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The Development of the Doctrine of Predestination among the
Reformed (continued): the Controversy in regard to Infra- and
Supralapsarianism:
(1) This controversy is rooted in the struggle between Augustine
and Pelagius. According to Pelagianism both original and actual
sin (unbelief) logically precede election and reprobation;
according to Augustine ONLY original sin precedes
predestination. According to supra, predestination logically
precedes not only actual but also original sin. Hence,
Pelagianism: original sin, actual sin, predestination;
Augustinianism or infralapsarianism: original sin,
predestination, actual sin; supralapsarianism: predestination,
original sin, actual sin.
(2) Many followers of Augustine accepted the doctrine of twofold predestination: a predestination unto glory and a
predestination unto death.
(3) The three Reformers: Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, arrived at
the supralapsarian view: election and reprobation are deeds of
God's sovereignty, logically preceding God's decree concerning
the fall. Nevertheless, Calvin often follows the infralapsarian
reasoning.
(4) For the order of the elements of the decree see III C.
(5) The Synod of Dort expressed itself in an infralapsarian
manner but did not in any sense condemn supralapsarianism. It
rejected Arminianism.
Among the Reformed another controversy soon arose, namely, in
regard to supra- and infralapsarianism. This controversy is rooted in
the struggle between Augustine and Pelagius. With the Pelagians the
order in the elements of God's counsel was as follows:
1. A decree to create man.
2. A decree to send Christ in order to redeem fallen humanity, to
cause him to die for all and to be proclaimed to all, and to grant
to all “grace sufficient” unto salvation.
3. A decree determining the eternal salvation of some on the
ground of foreseen faith, and the eternal punishment of others
on the ground of foreseen unbelief.
A totally different order was presented by Augustine. At times he
makes reprobation a part of predestination, but even then he views
foreknowledge not as something negative and passive but as a divine
activity. For, God's will is the “necessary ground of things”; what
happens “contrary to his will does not defeat his will”; when God
“permits” something, this permission is positive, efficacious. “Surely,
he permits willingly, not unwillingly.” The supralapsarian position,
viz., that reprobation is an act of God's sovereignty, is already
implied in this view. Usually, however, Augustine uses the words
divine foreknowledge and permission when he speaks about the fall.
Augustine has the following order:
1. A decree to create man and to permit him to fall.
2. A decree to elect some out of this corrupt mass unto eternal life,
and to allow others to remain in the perdition wherein they have
involved themselves. Accordingly, both election and reprobation
presuppose a fallen humanity, a “corrupt mass.” From this it
appears that Augustine usually favors the infralapsarian
representation; in his reasoning he does not go back beyond the
fall; he views reprobation as an act of God's justice. “God is
good, God is just. Because he is good, he is able to deliver some
that are undeserving of salvation; because he is just, he is not
able to condemn any one who is undeserving of condemnation.”
Now, although Augustine does not view the decree of predestination
as preceding both original and actual sin (the supra position), neither
does he place the decree of election and reprobation after both of
these (the Pelagian position). According to Augustine, only original
sin logically precedes predestination. Moreover, he considers original
sin to be a sufficient ground for reprobation. Actual sins are not
taken into account in the decree of reprobation although they are
considered in connection with the determination of the degree of
punishment. Augustine derived this order in the elements of God's
counsel from Rom. 9:11, 12 (“. . . for the children being not yet born,
neither having done anything good or bad, that the purpose of God
according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that
calleth, it was said unto her, `The elder shall serve the younger.'
Even as it is written, `Jacob I loved, Esau I hated.'”) and from the
fate of children dying in infancy unbaptized. Nevertheless, although
original sin is a sufficient ground for reprobation, Augustine does not
view it as the final and deepest ground. According to him God's
sovereignty, as expressed in Rom. 9:18, (“So then, he hath mercy on
whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth”) is the only answer to
the question why God rejected some and chose others, particularly,
why this person was rejected and that one elected.
3. Finally, a decree determining the means whereby the end in
view will be realized.
Augustine does not directly deduce a decree establishing the means
unto perdition from the decree of reprobation as such. He does teach
that even in regard to sin God proceeds in an active and positive
manner; God is the “Disposer of sins,” he deemed it right that there
should be sin, he punishes sin with sin; but Augustine generally
views reprobation negatively, i.e., as preterition or dereliction
(passing by or abandonment), and he does not as a rule view it as
part of predestination, but identifies the latter with election, and
subsumes both election and reprobation under God's providence. On
the other hand there is a predestination of the means unto
salvation.With Augustine predestination or election is always a
predestination unto glory. It implies foreordination unto grace.
Accordingly, foreseen faith and good works are not the ground of
election, neither is Christ the final ground. But election is
foreordination unto the desired goal, hence, unto the means whereby
this goal will he realized, i. e., unto Christ who was himself
predestinated, and thus unto calling, baptism, faith, and the gift of
perseverance; predestination is a preparation for grace. Accordingly,
the elect, by way of grace in Christ, will surely obtain heavenly
salvation. Therefore, in later years many followers of Augustine
arrived at the doctrine of twofold predestination: a “predestination
unto death” began to be coordinated with a “predestination unto
glory.” Nevertheless, the former could not be construed in the same
sense as the latter; hence, a distinction was made between a negative
and a positive reprobation. The negative reprobation logically
precedes the fall; it is an act of God's sovereignty; it does not depend
upon foreseen demerits any more than election depends upon
foreseen merits; it implies “the decree to permit certain individuals
to fall into a state of guilt” and it is “the cause of dereliction.” Thus
many Thomists, Alvarez, the Salmanticenses, Estius, Sylvius. etc.,
taught that negative reprobation precedes the fall and that it is
purely an act of God's sovereignty and good pleasure. Nevertheless,
this supralapsarian reprobation was viewed as wholly negative, i.e.,
as God's purpose not to elect certain individuals, to permit them to
fall, and afterward to ordain them to everlasting punishment
(positive reprobation). Essentially, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and all
supralapsarian Reformed theologians never went beyond this point.
They neither taught a “predestination unto sins” nor did they
represent God as the author of sin, as is falsely charged by Roman
Catholics, who advance this accusation against the Predestinationists
of the fifth century, Gottschalk, Bradwardina, Wyclif, and especially
against the Reformers. They do this merely in order to justify their
own Semi-Pelagian view, and to harmonize it with the teachings of
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.
Essentially the teaching of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in regard
to predestination was accepted by the Reformers: the modifications
introduced by them were slight and unessential, if we except the
doctrine of assurance. The Reformers agreed with Augustine and
Thomas Aquinas on many points; viz., they, too, believed that
election is not conditioned upon foreseen merits, but that it is the
source of faith and good works; that predestination unto glory always
implies predestination unto grace; that negative reprobation is not to
be explained as an act of God's justice but as an act of his
sovereignty, and that it logically precedes sin; that this negative
reprobation is followed by a decree to permit sin and to allow some
to remain in their fallen state and that positive reprobation takes sin
into account. To all this they added, however, that the concepts
foreknowledqe and permission,though not wrong in themselves,
cannot and should not be interpreted in a merely passive sense; that
even if they could be so construed, they would offer no real solution
of the problem; and that the distinction between positive and
negative reprobation has very little value. Thus. all three Reformers
arrived at the so-called supralapsarian view of the doctrine of
predestination, according to which both election and reprobation are
to be viewed as acts of God's sovereignty, logically preceding God's
decree concerning the fall, sin, and redemption through Christ. But it
is especially Calvin who often purposely refuses to go beyond the
secondary causes of salvation and perdition, and therefore often
reasons in an infralapsarian manner. Let not the reprobate view
God's decree as the cause of his perdition, but let him rather look
upon his own corrupt nature with respect to which he himself is
guilty. The elect and the reprobate were equally guilty but God is
merciful toward the former, just toward the latter. In Romans 9:21
the “clay” indicates men in their fallen condition, of whom God elects
some while he leaves others “in their own ruin, to which by nature all
are exposed.” The fall in Adam is the nearest cause of reprobation.
God hates only sin in us. And of this representation: “that out of the
race doomed in Adam God elected those whom he was pleased to
elect, and reprobated those whom he willed to reprobate.” Calvin
says, “just as it is a great deal more suitable unto the cultivation of
faith, so it is discussed with greater profit.. . is not only more
conducive unto piety, but, it seems to me, more theological, more
suitable to practical Christianity, and also more conducive unto
edification.” Nevertheless, this does not fully satisfy Calvin. Sin may
be the proximate cause of perdition, it is, nevertheless. not the
deepest cause. For the theory that God apart from any previous plan
decided to create man, then sat down, as it were, in a watchtower to
see what man would do, and having seen and foreseen this, only
afterward proceeded to the act of election and reprobation, is
altogether untenable. Foreknowledge and permission do not solve
the problem. because God, foreseeing the fall, could have prevented
it; accordingly, he voluntarily permitted the fall because it seemed
good to him. Accordingly, the fall of Adam, sin in general, and all
evil, were not only foreseen by God but in a certain sense were willed
and determined by him. Accordingly, there must have been a reason,
unknown to us, why God willed the fall: there is “a deeper divine
decree” logically preceding the fall. Hence, when Pighius answers
Calvin by objecting that according to the latter's view there would
have been in the divine mind a “distinction between elect and
reprobate previous to the fall of man,” Calvin indeed answers that
Pighius fails to distinguish between “proximate and remote causes,”
that every reprobate must consider his own sin to be the direct cause
of his perdition, and that the opposite view is handicapped with the
same objections, he does not deny the validity of the conclusion
drawn by Pighius: there is a “secret divine decree” anteceding the
fall, The final and deepest cause of reprobation as well as of election
is the will of God. Hence, with Calvin the supralansarian and
infralapsarian representation alternates. This is also true of most of
the later theologians who embraced supralapsarianism. They regard
the supralapsarian view to be admissible they do not think of
condemning infralapsarianism or of demanding that their view be
embodied in the official confession of the church as the only
standard of truth. They do not ask that their own view he substituted
for the infralapsarian representation but they plead for actual
recognition of both views.
According to the supralapsarian view a divine knowledge of all
possibilities precedes every decree, a “knowledge of simple
intelligence.” According to the rule “what is ultimate in execution is
first in design,” supra teaches the following order in the elements of
God's counsel:
1. A decree determining the purpose for which God would create
and govern all things, namely. the revelation of his virtues, esp.
of his mercy and of his justice; respectively, in the eternal
salvation of a definite number of men conceived as yet only as
possibles, “creatable and fallible.” and in the eternal punishment
of another definite number. The manifestation of these virtues
necessitated:
2. A second decree determining the existence of human beings who
would be so wretched and pitiable that they would be fit objects
of God's mercy and justice. The actual existence of such human
beings necessitated:
3. A third decree to create a man adorned with the image of God to
be the head of humanity, and “by an efficacious permission” to
allow him to fall so that he would involve his entire posterity in
that fall.
4. Finally, a decree to manifest God's mercy in the elect by
providing a Mediator for them and by granting them the gifts of
faith and perseverance, and to show God's justice in the
reprobate by withholding saving grace from them and by giving
them up unto sin.
In this order of the decrees election and reprobation precede not only
faith and unbelief, regeneration and hardening, but also creation and
the fall. However, one difficulty presents itself immediately: it was
the established Reformed doctrine that the election of Christ and of
the church are not to be separated and that both are included in one
single decree that has as its object “the mystic Christ.” But in the
supralapsarian scheme the election of the church is separated from
the election of Christ by the two decrees of creation and the fall.
Comrie, however, tried to overcome this objection by teaching that
before the decree of creation and the fall the believers are chosen
unto union with Christ. This union is so close and unbreakable that
when those chosen fall, as is determined in a subsequent decree,
Christ, who had been elected as Head, is now also chosen to be the
Mediator of redemption. From this it is clear that Comrie understood
that the election of the church as the body of Christ cannot be
separated from the election of Christ as the Head of the Church.
Accordingly, he placed the election of both before the decree of
creation and the fall. However, in this manner not only men
considered as mere possibilities but also a merely possible Christ was
made the object of the decree of election.
The churches, however, always objected to this supralapsarian view.
As a result, there is not a single Reformed confession that offers this
representation. At the Synod of Dort there were a few adherents of
this view, esp. Gomarus and Maccovius; moreover, the delegates of
South Holland, Overisel, and Friesland preferred to leave the
question undecided and to use an expression that would satisfy both
parties. But although the “opinions” of the Dutch and of the foreign
delegates, also of those from Geneva, were definitely Reformed in
character, nevertheless, they were without exception infralapsarian
and clothed in mild and moderate terms. And the Synod at length
defined election as “the unchangeable purpose of God whereby,
before the foundation of the world, he hath out of mere grace,
according to the sovereign good pleasure of his own will, chosen
from the whole human race, which had fallen through their own fault
from their primitive state of rectitude, into sin and destruction, a
certain number of persons to salvation in Christ, whom he from
eternity appointed the Mediator and Head of the elect, and the
foundation of salvation.” Nevertheless, the Synod purposely refused
to condemn supralapsarianism; for, various theologians, among
whom were Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Perkins, Hommins, Bogerman,
etc., had at times used strong expression; e.g., “that some men are
created in order that they may be damned; that men viewed as
innocent are reprobated or damned; that God hates men irrespective
of sin; that men were predestinated unto sin; that God has need of
man as a sinner; that God willed and brought about the fact that men
sinned; that God acted insincerely in the calling of certain persons,”
etc. At the conference held in the Hague the Remonstrants had made
ready use of these expressions and of the difference between infraand supralapsarianism; consequently, the members of the synod
were intent on avoiding such “phrases that were too harsh.” But
when the delegates from England, Bremen, and Hesse insisted that
these expressions be condemned, the Synod refused to grant this
request. In defence of this refusal Synod stated that Scripture also
uses very strong expressions at times, that such phrases may have a
much milder meaning when examined in their context than they
appear to have when considered apart from their context, and that
the responsibility for them rests with the respective authors. In
addition, Synod admonished against the use of immoderate phrases
without mentioning any specifically and against “many other things
of the same kind,” and at a later session administered a severe
rebuke to Maccovius because of the manner in which he had
conducted himself. Accordingly, although the supralapsarian view
was not embodied in the confession, neither was it condemned. The
Westminster Assembly purposely refrained from attempting to
decide this question and from siding with either the infra- or the
supralapsarian party. For that reason many continued to favor
supralapsarianism although the rights of infralapsarianism were at
the same time recognized inasmuch as the latter view had been
embodied in the confession of the churches, was zealously and ably
defended by many theologians, and was usually placed in the
foreground in the preaching of the Gospel.
Reformed (continued): the Controversy in regard to Infra- and
Supralapsarianism:
(1) This controversy is rooted in the struggle between Augustine
and Pelagius. According to Pelagianism both original and actual
sin (unbelief) logically precede election and reprobation;
according to Augustine ONLY original sin precedes
predestination. According to supra, predestination logically
precedes not only actual but also original sin. Hence,
Pelagianism: original sin, actual sin, predestination;
Augustinianism or infralapsarianism: original sin,
predestination, actual sin; supralapsarianism: predestination,
original sin, actual sin.
(2) Many followers of Augustine accepted the doctrine of twofold predestination: a predestination unto glory and a
predestination unto death.
(3) The three Reformers: Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, arrived at
the supralapsarian view: election and reprobation are deeds of
God's sovereignty, logically preceding God's decree concerning
the fall. Nevertheless, Calvin often follows the infralapsarian
reasoning.
(4) For the order of the elements of the decree see III C.
(5) The Synod of Dort expressed itself in an infralapsarian
manner but did not in any sense condemn supralapsarianism. It
rejected Arminianism.
Among the Reformed another controversy soon arose, namely, in
regard to supra- and infralapsarianism. This controversy is rooted in
the struggle between Augustine and Pelagius. With the Pelagians the
order in the elements of God's counsel was as follows:
1. A decree to create man.
2. A decree to send Christ in order to redeem fallen humanity, to
cause him to die for all and to be proclaimed to all, and to grant
to all “grace sufficient” unto salvation.
3. A decree determining the eternal salvation of some on the
ground of foreseen faith, and the eternal punishment of others
on the ground of foreseen unbelief.
A totally different order was presented by Augustine. At times he
makes reprobation a part of predestination, but even then he views
foreknowledge not as something negative and passive but as a divine
activity. For, God's will is the “necessary ground of things”; what
happens “contrary to his will does not defeat his will”; when God
“permits” something, this permission is positive, efficacious. “Surely,
he permits willingly, not unwillingly.” The supralapsarian position,
viz., that reprobation is an act of God's sovereignty, is already
implied in this view. Usually, however, Augustine uses the words
divine foreknowledge and permission when he speaks about the fall.
Augustine has the following order:
1. A decree to create man and to permit him to fall.
2. A decree to elect some out of this corrupt mass unto eternal life,
and to allow others to remain in the perdition wherein they have
involved themselves. Accordingly, both election and reprobation
presuppose a fallen humanity, a “corrupt mass.” From this it
appears that Augustine usually favors the infralapsarian
representation; in his reasoning he does not go back beyond the
fall; he views reprobation as an act of God's justice. “God is
good, God is just. Because he is good, he is able to deliver some
that are undeserving of salvation; because he is just, he is not
able to condemn any one who is undeserving of condemnation.”
Now, although Augustine does not view the decree of predestination
as preceding both original and actual sin (the supra position), neither
does he place the decree of election and reprobation after both of
these (the Pelagian position). According to Augustine, only original
sin logically precedes predestination. Moreover, he considers original
sin to be a sufficient ground for reprobation. Actual sins are not
taken into account in the decree of reprobation although they are
considered in connection with the determination of the degree of
punishment. Augustine derived this order in the elements of God's
counsel from Rom. 9:11, 12 (“. . . for the children being not yet born,
neither having done anything good or bad, that the purpose of God
according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that
calleth, it was said unto her, `The elder shall serve the younger.'
Even as it is written, `Jacob I loved, Esau I hated.'”) and from the
fate of children dying in infancy unbaptized. Nevertheless, although
original sin is a sufficient ground for reprobation, Augustine does not
view it as the final and deepest ground. According to him God's
sovereignty, as expressed in Rom. 9:18, (“So then, he hath mercy on
whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth”) is the only answer to
the question why God rejected some and chose others, particularly,
why this person was rejected and that one elected.
3. Finally, a decree determining the means whereby the end in
view will be realized.
Augustine does not directly deduce a decree establishing the means
unto perdition from the decree of reprobation as such. He does teach
that even in regard to sin God proceeds in an active and positive
manner; God is the “Disposer of sins,” he deemed it right that there
should be sin, he punishes sin with sin; but Augustine generally
views reprobation negatively, i.e., as preterition or dereliction
(passing by or abandonment), and he does not as a rule view it as
part of predestination, but identifies the latter with election, and
subsumes both election and reprobation under God's providence. On
the other hand there is a predestination of the means unto
salvation.With Augustine predestination or election is always a
predestination unto glory. It implies foreordination unto grace.
Accordingly, foreseen faith and good works are not the ground of
election, neither is Christ the final ground. But election is
foreordination unto the desired goal, hence, unto the means whereby
this goal will he realized, i. e., unto Christ who was himself
predestinated, and thus unto calling, baptism, faith, and the gift of
perseverance; predestination is a preparation for grace. Accordingly,
the elect, by way of grace in Christ, will surely obtain heavenly
salvation. Therefore, in later years many followers of Augustine
arrived at the doctrine of twofold predestination: a “predestination
unto death” began to be coordinated with a “predestination unto
glory.” Nevertheless, the former could not be construed in the same
sense as the latter; hence, a distinction was made between a negative
and a positive reprobation. The negative reprobation logically
precedes the fall; it is an act of God's sovereignty; it does not depend
upon foreseen demerits any more than election depends upon
foreseen merits; it implies “the decree to permit certain individuals
to fall into a state of guilt” and it is “the cause of dereliction.” Thus
many Thomists, Alvarez, the Salmanticenses, Estius, Sylvius. etc.,
taught that negative reprobation precedes the fall and that it is
purely an act of God's sovereignty and good pleasure. Nevertheless,
this supralapsarian reprobation was viewed as wholly negative, i.e.,
as God's purpose not to elect certain individuals, to permit them to
fall, and afterward to ordain them to everlasting punishment
(positive reprobation). Essentially, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and all
supralapsarian Reformed theologians never went beyond this point.
They neither taught a “predestination unto sins” nor did they
represent God as the author of sin, as is falsely charged by Roman
Catholics, who advance this accusation against the Predestinationists
of the fifth century, Gottschalk, Bradwardina, Wyclif, and especially
against the Reformers. They do this merely in order to justify their
own Semi-Pelagian view, and to harmonize it with the teachings of
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.
Essentially the teaching of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in regard
to predestination was accepted by the Reformers: the modifications
introduced by them were slight and unessential, if we except the
doctrine of assurance. The Reformers agreed with Augustine and
Thomas Aquinas on many points; viz., they, too, believed that
election is not conditioned upon foreseen merits, but that it is the
source of faith and good works; that predestination unto glory always
implies predestination unto grace; that negative reprobation is not to
be explained as an act of God's justice but as an act of his
sovereignty, and that it logically precedes sin; that this negative
reprobation is followed by a decree to permit sin and to allow some
to remain in their fallen state and that positive reprobation takes sin
into account. To all this they added, however, that the concepts
foreknowledqe and permission,though not wrong in themselves,
cannot and should not be interpreted in a merely passive sense; that
even if they could be so construed, they would offer no real solution
of the problem; and that the distinction between positive and
negative reprobation has very little value. Thus. all three Reformers
arrived at the so-called supralapsarian view of the doctrine of
predestination, according to which both election and reprobation are
to be viewed as acts of God's sovereignty, logically preceding God's
decree concerning the fall, sin, and redemption through Christ. But it
is especially Calvin who often purposely refuses to go beyond the
secondary causes of salvation and perdition, and therefore often
reasons in an infralapsarian manner. Let not the reprobate view
God's decree as the cause of his perdition, but let him rather look
upon his own corrupt nature with respect to which he himself is
guilty. The elect and the reprobate were equally guilty but God is
merciful toward the former, just toward the latter. In Romans 9:21
the “clay” indicates men in their fallen condition, of whom God elects
some while he leaves others “in their own ruin, to which by nature all
are exposed.” The fall in Adam is the nearest cause of reprobation.
God hates only sin in us. And of this representation: “that out of the
race doomed in Adam God elected those whom he was pleased to
elect, and reprobated those whom he willed to reprobate.” Calvin
says, “just as it is a great deal more suitable unto the cultivation of
faith, so it is discussed with greater profit.. . is not only more
conducive unto piety, but, it seems to me, more theological, more
suitable to practical Christianity, and also more conducive unto
edification.” Nevertheless, this does not fully satisfy Calvin. Sin may
be the proximate cause of perdition, it is, nevertheless. not the
deepest cause. For the theory that God apart from any previous plan
decided to create man, then sat down, as it were, in a watchtower to
see what man would do, and having seen and foreseen this, only
afterward proceeded to the act of election and reprobation, is
altogether untenable. Foreknowledge and permission do not solve
the problem. because God, foreseeing the fall, could have prevented
it; accordingly, he voluntarily permitted the fall because it seemed
good to him. Accordingly, the fall of Adam, sin in general, and all
evil, were not only foreseen by God but in a certain sense were willed
and determined by him. Accordingly, there must have been a reason,
unknown to us, why God willed the fall: there is “a deeper divine
decree” logically preceding the fall. Hence, when Pighius answers
Calvin by objecting that according to the latter's view there would
have been in the divine mind a “distinction between elect and
reprobate previous to the fall of man,” Calvin indeed answers that
Pighius fails to distinguish between “proximate and remote causes,”
that every reprobate must consider his own sin to be the direct cause
of his perdition, and that the opposite view is handicapped with the
same objections, he does not deny the validity of the conclusion
drawn by Pighius: there is a “secret divine decree” anteceding the
fall, The final and deepest cause of reprobation as well as of election
is the will of God. Hence, with Calvin the supralansarian and
infralapsarian representation alternates. This is also true of most of
the later theologians who embraced supralapsarianism. They regard
the supralapsarian view to be admissible they do not think of
condemning infralapsarianism or of demanding that their view be
embodied in the official confession of the church as the only
standard of truth. They do not ask that their own view he substituted
for the infralapsarian representation but they plead for actual
recognition of both views.
According to the supralapsarian view a divine knowledge of all
possibilities precedes every decree, a “knowledge of simple
intelligence.” According to the rule “what is ultimate in execution is
first in design,” supra teaches the following order in the elements of
God's counsel:
1. A decree determining the purpose for which God would create
and govern all things, namely. the revelation of his virtues, esp.
of his mercy and of his justice; respectively, in the eternal
salvation of a definite number of men conceived as yet only as
possibles, “creatable and fallible.” and in the eternal punishment
of another definite number. The manifestation of these virtues
necessitated:
2. A second decree determining the existence of human beings who
would be so wretched and pitiable that they would be fit objects
of God's mercy and justice. The actual existence of such human
beings necessitated:
3. A third decree to create a man adorned with the image of God to
be the head of humanity, and “by an efficacious permission” to
allow him to fall so that he would involve his entire posterity in
that fall.
4. Finally, a decree to manifest God's mercy in the elect by
providing a Mediator for them and by granting them the gifts of
faith and perseverance, and to show God's justice in the
reprobate by withholding saving grace from them and by giving
them up unto sin.
In this order of the decrees election and reprobation precede not only
faith and unbelief, regeneration and hardening, but also creation and
the fall. However, one difficulty presents itself immediately: it was
the established Reformed doctrine that the election of Christ and of
the church are not to be separated and that both are included in one
single decree that has as its object “the mystic Christ.” But in the
supralapsarian scheme the election of the church is separated from
the election of Christ by the two decrees of creation and the fall.
Comrie, however, tried to overcome this objection by teaching that
before the decree of creation and the fall the believers are chosen
unto union with Christ. This union is so close and unbreakable that
when those chosen fall, as is determined in a subsequent decree,
Christ, who had been elected as Head, is now also chosen to be the
Mediator of redemption. From this it is clear that Comrie understood
that the election of the church as the body of Christ cannot be
separated from the election of Christ as the Head of the Church.
Accordingly, he placed the election of both before the decree of
creation and the fall. However, in this manner not only men
considered as mere possibilities but also a merely possible Christ was
made the object of the decree of election.
The churches, however, always objected to this supralapsarian view.
As a result, there is not a single Reformed confession that offers this
representation. At the Synod of Dort there were a few adherents of
this view, esp. Gomarus and Maccovius; moreover, the delegates of
South Holland, Overisel, and Friesland preferred to leave the
question undecided and to use an expression that would satisfy both
parties. But although the “opinions” of the Dutch and of the foreign
delegates, also of those from Geneva, were definitely Reformed in
character, nevertheless, they were without exception infralapsarian
and clothed in mild and moderate terms. And the Synod at length
defined election as “the unchangeable purpose of God whereby,
before the foundation of the world, he hath out of mere grace,
according to the sovereign good pleasure of his own will, chosen
from the whole human race, which had fallen through their own fault
from their primitive state of rectitude, into sin and destruction, a
certain number of persons to salvation in Christ, whom he from
eternity appointed the Mediator and Head of the elect, and the
foundation of salvation.” Nevertheless, the Synod purposely refused
to condemn supralapsarianism; for, various theologians, among
whom were Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Perkins, Hommins, Bogerman,
etc., had at times used strong expression; e.g., “that some men are
created in order that they may be damned; that men viewed as
innocent are reprobated or damned; that God hates men irrespective
of sin; that men were predestinated unto sin; that God has need of
man as a sinner; that God willed and brought about the fact that men
sinned; that God acted insincerely in the calling of certain persons,”
etc. At the conference held in the Hague the Remonstrants had made
ready use of these expressions and of the difference between infraand supralapsarianism; consequently, the members of the synod
were intent on avoiding such “phrases that were too harsh.” But
when the delegates from England, Bremen, and Hesse insisted that
these expressions be condemned, the Synod refused to grant this
request. In defence of this refusal Synod stated that Scripture also
uses very strong expressions at times, that such phrases may have a
much milder meaning when examined in their context than they
appear to have when considered apart from their context, and that
the responsibility for them rests with the respective authors. In
addition, Synod admonished against the use of immoderate phrases
without mentioning any specifically and against “many other things
of the same kind,” and at a later session administered a severe
rebuke to Maccovius because of the manner in which he had
conducted himself. Accordingly, although the supralapsarian view
was not embodied in the confession, neither was it condemned. The
Westminster Assembly purposely refrained from attempting to
decide this question and from siding with either the infra- or the
supralapsarian party. For that reason many continued to favor
supralapsarianism although the rights of infralapsarianism were at
the same time recognized inasmuch as the latter view had been
embodied in the confession of the churches, was zealously and ably
defended by many theologians, and was usually placed in the
foreground in the preaching of the Gospel.