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C. The supralapsarian and infralapsarian interpretation of the
decree:
(1) Points of agreement. Both agree:
(a) That God is not the Author of sin (supra as well as infra).
(b) That Scripture (not philosophy) is the only source of our
knowledge of God's decree (supra as well as infra).
(c) That man's fall and punishment is not merely the object
of God's foreknowledge but of his decree and foreordination
(infra as well as supra).
(d) That faith is not the cause of the decree of election,
neither sin the cause of the decree of reprobation (infra as
well as supra).
(2) Points of disagreement:
(a) In general, supralapsarianism places the decree of
predestination proper above (supra) the decree to permit
the fall (lapsus); while infralapsarianism places the decree
of predestination proper below (infra) the decree to permit
the fall (lapsus). Hence:
Supralapsarianism:
predestination
fall
Infralapsarianism:
fall
predestination
(b) From this general differentiation it becomes clear that
supra and infra differ in regard to their presentation of the
order in the elements of God's plan. The logical order
according to supra:
1. a decree determining the purpose of all things,
namely, the revelation of God's virtues; specifically, the
revelation of his mercy in the salvation of a definite
number of possible men; and the revelation of his
justice in the perdition of another definite number of
possible men
2. a decree to create the men thus elected and
reprobated.
3. a decree to permit them to fall.
4. a decree to provide a Mediator for the elect and
through him to justify them, and to condemn the
reprobate.
The logical order according to infra:
1. a decree to create man in holiness and blessedness.
2. a decree to permit man to fall.
3. a decree to elect some out of this fallen multitude
and to leave others in their misery.
4. a decree to bring about the salvation of the elect
through Christ. See II, F.
(c) From this again it is apparent that according to supra
men viewed as possible or creatable and fallible are the
objects of the decree; while, according to infra men viewed
as fallen are objects of the decree.
(3) Objections:
(a) To infra:
1. God's justice does not explain the decree of
reprobation. The ultimate ground of reprobation is
God's sovereign will.
2. In order to maintain reprobation as an act of God's
JUSTICE infra places reprobation after the FALL as if
in the decree of reprobation God figured only with
ORIGINAL sin and not also with ACTUAL sins.
(b) To supra:
1. Supra is correct when it maintains that God's glory is
the final goal of all God's works, but the manner in
which that goal will be realized is not thereby given; it
is incorrect to say that in the eternal perdition of the
reprobate God reveals his justice only and that in the
eternal salvation of the elect he reveals his mercy
exclusively.
2. According to supra the decree of predestination has
for its object possible men and a possible Redeemer;
but just how are we to conceive of a decree concerning
possible men whose actual future existence has not
even been determined? 3. Supra makes the damnation
of the reprobate the object of the divine will IN THE
SAME SENSE as the salvation of the elect. This
position is not sustained by Scripture.
(c) To both infra and supra:
1. It is incorrect to define the final goal of all things as
the revelation of God's mercy in the elect and of his
justice in the reprobate.
2. It is incorrect to represent the lost condition of the
reprobate in hell as an object of predestination.
3. Predestination unto eternal death should not be
coordinated with predestination unto eternal life, for
while certain Individuals constitute the object of
reprobation, the human race under a new Head, even
Christ, is the object of election.
4. Both supra and infra err when they regard the
various elements of God's counsel as subordinately
related to each other.
5. Both are one-sided: supra emphasizing God's
sovereignty; Infra, God's righteousness, holiness, and
mercy.
(4) The author's conclusion in regard to the whole matter:
“God's decree should not be exclusively described . . . as a
straight line to indicate a relation merely of before and after,
cause and effect, means and goal; but it should also be viewed as
a system the several elements of which are coordinately related
to one another. . . . As in an organism all the members are
dependent upon one another and in a reciprocal manner
determine one another, so also the universe is God's work of art,
the several parts of which are organically related.”
The word “predestination,” has been used in more than one sense: it
has been given a broad and a narrow meaning. According to
Pelagianism it is merely the decree whereby God, on the ground of
foreseen faith and perseverance on the part of some, and foreseen sin
and unbelief on the part of others, has determined to give to the
former eternal salvation and to the latter eternal punishment.
According to this conception, creation, the fall, Christ, the
proclamation of the Gospel and the offering of grace to all,
persevering faith and unbelief precede predestination and are not
included in it but excluded from it; the decree of predestination is no
more than the assignment to eternal life or eternal punishment. In
this way the most restricted meaning is given to the word
predestination, which is then made entirely dependent upon “the
bare foreknowledge of God,” is a matter of uncertainty, and is not
worthy of the name predestination. In that case not God but man is
the maker of history and the arbiter of its destiny. This error has
been sufficiently refuted in the former paragraph. The important
difference between infra- and supralapsarianism. however, must be
given more detailed discussion. At bottom this difference consists in
a broader or a more restricted definition of the concept
“predestination.” Augustine accepted a twofold restriction of this
concept: in his system the decree of predestination follows that
concerning creation and the fall, and he generally used the term
“predestination” in the favorable sense, as a synonym for “election,”
while he gave the preference to the term “foreknowledge” to indicate
reprobation: predestination, then, is what God does, namely that
which is good; while “foreknowledge” refers to what man does,
namely evil. In general, scholasticism, Roman Catholicism, and
Lutheranism, accepted this interpretation of the term predestination.
Also in the writings of Reformed infralapsarian theologians the
decree of creation and of the fall precedes that of election and of
reprobation; but while most of them were willing to look upon
reprobation as a part of predestination — just so the decree of
predestination follows that of the fall — and to speak of a twin or
double predestination, others considered it better to conceive of
predestination as a synonym for election, and to discuss reprobation
separately and under a different name. Now, if the term
“foreknowledge” is not used in a Pelagian sense, and if the decree of
reprobation is not withdrawn from the province of the will of God, as
was done by later Roman Catholic and Lutheran theologians, the
difference is not essential but merely verbal. But it. is characteristic
of infralapsarianism that, in the decree, creation and the fall precede
election and reprobation; while supralapsarianism's concept of
predestination is broad enough to include creation and the fall,
which are then looked upon as means to an end: the eternal destiny
of rational creatures. In the Reformed Church and in Reformed
theology equal recognition has always been given to both supra- and
infralapsarianism, viewed as interpretations of the decree of
predestination. To be sure, the Dutch confessional standards are
infralapsarian; nevertheless, no ecclesiastical assembly, not even the
Synod of Dort, has ever troubled the supralapsarians. The Lambeth
articles of Confession, purposely leave the question unanswered.
Reformed theologians have always granted charter privileges to both
conceptions. Spanheim used to say that in the cathedra he was supra,
but when he was teaching his congregation he was infra. On the one
hand, supralapsarians as well as infralapsarians teach that God is not
the Author of sin, but that the cause of sin lies in the will of man.
Though, as the Omnipotent One. God predestined the fall, and
though, as Supreme Ruler, he executes his plan even by means of sin;
nevertheless, he remains holy and righteous; of his own accord man
falls and sins: the guilt is his alone. “Man falls according to the
appointment of divine providence, but he falls by his own fault.”
Also, the supralapsarians did not arrive at their conception by means
of philosophical speculation, but they presented their view because
they considered it to come closer to the teaching of Scripture. just as
Augustine arrived at the doctrine of predestination through his study
of Paul, so Calvin became convinced of the truth of
supralapsarianism by means of his reflection on the Scriptural
doctrine of sin. According to his own statement he was not giving a
philosophy but the truth of God's Word. On the other hand,
Reformed infralapsarian theologians are fully agreed that man's fall,
sin, and the eternal punishment of many was not the object of “bare
foreknowledge” but of God's decree and foreordination. Hence, the
difference does not concern the content of God's counsel. Both infraand supralapsarianism deny the freedom of the will, reject the idea
that faith is the cause of election and that sin is the cause of
reprobation, and thus oppose Pelagianism; both in the final analysis
pay homage to God's sovereignty. The difference concerns only the
order of the decrees. Infralapsarians prefer the historical, causal
order; supralapsarians defend the ideal, teleological order. The
former give a more limited meaning to the concept predestination,
and exclude from it a preceding creation, fall, and providence; the
latter subsume all the other decrees under predestination. The
former emphasizes the manyness, the latter the oneness, of the
decree. With the former each of the several decrees has significance
by itself; with the latter all the preceding decrees are subordinate to
the final decree.
The problem is not solved by means of an appeal to Scripture.
Whereas infralapsarianism is supported by all those passages in
which election and reprobation have reference to a fallen universe,
and are represented as deeds of mercy and of justice, Deut. 7:6-8;
Matt. 12:25, 26; John 15:19; Rom. 9:15, 16; Eph. 1:4-12; II Tim. 1:9;
supralapsarianism seeks its strength in all those texts that declare
God's absolute sovereignty, especially with reference to sin, Ps. 115:3;
Prov. 16:4; Is. 10:15; 45:9; Jer. 18:6; Matt. 20:15; Rom. 9:17, 19-21.
The fact that each of the two views leans for support on a certain
group of texts without doing full justice to a different group indicates
the one-sided character of both theories. Though infralapsarianism
deserves praise because of its modesty — it abides by the historical,
causal order — and though it seems to be less offensive and though it
shows greater consideration for the demands of practical life, it fails
to give satisfaction. It is just as difficult to conceive of reprobation as
an act of God's justice as it is thus to conceive of election. Faith and
good works, to be sure, are not the cause of election, but neither is
sin the cause of reprobation; God's sovereign good pleasure is the
cause of both; hence, in a certain sense, the decree of reprobation
always precedes the decree to permit sin. Moreover, if in the divine
conscious ness the decree of reprobation follows that to permit sin,
the question cannot be suppressed, “Then why did God permit sin?”
Did this permission consist in a “bare foreknowledge” and was the
fall in reality a frustration of God's plan? But no Reformed
theologian, even though he be an infralapsarian, can ever or may
ever say this. In a certain sense he must include the fall in God's
decree; he must conceive of it as having been foreordained. But why
did God “by an efficacious permission” foreordain the fall?
Infralapsarianism can answer this question only by referring to God's
good pleasure, and then it agrees with supralapsarianism.
Reprobation cannot be explained as an act of God's justice, for the
first sinful deed at any rate was permitted by God's sovereignty.
Reasoning backward, infralapsarianism finally arrives at the position
of supralapsarianism; in case it should be unwilling to admit this, it
would have to resort to foreknowledge. Add to all this the fact that
infra places the decree of reprobation after the fall, but just where?
Is original sin the only sin that is taken into account by the decree of
reprobation, and in making this dreadful decree does God leave
actual sins entirely out of consideration? If, as infra insists,
reprobation must be referred to God's justice, then instead of placing
this decree immediately after the entrance of original sin, why not
place it after the complete accomplishment — respectively by each
reprobate person — of all actual sins? This is exactly what was done
by Arminius — who also included the sin of foreseen unbelief — but
such a procedure would never do on the part of a Reformed
theologian. Reprobation would then become dependent upon bare
foreknowledge, i.e., upon man; man's sinful deeds would then
become the final and deepest cause of reprobation; hence, in order to
avoid this error the decree of reprobation was placed immediately
after the fall. But by doing this infra becomes supralapsarian with
respect to all actual sins: reprobation does not precede original sin,
but it does precede all other sin. At first glance infralapsarianism
seems to be more moderate and less offensive than
supralapsarianism, but deeper study reveals the fact that
appearances deceive.
Accordingly, supralapsarianism undoubtedly has in its favor the fact
that it refrains from every attempt to justify God, and that both with
respect to reprobation and with respect to election it rests in God's
sovereign, incomprehensible, yet wise and holy good pleasure.
Nevertheless, it is at least just as unsatisfactory as is
infralapsarianism, and perhaps even more so. It wishes to pass for a
solution, but in no sense whatever does it give a solution of even a
single problem. In the first place, to say that the manifestation of all
God's excellencies is the final goal of all of the ways of God is indeed
correct; but when supra includes in that goal the manner in which
the divine glory will be revealed in the eternal destiny of rational
creatures, it errs. For, the eternal state of salvation or of perdition is
not in itself the goal, but one of the means employed in order to
reveal God's excellencies in a manner suited to the creature. It would
not do to say that God would have been unable to manifest his glory
by saving all men, if this had been his pleasure. Neither is it correct
to say that in the eternal state of the reprobate God reveals his justice
exclusively, and that in the eternal state of the elect he manifests his
mercy exclusively.Also in the church, purchased with the blood of
the Son, God's justice is revealed; and also in the place of perdition
there are degrees of punishment and sparks of divine mercy. The
final goal of all God's work's must needs be his glory, but the manner
in which that glory will shine forth is not thereby given, but has been
determined by God's will; and although there were wise and holy
reasons why God purposed the perdition of many and not the
salvation of all, nevertheless these reasons, though known to him,
are not known to us: we are not able to say why God willed to make
use of this means and not of another. A further objection to
supralapsarianism is the fact that according to this view the objects
of the decree of election and reprobation are men considered merely
as possibilities and — as Comrie added — a Christ viewed as a mere
possibility. To be sure by some this element has been eliminated
from the supralapsarian scheme. But the principle which gave rise to
this error still remains. Logic requires that a possible Christ should
be added to possible men as the object of election, for in the decree of
election the church and its Head, i.e., the saved and the Savior
cannot be separated.
But even aside from this, the decree of election and reprobation
which has for Its object “creatable and fallible men” is not the real,
but merely a tentative decree. In the end supralapsarianism is forced
to proceed to the infralapsarian order in the elements of the decree.
For, following the decree concerning the election and reprobation of
these possible men comes the decree to create them and to permit
them to fall, and this must be succeeded by another decree
respecting these men, who are now no longer viewed as mere
possibilities but as realities — even in the decree — viz., to elect some
and to reprobate others. The logic of the supralapsarian scheme is
very weak, indeed. Supralapsarianism really differs from
infralapsarianism only in this respect, viz., that after the manner of
Amyraldism, it prefixes a decree concerning possibilities to the
infralapsarian series of decrees. But just how are we to conceive of a
decree respecting possible men, whose actual future existence has as
yet not been determined? In the consciousness of God there is an
infinite number of “possible men,” who will never live. Hence, the
decree of election and reprobation has for its object “nonentities,”
not definite persons known to God by name. Finally, there is this
difficulty connected with supra, viz., that it makes the eternal
punishment of the reprobates an object of the divine will in the same
manner and in the same sense as the eternal salvation of the elect;
and that it makes sin, which leads to eternal destruction, a means in
the same manner and in the same sense as the redemption in Christ
is a means unto eternal salvation.
Now Reformed theologians all agree that the entrance of sin and
punishment was willed and determined by God. It is perfectly true
that words like “permission” and “foreknowledge” do not solve
anything. The difficulty remains the same, and the same questions
arise; viz., why, if God foreknew everything, did he create man
fallible, and why did he not prevent the fall? Why did he allow all
men to fall in Adam? Why does he not grant to all men faith and the
blessing of hearing the Gospel? In brief, if God foreknows and
permits something, he does this either “willingly” or “unwillingly.”
The latter is impossible. Accordingly. only the former remains: God's
permission is an “efficacious permission,” an act of his will. Nor
should it be supposed that the idea of permission is of any force or
value over against the charge that God is the Author of sin; for he
who permits or allows someone to sin and to perish in his sin
although he was able to prevent him from sinning is just as guilty as
he who incites someone to sin. On the other hand, however, all agree
that although sin is not “excluded”from the will of God it is,
nevertheless, “contrary” to his will; that it is not merely a means to
the final goal, but a disturbance in God's creation; and that Adam's
fall was not a step ahead but a fall in the real sense of the word. It is
also a fact that admits of no doubt that, however much logical
reasoning may demur, no one is able to suggest other and better
words than “permission, foreknowledge, preterition, dereliction,”
etc. Even the most outspoken supralapsarian is not able to dispense
with these words, neither in the pulpit nor in the cathedra. For,
although it be admitted that there is a “predestination unto death,”
no Reformed theologian has ever dared to speak of a “predestination
unto sin.” Without any exception all (i.e., Zwingli, Calvin, Beza,
Zanchius, Gomarus, Comrie, etc.) have rejected the idea that God is
the Author of sin, that man was created unto damnation, that
reprobation is the “cause” of sin, and that sin is the “efficient cause”
of reprobation; and all have maintained, that the inexorable
character of God's justice is manifest in the decree of reprobation,
that reprobation is the “accidental cause” of sin, and that sin is the
“sufficient cause” of reprobation, etc. Accordingly and happily,
supralapsarianism is always inconsistent: it begins by making a
daring leap, but it soon retreats and returns to the previously
abandoned position of infralapsarianism. This is very evident from
the works of supralapsarians. Nearly all of them hesitate to place the
decree of reprobation in its entirety and without any restriction
before the decree to permit sin. The Thomists differentiated between
a “negative and a positive reprobation”; the former was made to
precede creation and fall, the latter was made to follow them. This
same distinction, be it in a modified form, recurs in the works of
Reformed theologians. Not only do all admit that reprobation should
be distinguished from condemnation, which is the execution of that
decree, takes place in time, and has sin for its cause; but in the
decree of reprobation itself many differentiate between a preceding,
general purpose of God to reveal his excellencies, especially his
mercy and justice, in certain “creatable and fallible men”; and a
subsequent, definite purpose to create these “possible men,” to
permit them to fall and to sin, and to punish them for their sins.
Accordingly, neither supra- nor infralapsarianism has succeeded in
its attempt to solve this problem and to do justice to the manysidedness of Scripture. To a certain extent this failure is due to the
one-sidedness that characterizes both views. In the first place it is
incorrect, as we stated before, to define the “final goal” of all things
as the revelation of God's mercy in the elect, and of his justice in the
reprobate. God's glory and the manifestation of his excellencies is, to
be sure, the final goal of all things; but the double state of salvation
and damnation is not included in that final goal, but is related to it as
a means. No one is able to prove that this double state must of
necessity constitute an element in the final goal of God's glory. In all
his “outgoing works” God always has in view his own glory; but that
he seeks to establish this glory in this and in no other way is to be
ascribed to his sovereignty and to nothing else. But even aside from
this, it is not true that God manifests his justice only in the
damnation of the reprobate, and his mercy only in the salvation of
the elect, for also in heaven God's justice and holiness shines forth,
and also in hell there is a remnant of his mercy and compassion.
Secondly, it is incorrect to represent the lost condition of the
reprobate in hell as an object of predestination. To be sure, sin
should not be referred to “bare foreknowledge and permission”; in a
certain sense, the fall, sin, and eternal punishment are included in
God's decree and willed by him. But this is true in a certain sense
only, and not in the same sense as grace and salvation. These are the
objects of his delight; but God does not delight in sin, neither has he
pleasure in punishment. When he makes sin subservient to his glory,
he does this by means of the exercise of his omnipotence, but to
glorify God is contrary to sin's nature. And when he punishes the
wicked, he does not take delight in their sufferings as such, but in
this punishment he celebrates, the triumph of his virtues, Deut.
28:63; Ps. 2:4; Prov. 1:26; Lam. 3:33. Accordingly, though on the one
hand, with a view to the all-comprehensive and immutable character
of God's counsel, it is not wrong to speak of a “twofold
predestination” (gemina praedestinatio); nevertheless, on the other
hand, we must be careful to keep in mind that in the one case
predestination is of a different nature than in the other.
“Predestination is the disposition, goal and ordination of the means
with a view to a goal. Since eternal damnation is not the goal but
merely the termination of a person's life, therefore reprobation
cannot properly be classified under predestination. For these two
things are in conflict with each other: to ordain unto a goal and to
ordain unto damnation. For by reason of its very nature, every goal is
the very best something, the perfection of an object; damnation,
however, is the extreme evil and the greatest imperfection; hence the
expression `God has predestinated some men unto damnation' is
incorrect.” Hence, no matter how often and clearly Scripture tells us
that sin and punishment were ordained by God, nevertheless, the
words “purpose” (prothesis),“foreknowledge” (prognosis)and
“foreordination” (proorismos)are used almost exclusively with
reference to “predestination unto glory.” In the third place, there is
still another ground for the assertion that those err who coordinate
“predestination unto eternal death” with “predestination unto
eternal life,” and view the former as a goal in the same sense as the
latter; while it is true that certain individuals constitute the object of
reprobation, the human race under a new Head, namely Christ, is
the object of election; hence, by grace not only certain individuals are
saved, but the human race itself together with the entire cosmos is
saved. Moreover, we are not to suppose that merely a few of God's
virtues are revealed in this salvation of the human race and of the
universe, so that in order to reveal God's justice the state of eternal
perdition must needs be called into being; on the contrary, in the
consummated Kingdom of God all of God's virtues and excellencies
are unfolded: his justice and his grace, his holiness and his love, his
sovereignty and his mercy. Hence, this “state of glory” is the real and
direct end of creation, though even this goal is subordinate to the
exaltation of God. In the fourth place, both supra and infra err when
they regard the various elements of the decree as standing in
subordinate relation to each other. Now it is true, of course, that the
means are subordinate to the final end in view, but from this it does
not follow that they are subordinate to one another. Creation is not a
mere means toward the fall, neither is the fall a mere means toward
grace and perseverance, nor are these in turn merely means toward
salvation and perdition. We should never lose sight of the fact that
the decrees are as rich in content as the entire history of the universe,
for the latter is the unfoldment of the former. The history of the
universe can never be made to fit into a little scheme of logic. It is
entirely incorrect to suppose that of the series: creation, fall, sin,
Christ, faith, unbelief, etc., each constituent is merely a means
toward the attainment of the next, which as soon as it is present
renders the former useless. As Twissus already remarked, “The
different elements of the decree do not stand to one another in a
relation merely of subordination, but they are also coordinately
related.” It is certainly wrong to suppose that the sole purpose of
creation was to produce the fall; on the contrary, by means of God's
creative activity a universe that will remain even in the state of glory
was called into being. The fall took place not only in order that there
might be a “creature in the condition of misery,” but together with all
its consequences it will retain its significance. Christ not merely
became a Mediator, which would have been all that was necessary
for the expiation of sin, but he was also ordained by God to be the
Head of the church. The history of the universe is not a mere means
which loses its value as soon as the end of the age is reached, but it
has influence and leaves fruits, for eternity. Moreover, here on earth
we should not conceive of election and reprobation as two straight
and parallel lines; on the contrary, in the unbeliever there is much
that is not the result of reprobation, and in the believer there is much
that should not be ascribed to election. On the one hand, both
election and reprobation presuppose sin, and are deeds of mercy and
of justice, Rom. 9:15; Eph. 1:4; on the other hand both are also deeds
of divine right and sovereignty, Rom. 9:11, 17, 21. So, Adam even
before the fall is a type of Christ, I Cor. 15:47ff.; nevertheless, in
Scripture the fact of the incarnation always rests upon the fall of the
human race, Heb. 2:14ff. At times Scripture expresses itself so
strongly that reprobation and election are coordinated, and God is
represented as having purposed eternal perdition as well as eternal
salvation, Luke 2:34; John 3:19-21; I Pet. 2:7, 8; Rom. 9:17, 18, 22,
etc.; but in other passages eternal death is entirely absent in the
description of the future; the victorious consummation of the
kingdom of God, the new heaven and earth, the new Jerusalem in
which God will be all and in all is pictured to us as the end of all
things, I Cor. 15; Rev. 21, 22; the universe is represented as existing
for the church, and the church for Christ, I Cor. 3 :21-23; and
reprobation is completely subordinated to election.
Accordingly, neither the supra- nor the infralapsarian view of
predestination is able to do full justice to the truth of Scripture, and
to satisfy our theological thinking. The true element in
supralapsarianism is: that it emphasizes the unity of the divine
decree and the fact that God had one final aim in view, that sin's
entrance into the universe was not something unexpected and
unlooked for by God but that he willed sin in a certain sense, and
that the work of creation was immediately adapted to God's
redemptive activity so that even before the fall, i.e., in the creation of
Adam, Christ's coming was definitely fixed. And the true element in
infralapsarianism is: that the decrees manifest not only a unity but
also a diversity (with a view to their several objects), that these
decrees reveal not only a teleological but also a causal order, that
creation and fall cannot merely be regarded as means to an end, and
that sin should be regarded not as an element of progress but rather
as an element of disturbance in the universe so that in and by itself it
cannot have been willed by God. In general, the formulation of the
final goal of all things in such a manner that God reveals his justice
in the reprobate and his mercy in the elect is too simple and
incomplete. The “state of glory” will be rich and glorious beyond all
description. We expect a new heaven, a new earth, a new humanity, a
renewed universe, a constantly progressing and undisturbed
unfoldment. Creation and the fall, Adam and Christ, nature and
grace, faith and unbelief, election and reprobation — all together and
each in its own way — are so many factors, acting not only
subsequently to but also in coordination with one another,
collaborating with a view to that exalted state of glory. Indeed, even
the universe as it now exists together with its history, constitutes a
continuous revelation of God's virtues. It is not only a means toward
a higher and richer revelation that is still future, but it has value in
itself. It will continue to exert its influence also in the coming
dispensation, and it will continue to furnish material for the
exaltation and glorification of God by a redeemed humanity.
Accordingly, between the different elements of the decree — as also
between the facts of the history of the universe — there is not only a
causal and teleological but also an organic relation. Because of the
limited character of our reasoning powers we must needs proceed
from the one or from the other viewpoint; hence, the advocates of a
causal world and life-view and the defenders of a teleological
philosophy are engaged in continual warfare. But this disharmony
does not exist in the mind of God. He sees the whole, and surveys all
things in their relations. All things are eternally present in his
consciousness. His decree is a unity: it is a single conception. And in
that decree all the different elements assume the same relation which
a posteriori we even now observe between the facts of history, and
which will become fully disclosed in the future. This relation is so
involved and complicated that neither the adjective “supralapsarian”
nor “infralapsarian” nor any other term is able to express it. It is both
causal and teleological: that which precedes exerts its influence upon
that which follows, and that which is still future already determines
the past and the present. There is a rich, all-sided “reciprocity.”
Predestination, in the generally accepted sense of that term: the
foreordination of the eternal state of rational creatures and of all the
means necessary to that end, is not the sole, all-inclusive and allcomprehensive, purpose of God. It is a very important part of God's
decree but it is not synonymous with the decree. God's decree or
counsel is the main concept because it is all-comprehensive; it
embraces all things without any exception: heaven and earth, spirit
and matter, visible and invisible things, organic and inorganic
creatures; it is the single will of God concerning the entire universe
with reference to the past, the present, and the future. But
predestination concerns the eternal state of rational creatures, and
the means thereto: but not all things that ever come into being nor
all events that ever happen can be included in these means. Hence, in
a previous paragraph we discussed “providence” as a thing by itself,
although the relation between it and predestination was clearly
shown. In the doctrine of God's decree common grace should receive
a much more detailed discussion than was formerly the case, and
should be recognized in its own rights. Briefly stated, God's decree
together with the history of the universe which answers to it should
not be exclusively described — after the manner of infra- and
supralapsarianism — as a straight line indicating a relation merely of
before and after, cause and effect, means and goal; but it should also
be viewed as a system the several elements of which are coordinately
related to one another and cooperate with one another toward that
goal which always was and is and will be the deepest ground of all
existence, namely, the glorification of God. As in an organism all the
members are dependent upon one another and in a reciprocal
manner determine one another, so also the universe is God's work of
art, the several parts of which are organically related. And of that
universe, considered in its length and breadth, the counsel or decree
of God is the eternal idea.
decree:
(1) Points of agreement. Both agree:
(a) That God is not the Author of sin (supra as well as infra).
(b) That Scripture (not philosophy) is the only source of our
knowledge of God's decree (supra as well as infra).
(c) That man's fall and punishment is not merely the object
of God's foreknowledge but of his decree and foreordination
(infra as well as supra).
(d) That faith is not the cause of the decree of election,
neither sin the cause of the decree of reprobation (infra as
well as supra).
(2) Points of disagreement:
(a) In general, supralapsarianism places the decree of
predestination proper above (supra) the decree to permit
the fall (lapsus); while infralapsarianism places the decree
of predestination proper below (infra) the decree to permit
the fall (lapsus). Hence:
Supralapsarianism:
predestination
fall
Infralapsarianism:
fall
predestination
(b) From this general differentiation it becomes clear that
supra and infra differ in regard to their presentation of the
order in the elements of God's plan. The logical order
according to supra:
1. a decree determining the purpose of all things,
namely, the revelation of God's virtues; specifically, the
revelation of his mercy in the salvation of a definite
number of possible men; and the revelation of his
justice in the perdition of another definite number of
possible men
2. a decree to create the men thus elected and
reprobated.
3. a decree to permit them to fall.
4. a decree to provide a Mediator for the elect and
through him to justify them, and to condemn the
reprobate.
The logical order according to infra:
1. a decree to create man in holiness and blessedness.
2. a decree to permit man to fall.
3. a decree to elect some out of this fallen multitude
and to leave others in their misery.
4. a decree to bring about the salvation of the elect
through Christ. See II, F.
(c) From this again it is apparent that according to supra
men viewed as possible or creatable and fallible are the
objects of the decree; while, according to infra men viewed
as fallen are objects of the decree.
(3) Objections:
(a) To infra:
1. God's justice does not explain the decree of
reprobation. The ultimate ground of reprobation is
God's sovereign will.
2. In order to maintain reprobation as an act of God's
JUSTICE infra places reprobation after the FALL as if
in the decree of reprobation God figured only with
ORIGINAL sin and not also with ACTUAL sins.
(b) To supra:
1. Supra is correct when it maintains that God's glory is
the final goal of all God's works, but the manner in
which that goal will be realized is not thereby given; it
is incorrect to say that in the eternal perdition of the
reprobate God reveals his justice only and that in the
eternal salvation of the elect he reveals his mercy
exclusively.
2. According to supra the decree of predestination has
for its object possible men and a possible Redeemer;
but just how are we to conceive of a decree concerning
possible men whose actual future existence has not
even been determined? 3. Supra makes the damnation
of the reprobate the object of the divine will IN THE
SAME SENSE as the salvation of the elect. This
position is not sustained by Scripture.
(c) To both infra and supra:
1. It is incorrect to define the final goal of all things as
the revelation of God's mercy in the elect and of his
justice in the reprobate.
2. It is incorrect to represent the lost condition of the
reprobate in hell as an object of predestination.
3. Predestination unto eternal death should not be
coordinated with predestination unto eternal life, for
while certain Individuals constitute the object of
reprobation, the human race under a new Head, even
Christ, is the object of election.
4. Both supra and infra err when they regard the
various elements of God's counsel as subordinately
related to each other.
5. Both are one-sided: supra emphasizing God's
sovereignty; Infra, God's righteousness, holiness, and
mercy.
(4) The author's conclusion in regard to the whole matter:
“God's decree should not be exclusively described . . . as a
straight line to indicate a relation merely of before and after,
cause and effect, means and goal; but it should also be viewed as
a system the several elements of which are coordinately related
to one another. . . . As in an organism all the members are
dependent upon one another and in a reciprocal manner
determine one another, so also the universe is God's work of art,
the several parts of which are organically related.”
The word “predestination,” has been used in more than one sense: it
has been given a broad and a narrow meaning. According to
Pelagianism it is merely the decree whereby God, on the ground of
foreseen faith and perseverance on the part of some, and foreseen sin
and unbelief on the part of others, has determined to give to the
former eternal salvation and to the latter eternal punishment.
According to this conception, creation, the fall, Christ, the
proclamation of the Gospel and the offering of grace to all,
persevering faith and unbelief precede predestination and are not
included in it but excluded from it; the decree of predestination is no
more than the assignment to eternal life or eternal punishment. In
this way the most restricted meaning is given to the word
predestination, which is then made entirely dependent upon “the
bare foreknowledge of God,” is a matter of uncertainty, and is not
worthy of the name predestination. In that case not God but man is
the maker of history and the arbiter of its destiny. This error has
been sufficiently refuted in the former paragraph. The important
difference between infra- and supralapsarianism. however, must be
given more detailed discussion. At bottom this difference consists in
a broader or a more restricted definition of the concept
“predestination.” Augustine accepted a twofold restriction of this
concept: in his system the decree of predestination follows that
concerning creation and the fall, and he generally used the term
“predestination” in the favorable sense, as a synonym for “election,”
while he gave the preference to the term “foreknowledge” to indicate
reprobation: predestination, then, is what God does, namely that
which is good; while “foreknowledge” refers to what man does,
namely evil. In general, scholasticism, Roman Catholicism, and
Lutheranism, accepted this interpretation of the term predestination.
Also in the writings of Reformed infralapsarian theologians the
decree of creation and of the fall precedes that of election and of
reprobation; but while most of them were willing to look upon
reprobation as a part of predestination — just so the decree of
predestination follows that of the fall — and to speak of a twin or
double predestination, others considered it better to conceive of
predestination as a synonym for election, and to discuss reprobation
separately and under a different name. Now, if the term
“foreknowledge” is not used in a Pelagian sense, and if the decree of
reprobation is not withdrawn from the province of the will of God, as
was done by later Roman Catholic and Lutheran theologians, the
difference is not essential but merely verbal. But it. is characteristic
of infralapsarianism that, in the decree, creation and the fall precede
election and reprobation; while supralapsarianism's concept of
predestination is broad enough to include creation and the fall,
which are then looked upon as means to an end: the eternal destiny
of rational creatures. In the Reformed Church and in Reformed
theology equal recognition has always been given to both supra- and
infralapsarianism, viewed as interpretations of the decree of
predestination. To be sure, the Dutch confessional standards are
infralapsarian; nevertheless, no ecclesiastical assembly, not even the
Synod of Dort, has ever troubled the supralapsarians. The Lambeth
articles of Confession, purposely leave the question unanswered.
Reformed theologians have always granted charter privileges to both
conceptions. Spanheim used to say that in the cathedra he was supra,
but when he was teaching his congregation he was infra. On the one
hand, supralapsarians as well as infralapsarians teach that God is not
the Author of sin, but that the cause of sin lies in the will of man.
Though, as the Omnipotent One. God predestined the fall, and
though, as Supreme Ruler, he executes his plan even by means of sin;
nevertheless, he remains holy and righteous; of his own accord man
falls and sins: the guilt is his alone. “Man falls according to the
appointment of divine providence, but he falls by his own fault.”
Also, the supralapsarians did not arrive at their conception by means
of philosophical speculation, but they presented their view because
they considered it to come closer to the teaching of Scripture. just as
Augustine arrived at the doctrine of predestination through his study
of Paul, so Calvin became convinced of the truth of
supralapsarianism by means of his reflection on the Scriptural
doctrine of sin. According to his own statement he was not giving a
philosophy but the truth of God's Word. On the other hand,
Reformed infralapsarian theologians are fully agreed that man's fall,
sin, and the eternal punishment of many was not the object of “bare
foreknowledge” but of God's decree and foreordination. Hence, the
difference does not concern the content of God's counsel. Both infraand supralapsarianism deny the freedom of the will, reject the idea
that faith is the cause of election and that sin is the cause of
reprobation, and thus oppose Pelagianism; both in the final analysis
pay homage to God's sovereignty. The difference concerns only the
order of the decrees. Infralapsarians prefer the historical, causal
order; supralapsarians defend the ideal, teleological order. The
former give a more limited meaning to the concept predestination,
and exclude from it a preceding creation, fall, and providence; the
latter subsume all the other decrees under predestination. The
former emphasizes the manyness, the latter the oneness, of the
decree. With the former each of the several decrees has significance
by itself; with the latter all the preceding decrees are subordinate to
the final decree.
The problem is not solved by means of an appeal to Scripture.
Whereas infralapsarianism is supported by all those passages in
which election and reprobation have reference to a fallen universe,
and are represented as deeds of mercy and of justice, Deut. 7:6-8;
Matt. 12:25, 26; John 15:19; Rom. 9:15, 16; Eph. 1:4-12; II Tim. 1:9;
supralapsarianism seeks its strength in all those texts that declare
God's absolute sovereignty, especially with reference to sin, Ps. 115:3;
Prov. 16:4; Is. 10:15; 45:9; Jer. 18:6; Matt. 20:15; Rom. 9:17, 19-21.
The fact that each of the two views leans for support on a certain
group of texts without doing full justice to a different group indicates
the one-sided character of both theories. Though infralapsarianism
deserves praise because of its modesty — it abides by the historical,
causal order — and though it seems to be less offensive and though it
shows greater consideration for the demands of practical life, it fails
to give satisfaction. It is just as difficult to conceive of reprobation as
an act of God's justice as it is thus to conceive of election. Faith and
good works, to be sure, are not the cause of election, but neither is
sin the cause of reprobation; God's sovereign good pleasure is the
cause of both; hence, in a certain sense, the decree of reprobation
always precedes the decree to permit sin. Moreover, if in the divine
conscious ness the decree of reprobation follows that to permit sin,
the question cannot be suppressed, “Then why did God permit sin?”
Did this permission consist in a “bare foreknowledge” and was the
fall in reality a frustration of God's plan? But no Reformed
theologian, even though he be an infralapsarian, can ever or may
ever say this. In a certain sense he must include the fall in God's
decree; he must conceive of it as having been foreordained. But why
did God “by an efficacious permission” foreordain the fall?
Infralapsarianism can answer this question only by referring to God's
good pleasure, and then it agrees with supralapsarianism.
Reprobation cannot be explained as an act of God's justice, for the
first sinful deed at any rate was permitted by God's sovereignty.
Reasoning backward, infralapsarianism finally arrives at the position
of supralapsarianism; in case it should be unwilling to admit this, it
would have to resort to foreknowledge. Add to all this the fact that
infra places the decree of reprobation after the fall, but just where?
Is original sin the only sin that is taken into account by the decree of
reprobation, and in making this dreadful decree does God leave
actual sins entirely out of consideration? If, as infra insists,
reprobation must be referred to God's justice, then instead of placing
this decree immediately after the entrance of original sin, why not
place it after the complete accomplishment — respectively by each
reprobate person — of all actual sins? This is exactly what was done
by Arminius — who also included the sin of foreseen unbelief — but
such a procedure would never do on the part of a Reformed
theologian. Reprobation would then become dependent upon bare
foreknowledge, i.e., upon man; man's sinful deeds would then
become the final and deepest cause of reprobation; hence, in order to
avoid this error the decree of reprobation was placed immediately
after the fall. But by doing this infra becomes supralapsarian with
respect to all actual sins: reprobation does not precede original sin,
but it does precede all other sin. At first glance infralapsarianism
seems to be more moderate and less offensive than
supralapsarianism, but deeper study reveals the fact that
appearances deceive.
Accordingly, supralapsarianism undoubtedly has in its favor the fact
that it refrains from every attempt to justify God, and that both with
respect to reprobation and with respect to election it rests in God's
sovereign, incomprehensible, yet wise and holy good pleasure.
Nevertheless, it is at least just as unsatisfactory as is
infralapsarianism, and perhaps even more so. It wishes to pass for a
solution, but in no sense whatever does it give a solution of even a
single problem. In the first place, to say that the manifestation of all
God's excellencies is the final goal of all of the ways of God is indeed
correct; but when supra includes in that goal the manner in which
the divine glory will be revealed in the eternal destiny of rational
creatures, it errs. For, the eternal state of salvation or of perdition is
not in itself the goal, but one of the means employed in order to
reveal God's excellencies in a manner suited to the creature. It would
not do to say that God would have been unable to manifest his glory
by saving all men, if this had been his pleasure. Neither is it correct
to say that in the eternal state of the reprobate God reveals his justice
exclusively, and that in the eternal state of the elect he manifests his
mercy exclusively.Also in the church, purchased with the blood of
the Son, God's justice is revealed; and also in the place of perdition
there are degrees of punishment and sparks of divine mercy. The
final goal of all God's work's must needs be his glory, but the manner
in which that glory will shine forth is not thereby given, but has been
determined by God's will; and although there were wise and holy
reasons why God purposed the perdition of many and not the
salvation of all, nevertheless these reasons, though known to him,
are not known to us: we are not able to say why God willed to make
use of this means and not of another. A further objection to
supralapsarianism is the fact that according to this view the objects
of the decree of election and reprobation are men considered merely
as possibilities and — as Comrie added — a Christ viewed as a mere
possibility. To be sure by some this element has been eliminated
from the supralapsarian scheme. But the principle which gave rise to
this error still remains. Logic requires that a possible Christ should
be added to possible men as the object of election, for in the decree of
election the church and its Head, i.e., the saved and the Savior
cannot be separated.
But even aside from this, the decree of election and reprobation
which has for Its object “creatable and fallible men” is not the real,
but merely a tentative decree. In the end supralapsarianism is forced
to proceed to the infralapsarian order in the elements of the decree.
For, following the decree concerning the election and reprobation of
these possible men comes the decree to create them and to permit
them to fall, and this must be succeeded by another decree
respecting these men, who are now no longer viewed as mere
possibilities but as realities — even in the decree — viz., to elect some
and to reprobate others. The logic of the supralapsarian scheme is
very weak, indeed. Supralapsarianism really differs from
infralapsarianism only in this respect, viz., that after the manner of
Amyraldism, it prefixes a decree concerning possibilities to the
infralapsarian series of decrees. But just how are we to conceive of a
decree respecting possible men, whose actual future existence has as
yet not been determined? In the consciousness of God there is an
infinite number of “possible men,” who will never live. Hence, the
decree of election and reprobation has for its object “nonentities,”
not definite persons known to God by name. Finally, there is this
difficulty connected with supra, viz., that it makes the eternal
punishment of the reprobates an object of the divine will in the same
manner and in the same sense as the eternal salvation of the elect;
and that it makes sin, which leads to eternal destruction, a means in
the same manner and in the same sense as the redemption in Christ
is a means unto eternal salvation.
Now Reformed theologians all agree that the entrance of sin and
punishment was willed and determined by God. It is perfectly true
that words like “permission” and “foreknowledge” do not solve
anything. The difficulty remains the same, and the same questions
arise; viz., why, if God foreknew everything, did he create man
fallible, and why did he not prevent the fall? Why did he allow all
men to fall in Adam? Why does he not grant to all men faith and the
blessing of hearing the Gospel? In brief, if God foreknows and
permits something, he does this either “willingly” or “unwillingly.”
The latter is impossible. Accordingly. only the former remains: God's
permission is an “efficacious permission,” an act of his will. Nor
should it be supposed that the idea of permission is of any force or
value over against the charge that God is the Author of sin; for he
who permits or allows someone to sin and to perish in his sin
although he was able to prevent him from sinning is just as guilty as
he who incites someone to sin. On the other hand, however, all agree
that although sin is not “excluded”from the will of God it is,
nevertheless, “contrary” to his will; that it is not merely a means to
the final goal, but a disturbance in God's creation; and that Adam's
fall was not a step ahead but a fall in the real sense of the word. It is
also a fact that admits of no doubt that, however much logical
reasoning may demur, no one is able to suggest other and better
words than “permission, foreknowledge, preterition, dereliction,”
etc. Even the most outspoken supralapsarian is not able to dispense
with these words, neither in the pulpit nor in the cathedra. For,
although it be admitted that there is a “predestination unto death,”
no Reformed theologian has ever dared to speak of a “predestination
unto sin.” Without any exception all (i.e., Zwingli, Calvin, Beza,
Zanchius, Gomarus, Comrie, etc.) have rejected the idea that God is
the Author of sin, that man was created unto damnation, that
reprobation is the “cause” of sin, and that sin is the “efficient cause”
of reprobation; and all have maintained, that the inexorable
character of God's justice is manifest in the decree of reprobation,
that reprobation is the “accidental cause” of sin, and that sin is the
“sufficient cause” of reprobation, etc. Accordingly and happily,
supralapsarianism is always inconsistent: it begins by making a
daring leap, but it soon retreats and returns to the previously
abandoned position of infralapsarianism. This is very evident from
the works of supralapsarians. Nearly all of them hesitate to place the
decree of reprobation in its entirety and without any restriction
before the decree to permit sin. The Thomists differentiated between
a “negative and a positive reprobation”; the former was made to
precede creation and fall, the latter was made to follow them. This
same distinction, be it in a modified form, recurs in the works of
Reformed theologians. Not only do all admit that reprobation should
be distinguished from condemnation, which is the execution of that
decree, takes place in time, and has sin for its cause; but in the
decree of reprobation itself many differentiate between a preceding,
general purpose of God to reveal his excellencies, especially his
mercy and justice, in certain “creatable and fallible men”; and a
subsequent, definite purpose to create these “possible men,” to
permit them to fall and to sin, and to punish them for their sins.
Accordingly, neither supra- nor infralapsarianism has succeeded in
its attempt to solve this problem and to do justice to the manysidedness of Scripture. To a certain extent this failure is due to the
one-sidedness that characterizes both views. In the first place it is
incorrect, as we stated before, to define the “final goal” of all things
as the revelation of God's mercy in the elect, and of his justice in the
reprobate. God's glory and the manifestation of his excellencies is, to
be sure, the final goal of all things; but the double state of salvation
and damnation is not included in that final goal, but is related to it as
a means. No one is able to prove that this double state must of
necessity constitute an element in the final goal of God's glory. In all
his “outgoing works” God always has in view his own glory; but that
he seeks to establish this glory in this and in no other way is to be
ascribed to his sovereignty and to nothing else. But even aside from
this, it is not true that God manifests his justice only in the
damnation of the reprobate, and his mercy only in the salvation of
the elect, for also in heaven God's justice and holiness shines forth,
and also in hell there is a remnant of his mercy and compassion.
Secondly, it is incorrect to represent the lost condition of the
reprobate in hell as an object of predestination. To be sure, sin
should not be referred to “bare foreknowledge and permission”; in a
certain sense, the fall, sin, and eternal punishment are included in
God's decree and willed by him. But this is true in a certain sense
only, and not in the same sense as grace and salvation. These are the
objects of his delight; but God does not delight in sin, neither has he
pleasure in punishment. When he makes sin subservient to his glory,
he does this by means of the exercise of his omnipotence, but to
glorify God is contrary to sin's nature. And when he punishes the
wicked, he does not take delight in their sufferings as such, but in
this punishment he celebrates, the triumph of his virtues, Deut.
28:63; Ps. 2:4; Prov. 1:26; Lam. 3:33. Accordingly, though on the one
hand, with a view to the all-comprehensive and immutable character
of God's counsel, it is not wrong to speak of a “twofold
predestination” (gemina praedestinatio); nevertheless, on the other
hand, we must be careful to keep in mind that in the one case
predestination is of a different nature than in the other.
“Predestination is the disposition, goal and ordination of the means
with a view to a goal. Since eternal damnation is not the goal but
merely the termination of a person's life, therefore reprobation
cannot properly be classified under predestination. For these two
things are in conflict with each other: to ordain unto a goal and to
ordain unto damnation. For by reason of its very nature, every goal is
the very best something, the perfection of an object; damnation,
however, is the extreme evil and the greatest imperfection; hence the
expression `God has predestinated some men unto damnation' is
incorrect.” Hence, no matter how often and clearly Scripture tells us
that sin and punishment were ordained by God, nevertheless, the
words “purpose” (prothesis),“foreknowledge” (prognosis)and
“foreordination” (proorismos)are used almost exclusively with
reference to “predestination unto glory.” In the third place, there is
still another ground for the assertion that those err who coordinate
“predestination unto eternal death” with “predestination unto
eternal life,” and view the former as a goal in the same sense as the
latter; while it is true that certain individuals constitute the object of
reprobation, the human race under a new Head, namely Christ, is
the object of election; hence, by grace not only certain individuals are
saved, but the human race itself together with the entire cosmos is
saved. Moreover, we are not to suppose that merely a few of God's
virtues are revealed in this salvation of the human race and of the
universe, so that in order to reveal God's justice the state of eternal
perdition must needs be called into being; on the contrary, in the
consummated Kingdom of God all of God's virtues and excellencies
are unfolded: his justice and his grace, his holiness and his love, his
sovereignty and his mercy. Hence, this “state of glory” is the real and
direct end of creation, though even this goal is subordinate to the
exaltation of God. In the fourth place, both supra and infra err when
they regard the various elements of the decree as standing in
subordinate relation to each other. Now it is true, of course, that the
means are subordinate to the final end in view, but from this it does
not follow that they are subordinate to one another. Creation is not a
mere means toward the fall, neither is the fall a mere means toward
grace and perseverance, nor are these in turn merely means toward
salvation and perdition. We should never lose sight of the fact that
the decrees are as rich in content as the entire history of the universe,
for the latter is the unfoldment of the former. The history of the
universe can never be made to fit into a little scheme of logic. It is
entirely incorrect to suppose that of the series: creation, fall, sin,
Christ, faith, unbelief, etc., each constituent is merely a means
toward the attainment of the next, which as soon as it is present
renders the former useless. As Twissus already remarked, “The
different elements of the decree do not stand to one another in a
relation merely of subordination, but they are also coordinately
related.” It is certainly wrong to suppose that the sole purpose of
creation was to produce the fall; on the contrary, by means of God's
creative activity a universe that will remain even in the state of glory
was called into being. The fall took place not only in order that there
might be a “creature in the condition of misery,” but together with all
its consequences it will retain its significance. Christ not merely
became a Mediator, which would have been all that was necessary
for the expiation of sin, but he was also ordained by God to be the
Head of the church. The history of the universe is not a mere means
which loses its value as soon as the end of the age is reached, but it
has influence and leaves fruits, for eternity. Moreover, here on earth
we should not conceive of election and reprobation as two straight
and parallel lines; on the contrary, in the unbeliever there is much
that is not the result of reprobation, and in the believer there is much
that should not be ascribed to election. On the one hand, both
election and reprobation presuppose sin, and are deeds of mercy and
of justice, Rom. 9:15; Eph. 1:4; on the other hand both are also deeds
of divine right and sovereignty, Rom. 9:11, 17, 21. So, Adam even
before the fall is a type of Christ, I Cor. 15:47ff.; nevertheless, in
Scripture the fact of the incarnation always rests upon the fall of the
human race, Heb. 2:14ff. At times Scripture expresses itself so
strongly that reprobation and election are coordinated, and God is
represented as having purposed eternal perdition as well as eternal
salvation, Luke 2:34; John 3:19-21; I Pet. 2:7, 8; Rom. 9:17, 18, 22,
etc.; but in other passages eternal death is entirely absent in the
description of the future; the victorious consummation of the
kingdom of God, the new heaven and earth, the new Jerusalem in
which God will be all and in all is pictured to us as the end of all
things, I Cor. 15; Rev. 21, 22; the universe is represented as existing
for the church, and the church for Christ, I Cor. 3 :21-23; and
reprobation is completely subordinated to election.
Accordingly, neither the supra- nor the infralapsarian view of
predestination is able to do full justice to the truth of Scripture, and
to satisfy our theological thinking. The true element in
supralapsarianism is: that it emphasizes the unity of the divine
decree and the fact that God had one final aim in view, that sin's
entrance into the universe was not something unexpected and
unlooked for by God but that he willed sin in a certain sense, and
that the work of creation was immediately adapted to God's
redemptive activity so that even before the fall, i.e., in the creation of
Adam, Christ's coming was definitely fixed. And the true element in
infralapsarianism is: that the decrees manifest not only a unity but
also a diversity (with a view to their several objects), that these
decrees reveal not only a teleological but also a causal order, that
creation and fall cannot merely be regarded as means to an end, and
that sin should be regarded not as an element of progress but rather
as an element of disturbance in the universe so that in and by itself it
cannot have been willed by God. In general, the formulation of the
final goal of all things in such a manner that God reveals his justice
in the reprobate and his mercy in the elect is too simple and
incomplete. The “state of glory” will be rich and glorious beyond all
description. We expect a new heaven, a new earth, a new humanity, a
renewed universe, a constantly progressing and undisturbed
unfoldment. Creation and the fall, Adam and Christ, nature and
grace, faith and unbelief, election and reprobation — all together and
each in its own way — are so many factors, acting not only
subsequently to but also in coordination with one another,
collaborating with a view to that exalted state of glory. Indeed, even
the universe as it now exists together with its history, constitutes a
continuous revelation of God's virtues. It is not only a means toward
a higher and richer revelation that is still future, but it has value in
itself. It will continue to exert its influence also in the coming
dispensation, and it will continue to furnish material for the
exaltation and glorification of God by a redeemed humanity.
Accordingly, between the different elements of the decree — as also
between the facts of the history of the universe — there is not only a
causal and teleological but also an organic relation. Because of the
limited character of our reasoning powers we must needs proceed
from the one or from the other viewpoint; hence, the advocates of a
causal world and life-view and the defenders of a teleological
philosophy are engaged in continual warfare. But this disharmony
does not exist in the mind of God. He sees the whole, and surveys all
things in their relations. All things are eternally present in his
consciousness. His decree is a unity: it is a single conception. And in
that decree all the different elements assume the same relation which
a posteriori we even now observe between the facts of history, and
which will become fully disclosed in the future. This relation is so
involved and complicated that neither the adjective “supralapsarian”
nor “infralapsarian” nor any other term is able to express it. It is both
causal and teleological: that which precedes exerts its influence upon
that which follows, and that which is still future already determines
the past and the present. There is a rich, all-sided “reciprocity.”
Predestination, in the generally accepted sense of that term: the
foreordination of the eternal state of rational creatures and of all the
means necessary to that end, is not the sole, all-inclusive and allcomprehensive, purpose of God. It is a very important part of God's
decree but it is not synonymous with the decree. God's decree or
counsel is the main concept because it is all-comprehensive; it
embraces all things without any exception: heaven and earth, spirit
and matter, visible and invisible things, organic and inorganic
creatures; it is the single will of God concerning the entire universe
with reference to the past, the present, and the future. But
predestination concerns the eternal state of rational creatures, and
the means thereto: but not all things that ever come into being nor
all events that ever happen can be included in these means. Hence, in
a previous paragraph we discussed “providence” as a thing by itself,
although the relation between it and predestination was clearly
shown. In the doctrine of God's decree common grace should receive
a much more detailed discussion than was formerly the case, and
should be recognized in its own rights. Briefly stated, God's decree
together with the history of the universe which answers to it should
not be exclusively described — after the manner of infra- and
supralapsarianism — as a straight line indicating a relation merely of
before and after, cause and effect, means and goal; but it should also
be viewed as a system the several elements of which are coordinately
related to one another and cooperate with one another toward that
goal which always was and is and will be the deepest ground of all
existence, namely, the glorification of God. As in an organism all the
members are dependent upon one another and in a reciprocal
manner determine one another, so also the universe is God's work of
art, the several parts of which are organically related. And of that
universe, considered in its length and breadth, the counsel or decree
of God is the eternal idea.