Post by Admin on Aug 18, 2023 18:59:46 GMT -5
William Brakel
The Knowledge of God
Though rational creatures possess a measure of knowledge, there is nevertheless an infinite difference between God's knowledge and the knowledge of His creatures, both in reference to the mode as well as to the objects of their knowledge.
First, let us consider the mode of God's knowledge. Man acquires knowledge by means of deliberation and rational deduction, deducing and drawing conclusions by viewing one fact in reference to another. The initial knowledge concerning an object is acquired by way ofspecies sensibiles, that is, sensible observations, which are made regarding
physical objects through the agency of the five senses, and by means of species intelligibiles, that is, intellectual observations which are made through the agency of one's intellect regarding matters about which man reasons. The knowledge of God, on the contrary, neither has its origin in the creature nor does it flow from the creature to God; rather it flows from God Himself to the creature. God does not become acquainted with things after the fact by virtue of their existence and function; rather, He knows matters in advance so that they will exist and function according
to His decree. God does not decree His workmanship by considering cause and effect. He does not acquire His knowledge concerning His creature through the process of research and rational deduction; rather,
He knows them since He has decreed that they should exist and operate.
His cognizance of everything is full and instantaneous in consequence of who He is.He views everything simultaneously, and each matter in particular; this pertains even to the minutest detail of its existence.
Beyond this we cannot speculate about the mode of God's knowledge. We must confess, "such knowledge is too wonderful for me" (Ps 139:6).
Secondly, The object of God's knowledge. Also here there is an infinite difference between the knowledge of men and the knowledge of God.
Man is knowledgeable about only a few things, and that which he knows is only known superficially, as he lacks the capacity to uncover the most profound and essential substance of a matter. "For we are but of yesterday, and know nothing" (Job 8:9); "Lo, these are parts of His ways: but how little a portion is heard of Him?" (Job 26:14).
(1) On the contrary, God knows Himself, and that perfectly. "... the thingsof God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of
God" (1 Cor 2:11).
(2) God is cognizant of His omnipotence, knowing that He can fully perform all that He would desire to do. All that he would desire to do can indeed come to pass and be accomplished by Him. This we would refer to as the possibility of all things. The Lord Jesus refers to this when He states, "I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham" (Matt 3:9). This is generally referred to as scientam simplicis intelligentiae, that is, knowledge in its most simple or essential form.
3) God is also cognizant of all things which currently exist or will exist— that is, prior to their existence. This is not merely true in a general sense, but it relates to each individual matter or action as if each were singular in its existence. This knowledge is generally referred to as scientia visionis, that is, visionary knowledge as it relates to the perception ofthings which shall be or currently exist.
God clearly testifies in His Word that He does not merely have a general knowledge concerning matters, but a specific knowledge of eachindividual matter. Such is not only confirmed by texts which refer to God's knowledge in a general sense, such as, "Known unto God are all His works from the beginning of the world" (Acts 15:18); "all things are naked
and opened unto the eyes of Him with w hom we have to do" (Heb 4:13); "God ... knoweth all things" (1 John 3:20)
—also by texts which refer to God's knowledge concerning each matter individually, such as, "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in His sight" (Heb 4:13); "But the very hairs of your head are all numbered" (Matt 10:30); "He telleth the number of the stars; He calleth them all by their names" (Ps 147:4).
(1) The Lord observes and is cognizant of all things, both great and small. He knows the heart of kings (Prov 21:1) and takes notice of every sparrow (Matt 10:29).
(2) He is cognizant of all good and evil things, "Thou hast set our iniquities before Thee, our secret sins in the light of Thy countenance" (Ps 90:8).
(3) The Lord is cognizant of all secret things, "Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men" (1 Kings 8:39); "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man" (Ps 94:11); "for He knew what was in man" (John 2:25).
(4) The Lord has an infallible knowledge of all future things which will transpire due to the exercise of man's free will, and therefore knows all things which will occur relative to man. God knows everything, for all His works are known to Him from eternity and are naked and open before Him. This becomes evident from the following:
First, the word "all" comprehends everything. It includes all future events, including those which occur as a result of the exercise of man's
Free will. If God were not cognizant of such events, He would be ignorant concerning many things. The contrary is true, however, for He knows everything.
Secondly, what is more frequent in occurrence and more dependent upon the exercise of man's free will than his sitting down and rising up, as well as the function of thought and speech? The Lord knows all this from afar, however, even before one thinks or speaks. "... for I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously" (Isa 48:8; see also Ps 139:1-2); "Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee" (Jer 1:5); "For I know the things thirdly, this is true for all prophecies, even those which refer to such events which could only come about as a result of the exercise of
man's free will. Examples of this are too numerous to mention here; the entire divine revelation exemplifies this. The Lord Jesus Himself says, "Now I tell you before it come, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe that I am He" (John 13:19).
Fourthly, nothing exists or comes to pass apart from the operation of God. God sustains everything by His omnipotent and omnipresent power.
Nothing can move without divine cooperation and thus everything transpires according to His decree, be it either by the Lord's initiation or permission, directing things in such a manner that they accomplish His purpose. Thus it becomes evident that the Lord has prior knowledge concerning all things. You will comprehend this with more clarity and be less confused if you keep in mind that God is omniscient and has decreed all that transpires. His knowledge is not derived from existing matters and secondary causes as is true for man. Keep in mind that from God's perspective, who is the first cause of all things, everything is an absolute certainty even though it appears to be uncertain when viewed from the perspective of secondary causes. From God's perspective there are no contingencies; such is only true from man's perspective. Thus, in defining the freedom of the will we must not think of it as functioning independently from God, on an equal plane with His will, or as a neutral entity; rather, this freedom is a function of necessity. Thus, the freedom of the will does not contradict the certain foreknowledge of God. Man,
without coercion and by arbitrary choice, performs that which God has most certainly decreed, and of which He was cognizant that it would occur.God speaks in the manner of men when it is recorded that He tries man in order to know what is in him, and also when He states, "... now I know that thou fearest God" (Gen 22:12). He had knowledge of this already from eternity. He also speaks in the manner of men when it is recorded that He waits whether man will perform a particular duty. He does this inorder to exhort and warn man that he must be aware that God takes notice of his actions; it is not that He does not know what will occur.
Jesuits, Arminians, and others who fanatically insist that man has a free will have concocted a scientiam mediam, that is, a mediate knowledge which would positionally be between the absolute, natural, and essential knowledge of God by which God is cognizant of the full potential of all things. His volitional, visionary knowledge would then be that knowledge whereby He has a particular and detailed knowledge of all things
—having decreed them—as far as circumstances and occurrence are concerned.
Such a will, being in a mediate position relative to both [essential and visionary knowledge], would be a means whereby God knows one thing by means of the other, that is, that which takes place by means of causes and circumstances.
They define this mediate knowledge to be the knowledge of God whereby He is cognizant of future events which are not yet considered as certain, since no determination has yet been made by presupposing in what manner these events will be shaped by the exercise of man's free will. Let me illustrate by way of hypothesis. God, in envisioning that man would be created in perfection and would be confronted with a particular temptation of Satan, could foresee that man in the exercise of His free will would abuse His gifts. God further envisioned, after man had fallen, that the gospel would be proclaimed to him, urgently motivating him in various ways to believe it, this taking place at such a moment when man would be most pliable, attentive, and properly prepared. Thus, He would be enabled to foresee and know who would and who would not repent, believe, and persevere until the end of life. Such reasoning could also be
applied to other situations in which angels or men would appear to exercise their free will in one way or another. The foolishness of such a hypothesis will be evident from the following:
First, if God had such a mediate knowledge, all knowledge of God relative to the actions of men would be fraught with uncertainty and mere assumptions. Even if every imaginable circumstance needed to induce man to a certain action would be brought into play, man, in their opinion, would still be free to do as he pleased. They reason that man would not be limited by a necessary cause, and thus it would be uncertain what he would do. Consequently, God's knowledge relative to such actions would be of a contingent nature. Far be it from us to entertain such a notion concerning an omniscient God!
Secondly, such mediate knowledge implies that God has no control over the voluntary actions of man. Such an assumption is an absurdity in reference to both the Creator and the creature. As far as the future is concerned, such voluntary actions would have no causal relationship to God at all, as there would neither be any decree concerning them, nor
could they have been a contingent element of any decree. Then such actions would proceed entirely from man in the exercise of his free will.
Indeed, in such instances God would be dependent upon the creature, unable to decree anything concerning man apart from the intervention of man's free will. Consequently, all decrees could only be executed upon the condition that it would please man to cooperate, he being lord over his free will and thus unable to be restricted by anyone but himself. Their view [the Jesuits and Arminians] implies that all that God has decreed is uncertain because man by the exercise of his free will is able to change it.
To be Lord over man's volitional action, it is not sufficient that God have control over the circumstances which can sway the activity of man's will, either causing or not causing certain things to take place, or to be in a given condition. These circumstances must not be contingent upon the exercise of man's free will for then it would be in man's power to dictate the circumstances either verbally or physically relative to other individuals. Apart from such a consideration, it must be recognized that such power and control would only involve the circumstances and
situations which would induce man to exercise his free will but would not extend to the will itself. It would remain free and thus, independent from God, maintain control over itself rather than being subject to His control.
Even if they allow that both the will and its freedom have their origin in God, they nevertheless maintain that man remains his own master relative to the exercise of his free will. Thus, he is not dependent upon God, nor can be controlled by Him. Such are the absurdities which follow from holding to a view that God has a mediate knowledge of things. Having concluded this, it must also be posited that consistent with this view such divine knowledge is merely related to circumstances which occur to man; this would then have an effect upon his will. This in turn would result in a given event, in response to which God would subsequently establish His decree. Such reasoning changes the very
nature of both God and man as it consequently removes the creature from the realm of God's control. Since all of this is nonsensical, we conclude the existence of such mediate knowledge to be an absurdity
The Knowledge of God
Though rational creatures possess a measure of knowledge, there is nevertheless an infinite difference between God's knowledge and the knowledge of His creatures, both in reference to the mode as well as to the objects of their knowledge.
First, let us consider the mode of God's knowledge. Man acquires knowledge by means of deliberation and rational deduction, deducing and drawing conclusions by viewing one fact in reference to another. The initial knowledge concerning an object is acquired by way ofspecies sensibiles, that is, sensible observations, which are made regarding
physical objects through the agency of the five senses, and by means of species intelligibiles, that is, intellectual observations which are made through the agency of one's intellect regarding matters about which man reasons. The knowledge of God, on the contrary, neither has its origin in the creature nor does it flow from the creature to God; rather it flows from God Himself to the creature. God does not become acquainted with things after the fact by virtue of their existence and function; rather, He knows matters in advance so that they will exist and function according
to His decree. God does not decree His workmanship by considering cause and effect. He does not acquire His knowledge concerning His creature through the process of research and rational deduction; rather,
He knows them since He has decreed that they should exist and operate.
His cognizance of everything is full and instantaneous in consequence of who He is.He views everything simultaneously, and each matter in particular; this pertains even to the minutest detail of its existence.
Beyond this we cannot speculate about the mode of God's knowledge. We must confess, "such knowledge is too wonderful for me" (Ps 139:6).
Secondly, The object of God's knowledge. Also here there is an infinite difference between the knowledge of men and the knowledge of God.
Man is knowledgeable about only a few things, and that which he knows is only known superficially, as he lacks the capacity to uncover the most profound and essential substance of a matter. "For we are but of yesterday, and know nothing" (Job 8:9); "Lo, these are parts of His ways: but how little a portion is heard of Him?" (Job 26:14).
(1) On the contrary, God knows Himself, and that perfectly. "... the thingsof God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of
God" (1 Cor 2:11).
(2) God is cognizant of His omnipotence, knowing that He can fully perform all that He would desire to do. All that he would desire to do can indeed come to pass and be accomplished by Him. This we would refer to as the possibility of all things. The Lord Jesus refers to this when He states, "I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham" (Matt 3:9). This is generally referred to as scientam simplicis intelligentiae, that is, knowledge in its most simple or essential form.
3) God is also cognizant of all things which currently exist or will exist— that is, prior to their existence. This is not merely true in a general sense, but it relates to each individual matter or action as if each were singular in its existence. This knowledge is generally referred to as scientia visionis, that is, visionary knowledge as it relates to the perception ofthings which shall be or currently exist.
God clearly testifies in His Word that He does not merely have a general knowledge concerning matters, but a specific knowledge of eachindividual matter. Such is not only confirmed by texts which refer to God's knowledge in a general sense, such as, "Known unto God are all His works from the beginning of the world" (Acts 15:18); "all things are naked
and opened unto the eyes of Him with w hom we have to do" (Heb 4:13); "God ... knoweth all things" (1 John 3:20)
—also by texts which refer to God's knowledge concerning each matter individually, such as, "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in His sight" (Heb 4:13); "But the very hairs of your head are all numbered" (Matt 10:30); "He telleth the number of the stars; He calleth them all by their names" (Ps 147:4).
(1) The Lord observes and is cognizant of all things, both great and small. He knows the heart of kings (Prov 21:1) and takes notice of every sparrow (Matt 10:29).
(2) He is cognizant of all good and evil things, "Thou hast set our iniquities before Thee, our secret sins in the light of Thy countenance" (Ps 90:8).
(3) The Lord is cognizant of all secret things, "Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men" (1 Kings 8:39); "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man" (Ps 94:11); "for He knew what was in man" (John 2:25).
(4) The Lord has an infallible knowledge of all future things which will transpire due to the exercise of man's free will, and therefore knows all things which will occur relative to man. God knows everything, for all His works are known to Him from eternity and are naked and open before Him. This becomes evident from the following:
First, the word "all" comprehends everything. It includes all future events, including those which occur as a result of the exercise of man's
Free will. If God were not cognizant of such events, He would be ignorant concerning many things. The contrary is true, however, for He knows everything.
Secondly, what is more frequent in occurrence and more dependent upon the exercise of man's free will than his sitting down and rising up, as well as the function of thought and speech? The Lord knows all this from afar, however, even before one thinks or speaks. "... for I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously" (Isa 48:8; see also Ps 139:1-2); "Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee" (Jer 1:5); "For I know the things thirdly, this is true for all prophecies, even those which refer to such events which could only come about as a result of the exercise of
man's free will. Examples of this are too numerous to mention here; the entire divine revelation exemplifies this. The Lord Jesus Himself says, "Now I tell you before it come, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe that I am He" (John 13:19).
Fourthly, nothing exists or comes to pass apart from the operation of God. God sustains everything by His omnipotent and omnipresent power.
Nothing can move without divine cooperation and thus everything transpires according to His decree, be it either by the Lord's initiation or permission, directing things in such a manner that they accomplish His purpose. Thus it becomes evident that the Lord has prior knowledge concerning all things. You will comprehend this with more clarity and be less confused if you keep in mind that God is omniscient and has decreed all that transpires. His knowledge is not derived from existing matters and secondary causes as is true for man. Keep in mind that from God's perspective, who is the first cause of all things, everything is an absolute certainty even though it appears to be uncertain when viewed from the perspective of secondary causes. From God's perspective there are no contingencies; such is only true from man's perspective. Thus, in defining the freedom of the will we must not think of it as functioning independently from God, on an equal plane with His will, or as a neutral entity; rather, this freedom is a function of necessity. Thus, the freedom of the will does not contradict the certain foreknowledge of God. Man,
without coercion and by arbitrary choice, performs that which God has most certainly decreed, and of which He was cognizant that it would occur.God speaks in the manner of men when it is recorded that He tries man in order to know what is in him, and also when He states, "... now I know that thou fearest God" (Gen 22:12). He had knowledge of this already from eternity. He also speaks in the manner of men when it is recorded that He waits whether man will perform a particular duty. He does this inorder to exhort and warn man that he must be aware that God takes notice of his actions; it is not that He does not know what will occur.
Jesuits, Arminians, and others who fanatically insist that man has a free will have concocted a scientiam mediam, that is, a mediate knowledge which would positionally be between the absolute, natural, and essential knowledge of God by which God is cognizant of the full potential of all things. His volitional, visionary knowledge would then be that knowledge whereby He has a particular and detailed knowledge of all things
—having decreed them—as far as circumstances and occurrence are concerned.
Such a will, being in a mediate position relative to both [essential and visionary knowledge], would be a means whereby God knows one thing by means of the other, that is, that which takes place by means of causes and circumstances.
They define this mediate knowledge to be the knowledge of God whereby He is cognizant of future events which are not yet considered as certain, since no determination has yet been made by presupposing in what manner these events will be shaped by the exercise of man's free will. Let me illustrate by way of hypothesis. God, in envisioning that man would be created in perfection and would be confronted with a particular temptation of Satan, could foresee that man in the exercise of His free will would abuse His gifts. God further envisioned, after man had fallen, that the gospel would be proclaimed to him, urgently motivating him in various ways to believe it, this taking place at such a moment when man would be most pliable, attentive, and properly prepared. Thus, He would be enabled to foresee and know who would and who would not repent, believe, and persevere until the end of life. Such reasoning could also be
applied to other situations in which angels or men would appear to exercise their free will in one way or another. The foolishness of such a hypothesis will be evident from the following:
First, if God had such a mediate knowledge, all knowledge of God relative to the actions of men would be fraught with uncertainty and mere assumptions. Even if every imaginable circumstance needed to induce man to a certain action would be brought into play, man, in their opinion, would still be free to do as he pleased. They reason that man would not be limited by a necessary cause, and thus it would be uncertain what he would do. Consequently, God's knowledge relative to such actions would be of a contingent nature. Far be it from us to entertain such a notion concerning an omniscient God!
Secondly, such mediate knowledge implies that God has no control over the voluntary actions of man. Such an assumption is an absurdity in reference to both the Creator and the creature. As far as the future is concerned, such voluntary actions would have no causal relationship to God at all, as there would neither be any decree concerning them, nor
could they have been a contingent element of any decree. Then such actions would proceed entirely from man in the exercise of his free will.
Indeed, in such instances God would be dependent upon the creature, unable to decree anything concerning man apart from the intervention of man's free will. Consequently, all decrees could only be executed upon the condition that it would please man to cooperate, he being lord over his free will and thus unable to be restricted by anyone but himself. Their view [the Jesuits and Arminians] implies that all that God has decreed is uncertain because man by the exercise of his free will is able to change it.
To be Lord over man's volitional action, it is not sufficient that God have control over the circumstances which can sway the activity of man's will, either causing or not causing certain things to take place, or to be in a given condition. These circumstances must not be contingent upon the exercise of man's free will for then it would be in man's power to dictate the circumstances either verbally or physically relative to other individuals. Apart from such a consideration, it must be recognized that such power and control would only involve the circumstances and
situations which would induce man to exercise his free will but would not extend to the will itself. It would remain free and thus, independent from God, maintain control over itself rather than being subject to His control.
Even if they allow that both the will and its freedom have their origin in God, they nevertheless maintain that man remains his own master relative to the exercise of his free will. Thus, he is not dependent upon God, nor can be controlled by Him. Such are the absurdities which follow from holding to a view that God has a mediate knowledge of things. Having concluded this, it must also be posited that consistent with this view such divine knowledge is merely related to circumstances which occur to man; this would then have an effect upon his will. This in turn would result in a given event, in response to which God would subsequently establish His decree. Such reasoning changes the very
nature of both God and man as it consequently removes the creature from the realm of God's control. Since all of this is nonsensical, we conclude the existence of such mediate knowledge to be an absurdity