15). It dies under divine judgment shortly after the Church’s establishment.
B) The Non-Theocratic Character of Civil Authority till the Return of Christ.
The first conclusion reminds us that with the expiration of the partially restored Theocratic order all civil authority ceased to be Theocratic in the sense in which we have defined that word in this here. God is no longer the unique king of any civil entity. No nation is now mandated to adhere to a divinely revealed civil order. While the moral principles enshrined in the laws of the Old Covenant remain authoritative, no nation is bound to the detailed, civil order of Old Testament Israel. Add to all of this the destruction of the Temple as the earthly throne of Yahweh and one must also conclude that no longer are church and state a united entity. The redeemed community no longer has a civil structure. Thus, the divine establishment of the Gentile civil authorities means that the separation of the civil and ecclesiastical institutions in human society is now God’s preceptive will. The alteration of this order will be signaled only by the return of Christ.
C) The Divine Establishment of the Gentile, Civil Authorities.
The assertion that no civil authority is now Theocratic definitely does not mean, biblically, that civil authority now stands in no relation or only a negative relation to God. The biblical data clearly establishes the fact that the present, Gentile civil authorities are divinely constituted. It was clear that this fact implies the idea that Gentile authorities are responsible to God and owe Him obedience as civil authorities. More stress is placed in the literature, however, on the duty of the people of God to subject themselves to the government of these rulers. To resist Nebuchadnezzar was to resist God.
The Biblical mandate to render obedience to the Gentile kings sheds light on the extent and character of the duty owed to civil authorities. Of course, no obedience was to be rendered to demands that violated the explicit demands of God. On the other hand, service and obedience was to be rendered to uncovenanted, autocratic, proud, idolatrous, abusive, and often bestial rulers. No fact could speak more eloquently of the truth that our subjection to civil authority is not conditioned on (our estimate of) the way it is being exercised. Bestial demands and behavior may call for disobedience or flight, but they never provide the grounds for violent resistance or rebellion. If Nebuchadnezzar’s self-deifying idolatry and Ahasuerus’ tyranny did not give the right of rebellion, then it is hard to imagine any conditions under which the abuse of civil power would warrant rebellion against “the powers that be.”
Worth mentioning here is the fact that examples of rebellions led by Jews against foreign kings during the time of the Theocracy are not relevant to the issue now being addressed. Shamgar, Samson, and the other saviors sent to deliver Israel from foreign domination lived before the divine transfer of civil authority to the Gentile kings and before the divine destruction of the Theocracy. There is a qualitative redemptive-historical difference between Eglon and Nebuchadnezzar.
D) The Curse-Character of Life under the Gentile kingdoms.
The authority of the Gentile kingdoms originated in covenantal curses and life under them continues and will continue to be a curse to the people of God. The clear prophetic outlook of the word of God is that the bestial character of these kingdoms will continue to characterize them and will finally completely dominate the eschatological manifestation of Gentile authority. This is not to be read as permission to ignore or be indifferent to civil righteousness insofar as it is within our ability to enhance it. Such a conclusion would fly in the face of the totalitarian claims of God and His word. This conclusion does mean, however, that civil authority is not to be made the object of mis-directed hope or consuming attention by the people of God. The mark of the perversion of the Biblical perspective is the re-focusing of hope upon social change. This error pervades modern theologies of social change. The true hope of the people of God is the re-establishment of the Theocratic kingdom. This, as the Scripture declares, will be the achievement not of civil reformation but of cataclysmic and supernatural divine intervention. The application of this observation to Theonomic Postmillenialism is obvious. It must be expanded when we come to deal with the eschatological expectations of Christian reconstruction.
E) The Central Importance of the Church for the Work of the Kingdom.
The entire theological perspective enumerated in this study warrants the conclusion that the energies and responsibilities of the Kingdom center on the Church in this age. The Theocratic Kingdom is present only in the redemptive task of the church not in the conservative task of the state. Therefore, labor for the Kingdom, must not place an equal importance on ecclesiastical and civil matters. The dominion mandate must not be set alongside the Great Commission as its equal nor may it be seen as its real content. The Church (and its task) is the exclusive focus of kingdom endeavor in this age. The theocratic kingdom is now present not in visible or political form, but in spiritual and ecclesiastical form.
F) This study of the Theocratic Kingdom leads us to expect that the judicial laws which were part and parcel of the Theocratic Kingdom would receive a distinctive application in the New Testament.
Specifically, this treatment would lead us to expect that they would be applied (1) to the eschatological restoration of the Theocratic Kingdom in the age to come and (2) to the ecclesiastical manifestation of the Theocratic Kingdom in this age. As a matter of fact further examination of the New Testament in the next part of this study will confirm this hypothesis.
Implicit in this application of the judicial laws is a reality that must be stated explicitly. The restoration of the Theocratic Kingdom at the end of the age is not the restoration of the same, old Theocratic Kingdom. Rather, the kingdom is restored in a glorified and transfigured form. The old kingdom sustained a typical relation to the glorious kingdom to come. Thus, there should be no expectation that in the coming kingdom the judicial laws of Israel would receive an exact and literal application. Thus, it is even more clear that no such literal and wooden use of the judicial law is appropriate in the present, ecclesiastical manifestation of the kingdom. How much less is such an application appropriate to the uncovenanted, Gentile kingdoms.
[1]ibid.
[2]Loc. cit.
[3]W. M. McPheeters, International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, ed. J. Orr, V. Wilmington, AP&A, n. d., p. 2965.
[4]Patrick Fairbairn, The Typology of Scripture, II, Evangelical Press, 1975, pp. 418, 419.
[5]Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, “Theocracy”, p. 617
[6]Brown, Driver, Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, attributes the meaning, priest-king, to MAMLEKAH COHENIM here. The LXX translates “hierateuma“, royal priest-hood, and this rendering is adopted in the N. T., 1 Pet. 2:9. Others references to this phrase in the N. T. further substantiate this translation (Rev. 1:6, 5:10).
[7]Cf. BDB in loc.
[8]Young, op. cit., p. 73. Cf. also
Joyce Baldwin, Daniel, Inter-varsity Press, 1978, p. 93.
[9]Wood, op. cit., p. 72f.
[10]Fairbairn, op. cit., pp. 440f.
[11]Ridderbos, op. cit., p. 137
[12]Ladd, op. cit., p. 97
[13]Cf. G. E. Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, Herman Ridderbos, The Coming of the Kingdom, Anthony Hoekema, The Bible and the Future, Geerhardus Vos, Pauline Eschatology.
[14]Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 441.
[15]Exegetical facts which encourage this identification are the allusions to Daniel in the surrounding context of this phrase, 21:20 and 27, and the linguistic parallels between the use of kairoi here and its frequent use in Daniel with reference to the Gentile kingdoms (Dan. 2:21; 7:25; 9:26, 27).
[16]Murray, op. cit., pp. 253, 25
Sam Waldron
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 11:47:15 GMT -5
The Historical Background of Theonomic Ethics
Two major questions need to be asked here. They are …
Is the Theonomic view of the Mosaic “Judicial Law” consistent with the Reformed tradition?
Is the Theonomic viewpoint the legitimate offspring of Reformed paedobaptism?
1.) Is the Theonomic view of the Mosaic “Judicial Law” consistent with the Reformed tradition?
A.) The Reformed Tradition
This is a pressing question for Theonomists. On the one hand, in asserting “the abiding validity of the law in exhaustive detail” they appear to teach the binding obligation of the “judicial law” of Moses on society today.
[1] On the other hand, the divines of the Westminster Assembly and Calvin, their mentor, clearly teach the “expiration” of the judicial law of Moses and deny that it is as such binding on nations today. The critical statement in the Westminster Confession of Faith is found in 19:4. Having clearly distinguished the moral, ceremonial, and judicial law, the Confession states, “To them also, as a body politic, He gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the State of that people; not obliging any other now, further than the general equity thereof may require.”
[2] Calvin elaborates on this very point in his Institutes. His statements are so similar to that of the Confession that it is probable that here as in so many other places he had a formative impact on the Confession.
I will briefly remark, however, by the way, what laws it may piously use before God, and be rightly governed by among men. And even this I would have preferred passing over in silence, if I did not know that it is a point on which many persons run into dangerous errors. For some deny that a state is well constituted, which neglects the polity of Moses, and is governed by the common laws of the nations. the dangerous and seditious nature of this opinion I leave to the examination of others; it will be sufficient for me to have evinced it to be false and foolish. Now, it is necessary to observe that common distinction, which distributes all the laws of God promulgated by Moses into moral, ceremonial, and judicial; and these different kinds of laws are to be distinctly examined, that we may ascertain what belongs to us, and what does not ….
What I have said will be more clearly understood, if in all laws we properly consider these two things-the constitution of the law and its equity, on the reason of which the constitution itself is founded and rests. Equity, being natural, is the same to all mankind; and consequently all laws, on every subject ought to have the same equity for their end. Particular enactments and regulations being connected with circumstances, and partly dependent upon them, may be different in different cases without any impropriety, provided they are all equally directed to the same object of equity …. Whatever laws shall be framed according to that rule, directed to that object, and limited to that end, there is no reason why we should censure them, however, they may differ from the Jewish law or from each other. The law of God forbids theft. What punishment was enacted for thieves, among the Jews, may be seen in the book of Exodus. The most ancient laws of other nations punished theft by requiring a compensation of double the value. Subsequent laws made a distinction between open and secret theft. Some proceeded to banishment, some to flagellation, and some to the punishment of death. False witness was punished, among the Jews, with the same punishment as such testimony would have caused to be inflicted on the person against whom it was given; in some countries it was punished with infamy, in others with hanging, in others with crucifixion. All laws agree in punishing murder with death, though in several different forms. The punishment of adulterers in different countries have been attended with different degrees of severity. Yet we see how, amidst this diversity, they are all directed to the same end. For they all agree in denouncing punishment against those crimes which are condemned by the eternal law of God; such as murderers, thefts, adulteries, false testimonies, though there is not a uniformity in the mode of punishment; and, indeed, this is neither necessary, nor even expedient. . . . For the objection made by some, that it is an insult to the law of God given by Moses, when it is abrogated, and other laws preferred to it, is without any foundation; for neither are other laws preferred to it, when they are more approved, not on a simple comparison, but on account of the circumstances of time, place, and nation; nor do we abrogate that which was never given to us. For the Lord gave not that law by the hand of Moses to be promulgated among all nations, and to be universally binding; but after having taken the Jewish nation into his special charge, patronage, and protection, he was pleased to become, in peculiar manner, their legislator, and, as became a wise legislator, in all the laws which he gave them, he had a special regard to their peculiar circumstances.”
[3]If we are permitted to exegete the Westminster Confession by means of its admitted historical precedents, there need be no doubt that it is not a Theonomic document. How anyone in the sixteenth century could have stated more clearly theoretical disagreement with modern, Theonomic perspectives than Calvin has in the above quotation, it is impossible to imagine.
[4] Research into the views of the Puritans themselves only serves to confirm this exegesis.
[5]B.) The Theonomist Response
Theonomists respond to this apparent conflict with the recognized standards of the Reformed tradition in various and contradictory ways.
Rushdoony’s response is perhaps the most honest and certainly the most straightforward. At the same time, however, it is also the most arrogant. He unflinchingly admits the contradiction and then accuses the Confession of “confusion” and “nonsense” and charges Calvin with uttering “heretical nonsense.”
[6]Other Theonomists have not been so eager to take on the Reformed tradition and have manifested more reverence for its perspectives. At the same time, they appear to have infringed historical honesty and literary clarity.
Bahnsen at the opposite extreme from Rushdoony in this matter argues that his thesis is in accord with the Confession. (As an Orthodox Presbyterian Church minister, we would expect Bahnsen either to do this or to exit the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, since that denomination holds the Westminster Confession of Faith.) What Bahnsen gains by this in proper veneration for the Reformed tradition, he loses in literary clarity. It is vexingly difficult to penetrate his thinking at this point. The confession asserts the “expiration” and “non-obligation” of the judicial laws with the qualification “further than the general equity thereof may require.” Bahnsen in his appendix dealing with the Westminster Confession seeks to view the distinction implicit here as a distinction between “the particular cultural expression of a judicial law” and the law itself in its cross-cultural general equity.
7]Fowler’s assessment appears to be accurate.
What Dr. Bahnsen is actually saying is that the connotations of Israel’s ancient culture are no longer binding in today’s culture. But the case laws are illustrations to be applied equitably to today’s culture.
There is no doubt, therefore, that for Dr. Bahnsen, “general equity” does not refer to general moral principles underlying the case laws (i. e. the scope of the Ten Commandments). He is not saying that the case laws are no longer binding. Instead, “general equity” refers to the case laws, minus their cultural expressions, which are to be applied in an equitable manner cross-culturally in today’s society.
Dr. Bahnsen’s view of general equity stands in contrast to Reformed thought. This is one of the distinctives of Dr. Bahnsen’s view of the judicial law.(pp. 24, 25).
[8]As Fowler says, this view of the expiration of the judicial law does not satisfy the language of the Confession. To put it plainly, where the Confession speaks of the expiration of the judicial law as given to Israel as a body politic, Bahnsen speaks merely of the passing of its “particular cultural expression.”
James Jordan, writing in the Journal of Christian Reconstruction,
[9] takes yet another approach to this problem. Jordan argues that the Westminster Confession is ambiguous with reference to the distinctive position of Theonomy.
[10] Two salient features of Jordan’s article may be noted.
First, Jordan regards the very classification, “judicial law” as ambiguous.
[11] Richard Flinn writing in the same issue of this journal seconds this opinion when he asserts (p. 55).
There is a perplexing problem of historical interpretation here, which in our day is causing some worthy men to engage in rather vain polemics. In the face of the political, economic, and social theory enunciated from the Scriptures by the Chalcedon Foundation, some in the neo-Puritan movement have argued that the doctrine of the continuity of the case law and its relevance for the church, state, family, and society was never part of Calvinistic and Puritan tradition. The dispute arises partly because of the ambiguity of the Puritans on this matter. There was some discussion amongst them on exactly how far the judicial law of Moses was to be carried over. The doctrine of the continuity of the case law was not articulated, to my knowledge, in a fully self-consistent, self-conscious form. But the case law did form the bedrock of the Puritans’ outlook on society, as we will demonstrate below from Rutherford. To declare that the doctrine of the continuing relevance of the case law was never part of Puritan theology is errant nonsense, but I readily grant that it had not been developed as consistently by them as it has been in our day by men like Rushdoony, Bahnsen, and others of the Chalcedon Foundation.
[12]This is a most significant point. For since the Westminster Confession presents its whole treatment of the law in terms of the moral, ceremonial, judicial distinction
[13] these comments amount to a concession of a distinct departure from the conceptual framework of the Confession.
The second salient feature of Jordan’s argument is to stress the multi-faceted practical agreement between Theonomy and Calvin and Westminster as to the application of the Mosaic Judicial Law to society. Undoubtedly, such agreement exists. The Confession and Calvin did agree with Theonomy with reference to such issues as the relation of church and state. Calvin seems as well to have argued in favor of the death penalty for adultery later in his life.
[14]Such argumentation has, however, a fatal flaw. Practical agreement is not the same as theoretical agreement. Jordan virtually admits this when he concedes that Calvin did not “advocate the Mosaic judicials.”
[15] Fowler is right, then, when he argues:It is one thing to say that certain crimes or offenses against the law of God still deserve the death penalty meted out in the Old Testament, it is another thing to say that the Old Testament judicial law is binding in exhaustive detail! . . . In their incidental applications of particular laws, they may be alike therefore, but in the foundation of their respective systems, they are completely different! It is the foundation, not the incidentals that matters.
[16]C.) The Proper Conclusions
It is clear that major spokesmen for Theonomy are in profound disagreement on the subject of the relation of modern Theonomy to the historical Reformed touchstone of the Westminster Confession. Rushdoony admits the contradiction. Bahnsen attempts to eliminate but loses clarity of presentation in doing so. Jordan and Flinn find the Westminster Confession ambiguous in terms of the thought of modern Theonomy. This state of confusion among Theonomists in itself eloquently and poignantly suggests their deviation from the Reformed tradition.
Three things at least distinguish Theonomy from the Reformed tradition.
First, Theonomists challenge as errant or ambiguous the moral/judicial distinction. Second, Theonomists proceed from a new (or novel) case law view of the judicial law. Third, Theonomists emphasize that the judicial law is abidingly valid, whereas the Confession sees it as “expired.”
2.) Is the Theonomic viewpoint the legitimate offspring of Reformed paedobaptism?
If Theonomy departs from the Reformed view of the “judicial law” the question is raised, From what in the Reformed tradition does it originate? Clearly, Theonomy has arisen from within the general confines of the Reformed tradition. What, then, is its historical antecedent in that theological tradition. Though in the nature of the case absolute proof may not be offered for his conviction, this writer is convinced that the logical starting-point for Theonomic thought in the Reformed tradition is to be found in paedobaptism and the logic by which it was and is supported in the Reformed tradition. In other words, Theonomy is simply the hermeneutic of paedobaptism consistently applied to the relation of Israel and the Church, the Old Testament and the New Testament. A number of considerations may be brought forward which commend this diagnosis of the Theonomic symptoms.
First, paedobaptist logic is committed to restricting the discontinuity between the Old Covenant and the New Covenant to a very superficial level and at the same time emphasizing the continuity between them to the point of practical identity. In order to facilitate the introduction of paedobaptism, baptism and circumcision are equated as closely as possible. This tendency to discount the discontinuity of and the diversity between baptism and circumcision is precisely the tendency of Theonomy in regard to the “judicial law” of Israel as it applies it to the modern state.
Second, even more cogently it may be argued that Reformed Paedobaptist thought treats Old Testament Israel as the paradigm for the New Testament Church and its baptism. Theocratic Israel is the model for the Church. Clearly, it seems to this writer, that is precisely the methodology of Theonomy in economic and political theology. Theonomy, if it is anything, is the erecting of the theocracy into a model for modern economics and politics. This is in fact precisely what Bahnsen says.
The civil precepts of the Old Testament (standing “judicial” laws) are a model of perfect social justice for all cultures, even in the punishment of criminals. . . “All of the statutes” revealed by Moses for the covenant nation were a model to be emulated by the non-covenantal nations as well . . .
[17]Third, Baptists in the Reformed tradition have long argued that Reformed Paedobaptists are (happily) inconsistent in their general refusal to practice paedocommunion. Paedobaptists, they have argued, use the theocratic model for baptism, but not for communion. Theonomists, however, are among the leading advocates in the recent Reformed movement for paedocommunion. Rushdoony,
[18] North,
[19] Jordan,
[20] though not Bahnsen,
[21] vehemently argue for paedocommunion. In so doing they are simply being consistent in their paedobaptist logic.
The consistency, however, must be extended further. In bringing the Reformed tradition into strict conformity to the paedobaptist logic and the theocratic model, one must not only practice paedocommunion, but also adopt the judicial law as normative for the modern state. By doing this the “ambiguity” in the Westminster Confession is eliminated. For, it seems to this writer, the Confession and the Reformed tradition have been ambiguous in their adoption of the theocratic model at some points and not at others. To make the Reformed tradition “consistently Presbyterian,” the Theonomists eliminate those aspects of that tradition which have, in fact, been implicitly Baptist.
Fourth, in further confirmation of our suspicion-thesis that Theonomy is ultimately paedobaptist in its origins is the choice of the Tyler Theonomists as to their first volume in the Christianity and Civilization symposiums. Its title tells us all we need to know. It is entitled The Failure of the American Baptist Culture.
[22]Fifthly, one further similarity between Paedobaptismand Theonomy may be mentioned. Paedobaptist apologetes are unable to generate a unified perspective in defense of paedobaptism. Rather considerable diversity is the result of the attempt to provide a biblical justification of paedobaptism. Similarly, Theonomy as documented previously results in tremendous disagreement and debate in its practical application. We are convinced that the reason for this divisive tendency in both cases is the inherent inadequacies of the Theocratic model as a paradigm for either the Church or the State in the present age.
It is, then, the contention of this assessment that Theonomists have seen a very clear problem in the Reformed tradition, its ambiguity regarding theocratic Israel as a model for modern society, church, and state. They have, however, chosen the wrong direction in removing that ambiguity. Instead of attempting to make Reformed Theology consistently Paedobaptist, they should have argued for making it consistently Baptist. In refusing this alternative and opting for the theocratic model, we are convinced that they are on a theological road which can–consistently taken –lead by way of paedocommunion only to externalism and formalism. The frightening thing is that Theonomy has manifested a dogmatic commitment to following its premises to their logical conclusions–no matter how awful!
[1]Bahnsen, op. cit., p xxix
[2]Westminster Confession of Faith, (The Publications Committee of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland,1970), p. 81
[3]John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, (Vol II, ed. John Allen, (Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, n.d), pp. 787, 788, 789-791 (4:20: 14, 16)
[4]Cf. the article by Robert Godfrey entitled “Calvin and Theonomy” (pp. 299f.) in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, ed. by W. Robert Godfrey and William S. Barker, (Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 1990).
[5]Sinclair B. Ferguson in an excellent and detailed article in Theonomy: A Reformed Critique, ed. by W. Robert Godfrey and William S. Barker, (Zondervan, Grand Rapids, 1990) entitled, “An Assembly of Theonomists? The Teaching of the Westminster Divines on the Law of God” (pp. 315ff.) has shown with precise and exhaustive Puritan scholarship the contradiction between 19:4 of the Westminster Confession and modern Theonomy.
[6]Rushdoony, Institutes, pp. 9, 550, 551
[7]Bahnsen, op. cit., pp. 540, 541
[8] Paul B. Fowler, God’s Law Free From Legalism, pp. 24, 25 (Privately Distributed)
[9]James Jordan, The Journal of Christian Reconstruction, “Calvinism and the “Judicial Law of Moses” an Historical Survey,” (Winter, 1978-79; vol. v, no. 2) p. 175.
[10]Ibid., p. 43
[11]Ibid., p. 21
[12]Richard Flinn, The Journal of Christian Reconstruction, “Rutherford and Puritan Political Theory,” (Winter, 1978-79; vol. v, no. 2) p. 55
[13]Westminster Confession of Faith, p. 79f.
[14]Jordan, op. cit., pp. xvii, xviii
[15]Ibid, p. 25
[16]Fowler, op. cit., p. 46
[17]Bahnsen, op. cit., pp. xvii, xviii
[18]Rushdoony
[19]North
[20]North
[21]James Jordan, “Theses on Paedocommunion,” The Geneva Papers, special edition (from Geneva Divinity School, 1982)
[22]The Failure of the American Baptist Culture, ed. James B. Jordan (The Geneva Divinity School, 1982)
Sam Waldron
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 11:49:15 GMT -5
Theonomy: A Reformed Baptist Assessment
The Sources of Theonomic Development
It is not my goal to provide a thorough overview of Christian Reconstruction. Others have done this well. ((For a personal, interesting, and much more extensive introduction to Christian Reconstruction, see H. Wayne House’s and Tommy Ice’s Dominion Theology: Blessing or Cuse, (Multnomah, Portland, 1988), pp. 13f. )) Something must be said, however, about the basic sources of this movement (and of this assessment) and the major tenets of Theonomy or Christian Reconstruction.
I. Basic Sources
A. Rousas J. Rushdoony
Theonomy, or as it is also called, Christian Reconstruction, has for its father R. J. Rushdoony and his prolific pen. Among his many books, the most important ones are, first and foremost, The Institutes of Biblical Law and his brief treatment entitled, The Meaning of Postmillennialism: God’s Plan for Victory. Rushdoony ascribes to Cornelius Van Til the greatest influence on his thinking. Rushdoony is the master influence in three Theonomic organs: The Chalcedon Foundation, “The Journal of Reconstruction,” and a newsletter entitled “The Chalcedon Report.” ((Peter J. Leithart, “An Interview with Dr. R.J. Rushdoony,” The Counsel of Chalcedon (Sept. 1985): 14-17))
B. Greg Bahnsen
It is probably due to Mr. Bahnsen that Christian Reconstructionism owes the name, Theonomy. His Theonomy in Christian Ethics, with a foreword by Rushdoony, is perhaps the single most influential and controversial of the Theonomic literature. He is also well-known for his book, Homosexuality: A Biblical View. This book illustrates what is best from the Theonomic perspective. Mr. Bahnsen is now an Orthodox Presbyterian Church minister in California. He graduated from Westminster Theological Seminary and was formerly the Professor of Apologetics at Reformed Theological Seminary (RTS) in Jackson, Mississippi. Though a fine apologist in the presuppositional school of thought, he was dismissed from RTS in a dispute over Theonomy. The Covenant Tape Ministry distributes tapes of his teaching.
C. Gary North
Gary North was formerly editor of the “Journal of Christian Reconstruction.” He is the editor of numerous works, including, The Theology of Christian Resistance and The Tactics of Christian Resistance. He is the author of a popularization of Christian Reconstruction entitled, Unconditional Surrender: God’s Program for Victory, as well as Backward Christian Soldiers and volume 1 of an economic commentary on the Bible entitled The Dominion Covenant: Genesis. He also contributed to The Failure of the American Baptist Culture, edited by James B. Jordan.
These are probably the most well-known Christian Reconstructionists. There are, however, several other prolific spokesmen for the Theonomic movement. Among them may be mentioned David Chilton, Gary Demar, Peter Leithart, Ray Sutton, Joe Kickasola, Joseph C. Morecraft III, and at one time James B. Jordan.
II. Major Tenets
The Christian Reconstructionists have defined the major tenets of their system. They are presuppositional apologetics, predestination, their view of the abiding validity of the law in exhaustive detail, and postmillennialism. North writes,
Mr. Clapp lists three key doctrines of the Reconstructionists: presuppositional apologetics, biblical law, and postmillennialism. He left out one crucial doctrine: predestination. These were the four that David Chilton and I listed in our essay. “Apologetics and Strategy” in Christianity and Civilization 3 (1983). ((Gary North, Honest Reporting as Heresy: My Response to Christianity Today (Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1987), 7. North and the Tyler Theonomists have attempted to add a fifth major tenet, the covenant concept as the key to the Bible, history, and Christian living, but there is not general agreeemtn among Theonomists about this. Cf. the citation in this footnote.))
As we begin a preliminary assessment of Theonomy, we will comment further on these self-confessed distinctives of Christian Reconstruction.
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 11:50:54 GMT -5
Theonomy: A Reformed Baptist Assessment. Pt.3
The Challenges of Critiquing Theonomy
I. The Necessity of Honesty
There is peculiar danger in caricaturing Christian Reconstructionism. This is aptly illustrated by the recent article in “Christianity Today” by Rodney Clapp and the rebuttal written by Gary North. They have entitled “Democracy as Heresy” and “Honest Reporting as Heresy: My Response to Christianity Today.”[1]
Several misconceptions of the teaching of Christian Reconstructionism do exist, and the Theonomic perspective seems unusually susceptible to misunderstanding. Some of these misconceptions are:
— Theonomists do not believe in the separation of church and state.
— Theonomists want to impose Christian government on the U. S. by force and revolution.
— Theonomists are seeking a one-world Christian government.
— Theonomists believe that the Mosaic Law should be the constitution of every nation.
— Theonomists believe that we are saved by the law.
— Theonomists believe that a terrible crisis will usher in the millennial period in the next few years.
Compare for other misconceptions Bahnsen’s Preface to the Second Edition of Theonomy.[2] Some of these beliefs may be held in some form by an occasional Theonomists. Yet even in those cases, none of these ideas is better than a half-truth. None are warranted as general characterizations of Theonomy by a fair assessment of their literature.
Why is Theonomy so susceptible to misunderstanding? Two reasons may be given. First, the Theonomists themselves are frequently guilty of violent or extreme rhetoric in their writings which gives unnecessary occasion for misunderstanding. Father Rushdoony set the course in this regard by charging Calvin with “heretical nonsense,”[3] the Westminster Confession with “confusion” and “nonsense,”[4] and those tainted with Pietism with being “nothing people, pious poops.”[5] North also illustrates this tendency by calling Meredith C. Kline and millions of other Christians “full-time Christian antinomians.”[6] He also offends by such descriptions as these of the Third World when he writes,
He is correct when he cites me as saying that the poverty of the Third World stems from its commitment to socialism and outright demonism. I have said that these societies are cursed. I would now add that the depopulation of central Africa from AIDS is a direct judgment of God on the universal promiscuity of these nations. God will not be mocked.[7]
James B. Jordan is known as a Theonomist, but in a letter to me, he states, “I do not consider myself a Theonomist.” Later he describes himself as a “borderline C[hristian] R[econstructionists].” Jordan states in the same letter, “I agree with you regarding the extreme rhetoric of many Christian Reconstructionists, and I have criticized it in print.”[8]
The second reason which may be given for the frequent misrepresentation of Theonomy is that the position they are advocating runs completely against the grain of 20th century American thinking. Though it is no doubt true that they throw around the charge of “antinomianism” with undue frequency, the fact is that most American and evangelical thinking in our day is grossly sub-Biblical in its view of the law. Frequently one’s reaction to those seeking to refute Theonomy is to feel more sympathy for the Theonomists than those attempting to refute their supposed heresies. Even at those points where one is disposed to disagree with them, for instance, in their advocacy of civil punishment for public blasphemy or idolatry, the fact is that revered fathers in the Reformed faith agree with them, not the modern consensus. Further, the modern consensus against such things–no matter how much we may agree with it in practice–is often defended or based on ways of thinking that undermine basic truths of Christianity.
II. The Problem of Diversity
One major difficulty in critiquing Theonomy is the diversity of thought within the ranks of Christian Reconstructionists. One must be careful not to treat some particular application of the Mosaic Law, for instance, as standard among all Theonomists. There is substantial difference of opinion among “Theonomists” as to the specific application of Old Testament laws. Bahnsen makes this point in the Preface to the Second Edition of his Theonomy.
Our outline of the Theonomic perspective indicates that it pertains to fundamental, underlying ethical principles and is not, as such, committed to distinctive interpretations and applications of the Old Testament moral directives. In the nature of the case, these principles leave plenty of room for disagreements in Biblical exegesis (for prescriptive premises), observation of the world (for factual premises), and reasoning (for logically drawing an application). Thus Theonomists will not necessarily agree with each other’s every interpretation and ethical conclusion. For instance, many (like myself) do not affirm R. J. Rushdoony’s view of the dietary laws, Gary North’s view of home mortgages, James Jordan’s stance on automatic infant communion (without sessional examination), or David Chilton’s attitudes toward bribery and “ripping off” the unbeliever. Nevertheless, all share the basic perspective reflected in the above ten propositions.[9]
North distances himself from certain of Rushdoony’s peculiarities:
So far as I know, all of the younger Reconstructionists reject Mr. Rushdoony’s Armenian (note not Arminian) view of the patriarchal family (p. 19). This is a major area of disagreement within the Reconstructionist camp. The “Tyler Group,” as well as Greg Bahnsen, holds to the biblical nuclear family, where the departure of sons and daughters to set up new covenantal family units (Gen. 2:24) establishes a clear covenantal break with parents. No man will tolerate living in his father’s household with his wife and children unless forced to by custom or economics. Another Armenian church practice that the article refers to is the practice of sacrificing animals at the door of the church, which Rushdoony discusses in The Institutes of Biblical Law, pp. 782-3. Unquestionably, we in Tyler would utterly reject such a practice as heretical throwback to Old Testament “shadows” that were completely fulfilled by the death and resurrection of Christ. It is our rejection of what Mr. Clapp correctly identifies as Rushdoony’s “Armenian Connection” that ultimately led to the split in the Reconstructionist camp: Tyler vs. Vallecito.[10]
It is also well-known that Bahnsen as a believer in the Christian Sabbath[11] disagrees with North’s vitriolic attack on this doctrine.[12] In fairness, therefore, to Theonomy one must distinguish their basic perspectives and their necessary applications from the particular applications or aberrations of individual writers.
III. The Difficulty of Volume
One cannot but be impressed by the enormous volume of literature that Christian Reconstructionism is spawning and much of it is composed of technical theological writings. To make concrete the monumental size of the task, let it be noted that simply reading Rushdoony’s Institutes and Bahnsen’s Theonomy would mean reading well in excess of 2000 pages of technical theology. The sheer volume of literature is another difficulty standing in the way of accurate assessment.
IV. The Urgency of the Study
One cannot, however, ignore the Christian Reconstructionists in the hope that they will go away because of these difficulties. There is every indication that they are commanding more and more support and allegiance, or at least are having a formative impact on many prominent Christian leaders. Two prominent leaders who have felt their impact are, in fact, Pat Robertson and D. James Kennedy. In most, if not all, of the conservative Presbyterian and Reformed denominations, Theonomy is a very live issue. Bahnsen elaborately documents the debate stirred by his book alone in his Preface to the Second Edition of Theonomy.[13]
House and Ice summarize the necessity of their critique of Christian Reconstruction by the following statements. They apply with intensified propriety to those who, unlike House and Ice, identify themselves with historic, Reformed theology.
The Reconstructionists cannot be dismissed as a passing, therefore irrelevant, side-current on the course of evangelical thought. As will be discussed later, the Reconstructionists have garnered support from such disparate groups as old-time fundamentalists, charismatics, and some members of the evangelical intelligentsia….
The Christian Reconstruction movement deserves analysis because of its thoughtful, startling, and thorough challenge to contemporary evangelicalism and American life generally. Its views must be considered with care by what Thomas Jefferson called a “candid world.”[14]
V. The Danger of Overreaction
The clear and present danger of overreacting to Theonomy has already been clearly illustrated in Calvinistic Baptist circles. Carl W. Bogue writing in the “Covenanter Witness,” reminds us of this danger:
At the 1980 Council of Baptist Theology, Ronald McKinney, Jon Zens, and others known as Reformed Baptists charted a new course, denying their previously held commitment to covenant theology. McKinney and Zens told me privately what McKinney repeated in his opening address, namely, their conviction that covenant theology would of necessity lead to the doctrines of infant baptism and Theonomy. Since they were convinced these were wrong, they repudiated covenant theology.[15]
One must face the issue of Theonomy now before it is faced in the crucible of the pastorate or other forms of church leadership. When one sees it creating division and disaster in the church or danger for the individual sheep, as it has in many cases, it is easy under the pressure of the pastorate to overreact theologically. If, however, we overreact to Theonomy, we may well throw out several babies with the bath water.
VI. The Expression of Appreciation
It would be imbalanced and out of due perspective, if it were not noted that at a number of points those who embrace a “Theonomic” perspective are to be commended. As the previous delineation of the major tenets of Theonomy make clear, there is much with which one can find agreement in their writings. We wholeheartedly embrace both the Reformed doctrine of predestination and the consistently Reformed apologetic known as presuppositionalism. Furthermore, one cannot but appreciate the high supernaturalist, inerrancy view of Scripture so straightforwardly embraced and exemplified in their writings, especially when it is contrasted with that found in Neo-orthodox and Neo-evangelical writings. Further, no one with a Reformed bone in their body can fail to appreciate the consistent emphasis on the sovereign prerogatives of God and His Word over every area of human life, whether it be civil, economic, or some other area.
Other areas of appreciation and agreement will be enunciated later. Though these points of agreement do not alleviate our deep concern over the points with which we differ, they do put into perspective the critique we are about to engage.
VII. The Areas of Criticism
Having warned the student of the various pitfalls surrounding an evaluation of Theonomy and placed the present critique into perspective, it is now necessary to articulate two areas that are to be addressed critically in this assessment of Theonomy. Four tenets of Christian Reconstruction were delineated above. Only two of those tenets are distinctive of the movement. Only those two will come up for particular criticism in this assessment. Speaking generally those areas are their distinctive postmillennialism and their distinctive view of biblical law. We shall describe those two areas as Theonomic Ethics and Theonomic Postmillenialism.
VIII.The Method of Approach
Both of the two areas just mentioned are intimately related to the subject of the Theocratic Kingdom of Israel. It is clearly the perpetuity of the social ethics of the Theocratic Kingdom which form the distinctive heart of Theonomic Ethics. A cursory knowledge of the debate over Theonomy makes clear that it centers upon the subject of the judicial law of Israel. Theonomy has focused its attention on the cultural, economic, and, therefore, political applications of the law of Israel. This, however, specifically confronts us with the subject of the Theocratic Kingdom of Israel and its place in redemptive history.
Furthermore, it is the renewed glory of the Theocratic Kingdom which forms the grand goal and focus of Theonomic Postmillennialism. Yet further, as we shall see, Theonomic Ethics and Theonomic Postmillennialism are connected for Christian Reconstructionists. By way of Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 28 obedience to Theonomic Ethics is by Theonomists made the cause of which Theonomic Postmillennialism is the effect. For these reasons, there is no more foundational issue for the right assessment of Christian Reconstruction than the subject of the Theocratic Kingdom in redemptive history.
Any more than superficial acquaintance with the Bible vindicates the assertion that the Bible is the chronicle of and commentary upon God’s redemptive activity in history. The Bible is not first of all a systematic theology, catechism, or an ethical code. It is redemptive history. This is very significant for our purposes because by asking about the place of the Theocratic Kingdom in redemptive history we inquire about that which is at the heart of the Bible. Does the redemptive history revealed to us in the Bible permit the idea that the law of the theocratic Kingdom of Israel and in particular its judicial law remains abidingly valid in exhaustive detail in the present phase of redemptive history? Does the redemptive history revealed in the Bible allow for the possibility that millennial blessings of the Theocratic type expected by Theonomy await the church before the return of Christ? When the questions are put this way, it becomes clear that nothing is more important in weighing Theonomy than a penetrating understanding of redemptive history as it is presented and structured in the Bible.
This assessment will, therefore, commence by endeavoring to lay the foundation of a proper understanding of the Theocratic Kingdom in redemptive history. This foundation will then be applied and elaborated in a consideration of Theonomic Ethics and Theonomic Postmillennialism. This positive method of approach will be characteristic of this assessment as a whole. We will endeavor to set forth the positive teaching of the Bible about these matters and allow that teaching to call into question the peculiarities of Christian Reconstruction.
[1]Rodney Clapp, “Democracy as Heresy,” Christianity Today,(Feb. 20, 1987), pp. 17-23; Gary North, “Honest Reporting as Heresy…”
[2]Greg Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian Reformed Publishing Company, 1984), pp. xx-xxi
[3]Rousas J. Rushdoony, The Institutes of Biblical Law (Craig Press, 1976), p. 9
[4] Ibid, p. 551
[5]Rousas J. Rushdoony, The Meaning of Postmillennialism: God’s Plan for Victory, (Fairfax, Virginia, Thoburn Press, 1977), p. 37
[6]North, Op. Cit., p. 6
[7]Ibid, p. 5
[8]He is referring to his article in The Geneva Review, January, 1986, “Tough Talk,” James B. Jordan, pp. 1, 2.
[9]Bahnsen, Op. Cit., p. xix
[10]North, Op. Cit., p. 6
[11]Bahnsen, Op. Cit., p. 228, 229
[12]Rushdoony, Institutes, pp. 824-836
[13]Bahnsen, Op. Cit., pp. xi-xxvii
[14]House and Ice, loc. cit., pp. 16, 24.
[15]Carl W. Bogue, “What does the Decalogue Summarize?” Covenanter Witness, (May 1987), p. 4
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Post by SovereignGrace on Aug 16, 2023 19:37:50 GMT -5
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Post by Admin on Aug 16, 2023 21:12:21 GMT -5
I looked at it in the 80's but turned from it then.
I am taking a fresh look at it as many are. Joe Boot and His book Mission of God are helpful.
I am reading Ken Gentry's book Covenantal Theonomy which directly answers T.David Gordons pdf article that I have listed here. To take a Fresh look I want to post several sources as I have started to do.
I want to extract their best questions.
I want to see the best I can find on it. Sam Waldron has always been a good source, but I like what Joe Boot is offering.
Also reading Doug Wilson, on Christendom.www.ezrainstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/S4E26_WhatisTheonomy-1.mp3 joe boot |
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Post by Admin on Oct 31, 2023 17:44:16 GMT -5
What is Theonomic Postmillennialism? | Sam Waldron
by Sam Waldron | Oct 20, 2022 | Theonomy?
*This series is a republication of lectures written by Dr. Waldron near the end of the 1980s. This is Part 8 of a series titled “Theonomy: A Reformed Baptist Assessment.”
For Part 1, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/theonomy-a-reformed-baptist-assessment-sam-waldron/
For Part 2, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/the-sources-of-theonomic-development-sam-waldron/
For Part 3, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/the-challenges-of-critiquing-theonomy-sam-waldron/
For Part 4, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/understanding-the-supposed-theocratic-kingdom-sam-waldron/
For Part 5, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/the-historical-background-of-theonomic-ethics-sam-waldron/
For Part 6, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/a-biblical-refutation-of-theonomic-ethics-sam-waldron/
For Part 7, you can click here: cbtseminary.org/a-reformed-alternative-to-theonomic-ethics-sam-waldron/
Theonomy: A Reformed Baptist Assessment
What is Theonomic Postmillenialism?
In the interest of fairness and clarity, it is well to begin by permitting Christian Reconstructionists to speak for themselves. Having permitted both Rushdoony and North to describe in their own terms the nature of their postmillennialism, we will conclude this presentation by observing three features of their eschatology.
Rushdoony in his popular booklet entitled The Meaning of Postmillennialism: God’s Plan for Victory presents his eschatology in stark contrast to all defeatist eschatologies whether premillennial or amillennial. Speaking of these other eschatologies, he says,
In theory, the amillennial position holds that there is a parallel development of good and evil, of God’s Kingdom and Satan’s Kingdom. In reality, amillennialism holds that the major area of growth and power is in Satan’s Kingdom, because the world is seen as progressively falling away to Satan, the church’s trials and tribulations increasing, and the end of the world finding the church lonely and sorely beset. There is no such thing as a millennium or a triumph of Christ and His Kingdom in history. The role of the saints is at best to grin and bear it, and more likely to be victims and martyrs. The world will go from bad to worse in the pessimistic viewpoint. The Christian must retreat from the world of action in the realization that there is no hope for this world, no world-wide victory of Christ’s cause, nor world peace and righteousness. The law of God is irrelevant, because there is no plan of conquest, no plan of triumph in Christ’s name and power. At best, God’s law is a plan for private morality, not for men and nations in their every aspect. Not surprisingly, amillennialism produces a retreating and crabbed outlook, a church in which men have no thought of victory but only of endless nit-picking about trifles. It produces a phariseeism of men who believe they are the elect in a world headed for hell, a select elite who must withdraw from the futility of the world around them. It produces what can be called an Orthodox Pharisees Church, wherein failure is a mark of election. Lest this seem an exaggeration, one small denomination has a habit of regarding pastors who produce growth in their congregations with some suspicion, because it is openly held by many pastors that growth is a mark of compromise, whereas incompetence and failure are marks of election! Amillennial pastors within this church regularly insist that success surely means compromise, and their failures are a mark of purity and election. Not surprisingly, postmillennials cannot long remain in this basically and almost exclusively amillennial church.
Let us now examine some common traits of amillennialism and premillennialism. First, both regard attempts to build a Christian society or to further Christian reconstruction as either futile or wrong. If God has decreed that the world’s future is one of downward spiral, then indeed Christian reconstruction is futile. As a prominent premillennial pastor and radio preacher, the Rev. J. Vernon McGee declared in the early 1950’s, “You don’t polish brass on a sinking ship.” If the world is a sinking ship, then efforts to eliminate prostitution, crime, or any kind of social evil, and to expect the Christian conquest of the social order, are indeed futile.”[1]
He concludes this booklet with a summary of his own eschatology,
Postmillennialism is the faith that Christ will through His people accomplish and put into force the glorious prophecies of Isaiah and all the Scriptures, that He shall overcome all His enemies through His covenant people, and that He shall exercise His power and Kingdom in all the world and over all men and nations, so that, whether in faith or in defeat, every knee shall bow to Him and every tongue shall confess God (Rom. 14:11; Phil. 2:11). . . .
How is Christ’s Kingdom to come? Scripture is again very definite and explicit. The glorious peace and prosperity of Christ’s reign will be brought about ONLY as people obey the covenant law. In Lev. 26, Deut. 28, and all of Scripture, this is plainly stated. There will be peace and prosperity in the land, the enemy will be destroyed, and men will be free of evils only “If ye walk in my statutes, and keep my commandments, and do them (Lev. 26:3). The obedience of faith to the law of God produces IRRESISTIBLE BLESSINGS. “And all these blessings shall come on thee, and overtake thee, if thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the LORD thy God” (Deut. 28:2). On the other hand, disobedience leads to IRRESISTIBLE CURSES. . . .
God’s determination of history is thus plainly described in His law. If we believe and obey, then we are blessed and we prosper in Him; if we deny Him and disobey His law, we are cursed and confounded. . . .
. . . Antinomian postmillennials deny the God-given way to God’s Kingdom when they by-pass the law. In effect, they posit without reference to it, a rapture! How else is the world going to move from its present depravity into God’s order? Are we going to float in on vague prayers and “higher-life” spirituality? The antinomian postmillennials have no answer.
The charge is often raised that the postmillennialism of colonial and 19th century Calvinism led to the Social Gospel of the 20th century. No one has documented this charge, which is obviously false. The Hodges, Warfield, Machen, and others were not the source of the Social Gospel, and were hostile to it. The roots of that movement are in Arminianism, and, very directly, in that notable humanist-revivalist, C. G. Finney.[2]
North in his popularization of Theonomy gives this summary of his eschatological outlook,
But it isn’t enough to proclaim the foundations of a godly society, nor is it sufficient to describe some of the institutional arrangements of such a society. What is needed is a dynamic, a psychologically motivating impulse to give godly men confidence that their efforts are not in vain, and that their work for the kingdom of God will have meaning in the future, not just in heaven, but in time and on earth. We need a goal to sacrifice for, a standard of performance that is at the same time a legitimate quest. What is needed is confidence that all this talk about the marvels of the kingdom of God becomes more than mere talk. What is needed is a view of history that guarantees to Christians external, visible victory, in time and on earth, as a prelude, a down payment, to the absolute and eternal victory which Christians are confident awaits them after the day of judgment. . . .
. . . What if the following scenario were the case? First, God saves men through the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Second, these men respond in faith to God’s dominion assignment, given to us through our fathers, Adam, Noah, and Christ in the great commission (Matthew 28:18-20). Third, these regenerate men begin to study the law of God, subduing their own hearts, lives, and areas of responsibility in terms of God’s comprehensive law-order. Fourth, the blessings of God begin to flow toward these who are acting in His name and in terms of His law. Fifth, the stewardship principle of “service as a road to leadership” begins to be acknowledged by those who call themselves Christian, in every sphere of life: family, institutional church, schools, civil government, economy. This leads to step six, the rise to prominence of Christians in every sphere of life, as Satanists become increasingly impotent to handle the crises that their world-and-life view has created. Seventh, the law of God is imposed progressively across the face of each society which has declared commitment to Christ. Eighth, this provokes foreign nations to jealousy, and they begin to imitate the Christian social order, in order to receive the external blessings. Ninth, even the Jews are provoked to jealousy, and they convert to Christ. Tenth, the conversion of the Jews leads to an unparalleled explosion of conversions, followed by even greater external blessings. Eleventh, the kingdom of God becomes worldwide in scope, serving as a down payment by God to His people on the restoration which will come beyond the day of judgment. Twelfth, the forces of Satan have something to provoke them to rebellion, after generations of subservience outwardly to the benefits-producing law of God. Thirteenth, this rebellion by Satan is immediately smashed by Christ in His final return in glory and judgment. Fourteenth, Satan, his troops of angels, and his human followers are judged, and then condemned to the lake of fire. And finally, fifteenth, God sets up His new heaven and new earth, for regenerate men to serve in throughout all eternity. . . .
. . .If men really believed that this scenario is possible–indeed, inevitable–would they not redouble their efforts to begin to subdue the earth?[3]
Later in the same book North elaborates upon this summary.[4]
Three features of this eschatological outlook must now be underscored. The first is its ethical rationale or, at least its intimate ethical association. Theonomic Postmillennialists believe their system is demanded or, at least strongly commended by its power to motivate men to keep God’s law in every worldly sphere of life. This is a thread which runs throughout Rushdoony’s The Meaning of Postmillennialism.[5] North’s description of his eschatological outlook as “dynamic, a psychologically motivating impulse” makes this explicit. Theonomists reason that since the dominion mandate of Genesis 1 demands that we subdue every area of life to God by means of His law, then that eschatology which most encourages us to do so must be the best and most Biblical eschatology.
The second feature which emerges from these quotations is the self-conscious peculiarity of Theonomic postmillennialism. Though they can cite those like Jonathan Edwards whom they call “pietistic postmillennialists” when it suits them,[6] the quote from Rushdoony above evinces a self-conscious distance from those whom Rushdoony calls “antinomian postmillennialists.” North in another work identifies Jonathan Edwards himself with such pietistic, antinomian postmillennialists. Chilton writes in his book, Days of Vengeance,
The great defect with the postmillennial revival inaugurated by Jonathan Edwards and his followers in the eighteenth century was their neglect of biblical law. They expected to see the blessings of God come as a result of merely soteriological preaching. Look at Edwards’ Treatise on the Religious Affections. There is nothing on the law of God on culture. Page after page is filled with the words “sweet” and “sweetness.” a diabetic reader is almost risking a relapse by reading this book in one sitting. The words sometimes appear four or five times on a page. And while Edwards was preaching the sweetness of God, Arminian semi-literates were “hot-gospeling” the Holy Commonwealth of Connecticut into political antinomianism. Where sweetness and emotional hot flashes are concerned, Calvinistic preaching is no match for antinomian sermons. The hoped-for revival of the 1700s became the Arminian revivals of the early 1800s, leaving emotionally burned-over districts, cults, and the abolitionist movement as their devastating legacy. Because the postmillennial preaching of the Edwardians was culturally antinomian and pietistic, it crippled the remnants of Calvinistic political order in the New England colonies, helping to produce a vacuum that Arminianism and then Unitarianism filled.[7]
It is clear that one peculiarity of Theonomic postmillennialism is its emphasis on the application of Biblical law to every area of human life as the means of bringing about millennial blessing. As North is fond of reminding us, the law is man’s instrument or “tool of dominion.”[8] As the quote from Rushdoony makes clear the full, present applicability of the blessings described in Lev. 26 and Deut. 28 (and there promised to the obedience of Israel, the Theocratic nation), is the crucial link which connects obedience to the law with millennial blessing. North seconds Rushdoony’s point.
God established His covenant with Adam, and again with Noah. It was a dominion covenant. It was man’s authorization to subdue the earth, but under God’s overall authority and under His law. God also covenanted with Abram, changing his name to Abraham, and instituting the sign of His covenant, circumcision. He covenanted with Jacob, Abraham’s grandson, changing his name to Israel, promising to bless Jacob’s efforts (Genesis 32:24-30). God covenanted with Moses and the children of Israel, promising to bless them if they conformed to His laws, but curse them if they disobeyed (Deuteronomy 8:28). The covenant was a treaty, and it involved mutual obligations and promises. The ruler, God, offers the peace treaty to a man or selection of men, and they in turn accept its terms of surrender. The treaty spells out mutual obligations: protection and blessings from the King, and obedience on the part of the servants. It also spells out the term of judgement: cursings from the King in case of rebellion on the part of the servants.
This same covenant is extended to the church to day. It covers the institutional church, and it also applies to nations that agree to conform their laws to God’s standards . . . .
The law of God also provides us with a tool of external dominion. God promises blessings for that society which surrenders unconditionally to Him, and then adopts the terms of His peace treaty (Deuteronomy 8 and 28).
Fourth, the blessings of God begin to flow in the direction of His people. “A good man leaveth an inheritance to his children’s children: and the wealth of the sinner is laid up for the just” (Proverbs 13:22). As Benjamin Franklin said, honesty is the best policy. Capital flows to those who will bear responsibility, predict the future accurately, plan to meet the needs of consumers with a minimum of waste, and deal honestly with both suppliers and customers. Again, Deuteronomy 8 and 28 show us the nature of this wealth-transfer process. This wealth-transfer program is through market completion and conformity to God’s law. Satan’s kingdom is progressively decapitalized.[9]
This use of Deut. 28 and parallel passages is a critical linchpin in the Theonomic argument for postmillennialism.
The third feature of Theonomic postmillennialism which must be underscored, though implicit in the above quotations, is not explicit. It is their rejection of what Chilton calls “Chiliastic Postmillennialism.”[10] Rather, they argue for the historical continuity of the present age until the return of Christ after their golden age. They reject the idea that the millennium or at least the future millennial blessings are to be brought in by a single catastrophic event. Chilton in his commentary on the Book of Revelation writing on Rev. 20 asserts,
Millennarianism can take two general forms. It can be either Premillennarianism (with the Second Coming as the cataclysm that ushers in the Millennium), or Postmillennarianism (with the Social Revolution as the cataclysm). Examples of the first branch of Chiliasm would be, of course, the Ebionite movement of the Early Church period, and the modern Dispensationalism of the Scofield-Ryrie school. Examples of the Postmillennarian heresy would be easy to name as well: the Munster Revolt of 1534, Nazism, and Marxism (whether “Christian” or otherwise). Orthodox Christianity rejects both forms of the Millennarian heresy. Christianity opposes the notion of any new redemptive cataclysm occurring before the Last Judgment. Christianity is anti-revolutionary. Thus, while Christians have always looked forward to the salvation of the world, believing that Christ died and rose again for that purpose, they have also seen the Kingdom’s work as leavening influence, gradually transforming the world into the image of God. The definitive cataclysm has already taken place, in the finished work of Christ. Depending on the specific question being asked, therefore, orthodox Christianity can be considered either amillennial or postmillennial because, in reality, it is both. . . .
With the rise of divergent eschatologies over the last two centuries, the traditional evangelical optimism of the Church was tagged with the term “postmillennialism,” whether the so-called “postmillennialists” liked it or not. This has had positive results. On the plus side, it is (as we have seen) a technically accurate description of orthodoxy; and it carries the connotation of optimism. On the minus side, it can too often be confused with heretical millennarianism. And, while, “amillennialism” rightly expresses the orthodox abhorrence of apocalyptic revolution, it carries (both by name and by historic association) a strong connotation of defeatism. The present writer therefore calls himself a “postmillennialist,” but also seeks to be sensitive to the inadequacies of current theological terminology. . . .
Some have sought to remedy this by styling themselves “optimistic amillennialists,” a term that has nothing wrong with it except a mouthful of syllables (the term “non-chiliastic postmillennialist” suffers from the same problem.)[11]
North likewise argues from the parables of Matt. 13.
If we are to take the parables seriously, then we have to begin to think about the continuity of history in between Pentecost and the final judgment. If there is no great break coming which will divide this period into two or more segments, then whatever happens to the world, the flesh, the devil, and the church (institutional) must happen without direct, cataclysmic intervention, either from God or Satan. The process will be one of growth or decay. The process may be an ebb and flow, heading for victory for the church or defeat for the church, in time and on earth. But what cannot possibly be true is that the church’s victory process or defeat process will be interrupted and reversed by the direct, visible physical intervention of Jesus Christ and His angels. No discontinuity of history which overcomes the very processes of history in one cataclysmic break will take place. Christians must not base their hopes for collective or personal victory on an historically unprecedented event in history which is in fact the destruction of history. They will sink or swim, win or lose, in time and on earth, by means of the same sorts of processes as we see today, although the speed will increase or decrease in response to man’s ethical conformity to God’s law, or his rebellion against that law.[12]
The Theonomic writers we have quoted are to be commended for avoiding a clearly unbiblical extremism and their attempt to embrace a Biblical perspective essentially alien to their own.
[1]Rushdoony, The Meaning of Postmillennialism, pp. 8, 9, 10 Cf. pp. 2, 10
[2]Ibid, pp. 53-56
[3]Gary North, Unconditional Surrender, God’s Program for Victory, (Tyler, TX, Geneva Divinity School Press 1983) pp. 176-177
[4]Ibid, pp. 196-201
[5]Rushdoony, The Meaning of Postmillennialism, pp. 2, 8-10, 16-27, 29, 30
[6]Ibid, pp. 21-23
[7]Ibid, pp. 21-23
[8] North, Unconditional Surrender, p. 73
[9] Chilton, op. cit., p. 495
[10] Chilton, op. cit., p. 495
[11] Ibid, pp. 495, 496, 498
[12]North, Unconditional Surrender, pp. 182, 193
Sam Waldron
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