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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 8:55:28 GMT -5
J.P.Boyce.....Abstract Of Principles....Monergism .com
CHAPTER I
THE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY
THE word Theology means literally a discourse concerning God, but in analogy with other words, as geology, chronology and biology, it means the science which treats of God.
It naturally concerns itself with such questions as these: Is there a God; can he be known; what is his nature, and character; what are the relations he sustains to the universe, particularly to intelligent beings possessed of spiritual natures, and above all, as most important to us, to men; in what ways has he made himself known; and especially in what aspect does he reveal himself to them as sinners. This is Theology proper.
In connection with this last relation it treats, particularly, of man as a creature of God placed under the government of his moral law. It inquires into his original condition of innocence, and happiness; the manner in which he fell therefrom; and his present state of sinfulness, and condemnation and inability for self-rescue. This is
Anthropology.
It is thus led, also, to discuss the nature of the salvation which God has provided as seen in the person and character of Jesus Christ, through whom it has come, and in the works of active and passive obedience, by which he has wrought out reconciliation to God.
This is Soteriology.
In like manner, also, does it consider the nature and work of the Holy Spirit, through whom man is led to accept the provisions of God's grace, and to attain through penitence and faith unto a salvation in Christ, which consists in freedom, not from condemnation only, but also from the dominion and defilement of sin, and in attainment of the holiness and happiness of children of the Heavenly Father.
This is Pneumatology.
It follows man also beyond the death of the body, and makes known the future state of both the righteous and the wicked, as well before as after the resurrection of the body, together with the final judgement of both these classes, and the heaven and hell which shall be their respective abodes forever.
This is Eschatology.
Finally it teaches the great end which God is accomplishing through all his works, in the manifestation to all his creatures of his own glory, as seen in its twofold aspect of mercy and justice in his dealings with this fallen race of man.
This is Teleology.
The term "theology" is applied, not only to the science itself, but to any treatise on that science. This is true, not only of a discourse upon the one true God, but even of one upon the many false gods of the heathen. It is also true, though the treatise be not a scientific
discussion, but simply an imaginative narrative or poem.
The term "theology" is, however, especially applicable to learned and scientific works upon God, or the gods.
The most valuable discussions among the heathen, however, are to be found in the works of the Greek philosophers, the greater part of which, when not directly upon the nature of the gods, involved questions as to the origin of the world, and the presence therein of a divine controlling Spirit, as well as upon the nature of the soul, and its duties, and its immortality. Of their works many have come down to us in fragments only, while a large portion of what they taught is found only in the records and reports made by others: but there are also many complete works which profess to have been written by the authors of these speculations. No human mind can estimate the value of these contributions, nor the influence they have exerted even over those possessed of the Christian Revelation.
The Latin writers also produced several works of a theological character, pre-eminent among which is that of Cicero "Concerning the nature of the Gods."
Theology is, also, frequently used for the set of opinions exhibited by a writer, or class of writers, in any one or more productions. Thus we have the theology of Calvin, or of Arminius, or of Baxter, that of the Reformation, Princeton theology, and New England theology. Men also speak of the theology of the Old, or of the New Testament, the theology of the Psalms, of the various Evangelists, especially of John, and Petrine, and Pauline theology.
Theology is defined as a science. It is eminently worthy of that name.
It lacks nothing that constitutes a science. It is concerned in the investigation of facts. It inquires into their existence, their relations to each other, their systematic arrangement,the laws which govern them, and the great principles which are the basis of this existence,and these relations.
As in other sciences, there is much that is absolutely known, much beyond this that is little questioned, much that is still matter of speculation, and much as to which there is decided difference of opinion. New facts are constantly developing in this science, as in others, which enable us to verify the facts and principles heretofore accepted, when true, and to modify them when erroneous. New theories present themselves for the better explanation of facts already known, and are tested by these, and by others subsequently discovered, and are received or rejected, according to their ascertained correctness. The knowledge of the past is built upon for progression towards the future.
The discovery of the facts is conducted, as in all other sciences, by study of what the field affords. Geology examines the earth, and derives its facts from the structure of that earth. Astronomy investigates the stars. Theology, likewise, studies the sources of its knowledge. Each science seeks to arrive at the truth. The votaries of each are certain that it is to be found in their fields, either partially, or completely. The perfect attainment of all facts prepares for the exactness of scientific knowledge. The absence of any must make the knowledge incomplete. The proper generalization of all is essential in this, as in all other kinds of science. A full knowledge of all the facts, and a perfect generalization of them, will constitute theology an exact science.
Theology is also as sensitive to the absence of facts as is any other science. The astronomer finds that his calculations, based upon correct theories, are not exactly verified, and at once suspects the presence of some disturbing body as the cause of this variation. So, also, in theology. The omission of a single fact, however small, must affect the whole universe of doctrine. The common mind does not perceive this, and hence is not prepared to value the discovery of the new fact. But the theologian finds in the new and more exact adjustment, thus made possible, the proof of the truth of his whole system, and therefore prizes it, even sometimes beyond what he ought.
Regarded as a science, theology may be classified in various forms.
1. According to the method of revelation, into natural and supernatural theology.
Natural theology embraces what man may attain by the study of God in Nature. This extends not only to what is beheld of him in the Heavens and the Earth, but also in the intellectual and spiritual nature of man himself. Supernatural theology is that derived from such special information as God has given by what we commonly call Revelation.
2. According to the purpose which it contemplates, into Systematic Theology, also called Didactic, or Dogmatic; Polemic or Controversial Theology; and Practical or Experimental Theology.
3. According to the main religious idea associated with it, as Pantheistic Theology; Deistic Theology; Rationalistic Theology, &c.
4. According to the name of its founder, or the race in which it originated, or flourishes, as Christian Theology; Judaistic Theology; Mohammedan Theology, &c.
5. According to the sources from which it is derived, into Biblical
Theology; Christian Dogmatic Theology; and Ecclesiastical
Dogmatics.
Biblical Theology consists in the facts of the Bible, harmonized by scriptural comparison, generalized by scriptural theories, crystalized into scriptural doctrines, and so systematized as to show the system of truth taught, to the full extent that it is a system, and no farther.
As in Botany, one gathers all the plants of the world, and arranges them without attempting to introduce new plants, even to fill up manifest gaps, so Biblical Theology, duly presented, shows scriptural truth in all the perfection, and in all the imperfection with which God has given it.
True Biblical Theology should recognize the inspired source whence come its teachings. But, as now technically used, Biblical Theology refers to the statement and development of doctrine by the various Biblical writers, or in other words to the development of Jewish religious thought without assuming or denying the inspiration of the Bible.
Christian Dogmatics is not confined, as is Biblical, to the facts and theories and statements of doctrine expressly and formally set forth in the Scriptures. It comprises in addition such philosophical explanations as seem necessary to make a complete and harmonious system. These additions are not necessarily non-scriptural, for they are often the embodiment of the very essence of Bible truth, though not of its formal utterances. They may be as much a part of Scripture as the theory of gravitation is of the revelation of nature. They should never be so far unscriptural as not to be either probable inferences from the Word of God or natural explanations of its statements. The more perfectly they accord with that word, and the greater the proportion of its facts which they explain, the more clearly do they establish their own truth, and the more forcibly do they demand universal acceptance. Failure to explain all difficulties or to harmonize all facts does not deprive them of confidence, but only teaches the need of further investigation. Direct opposition, however, to any one scriptural truth is enough to prove the existence of error in any Christian Dogmatic statement. Ecclesiastical Dogmatics consists of authoritative statements of doctrine put forth by some body of Christians claiming to be a church of Christ. These are to be found in creeds, symbols, decrees, apologies and resolutions. They may also appear in the form of authoritative discussions of the creed or system of doctrine of any church.
It thus appears that a perfect system of theology will combine all of these classes. It must be based upon Biblical Dogmatics which shall have so collected and systematized all the teachings of a full revelation as to be concurrent with the facts and doctrines of Christian Dogmatics.
The Ecclesiastical Dogmatics will have gone no farther than fully authorized by the Word of God, and therefore will concur with Biblical Dogmatics, while the fulness of revelation will have left to Christian Dogmatics no speculative questions; but in all its discussions it will have been able to attain unto full knowledge of the facts, and ascertainment of all the doctrines.
But this concurrence can only be when Theology has been reduced to an exact science. This can never be looked for in this life. The causes of doctrinal variation will therefore be apparent.
If men came to the study of Biblical Theology with minds entirely unprejudiced, capable of examining its truths with the same mental powers, and with the same amount of study, all would agree as to its facts and doctrines. But this cannot be done. Mental capacities vary.
All men have their prejudices. All have not equal time for study, and all use not equally the time that they have. Thus variety is certain even in studying Biblical Theology.
The same causes increase this in Christian Dogmatics, because here the human element enters more largely than in Biblical Theology; while reverence for antiquity, opposition to change, and the influence of the learned of the past and the present, prevent the alteration of Ecclesiastical creeds which embody Ecclesiastical Dogmatics, and thus lead men constantly to continuance in error, and refusal to accept truth.
These facts show with what spirit we should study Theology:
1. With reverence for truth, and especially for the truth taught in the Word of God.
2. With earnest prayer for Divine help.
3. With careful searching of heart against prejudice.
4. With timidity, as to the reception and propagation of new doctrine.
5. But with a spirit willing and anxious to examine, and to accept whatever we may be convinced is true.
6. With teachable humility, which, knowing that God has not taught us in his word all the truth that exists, not even all the truth on many a single point, accepts with implicit faith all that he has taught, and awaits his own time for that more full revelation which shall remove all our present perplexities.
The advantages of studying theology systematically are several.
1. We thus ascertain all that nature and the Scriptures teach on each point.
2. We compare all these teachings one with another and are enabled to define their mutual limitations.
3. We are brought face to face with the fact that our knowledge is bounded by God's Revelation, and are led to acknowledge it as its source.
4. We are consequently warned not to omit any of the truth ascertained from any source, nor to add to it anything not properly embraced therein. A departure from this rule will lead into inevitable
error.
5. The harmony, and consistency, which will be found in all God's teachings, from whatever source we may draw them, will become conclusive proof of the divine origin of revelation. This will result, not only from a comparison of what Reason and Nature teach, with the revelations of God's Word, but of each of the several books of the Bible with the others, and especially of the body of the Old Testament as one book, with that of the New Testament as another.
6. We are thus led to value each of the doctrines of the word of God.
Each is true. Each has been revealed that it might be believed. We cannot therefore omit any one, because of its forbidding aspect, or its seeming unimportance, or its mysterious nature, or its demand for great personal sacrifice, or its humiliating assertions, or requirements, or the free terms upon which it assures of life and salvation.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 9:04:46 GMT -5
CHAPTER II
THE BEING OF GOD
THE fundamental doctrine of Theology is that there is a God; for if this is not true, there can be no science of God.
The first duty of Theology, therefore, is to set forth the reasons men have for believing that such a being exists, and is a true object of dependence and worship.
I. GOD CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN
1. It is objected, however, to any science of God, that, if there is a God, he cannot be so known and comprehended as to be a true object of worship.
(1) If by this is meant that we cannot know the essential nature of God, it proceeds upon a principle upon which we can know nothing, for we do not know the essential nature of anything. We know not even the nature of our own essence. We cannot know that of any existent being or substance, not indeed of the smallest atom of matter. We can only judge what it must be from the qualities it is perceived to possess, or from its outward manifestations. In like manner we can discover something of the nature of God from the different ways in which he has manifested himself in ourselves and in the universe.
(2) If it is claimed that we cannot know him because his nature may be or must be wholly different from ours, the natural answer is that we do know many things which differ greatly from the mind which takes cognizance of them. Thus our own bodies, though purely material, are known through our mental faculties, and yet we believe mind and matter to be essentially diverse. We comprehend also our modes of existence, and those of other objects in time and space, though these modes are essentially different from the things which exist in them.
Besides, until we know what God is, we cannot be sure that he is in all respects different from ourselves. If there are any points of similarity, we can know him so far as these exist; and, if it is true that we have been made, in any respect, in the likeness and image of God, our knowledge of God may approach at least to such completeness as to enable us to recognize his more manifest perfections, and to perceive that because of these he ought to be reverenced and
worshipped. Guided by the analogy of our own natures we expect to find in him a personal, conscious, intelligent, and moral being, and this expectation is confirmed by the manifestations of his presence, and operations in the universe. This teaching of analogy is not worthless because it has also led some to believe that God has a material body, as has man. Analogy does not furnish proof, but only probability; in some instances only possibilities. It does not show what God is, but what he may be. That which it suggests is confirmed or denied by other sources of knowledge. But we are so far taught through its aid that we learn that God must either be a Spirit, such as we are, or that he must have a higher nature to which belong all those attributes of spirit which constitute conscious personality and intelligent purpose.
(3.) Does the objection mean that we cannot know God because we cannot come in contact with him through the senses as we do with our fellow-men, and cannot learn his nature through his conduct and personal action as we do theirs? But it is not only through personal contact with men that we know that they are and what they are; we both know and judge of them by their works, though we have never seen nor known them personally. In like manner through our senses are we brought into contact with God, who, though not material, is an artificer in material things, and has displayed before us, in the universe around, the evidences of his wisdom, power and goodness.
Surely so great a structure as this, which manifests a grasp of thought, and a power of performance so wonderfully beyond that of any human being, and a minuteness of detail and execution and finish, the limitations of which defy discovery through the most powerful microscope that man can ever make, shows that it has been fashioned, if not created, by some being of personal purposing skill and power immeasurably beyond anything that we can possibly conceive.
(4.) Is it asserted that the outward phenomena of the universe cannot give such mental and spiritual knowledge of God as is essential to our apprehension and worship of him? Even were this true, we get that knowledge through our own spiritual and mental operations. We find in ourselves consciousness of existence, of thought and of purpose, and thus learn not only what these are in other intelligent beings, but that they must exist in every being whose nature is as
high as, or higher than, that of man.
We perceive that the mind is governed by laws no less binding and effective, no less regular and permanent, than those of matter. In the study of these we learn the nature of mind and spirit, not by direct apprehension of their essences, but, as in matter, by indirectly apprehending them through their phenomena. That nature we ascribe to the Divine Mind and Spirit. The differences of mental and spiritual capacities in men convince us that there are degrees of greater or less in mental and spiritual natures. Hence we assign to God mind and spirit in the highest degree, because as their author he must himself be greater than all his mental and spiritual creations.
But, in addition to this, we have a peculiar source of information. We find our minds capable of intuitive knowledge. Some abstract principles need only to be understood, and the conviction that they are true immediately follows. That "the whole is greater than any one of its parts" is perceived as soon as understood, as is likewise that "a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time." Whence is this knowledge? We say that the mind is so constituted that it cannot
believe otherwise. Who has so constituted it? It must proceed from some one upon whose veracity we rely, when we accept what our nature teaches. But, if from any one, then there is a creating mind, and that mind operates directly upon mind without the intervention of matter, and thus teaches us truth. When, then, we find other convictions of like nature relative to our dependence upon a higher being, our obligations of duty to him, our sense of right, and wrong, and the duty to do the right, and not to do the wrong, we cannot avoid believing that these intuitions come from the same source, and are his instructions to us as to our moral relations, and duties to him.
2. But it is further objected that, if there is a God we cannot know him because he must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, and, therefore, cannot be an object of comprehension to us, whose nature is finite, and whose mode of existence is only relative, finite and conditioned. But the objection itself presents its own refutation. How do we know that God must be such, if there is a God?
In whatever way we know this, we know at least that much of God that he must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned. Even before we are supposed to know that he exists, therefore, we know this much of the nature which must be his, and upon the first evidence of his existence have the right to attribute to him all that is therein contained.
The characteristics thus ascribed to him, reveal him, therefore, to us, as an infinite existence, without other limitations than are found in his own nature, or essence, who, as Absolute, cannot be dependent, but must be the source and Sovereign of all else; and, as the Unconditioned, cannot be subject to time, and space, and matter, and must therefore exist without possibility of growth, or increase, and without that succession of periods, such as yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, and those measures of space, and location, which belong to matter.
The God, therefore, who is thus proclaimed to be unknowable is at least known as a self-existent spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in all the perfections that belong to his nature. Let but the least evidence appear that there is a God, and at once this nature may be ascribed to him.
The recognition and contemplation of such a being, though his other perfections are unknown, awaken the reverence and fear, and conviction of the littleness and dependence of man which enter so largely into the sense of the supernatural and lead men everywhere, when in danger or distress, to call upon God, though not moved to prayer by any promise of answers thereto.
3. Again, it is objected that though we should learn something of God, we can only attain partial knowledge of him. This is readily admitted. But partial knowledge is actual knowledge as far as it goes. We have complete knowledge of nothing. All our knowledge is partial. The child only partially knows its parent. The subject only partially knows his sovereign. Yet enough is known for the recognition of dependence, and of the duties of obedience and love. So, also, with the Heavenly Father, the King of Kings; although we can only know him in part, we know enough to lead us to revere his sovereign power, and gratefully adore his Fatherly affection. The Scripture teaching upon this subject is twofold.
(1) It agrees with Agnosticism in asserting that God cannot be fully known. The questions of Zophar have been, with full reverence for God, and earnest worship for such an one as it is believed that he must be, the language of the pious of all ages. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as Heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than Hell; what canst thou know?" Job 11:7–8. Elizur is represented as saying, "Behold, God is great and we know him not." Job 36:26. And Job, after his description of God's acts of power, declared, "Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways; and how small a whisper do we hear of him! But the thunder of his power who can understand?" Job 26:14. The Psalmist, referring to the omniscience and omnipresence of God, cried out, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it." Ps. 139:6.
(2) On the other hand, in opposition to Agnostics, the Bible declares that the partial knowledge of God attained by men is actual knowledge and not some inferior conception. God said through Jeremiah, "I will give them an heart to know me that I am the Lord" (Jer. 24:7), and again "they shall all know me from the least of them unto the greatest of them." Jer. 25:34. Our Lord himself, in his prayer to the Father, referring to those given to him that to them he should give eternal life declares "This is life eternal that they should know thee the only true God and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." John 17:3. The apostle who recorded this prayer uses this language, "He that knows God heareth us" (1 John 4:6), and also "He that loveth not, knows not God." 1 John 4:8.
The Bible, therefore, plainly teaches that God may be known, and so known as to be truly worshipped.
II. ALMOST UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN GOD; ITS SOURCES
Belief in the existence of God has been almost universal among men.
The same ideal of perfection has not everywhere been found. Some have gone no farther than to be moved by the sense of the supernatural, and to believe in a power to which they are subject, and upon which they depend. But at least this much is to be found in the lowest forms of fetish worshippers. Others have multiplied the numbers and forms of those towards whom they have felt this sense of dependence, and have accepted the existence of many gods. Yet, among these polytheists, the traces of the One God have not entirely disappeared, for they have referred the gods themselves to one originating source. Some, following too closely the analogy of man's nature, have believed God to be the animating soul of the world. The highest spiritual conception of God has been found only in those nations which have been recipients of his revelation. But the most ancient records show that, in the earliest times, the knowledge possessed by all was comparatively simple and pure.
So universal has been this belief, that but very few of the millions of the race in all its ages have denied the existence of God. It has been questioned whether these few have been deceived as to their actual convictions, or have been insincere in their avowal of Atheism; because it has seemed so impossible for man not to believe in a God.
A greater number still have been skeptical; sometimes led by wishes born of depravity and sin, but, also, sometimes misled by philosophical speculations, and apparently earnestly desirous to know the truth.
But the firm conviction of mankind in general that this belief is unavoidable in any man in his normal condition, and that its absence is due to some crushing out or erasure of his necessary moral capabilities, is seen, not only in the general horror which men have for those who profess Atheism, but in the denial to such men of the right to testify in the courts of justice.
1. This almost universal concurrence of men ought to be ascribed primarily to tradition.
Belief in God has been handed down from parent to child throughout all past generations. Some theologians are unwilling to recognize this fact or to accept it as a cause of the universal belief in God. Some have sought that cause in the idea of God as innate in the mind.
Others have simply rested upon other arguments for God's existence, and taken the universal consent of mankind as evidence that this is not an idea unnatural to them, since they have yielded ready assent to the proofs of it commonly given. But a recognition of the traditional teaching will not weaken the argument. Even if it does, it is a fact which must be acknowledged.
In favor of this as the primary source of this general belief it may be said,
(1.) That this is the natural manner in which every child among us learns about God. Its own questionings, or its parent's convictions of the importance of this knowledge cause it to be imparted at an early period, and by direct teaching of the fact alone without proof.
(2.) Information obtained by travelers, and especially by Christian missionaries, teaches that our own customs agree with those of heathen nations, as they also do with those of Christendom in general.
(3.) This accounts for the fact, that, while the belief has varied at different times and places, it is held in the same form by almost every one within a single nation at a single period.
(4.) The uniformity, too, in which it has continued among any one people for many generations, is also proof of traditional origin.
(5.) The general existence of it in a purer form the nearer we approach the origin of the race, shows that belief in a God was the primeval belief of man, and has thence been handed down from father to son, until it has reached our own age and ourselves.
(6.) This accounts also for the fact that, when that faith has been corrupted, it has continued in the corrupted form until some new mental or spiritual force has arisen to introduce change, and to give new shape to the belief for some time to come.
2. The belief thus dependent on this traditional teaching is of great value as proof of the truth of this doctrine.
(1.) Its general prevalence shows that this doctrine is suitable to all mankind. It is one that, though worthy of the wisest thought, is not dependent upon philosophical conceptions, or abstract, or logical reasoning for its acceptance. The most ignorant of men have been able to grasp it. It is like that teaching of the Great Master, whom "the common people heard gladly." There has been something, in it, or connected with it, that has made all men believe it. What this is will be hereafter shown. But the fact that this simple teaching, from father to son, throughout all the ages, has been enough to make it dwell as a powerful and controlling influence in the hearts of the masses of mankind, is a strong proof not only of its truth, but also that it has come from God, whose universal gifts are of this simple nature, suitable to all.
(2.) That it has come down through all the ages, shows that it has come in contact with all the best thoughts of the wisest of mankind. That, in its study, the wisest and best, even among the heathen, have approached, in their noblest conceptions of it, to what we believe we have received through the revelation of God, affords a convincing argument, not only in favor of this noblest conception, but of the Divine Word which reveals it. The least that can be said is, that, after being subjected to every variety of thought, and philosophical speculation, this traditional belief has maintained itself as truth, and convincingly withstood every objection that has been brought against it.
(3.) The variety of forms in which it has appeared shows some universal cognition of some one or more fundamental truths which has led all men to believe in the existence of some kind of Divinity. It also teaches that, through the knowledge of no additional truth than such as is afforded by the light of nature only, some have attained more correct ideas approximating, though in very different degrees, that true knowledge which is attainable only through the revelations
of Holy Scripture.
(4.) These simplest truths are seen to be a common possession of the higher heathen ideal, and of Divine revelation.
(5.) There is thus manifested, also, the existence of that knowledge of God in all men, which enforces the duty of worship and reverence, and causes accountability to him.
(6.) The continuance of this belief among those whose self-interest, because of sin, would naturally have led them to reject it, is a strong proof of the sincerity with which it has been held.
III. IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD INNATE?
The knowledge of the insufficiency of mere tradition to prove the truth of any doctrine leads us to seek some other ground of this universal belief of mankind. Tradition has been pointed out as the primary source of this faith. But it is primary, in point of time only, not as the real cause of the general acceptance of the doctrine.
Neither does the belief in a God arise from any of the various arguments which have been devised for its support. All men reach conviction on this subject before they ever hear any discussion about it. To the mass of men the arguments have been utterly unknown. While these arguments are, therefore, to be presented as confirmatory proof, we must seek some other cause for this continued general belief of man.
The true reason of it is that such is the constitution of the human mind that it naturally accepts as true the idea it has attained of God, and rests upon belief in his existence, as a fact that ought not to be doubted.
1. This is generally expressed by the statement that the idea of God is "innate." But the expression seems to be unfortunate.
(1.) There are no innate truths in the ordinary acceptation of the word innate. The mind possesses no ideas independent of all suggestion, or inward contemplation. No truth becomes truth to the mind, until it is perceived to be truth commonly understood, that idea would be as perfect in one man as in another. But there are evidently various degrees of that perfection. These, therefore, must arise from the different measures of cultivation and thought, as well as from the different circumstances by which the elements which compose that idea in its perfection are suggested.
(3.) Inasmuch as the idea of God, possessed by most men in Christian lands, is the result of the teachings of the Scriptures, or at least of the philosophical studies of men of thought, and is therefore one of the loftier conceptions of God, when the innateness of such an idea is urged as a reason for belief in God, we are naturally met by the avowal, on the part of many, if not all, that they have no such innate idea.
(4.) Any idea of God which we have is not an idea of himself, but of certain relations existing between him, and man, or the universe, or of his relation to certain facts which we perceive in connection with these.
2. A better statement, therefore, is that the belief in God is based upon the intuitive perception by the mind of certain truths, which necessarily involve the existence of God, and of the verity of which it attains absolute conviction. It has been already stated that man attains intuitive conceptions. He is not confined to a single method of obtaining knowledge. He arrives at truth through sensation. He is taught it by experience. He believes testimony. He is conscious of himself. But he is also so constituted as to certain truths, that they are self-evident upon an intelligent conception of what is meant by them. No reasoning about them can make them more convincing. No study of them, except as to the nature of the things affirmed, gives deeper conviction of their truth.
No personal experience, nor testimony of others, gives stronger witness to their reliability. In each individual mind, according to its comprehension of what is meant by the things spoken of, there arises personal conviction of their indubitable truth. This is really what is meant, when it is affirmed that these ideas are innate in man.
All that is necessary, prior to such intuitive conception, is a knowledge of the meaning of the truth which is to be intuitively perceived. Take, for example, the mathematical axiom before quoted,"the whole is greater than any one of its parts." Before the truth of this is perceived, it is necessary to know what is meant by "whole," and "part," and "greater." As soon as these are known, the truth of the affirmation at once appears. It is on this account that the term "God," or the expression "the true idea of God," cannot be a part of an intuitive conception.
We cannot know "God."
We may know certain things about God.
We have not "the true idea of God."
We only have some true idea of God. Hence our statement was limited to the assertion, that "such is the constitution of the human mind that it naturally accepts the idea it has attained of God as true."
These intuitive conceptions are originally single. Sir William Hamilton makes simplicity a characteristic of intuitive truth. In opposition to this statement which he quotes, Dr. Charles Hodge contends that "all of the propositions of the First Book of Euclid were as plain at first sight to Newton as the axioms, and the same is true in our moral and religious nature. The more that nature is purified, and exalted, the clearer is its vision, and the wider the scope of its intuitions. * * * If a proposition be capable of resolution into simpler factors, it may still, to a powerful intellect, be seen as self-evidently true. What is seen immediately, without the intervention of proof, to be true, is, according to the common mode of expression, said to be seen intuitively." Sys. Theol. Vol. 1, p. 193.
Both of these writers appear to be right, and both wrong. Hamilton is correct in stating that simplicity is a characteristic of intuitive truth, but incorrect in maintaining, as a consequence, that no complex truth can be intuitively perceived. For the mind, in perceiving separately the correctness of two intuitive truths, may, at the same time, combine them into a single conception, if they are homogeneous, just as we unite the different qualities of any object, as a table, or chair, and express them by a single term. But the mind apprehends these separately before it thus connects them. Indeed, it never so unites them as not still to preserve their separable character, and to cognize them as such. "The clearer is its vision," and "the wider the scope of its intuitions," to use the figurative language of Hodge, the more distinctly separate and the more plainly plural do these intuitions appear.
3. In seeking, therefore, for the intuitive conceptions which enter into the idea of God, we ought not to be surprised that they are simple, and yet that two or more of them may unite in the proof of his existence. Thus is it, that, so far as God is known, his existence is intuitively known, however few or many may be the intuitions involved; for the mind, while originally perceiving them separately, still combines them together, and, as the result of all, as of each, believes that God exists. But the meaning of what is thus affirmed, in relation to a single intuition only, is far less than in relation to two, or three, or all.
Of these intuitive conceptions we shall find that only the simplest are universally accepted. Greater intelligence, cultivation and thoughtfulness lead to the knowledge of others by some. Were these so stated to all as to be comprehended, they would be as fully acceptable to all as to any. They are limited as to their reception, not because they are less true, nor because the nature of one man accepts, while that of another rejects them, but because they have either not been suggested to the intellect, or, if suggested, their meaning has not been understood. The more of these that we know, and the higher the nature of the thought conveyed by them, the purer and the greater will be the meaning to us of the being of God.
4. Some of the more manifest of these may be taken as examples of their nature, and of the manner in which men arrive, through them, at the knowledge of God's existence.
(1.) That which is dependent must have its final support in something purely independent.
(2.) Derived existence must have its ultimate origin in that which is self-existent.
(3.) Every effect must have its cause, either within, or without itself.
The truth of the above affirmations must be admitted as soon as their meaning is perceived. But, if the first be true, there is some being upon whom men depend, and to whom, therefore, they are under obligations of duty and obedience, whom they must fear, and whose protection they must seek. This is the most general idea of God. If the second be true, the being upon whom men depend is, also, the one through whom they exist; or there are two beings, the one the source of life, the other the cause of its preservation and support. One of these will be independent, and the other self-existent. That the uncultivated should not perceive that these two are necessarily one, is not a matter of surprise.
The possibility of this has allowed the existence of polytheism. But when they are thus united, the idea of God has been that of an independent, self-existent being, which is a complex idea, and is consciously based upon, not one, but two intuitive conceptions, though they are now united together. In like manner the third of these is accepted as soon as comprehended. It is only necessary to know what is meant by the terms "effect," and "cause within or without itself." This is attained through observation and experience. The idea of cause and effect is found even in very young children, who cannot be persuaded that anything has happened without a cause. Nor is it difficult to teach what is meant by "having the cause within or without itself." It may be illustrated by the difference between a clock moving its own hands because of its own mechanism, and the hands of the same clock moved by some person; or by that between a horse which has the power of self motion, and the cart which moves only because he draws it. The meaning of the terms of this intuitive suggestion has not been difficult to comprehend, consequently the existence of God, as based upon it, has been generally accepted. To the common mind, especially, it has commended itself as teaching that God is the creator of the world, and thus accounting for the existence of all things that have been made. In this case, also, men have not always
associated the things which we see with the one God. In some forms of belief, they have divided the universe among more gods than one.
In others, they have conceived of it as made by a god inferior to the Great Supreme, whom they recognized. But, in these varied ways, they have shown a universal acceptance of the idea of causality, and of the intuitive conception which arises upon its comprehension. The only objection made to it, is that of Hume and Kant, who have thought that the knowledge of causation must be limited by our experience. But this is an objection to the amount of evidence we have of the effects of causation, which truly is measured by experience only, but our knowledge of the universal nature of the law comes not from experience, but from intuitive conceptions based upon the knowledge of its meaning.
5. Other intuitive conceptions might be added which are not so simple, but which are as truly believed by those who comprehend them. Take for example some of those which enter into the idea of God as the perfect Being.
(1.) The distinctions of right and wrong must have some absolute standard, which is personal, conscious, unchangeable, and without limitations of time or space. But this is God.
(2.) Moral perfection cannot be merely ideal, but must have some real embodiment; else there could be no imperfection, and, especially, no degrees of imperfection, since degrees imply the existence of that to which imperfection approaches, or from which it recedes, and this can only be absolute perfection. But absolute perfection is itself God.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS WHICH CONFIRM THIS BELIEF
The theistic proofs have been divided into arguments a priori and a posterior. This is a convenient division, although some of those a priori have in them some elements of an a posteriori nature, and some of those a posteriori depend upon a priori principles. As to some of them, also, it is difficult to draw an exact line, and assign them to the one class or to the other.
An argument a priori is one to prove the existence of some effect, or fact, from the knowledge we have of an antecedent cause, or of some reason, or principle, in the nature of things, which necessarily involves the existence of a certain consequence.
1. Some of the arguments a priori in proof of God's existence. An argument a priori, for the being of God, is one based upon some reason in the nature of things, or some principle cognized by the human mind, by which, independent of any examination of the works of God, we are led to infer his existence.
(1.) The most celebrated of all of these is that which argues the being of God from the idea we have of him in the mind. It is supposed to have been first presented by Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury,England, His form of the argument may be briefly stated thus. By definition God is a being such as that no greater can be conceived of.
But we can conceive of a being whose non-existence is impossible. If God, then, does not necessarily exist, we can conceive of a greater than God, which is contrary to the definition. Therefore, God must exist. [See chapters 2, 3, 4.]
This argument, from the idea of God in the mind, was a favorite with the Schoolmen. It appears in various forms in the works of many of them. It has, however, been commonly called the Cartesian argument, having been set forth with signal ability by Des Cartes.
One form in which he gives it is based upon the idea in the mind of supreme perfection. To this we attain, though ourselves only creatures of imperfection. Whence is it? It must come from the All Perfect, who has stamped it on our being, as the artificer sets his trade-mark on the work of his intelligence.
Des Cartes also presents, in the following syllogism, an argument more closely resembling that of Anselm.
"To affirm that any attribute is contained in the nature or conception of a thing, is to affirm that such attribute is true of the thing, and that it is surely contained in it;
"But, necessary existence is contained in the nature and conception of the Deity;
"Therefore, necessary existence is a true attribute of the Deity; or God of necessity exists."
[See Blunt's Theological Dictionary, Art. Theism: in which are also more full statements of all the above mentioned forms of this argument.]
The following is a mere statement of the syllogistic form presented, without the arguments that support it.
That, which we do clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing; a clear and distinct perception in the mind being the greatest evidence we can have of its truth. But we do have a clear and distinct perception that necessity of existence doth belong to the nature of God. Therefore, he must exist.
This argument, from the idea of God, has been strenuously objected to. Kant opposed it on the ground that "the mere supposableness or logical possibility of a perfect being, is no proof of the objective or real possibility of such a being, and existence cannot be inferred from a mere idea." Knapp's Theology, p. 86.
But, in reply to this objection, it may be said that the argument against which it is presented, does not prove the mere logical possibility, but the logical certainty, or necessity, for such a being.
Moreover, it is not contended that every subjective conception must have an objective reality; but only that certain ones may have such a reality, and that this one, the idea of God, which itself involves the idea of necessary existence, must, in consequence of the idea thus involved, possess that reality. Hodge objects that if it "has any validity it is unimportant. It is only saying that what must be, actually is." But this is not merely such an abstract statement. It is a proof that something, namely, the being of God, actually is, because of the proof of the correctness of our
conception that necessary existence belongs to his nature.
It has also been objected to it that "it confounds ideal existence with real existence" [A. H. Strong's Sys. Theol. p. 49.] But certainly there is no confounding of ideal existence and real existence, abstractedly, nor of forms of ideal and real existence, generally, but the arguments only show the actuality of a single form of ideal existence, because
the very nature of the idea involves its correspondent reality.
(2.) A second a priori argument for the existence of God was devised by Moses Lowman, and is from the nature of existence, and the relation between necessary and contingent existence. The following is a still more brief statement than the points of the argument, given by Dr. J. Pye Smith, in his First Lines of Christian Theology, pp. 99–101.
1. Positive existence is possible, for it involves no contradiction.
2. All possible existence is either necessary, which must be, and in its own nature cannot but be, or contingent, which may be, or may not be.
3. Some existence is necessary, for if all existence were contingent, all existence might not be, as well as might be; and that thing which might not be, never could be without some other thing as the prior cause of its existence, since every effect must have a cause. If,therefore, all possible existence were contingent, all existence would be impossible; because the idea or conception of it would be that of an effect without a cause, which involves a contradiction.
4. Necessary existence must be actual existence.
5. Necessary existence must be always.
6. Necessary existence must be wherever any existence is possible.
7. There can be but one necessarily existent being, for two could in no respect differ from each other; that is, they would be one and the same being.
8.The one necessarily existent being must have all possible perfections.
9. The one necessarily existent being must be a free agent.
10. Therefore, there is one necessarily existent being, the cause of all contingent existence, that is, of all other existences besides himself;and this being is eternal, infinite, possessed of all possible perfections, and is an intelligent free agent,—that is, this being is God.
3.) A third argument a priori is that of Dr. Samuel Clarke, in the Boyle Lectures which he delivered. It may be briefly presented thus. Something must have existed from all eternity, for since something now exists, it is evident that something always was,—otherwise the things which now are must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely, and without cause, which is absurd, for nothing can be produced, and yet be without cause.
But, now, if something has existed from all eternity, either there must always have been some unchangeable and infinite being, or else an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings, without any original cause, which is absurd.
Dr. Clarke does not discuss the absurdity of an infinite series in the past.
The impossibility of such a series appears, however, from its very nature. There can be no past infinite series, because an infinite series is one, the last term of which can never be attained, or completed.
But, in an infinite series going backward, the term now present is the first of the series, and not the last. The last term of the series is really the first in existence. But that first was completed before the second.
It has already existed. The series, therefore, as now before us is one, all of whose terms have already appeared, and the series, therefore, however indefinite in the numbers of its terms, is still a completed, and, therefore, a finite series.
The value of the arguments a priori has been questioned. But on the other hand they have seemed to some eminently satisfactory. To these, they have appeared to be clothed with the authority of God himself speaking through the constitution he has given to the mind, and its capacity for the intuitive conception of underlying principles.
To those who perceive these principles, the proofs are as conclusive as the consciousness of their own existence, and as authoritative as the dictates of conscience. These principles are accepted, and arguments are formed upon them in the same way as in mathematical demonstrations, and afford those who perceive the truth of them actual demonstrations of the fact that God exists.
But many have thought them fallacious, and have denied the possibility of demonstrative proof that there is a God. To such the arguments a posteriori have alone seemed to be valuable. Whether or not this be true, they are certainly of much greater value in general, because much more simple, and better adapted to force conviction upon the minds of the masses of mankind.
2. The arguments a posteriori.
The value of these arguments has not been duly appreciated. Men have looked for that kind of demonstration of God's existence, called mathematical, which can only arise from arguments based upon admitted axioms, and which proceed thence to their conclusions by invincible logical processes. Such arguments, if they exist, can only be of the nature of those a priori already considered.
But while no such demonstration is afforded by them, the arguments for God a posteriori are as conclusive as similar ones on any other subject. Their nature is precisely like that of those upon which all physical science is based, and upon which men act in all the affairs of life.
Physical science pursues the inductive method. It gathers all the facts in any matter. It recognizes that there are general laws which unite these facts in some one principle, and those who study them devise a theory to explain them. Such a theory must account for all the facts,and not be opposed by any one of them. If the series of facts can be traced very generally, and any theory universally accounts for them, while no other can, that theory which at first in the presence of a few facts, was only probable, becomes more and more certain, and finally unquestionable.
Thus, the theory of gravitation has been accepted as a great law of the universe, binding it together, keeping all its parts in all their courses, and everywhere equally effective according to a fixed proportion of numbers, and yet seen only in its effects.
In like manner we arrive, according to the strictest scientific method of induction, at the existence of God. The only theory which accounts for the universe with all its phenomena is that which asserts that it has proceeded from him. This alone has been satisfactory in the eyes of most men, from the beginning of all historic records. Mankind have been incredulous as to the sanity or sincerity of those who have denied it. No scientific theory has ever been held about facts so universally existent and so generally known. None has dealt with matters of more vital importance or absorbing interest. None has been, as has this, an object of thought to every intelligent human being. None has so commended itself at once to practical men and philosophers. None, after having been so far forgotten, because of sin and ignorance, as to be remembered only in its name and its simplest facts, has risen to a beauty of conception which beyond all else constitutes the glory of Grecian philosophy; while at the same time its belief has been preserved in another race in its purity by a literature which, despite all tendencies to corrupt the theory, has maintained it in its purest form for generation after generation.
(1.) The first argument a posteriori to be considered is commonly called the cosmological, because it argues the existence of God, as a First Cause, from the effects seen in the world. It should, however, be named the argument from causation, to distinguish it from the teleological argument and others which are equally cosmological.
"We acknowledge the existence of each other to be unquestionable.
We say that we know this from our senses. Yet, after all, it is intuitively certain that what we see is not the living, thinking being which we call man. On the contrary, they are merely effects of which that living, acting thing is the cause. We conclude the existence of the cause from the effects.
So in the universe around us we perceive a great variety of effects produced by some cause adequate to their production. "This cause is God, or a being possessed of sufficient intelligence and power to contrive and bring them to pass.
"If it be said that these are only the effect of certain inherent powers of matter, and mind, and, therefore, demand no extrinsic agency, the answer is that this affects the conclusion only by removing it one step farther back in the course of reasoning."
By this is meant that these inherent powers are only effects which themselves demand an adequate cause. It will be seen that this argument is based upon the law of causality.
Hence it should be called the argument from causation.
I proceed now to give this argument in another form, simpler indeed, but yet more complete.
It may be stated syllogistically thus:
A. Every fact or effect must have its adequate cause, either within or without itself.
B. There are effects in the universe which have no adequate cause, either in themselves or in the universe.
C. Therefore, there must be an adequate cause for their existence in some being without, which is the Supreme Being, the cause of all things.
We consider first the proof of the major premise of the syllogism, namely, A., that every effect must have its adequate cause, either within or without itself.
Objection 1. It has been objected to this that there is no such thing as causation, and that all of which we have any experience is mere antecedence and consequence.
But it may be replied that experience teaches us that there are effects in some consequents which are the result of relation to, and power in certain antecedents.
We admit the existence of many antecedents and consequents between which there is no relation of cause and effect, but experience plainly teaches that relation in others.
This has been so far admitted that Hume and Kant have simply attempted to confine the law of causation to our experience. But
(1.) It is evident that causes must exist independently of our experience, and that when we see an effect (namely, something evidently requiring some power for its production), we know that it has had its adequate cause, even though we have never had experience of its special cause. Indeed one of the most important branches of scientific inquiry is into the unknown causes of existing phenomena, which, without experience, we know must be effects of adequate causes. Thus Geology leads to inquiries into the causes of the original stratifications in the rocks, the existence of fossil remains, and the phenomena connected with the upheavals of rocks.
So Astronomy presents its problems about the perturbations of the planets, the movements of stars and their disappearances, the spots upon the sun, and the rugged volcanic condition of the moon. So also Medicine forces investigation into the origin of disease, as of yellow fever. Even Social Science seeks adequate physical causes for matters in which the human will or accident seems to have been most free from external influence, so as to establish that the number of marriages and murders, or railway accidents or suicides is governed by controlling law.
(2.) It might also be justly added that this point needs no proof, because the idea that every effect must have its cause is an intuitive conception of the human mind. It arises upon the first perception of what is meant by power. The conviction of its truth is seen in the very earliest stages of infancy.
Objection 2. It is again objected that we ought to carry this idea of causation farther back and apply it to the great First Cause. If subsequent effects, or facts, or existences must have had a cause, why should not this being, whom we call God, and who is more wonderful in his nature than all others, be himself an effect and himself have a cause?
The reply to this is, that experience does not teach us that every thing has a cause without itself, but only every thing which has not its cause in itself.
Wherever there is the principle of life, there is, to a limited extent at least, self-causation in its development.
(1.) Thus the tree puts forth its own leaves, and flowers, and fruits. It is true that it needs to have had its seed planted in a favorable position and to be surrounded by favorable circumstances. Yet, despite this, even here, though in a very limited way, there is self causation. So with the motion in a watch, the cause of which is in its own mechanism.
(2.) This is more distinctly seen as we reach higher forms of life. Here the movement is self-caused. Such is the movement of a bird as it shoots into the air, or of a beast as it springs upon its prey. The higher form of this is apparent. The watch needed some action upon it from without, before its springs within would act, but in these living forms no outward impelling cause originates the power. This may be illustrated by the difference between a steamboat, moved by its machinery under the guidance of men, and the movement of a fish which by its own powers swims through the seas.
(3.) In a still higher degree is this seen in man. Here is found a self determining will which puts forth effects which may be more confidently spoken of as self-originated. We have not here the mere instinct which perhaps blindly prompts the mere animal to act, but a will which acts as it pleases through liberty of choice, and is governed only by motives to which it yields of its own self-choice.
We do not presume to say that this explains to us God's self-existence and independence, nor how he is self-caused, having the cause of causes in himself, but we simply assert that our experience of causes does not force us to find an outside cause for every effect, and, therefore, a cause for what we call the first or final cause, but simply a cause for every thing which has not its cause of existence and action in itself.
We may also claim from this that, if, between the lifeless clod and the man made from it, such difference exists, that the one is no cause at all in itself, and the other capable of such self-causation, then, when we rise to the Great Being, who has made the Universe, we have the right to expect such infinite superiority to man, that he should be,
not only the cause of all things, but, being self-existent, should have within himself the cause or ground of his own existence. The existence of such a Great First Cause is beyond the denial of any. That which satisfies our minds of that existence is, that we are so constituted that we cannot rest under this conviction of causation, until the idea is presented of a Great First Cause having self existence or the cause of his own existence in himself.
If there is not such a self-existent and self-contained cause we are Eternity, or an infinite succession of such series, each of which is both impossible and absurd.
B. There are effects in the Universe which have no adequate cause in themselves, nor in the Universe as a whole. This may be argued from the Universe as a whole, as an existing substance (an entity), or from its component parts as existing substances (entities).
As presented to our eyes, it is a wonderful mechanism, more so than the most perfect machinery man can devise, and presents an effect in itself, and in its parts, which demands a cause of more power and skill than we can conceive.
Was it made as it is? If so, how great the cause which will account for its phenomena!
But it is asserted that it was not thus made, but is a growth which has been reached by long ages of gradual development, accompanied by destruction, and renewal, and modification until it has attained its present form.
We shall not deny this, but admit the force of all the evidence which suggests it.
But, after all, this growth is also an effect. It has proceeded either from some inherent power of self-development, or has been produced by the power and will of some outward cause.
It is claimed by anti-theists that it is a self-development of matter which has taken upon itself form after form until this result has been attained.
This theory involves the idea that all growth, and life, and mind, are the outcome of original inorganic matter. It claims that in the ultimate analysis we reach simple molecules of matter, and that,from the development of these, we have this whole universal summit now all that is thus claimed as a fact by anti-theists, even go so far as to suppose that there has been a time when nothing existed but molecules, even a few, even two only, even one, if it should be desired; reduce the whole material universe to a speck the one millionth part of a grain of sand,—and still we have in that molecule an effect entirely unaccounted for, except as it with all its vast possibilities was made by some creative energy. There is, therefore, even here a demand for the self-existent cause.
Yet, to admit all of the above, is to admit more than we ought, more than there is the slightest reason to suppose to be true; for there is no evidence that any matter has been added to the universe since its creation. Matter is seen to expand and contract, to take on one form and then another, but there is evidence neither of diminution on the one hand, nor of increase on the other. But there must have been such increase of matter unless the world had in its molecule period as many molecules containing in themselves as much material as is now existent. Whatever growth or development, therefore, may be ascribed to the world, the whole of it has existed from the beginning, whether in an organized form or in simple molecules. It is, however, as difficult, without admitting a producing cause, to account for the world-mass of molecules, even for a single molecule, as for the universe created in the forms in which it appears to-day. Let us now consider certain actual effects seen in the universe as farther proof of an external cause.
(1.) Motion. The principle of motion in the universe is beautifully developed. The universe is regular. It is governed by fixed laws.
There is harmony in its movements. The principles of centripetal and centrifugal action governed by the law of gravitation, not only regulate this motion, but cause the universe to be self-balanced; so that we have a kind of mechanism not only impossible for man to imitate, but the principle of which he cannot comprehend, though he sees and acknowledges it as a fact.
Now whence this motion? Inert matter has no motion. A piece of rock, or a clod of soil, even a tree, remains always where it is, unless moved by some outward power.
Our knowledge of this inertness in matter is such that we know that an infant's ball will remain forever where it has been put, unless disturbed from without.
Whence, then, this motion of the universe which is not a simple movement, such as is given to a ball by striking it, but a complex motion, involving the description of circles and ellipses and parabolas, and so involving them as to keep each in its sphere without confusion or distraction?
Can any one persuade himself that ten thousand balls laid upon a plain surface will have any more power of motion than one, or that a universe of them created without motion, would not, unless
influenced from without, remain utterly and forever at rest?
Something, therefore, must account for the motion. Now our experience is that all motion primarily proceeds from mind or will. Thus I move a ball as the result of will influenced by my mind. Even if I accidentally kick it, not intending to do so, and even ignorant that I have done so, this is still true. I had willed to move my body and that body by its contact when in motion with the ball, has moved it. Before motion then we have mind; before the motion of these atoms a directing mind; so that not only for the creation, but for the motion of molecules we must recognize God.
If it be said that this motion was caused by wind, we inquire whence came that wind?
Was it not itself produced by motion? If so, it cannot have been the primary cause of motion. We are still forced to the supposition that motion has proceeded from God.
If it be claimed that it came from heat, whence was the heat? Heat is also the result of motion. What caused the movement which led to its existence?
If it be said that the motion was a matter of chance, we ask what is chance? Is there any such reality? We apply the name variously, but in all cases the thoughtful mind knows that there is no "chance" in the sense of uncaused, unwilled forces present. Thus I place dice in a box and throw them. I say that the resultant numbers come by chance. But I know that that result has followed unerringly under law from the forces present. But law supposes the mind of the law-giver, and the results of his law are from purpose, not from chance. Hence the proverb: "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." Prov. 16:33.
So also when I meet in New York an acquaintance from Texas, I say, "We met by chance." By this I mean that the meeting was not because of the purpose of either of us. But I do not deny the laws
which have governed each of us, through which, guided by a higher power, we have met as he had purposed we should. In no usage of the word chance, therefore, do we mean to assert absence of mental purpose. There is no such kind of chance, and by none such can we account for the existence of motion in the universe.
(2.) Form and life also appear among the effects of the universe. Matter is not simply inorganic with the form and shape which might have been bestowed upon it by motion; but it takes special forms of life. Between the inorganic and this organic life there is a wide interval.
Even in the very lowest forms of vegetable life there is movement and growth and capacity to absorb and increase and give forth which shows a new kingdom in nature.
It is admitted that here the whole substance is material, and that the growth of vegetables is nothing more than the absorption into life of what has been already in inorganic nature.
But this power of taking on form and life is very striking. If the change could be made into a single form only, it would be still surprising. But the forms are innumerable. Not only this, but the specific form, having been once assumed, attains not only fixedness in the original, but power continuously in the species to reproduce its like. Yet, nevertheless, there is a certain power of adaptation by which, within fixed limits, there is variation.
This is the law of plants. In a still higher degree is it true of animals.
Now whence this change from inorganic to such organic matter?
Is it inherent in matter? Then matter would be constantly engaged in thus developing the organic from the inorganic. This is evident from what we see in crystallization. Here there is power in matter to assume special forms. The law under which this is done in each kind is known, and, in accordance with such law, and not otherwise, are the shapes in crystallization assumed. We can place the proper substances in their appropriate relations and produce the result.
Why? Because here certain matter has inherent power to assume certain forms. But this matter cannot assume other forms. Other matter cannot assume these forms. And thus is it seen that matter, as such, has not the inherent power to assume form, but that such power has been bestowed only on certain kinds of matter under the action of specific law and not of its own prompting.
Yet from this power of crystallization has been argued the power of matter to produce both vegetable and animal life. The most that could be concluded is that some kinds of matter, (such as we now see to do so,) under circumstances, (under which they now so act,) are capable of producing vegetable and animal life. But we see this done only by propagation and generation from like to like. Therefore, only thus are we authorized to infer that such life and form has been heretofore produced from matter alone. This still leaves necessary the creation of the first forms through which matter has this power.
Various attempts have been made to produce animals and plants by spontaneous generation. But these attempts have thus far utterly failed. Because of this inability to produce by any means the organic directly from the inorganic, anti-theists have been driven to adopt the idea, (a mere idea without proof,) that there is a substance which they call
protoplasm, which common substance underlies all life-forms, vegetable or animal, and that, in its varied changes, ordinary inorganic matter finally attains to this protoplasm.
As to this we should remember:
(a) That protoplasm is not the name of a substance which has been found developed from inorganic matter. No such substance has as yet been discovered. This is only the name that would be given to it if it should be.
(b) That the name is applied to the earliest forms of organic life, as being what protoplasm would be if thus developed from inorganic matter. But the substance here found is really a part of organic life, produced by the process of propagation or generation through which matter of this kind becomes life and form.
The whole idea of protoplasm, therefore, is a figment, except within the limits of organic life.
But, admit this to be true, and that the first forms (the protoplasm) that we see, are the results, directly, of inorganic matter and not of organic, it must still be acknowledged that in all the protoplasm yet examined there is no variation, that all of it is exactly alike, there being but one kind of protoplastic germs so far as investigation can perceive or material elements indicate. Yet, from a number of specimens of this protoplasm, come several different kinds of life. It is as though from seed, precisely the same, should come wheat and barley, and rice, and rye, and maize. Now, what is here the directing power which, from the same substance, apparently, produces different forms of life, some vegetable and some animal, and various vegetables, as well as various animals, and which so produces them without variation that the protoplasm of one species of animals always produces that species and not another? This can be
understood, if this be organic life which is acting, and acting under the laws which propagate species; but how explain it of mere matter which has become mere protoplasm—a substance whose forms and material have no difference in themselves, and which therefore must be indebted to some other directing power for the difference seen in its results.
It is evident, therefore, that in protoplasm we have matter not in a process of self-development, but matter already organized in organic forms, under a law for reproducing species; a law which can in no respect account for the origin of the species, and, therefore, forces us back to the idea of its direct creation.
But if this be true, the principle of form and life in the Universe speaks to us distinctly of a God.
(3.) Mind also appears among the effects in the Universe which can only be accounted for upon the supposition of a God.
The whole history of man teaches that the powers of the human mind are wonderful. Of this we are conscious in ourselves, and we are taught it by experience about others. Instinct in plants and animals is itself incomprehensible. We cannot tell why the vine should put forth entwining tendrils, or the root of a plant seek a piece of bone, or push forward to a well of water, nor why the birds should fly southward, or a horse or dog should dread danger which man cannot perceive, or an ox should utter cries of distress at the smell of blood, or a bee construct its cells of the most economical shape. We account for it by saying, that God has so constituted irrational creatures for their protection and happiness.
But an anti-theist would say, these are qualities inherent in matter, so that it is the matter that acts in the animal as it does in the vine.
But we have in mind something of which this cannot be said. Mind is not mere instinct. Indeed it differs widely from instinct. Thus:
(a) Mind is individual will or purpose; instinct is common to the whole species.
(b) The will or purpose is not a blind tendency, but is the result of mental perceptions, comprehensions of facts, logical reasoning, personal fancy, and other like causes.
(c) Its governing principle, being its prevailing motive, is the desire of the individual himself, not of another, not even of God, not even the dictate of conscience, nor of wisdom, but merely of self-choice.
(d) It often acts contrary to appetite, and desire, and passion. The will refuses to do that to which these prompt. This is a peculiar mark of excellence, not merely in the wise use of the power, but in the possession of the power itself. Its value in such exercise may be illustrated by the proverb of Solomon: "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city." Prov. 16:32.
These are some of the most important particulars in which mind is seen to be far superior to instinct. They have been presented as though admitting that instinct is a quality of matter.
But there is no reason for such admission. Instinct is a governing power over animals. But whence comes it? Is it a growth in them, or is it something bestowed on them by God for their control, just as he gives man conscience; or for their guidance, as he gives man intuitive conceptions? It is doubtless not a growth; but, admit that it is, whence the power for such growth in some matter and not in all? If it is a property of some of these united molecules, or of these particles
of protoplasm, and these are only matter self-developed, why has all matter not attained this growth? and why does not the growth developed itself alike in all?
No reason can be given for the phenomena of instinct which does not reject the idea of mere matter alone thus developing. Either
1. The power was first bestowed on some molecules to germinate this instinct, or
2. It was more directly given in connection with the development of the animal life, or
3. The animal was originally created with these functions, and they have continued by propagation to appear throughout the species.
If originating in either of these ways, the existence of the instinct proves that of a regulating, and originating, or creating mind.
But, as we have seen, mind is still higher than instinct, and, if instinct cannot be accounted for as a material growth, very much less so can mind. Even the most persistent advocates for the development of life from matter, admit that between the mind and the body which it inhabits there is a wide interval, and while they contend for the development of the latter through protoplasm as the work of unaided matter, they admit that they have never been able to discover anything which can account for the existence of mind.
But if mind has no cause for its existence in the material universe, it must be the direct product of the infinite mind, the intelligent, personal God. There is an old book of Jewish origin, called "Genesis" in which, long before the days of scientific inquiry into the origin of man, was given the only account which has ever satisfied or will ever satisfy the inquirer into that origin. "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Gen. 2:7. This was in fulfilment of the divine counsels, "Let us make man in our image after our likeness," Gen. 1:26. Strange that any writer of that day should have known that the body of man is of the same material as the inorganic matter of the earth, and stranger still that he should ascribe such origin to his mind and soul as fully accounts for the soul's existence and its union with matter; and, strangest of all, that he should have put forth a theory such as the world, with all the wisdom of the intervening ages to this day, has not bettered, but which has forced acceptance of its truth on all. Is not this God telling us what God did, and informing us through his servant of the true origin of mind?
(4.) Among the many other phenomena of the world which might be selected, one other only, namely, conscience, need be mentioned.
Of what is this an effect? Is it the result of matter or of mind? What is it but a controlling power, located in each man, and made a part of his nature, which commands him to do the right and avoid the wrong, and reproves, rebukes, and punishes him for disobedience to its dictates?
Upon the theory that it is God-given, its presence and its phenomena may be explained, but upon no other. If there is a God,
(a)There must be eternal principles of right and wrong which may form a foundation for conscience.
(b) There must be obligation to act in accordance with these principles, the non-fulfilment of which would involve punishment by God, and a reason for the apprehensions of conscience.
(c) If there is a God who has created man with his fellows, that God would seek the happiness of the race as such, which cannot be attained if moral obligations be ignored, and hence would place
conscience in each man to enforce these obligations.
(d) If there is a God, he must love the right and hate the wrong. How naturally would he seek through conscience to have man do right and avoid wrong. If, on the other hand, there is no God, then
(a) Is there any right and wrong as conscience teaches that there is?
(b) Are we under any obligation to our fellow-men? Have they any rights we should respect? Is our right to possess, to have any other limit than our power to attain?
(c) How can we account for the terror which strikes men for crimes which have been committed, terror not of punishment here, but hereafter?
Conscience, therefore, argues the existence of God perhaps even more wonderfully than mind; for conscience is the exponent of the law which keeps the moral universe in being and fixes the limits of its wanderings, as much and as truly as the law of gravitation does the material. Even the defects of it in our race, caused by sin, only prove the more conclusively the power of its law and its necessity to human existence. While the understanding is the guide to what is right and
wrong, conscience is the authority which enforces the right and forbids the wrong, and the avenging judge inflicting punishment on those who disobey. In the state of innocence it was perfect in its guidance, effective in its authority, and peaceful in its approval. In our present state, it is imperfect in its guidance and has only partial authority and limited punitive power. In the future it must be like the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched.
Now whence this conscience, if it be not the messenger God sets in the heart, teaching man more plainly than the starry heavens show God's glory that there is a God, that he rules over man and governs, him by laws of right and wrong and punishes the sinful and disobedient, and rewards the righteous and obedient.
The four effects in the universe which have been mentioned, motion, form and life, mind, and conscience, prove this second point of our syllogism, namely, that there are effects in the universe which have no adequate cause either in themselves or in the universe; and from A and B follows the conclusion C, that there must be an adequate cause for the existence of these effects in some being without, who must be the supreme being and the first cause of all things.
It can only be objected to this conclusion that the being who has made our universe may himself have been created by some other, and that he is not the supreme mind. But if this be so, then there must be some being who created him, and thus we are led to look one step further back until we reach an infinite being not created, but having self-existence, himself the cause of all other beings and things.
We are shut up by the argument from causation to this result, or to the adoption of the idea of an infinite succession of finite beings, which is absurd and impossible.
The remaining a posteriori arguments may be more briefly presented than this first one from causation, for the principles involved in this to some extent underlie all the rest.
(2.) The second a posteriori argument is that from design, commonly called the teleological argument.
It may be expressed as a syllogism, thus:
A. Whatever gives proof of design must have had a designer.
B. The Universe gives proof of design.
C. Therefore, it must have had a designer.
Design may be seen either in arrangement or adaptation. In both these respects the Universe gives proof of design.
1. In its arrangement the specific purpose may not be evident as it is in special adaptation. But evidence is given in that arrangement of the unity and universality which mark design throughout the whole universe. The syllogism of Principal Tulloch presents the argument in a convenient form.
I. Order universally proves mind.
II. The works of nature discover order.
III. The works of nature prove mind.
The point here to be proved is the major premise. There can be no question about the existence of order and arrangement throughout the universe. This is a matter of universal experience. It is also the testimony of all science. But does order universally prove mind?
(1.) We shall ascertain that it does by noticing that order always proceeds from law by which arrangement occurs, or from direct arrangement. In either event mind is the cause of the order, and, therefore, is proved by it. That the origin of order is in one of these ways, is a matter of universal experience, and we may from experience argue, at least, that such is everywhere true. There is no exception to the rule.
(2.) But, again, we may argue this to be true from the fact that such is the constitution of the human mind that "we cannot help apprehending everywhere in phenomena of order the operation of a
rational will or mind, * * * the laws of our rational nature compel us to do so. These will not permit us to rest short of mind as an ultimate explanation of such phenomena."
(3.) Having proved the existence of causation in the preceding argument we have also the right here to apply its principles. The order is an effect, and since every effect must have its adequate cause, so, because this is an effect of mind, we argue from it the existence of the supreme mind, which is alone sufficient to account for such harmony and arrangement.
(4.) Finally we may argue this from the very meaning of the word order. If order means arrangement, then it involves the existence of one who arranges. If order means plan, this demands mind to devise such plan. If order means laws or regulation, the word involves the idea of a lawgiver. Thus is it that simply considering design as order or arrangement we prove from it the existence of mind.
2. But the proof is much stronger when we look at design as adaptation to the object in view.
The same arguments here as in the syllogism by Tulloch prove the major premiss—whatever shows marks of design must have had a designer. The illustrations of the minor premise are numerous and convincing:
(1.) In the vegetable world; in the structure and arrangement of plants, in their connection with soil, climate and atmosphere; in their relations to the necessities of surrounding animal life; and in their material structure, fitting them to receive and assimilate food, and to breathe the atmosphere and absorb its gases, and to reproduce themselves.
(2.) In the animal world; in adaptation to climate, vegetable productions for food, and all the circumstances which make life possible at various places for some animals and not for all, especially in the peculiarity that man is fitted for all climates, and that the animals necessary to be present with him are capable of equal variety of climate.
(3.) It is also seen in the formation of the various parts of the body, especially of the eye, which presents signal evidences of design, in its structure for seeing, in its capacity for motion, in its instinct against danger, and in its protective apparatus. So also in the hand and foot, especially the thumb in man, which gives him such superiority over all other animals, in felling trees, chopping wood, sewing clothes, use of mechanic's tools and numberless other respects, intimately and essentially connected with a condition of high civilization, as well as of mere physical capacity to prevail over brute force.
So with a thousand times a thousand marks of special design in the forms of life in this world. All prove a designer, and that designer to be the Creator of the world and its forms of life.
It is vain to say that all these members of the body have been developed from inferior forms.
There is no evidence of any different structure in these particulars in the individuals of to-day than in those which earliest appear.
Whatever changes have occurred in animal life have been within fixed limits and under the regulation of law. They have always been such as have preserved those characteristics of the animals upon which difference in species is based. There is in each individual a wonderful capacity to enlarge, by exercise, the powers both of mind and body. But this goes not beyond what, according to some law of its nature, is a common property of humanity.
(3.) Another argument a posteriori may be drawn from the evidences of God's providential care and control of the world.
It may be thus stated:
Man perceives in his own life and in the lives of others, and in the history of nations and of the race, evidence of a superintending power, governing, guiding and protecting, and by means sometimes most insignificant or minute, accomplishing ends of greater or less magnitude. In the workings of this power there are traceable evidences of designing purpose which are so marked as to show it to be not mere blind force or established law, but an intelligent agent exercising such oversight as is rendered necessary by the presence of free will in man, which, but for such oversight, would prevent the accomplishment of ends, which would certainly be attained through
mere laws alone, were the universe, with its inhabitants, a mere machine governed only by purely mechanical laws—and such oversight also as supplies to man the information and resources
needed at particular stages in the world's progress, and as preserves from excess or deficiency the equilibrium of food and work in the world and its various parts.
As none but the supreme mind, which is omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent, can exercise such care, the proof that this care is exercised is a proof of the existence of God.
It will be seen from this that all the proof which can be presented of providential care becomes a proof of a God. This is very strong and conclusive, and is to be found in the historical accounts of mankind, as well as in the constant testimony of individual men.
(4.) The fourth argument a posteriori is from the miracles wrought by messengers from God.
A miracle is an extraordinary act performed, or event brought to pass by God, not through the established laws of nature, nor mere providential control, but by direct action without the use of efficient means.
The working of a miracle, therefore, shows the presence and act of a power superior to nature which can be no other than its creator and lawgiver. A miracle is, therefore, evidence of the existence of God. This argument rests upon the proof that miracles have been wrought.
Of this fact it is universally acknowledged that we have abundant testimony. But the credibility of the testimony, as for example of the New Testament miracles, has been questioned. If it be credible then the fact has been proved.
1. It is charged that the witnesses are not credible, because they were not disinterested.
(a) But disinterestedness is not necessary in a witness. Formerly courts required this, but now, in the more civilized communities, all evidence is heard and due weight is given to each part of it in connection with all the other circumstances and facts testified to.
(b) None of the witnesses for miracles were interested except upon the supposition that the facts which they attested were true. They could have no purpose, therefore, in testifying falsely.
(c) They published their testimony at a time when multitudes were alive who had been present at the times and places when the miracles were said to have been wrought. Had the facts not been
believed by all present on such occasions they would have been disputed and the witnesses exposed. This was especially true of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles.
(d) To the above may be added that the statements made about these miracles were such as to affect the character and position of men in public authority, and in some cases appealed to acts of the rulers in council, by whom the miracles were admitted. None could have dared to make such statements, unless they knew they spoke the truth.
2. It is charged that the witnesses were themselves deceived. But it was impossible that deception could take place in many of the miracles.
Could Israel be deceived about the plagues in Egypt, or the passage through the Red Sea, or that of the Jordan, or the fall of the walls of Jericho, or the guidance of the pillar of cloud and fire, &c., &c.But the rationalist will say that the history of these events was not written at the same time with the events themselves, and that the people in the wilderness never saw nor heard the record.
While this is not admitted of the Old Testament it cannot be justly said of the New Testament histories. The statements are by eyewitnesses. Could they have been deceived about the stilling of the waves, the feeding of the five thousand on one occasion, and of the four thousand on another, about the raising from the dead of the daughter of Jairus, of the son of the widow of Nain, of Lazarus, and especially the self-resurrection of Christ himself. One who looks at these facts is obliged to deny that these witnesses were deceived.
They have either knowingly stated what is false, or their testimony is true.
3. But it is maintained by Hume and others, that even if a miracle had been wrought it would be proof only to those who saw it. No testimony could convince others of the fact.
The argument is, that the uniformity of the laws of nature is a matter of universal experience, and that such is our knowledge of that uniformity that no testimony can convince us of the existence of a fact which is not consistent with it.
But the history of the world shows the contrary. Hume is actually presenting his argument, that no such proof could or would be accepted, to men who have already actually accepted it.
There are many events in the world which seem contrary to the uniformity of nature; as much so to the ignorant mind as the most wonderful miracle to the educated. Are such not accepted? What is
more apparently opposed to the uniformity of nature, as perceived by ignorant men, than eclipses of the sun or moon, or, to those who have never seen the sea, the phenomenon of water running or
swelling upwards in the tides.
Yet testimony of the facts is readily taken as evidence.The truth is that men almost universally believe, when there is no apparent reason to the contrary, in the truthfulness of their fellows and their capacity to perceive what has happened. Even strangers are trusted to this extent. But when men of known probity, having no motive to deceive and who cannot be self-deceived, testify to any fact, however incredible, conviction of the truthfulness of such persons is stronger than belief in the uniformity of nature.
What would appear more wonderful than that a world, the greater part of the surface of which is water, should be burned up with fire? yet a whole audience, to nine-tenths of whom previously such a thing would have seemed incredible, has been known to accept it as a fact upon the mere statement of a single scientific man.
In this argument the statements of the Bible have been used not as inspired truth, but merely as containing human testimony. In like manner in the succeeding argument the Bible is treated merely upon its own apparent merits as a book, without reference to its divine character.
(5.) The fifth argument a posteriori is from the contents of a book we call the Bible, which claims to have come from God. If these contents show a supernatural origin they prove the existence of a mind supreme above nature.
This proof may be presented:
1. With respect to the prophecies of the Bible. Events were predicted and recorded by its writers long periods, even centuries, before they took place. Many of them were minutely described, as to their nature, locality, persons, times, circumstances and causes. Such descriptions show such knowledge as belongs only to one who uses no conjectural knowledge, but knows certainly what will come to pass. But such knowledge of the far future can arise not otherwise than from full knowledge of the eternal purpose of God.
2. It may be presented with reference to the great central figure of
the Bible, our Lord Jesus Christ.
The Scriptures taken as a whole is his biography. The causes of his existence as seen in the original and fallen state of man and in God's mercy to our sinful race, the preparation for his coming, the gradual development of the doctrine of his person and work, the prophecy of his kingdom, his appearance, life, death, resurrection, the establishment of his throne in heaven upon his ascension from earth, the gift of the Holy Ghost, the power and progress of his religion and
its suitableness to our sinful race, all present a life of developed growth as plainly the result of a creative mind as the most wonderful creation of fiction. The unity of purpose is seen throughout. In the beginning we see but dimly what is taught and catch but feebly the outlines of the plot; but as we progress it grows upon us as a genuine creation. Whatever was at first dim is cleared up by the final record, and as we begin to read it over once more, its perfect unity, its
exactness of detail without superfluity, its development in the far future of the importance of facts which at first were only casually stated, as though of no special importance, its skilful interweaving of the minor characters and events, and its use of them in all their fulness to bring on the final catastrophe and its results, the great power with which the theme is handled, the majestic simplicity which everywhere pervades it, all show a master artist creating a character and work, through the instrumentality of writers so numerous, of such different capacities, under such various circumstances, with such manifest unity, as proclaims the mind of God which alone could conceive of such a character and work, and alone could thus reveal it to man, as he alone could create the real persons and events which embody the idea presented.
3. A further proof from the Bible is suggested by Nitzsch: namely, the revelation which it makes of God in Christ. He says, "The proof which is peculiar to Christianity, independent and historical, is not indeed, as some designate it, miracle, but the accomplishment of the passage in Isaiah 40:9. 'Behold your God.' It is revelation in an eminent sense, the existence of God in Christ, John 14:9." This is not the same argument as the last. That was an argument
from a development extending over so many thousand years, and proving the existence of one, who was contemporaneous with all those years, working out the character of Christ as the Saviour of mankind. This is based upon the evidence of divine perfection seen in Christ while here on earth. "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." John 14:9.
The revelation of the nature of God seen in the universe commends to us the fact that he exists, for the nature indicated is one worthy of such a being. Hence the force of Paul's language in Rom. 1:20. "For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his Everlasting power and Divinity."
So also with equal self-recommendation comes the character of God set forth in the words of the Bible in which he tells us what he is, and commends his spiritual nature with its unspeakable holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, with its infinite power and wisdom, as the character alone worthy of a God, and which makes us say at once:
This is the true character of God. If he exists he must be such as is thus described.
But in his incarnate Son we see the embodiment of that which before had appeared as but an ideal. Although appearing here on earth most obviously as a man, yet the divine attributes and character were so exhibited in him that we perceive the truthfulness with which Christ said to Philip: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." John14:9.
(6.) The sixth argument a posteriori is the historical, based upon the fact that the records of history cover so brief a period of time. If man has lived forever, where is the record of that life? It is strange that we find no historical monuments which go beyond a few thousand years.
(7.) Finally, an argument a posteriori may be drawn from geology.
This science teaches:
(a) That there was a time when life, both vegetable and animal, began upon this globe.
(b) That the remoteness of the period of that beginning, even according to the wildest hypothesis, is capable of calculation.
(c) That, in both the vegetable and animal life, of which we have fossil remains, there have been distinct successive genera which began with small numbers,gradually increased to their culminating
points and then as gradually decreased.
History and geology, therefore, furnish us conclusive proof against the eternity of form and life in the universe, and especially oppose the absurd idea of endless succession of finite objects or beings, in the past. Geology, indeed, seems also to give proof of an actual direct
creation of the first beginnings of each of these genera.
Thus, through the proofs of the existence of God, derived from many sources, do we arrive at that certainty of the fact which confirms the teaching of tradition. In the a priori arguments we proceed from admitted first principles to the existence of God, through demonstration, and acknowledge that the arguments are inconclusive if they fail to secure such absolute conviction as do the problems of mathematics. But the arguments a posteriori do not belong to this class of proof, but to that which is the only one found in the accepted theories of science. Scientific proof is only inductive proof, and no induction of science is more certainly true than that
God exists. No theory of science more fully answers all of the demands for the explanation of facts than does the theory that God exists respond to all the explanations required. None has been so universally, and so variously, and so successfully, tested. The theory of gravitation has been constantly becoming more acceptable until now it is held as scientifically certain, because of its success in accounting for all facts connected with it. In like manner has the theory that God exists been confirmed to almost universal satisfaction, by the fact that without it there is no explanation of the innumerable facts around us, while with it there is nothing lacking to account for the cause and origin of all things.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 9:54:09 GMT -5
CHAPTER III
REASON AND REVELATION
HAVING considered the proofs of the existence of God, we should discuss the ways in which he has made himself known, before we study his nature, and attributes, and relations to us. These constitute the sources of our knowledge of Theology, which are two, Reason and Revelation.
Reason is that power in man, which enables him to have mental perceptions, to exercise thought, and reflection, to know facts, to inquire into their mutual relations, and to deduce, logically, the conclusions which may be drawn from them. Reason may be used either with reference to the natural or supernatural means of knowledge conferred by God.
When we refer to reason as a source of knowledge distinct from revelation, we mean the information attained, by the use of this faculty, in connection only with the natural, as distinguished from
the supernatural. By revelation, we mean the knowledge which God conveys by direct supernatural instruction, pre-eminently that given in the book known as the Bible.
Reason involves all the cognitive powers of man, which are the faculties through which the mind attains knowledge. These faculties are not separate, and independent, but are merely the instruments of the mind.
The mind is not itself an original source of knowledge, like the Scriptures, but is merely an instrument by which the man attains knowledge through the exercise of its appropriate faculties. There are no such things as innate ideas. These arise only through the exercise of proper thought and reflection, in connection with some perceived facts.
The means by which the mind attains knowledge in the exercise of its faculties, are five.
1. Consciousness, by which we learn our own existence, and the fact that we think, and are personal beings, possessing personal identity during the term of our natural life.
2. Observation, and experience of the world about us, through the senses.
3. Through intuitive conceptions, by which, upon the suggestion, through some external object, of some principle, we find ourselves at once convinced of its correctness.
4. The dispositions, instincts and tendencies of our natures.
5. The course of events in nature, as tending to good or evil, to what is desirable or disastrous.
It is manifest that the knowledge obtained from these various sources must be abundant to teach man the simple facts upon which rests his duty to God; namely, that there is a God to whom he owes
existence, and consequent reverence, service and love, and whose greatness and goodness enforce this obligation; also to show him that that duty has not been discharged, and that he has not the
disposition to discharge it; and consequently to render him uneasy in his relations to God, and anxious to appease him, and secure some assurance of his pardon and approval. It has also been thought by many, that through reason alone man attains the conviction of immortality and of a future state of rewards and punishments.
However abundant may be the information thus conveyed to man, it is nevertheless clear that his knowledge in these directions must still remain very imperfect. This must have been true of man even in a state of innocence. His finite nature and the finite conditions which surrounded him must still have left him ignorant upon many desirable matters. It is natural, therefore, to believe that, in that condition, he received direct communications from God, which are properly esteemed revelations. But this imperfection must have been greatly increased by any subsequent fall from innocence. By this the perceptions of right and wrong would be dimmed, the power of conscience to enforce the right would be impaired, the desire to do the right would be diminished,
prejudices against the right would be created, and affection for God would be greatly decreased, if not entirely obliterated. Upon these grounds we may infer the necessity of some further source of knowledge of God, and of his will with respect to man.
We may also argue a priori as to the nature of this revelation.
1. It must come from God, the source of all our other knowledge. No other could give it, and it is fit that no other should do so.
2. It must be suited to our present condition, confirming the truth already known, and teaching what is practically useful to man as a sinner before God.
3. It must be secured from all possibility of error, so that its teachings may be relied on with equal, if not greater, confidence than those of reason.
4. It must come with authority, claiming and proving its claim to be the word of God, who has the right to command, and to punish those who disobey his commands; with authority also, that man may with confidence believe and trust the promises and hopes of pardon and peace it may hold out.
5. That it will be accompanied by difficulties and mysteries is what may be expected, since these are found frequently attending the knowledge derived from reason. The gift of such a revelation must of course depend absolutely upon the will of God. It is not for man to say, before it is given, whether it certainly will, or will not, be bestowed. That it is not improbable may be inferred from the fact that God has already made himself known to us in various ways in ourselves and in nature. If we need further revelation we may hope for it.
The only reason to the contrary is that we have sinned against God, and he may have chosen to abandon us to our fate. But this is not so truly understood until revelation has confirmed our conviction of our sinful estate. On the other hand, the favors which God still bestows, and the means of continued knowledge of him which he affords, indicate that he has not yet consigned us to our deserved fate, and that he may have purposes of mercy towards us.
That which renders it highly probable is the expectation seen in man, in the conceptions he has formed of God, as one to be propitiated by sacrifices and approached with prayer.
If the expectations thus formed are to be verified, the important question arises, in what way can God make known to us the new truth he wills to teach.
They manifestly speak unadvisedly who assert that this can in no wise be done.
If he should so choose, he could impress it on each one in like manner as we attain intuitive conceptions. He might reveal it to individuals in dreams and visions, so as to make each one feel and know that the vision is from God. Those through whom he has revealed himself have in some such way attained absolute conviction that God has spoken to and through them, and with God there is
neither impossibility nor difficulty in producing like certainty in the mind of each individual of the race. But as God usually acts through means, so he has revealed himself to a few, and through them to mankind in general.
The only question then is, how can he give evidence to the race at large that the men he has inspired are indeed his messengers? This also might be done in various ways, but he has chosen to do it by attesting their mission by miracles wrought through them.
As to the measure of authority to be ascribed to these miracles, men differ in opinion.
Some teach that any miracle wrought is of itself sufficient attestation of the messenger and of the truth which he teaches. Others, that miracles are only proofs to those who behold them, and dubious proofs even then, and that the true purpose of them is not to set the seal of God's authority, but simply to awaken attention and excite awe, and thus prepare the way for a proper hearing of the divine message. These assert that the revelation comes to us with the authority only of the self-convincing nature of the truth made known.
It is necessary, in this difference of opinions, to seek carefully after the true theory. From no source can we better obtain it than from the revelation itself, the teaching of which will be seen to be fully corroborated otherwise.
The Scripture theory seems to be this, that in any new revelation the prophet of God must present a doctrine perfectly consistent with every past revelation and with the knowledge conveyed by nature, and must, at the same time, confirm by miracles his authority as a teacher from God. Without the miracle the new truth has no evidence that it is not simply the product of human reason or imagination. The coincidence in doctrine is necessary to protect against pretended miracles and the tricks of unprincipled men. Besides, the new truth can have no higher authority than the old, and therefore cannot supersede it, for the old also has come from God.
No truth ever taught by God can be opposed by any new truth from him. What with God is truth is eternal truth. Like himself, it is the same "yesterday, to-day and forever." It may be more abundantly or clearly revealed. We may learn to comprehend it better and to correct our own misapprehensions of it, but whatever God has once given as truth must so remain forever, as changeless as his own life.
1. The Scriptural authority for this theory is conclusive. Moses announced the law, which shows the miracle alone not to be conclusive. See Deut. 13:1, 2, 3. "If there arise in the midst of thee a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and he give thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, let us go after other gods which thou hast not
known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or unto that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul." This passage shows that even a miracle, wrought by one teaching doctrine not in accordance with that already received, should not tempt to belief in the divine authority of him who should work it.
The Apostle Paul gives similar instruction to the Galatians, Gal. 1:8: "Though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema." Whatever might be the accredited authority of the messenger, his teachings were not to be received. Yet, with all this, the Scriptures do not disparage the miracle. The miracles of Mosaic times are constantly referred to as indubitably marking it as divine. Nicodemus recognized the high position assigned to miracles by the Jews, John 3:2: "No man can do these signs that thou doest, except God be with him." Christ himself says, John 10:25: "The works that I do in my Father's name, these bear witness of me."
This theory of the Scriptures is not necessarily based upon the idea that real miracles can be wrought otherwise than by divine power. Still the language sometimes used is liable to this construction. And much depends upon the definition of a miracle. If a miracle be a suspension of the fixed laws which God has established for the world, that suspension can only occur through his special permission.
Taking this as the true meaning of the word, we can understand why such stress is laid in the Scriptures upon the Mosaic miracles and those of Christ, since many of them are such as nothing but divine power could accomplish. But the word miracle in the Scriptures has not this restricted meaning, but is applied likewise to any marked supernatural event. Because men are apt to put these upon a level with the miracles which God alone can work, they are warned not to follow after what is thus supernaturally done, if it be accompanied by such teaching as is contrary to truth already received.See the apparent reality of such miracles in connection with the magicians of Egypt, Ex. 7:11; Chap. 8:7, and compare with it the conviction expressed by the magicians, Ex. 8:19, when they failed to produce lice from the dust, "This is the finger of God."
Notice also what Christ says, Mark 13:22: "For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall shew signs and wonders, that they may lead astray, if possible, the elect."
See also Rev. 16:13, 14: "And I saw coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the beast, and out of the mouth of the false prophet, three unclean spirits, as it were frogs, for they are spirits of devils, working signs; which go forth unto the kings of the whole world, to gather them together unto the war of the great day of God the Almighty."
It is because of this liability to be deceived, that the Scriptures require the miracle and the concurrent doctrine as both essential to the reception of a new revelation.
2. This theory alone concurs with the course to which nature necessarily impels us.
To the extent that we are fully convinced of the truth of a doctrine, no subsequent revelation could change our belief. It is true that this does not apply when we have doubts; but when our knowledge is fixed, we cannot be moved. No amount of miracle could convince a Christian that the nature of God is otherwise than pure and holy, or that he delights in worship not of the heart, or that he is not infinite in justice and holiness, in goodness, mercy and truth, or that he will
pardon sin without due satisfaction to his law.
3. This theory accords with the progressive character of divine revelation.
The earliest revelation came to those who had heretofore been guided only by reason. This was true even down to the beginnings of the Old Testament Scriptures, and, in that economy, only
preparation was made for the future glory of the New Testament revelation. Hence the truths taught were, for the most part, only those which come within the compass of discovery by reason, or
acceptance by it upon due suggestion, namely,—the existence of one God, the fact of creation, the law of moral obligation to God and man, the punishment of sinners, the duty of repentance, the
pardoning mercy of God, and the law of sacrifices, with substitution and satisfaction.
The new economy goes further in its clear instructions: it teaches the vicarious atonement of Christ, involving representation in him and also in Adam, the doctrine of the Trinity in the Godhead, the mysterious union in the person of Christ, and many other truths heretofore only very indistinctly revealed.
These could not have been presented to those only taught heretofore by reason. But the revelation which stood between foreshadowed them in different ways. From it alone originally they would not have been discovered. But now that they are made known, that former revelation is seen to concur with the new statements, and the conformity of the clearly expressed doctrines to the mere outlines of them in the past sustains the fact that they have a common author, and that the divine revealer is the same. It is like the presence in animals of the same genus in earlier days of germs which find their development in species which come later.
4. This accords with our means of judging what course of action infinite wisdom would have devised. The conviction we have of past truth renders it impossible that we should throw it aside. We must, therefore, still hold it fast. That conviction has come from God, and we can have no higher evidence. Yet, other statements and doctrines very probably or even certainly true, may be taught by men, as revealed to them, when they are either self-deceived, or attempting to deceive others. Hence, we must have the attesting miracle.
On the other hand, we are liable to be deceived as to what is supernatural, and especially, in the supernatural, as to what is within the limits of created power. Hence, we may be misled by the craft of men, or by the superhuman power of wicked spirits. Therefore, no doctrine must be accepted contrary to a truth already received.
A revelation, such as we have described, having been given and proved, another question arises: what is the relation which reason bears towards it?
We may lay down the following facts:
1. That reason is the first revelation, and is consequently presupposed in any other.
2. That the facts of reason cannot be denied by any subsequent revelation. No truth can destroy other truth. A limitation must, however, be put on the province of reason. The doctrines of which it may judge, are those only which come within its sphere. Upon the presentation of a new doctrine reason may decide whether it agrees with former knowledge. If agreeable thereto, it must be accepted, if opposed, it must be rejected. But, if it be above reason, it must stand or fall with the rest of the revelation. God may, in his mercy, refrain from trying faith by a revelation of supernatural doctrine, but, if he reveals it, it must be no barrier to the reception of that doctrine itself, or of the revelation which accompanies it. Ir. Thornwell puts this limitation upon reason, that it is sole arbiter within its own bounds, but no judge beyond them. He thinks that in this way only can it be applied as a test of doctrine. The theory is undoubtedly correct. It fails only in not recognizing the precise manner in which Scripture brings it in as an arbiter, not as the judge of truth as disconnected from the past, but as related to the various times and forms in which God has taught it. Reason should judge a new revelation, not by the truths taught by reason alone, but also by those which have been made known in any previous revelation.
The office of reason with respect to revelation, is therefore seen to
be:
1. To examine the evidence of the miracles upon which it rests.
2. To compare its doctrines with the teaching of the past, and recognize their correspondence with or opposition to that teaching.
3. To adopt or reject the revelation according to the evidence afforded that it is God's truth.
4. To interpret its contents, according to the best light which learning affords.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 9:56:09 GMT -5
CHAPTER IV
THE UNITY OF GOD
THE arguments by which we have proved the existence of God have
shown us:
1. From that of causation; that he is self-existent, having the cause of his existence in himself.
2. From the proof of design and from his creation of spirit; that he is an intelligent personal and spiritual being.
3. From the non-eternity of matter; that he alone is eternal.
4. From providence and miracles; that he continues to rule and govern the world which he has created. In them all have been the foundations upon which proofs of his wisdom, power, and goodness, as well as many other attributes are based.
The information thus received is however insufficient, and is capable of being greatly increased by further examination. Having proved that God is, we naturally desire to know more of what he is and who he is.
This leads to an inquiry into his nature or essence, and, since the nature and essence of all being, even of ourselves, can be known only by considering its mode of existence, its qualities and its manner of manifestation, we are led to inquire into the mode of God's existence and into the attributes and works by which he has made himself known to us.
Preliminary to this, however, are two subjects which demand
attention, viz.: The Unity and the Spirituality of God.
THE UNITY OF GOD
1. The proof thus far attained, to say the least of it, is not inconsistent with that unity. Indeed one God is all that is demanded by or involved in that proof.
But one first cause is needed; but one designer is suggested; one being alone meets all the conditions arising from our sense of dependence on another; but one is required to account for the
evidences of providential care over the world; but one for the wonders in miracles; but one for the scriptures with their prophecies and their revelation of Christ and God; and but one for the common consent of mankind.
This last point is the only apparent exception.
But
(1.) Universal consent only goes so far as to admit the existence of one God. Many have in one way or another assumed that there are more, but the belief in more than one is not universal.
(2.) The belief of more than one God was not the earliest type, but has been the result of corruption of the truth. This may be accounted for either from reverence for objects as representations of the divinity, as of the heavenly lights or for animals or statues representing deified attributes of God; or from veneration for men after death regarded as exponents of such attributes.
(3.) The belief of one God thus found in the earliest records of all nations was maintained among most men of intelligence even in the days of Heathenism.
"In the deepest emotions of their minds they never directed their exclamations to their false gods, but employed the words 'By God,''As truly as God lives,' 'God help me.' Moreover they do not have their eyes directed to the capitol, but to heaven." This belief in one God is true, even of that dualism which arose among the Persians because of their knowledge of the struggle between good and evil connected with the presence of sin in the world. They believed in a God superior to the two contestants in this struggle and thus they may be claimed as accepting the idea of the
unity of God. See Cudworth, Vol. I., p. 411, &c.
The argument for universal consent therefore does not demand more than one God.
2. But the proof of God's existence is not only not inconsistent, with the unity of God, but renders that unity highly probable and indeed almost certain.
The unity of the first cause, and of the designer is naturally if not necessarily involved in the unity of will or purpose or design, seen in the effects produced in Creation and Providence.
These show at least such perfect harmony and agreement between the wills of all gods, if there be more than one, as can result only from one Being, or from several as fully agreeing together as though they were but one.
But the very idea of will involves choice, and choice involves such right and possibility to select between two or more things as forbids universal original agreement in choice between two different beings. Either, therefore, there must be difference of choice, which would destroy the uniformity, or there must be a subordination of will one to another, which gives supremacy to one of the beings. This result would be to make that one a first cause of will or action to the others, and therefore to make him alone God.
If, therefore, there is uniformity in the designs and works of nature, that is almost if not quite certain proof that there is but one God.
That uniformity is seen,
(1.) In the materials which compose it.
(2.) In the qualities possessed by these materials.
(3.) In the nature of the forces which they evolve.
(4.) In the unity of design between all living forms, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammalia in all parts of the world whether adapted for air, water or earth, whether in fossils of the past or living organisms of the present; and in like unity seen in one species only as germs and developed into perfected organs in another separated from it by a wide interval of time.
3. The only objection to the unity of God which can be drawn from the world arises from the presence of pain and ill, of sorrow and suffering, of guilt and sin, together with the violent and destructive forces of nature.
(1.) But these are not inconsistent with the unity of God.
(a) If they ought not to be and God could prevent them, they would prove lack of goodness, not of unity.
(b) If they ought not to be and God cannot prevent them, then they would prove some other being to exist greater than he, and then that other being would be God.
(c) The evils referred to are as apparently under uniform general laws as any other facts or events of nature.
(2.) But there is no evidence that these evils ought not to be, and are not perfectly consistent with God's goodness.
(a) They may be part of a system which best exists in connection with them. We see this in part so far as the destructive forces of the world are concerned.
(b) We find among them traces of a working together for final and intermediate good ends, and hence they may safely be said neither to militate against goodness nor unity.
4. But while some of the arguments for God are only consistent with his unity and highly suggestive of the same, and others make it so highly probable as to be almost certain, there are others which establish it with absolute certainty.
(1.) The idea of God in the mind, to which is attached that of necessary existence, is the idea of one God, and one only. The notion of two or more gods is self-contradictory, for neither of them can be the absolute and perfect and independent being which is our idea of God. All the evidence for God therefore contained in the first of the a priori arguments is for one God and one only.
(2.) In the argument from the nature of necessary existence (the second a priori), the 7th point was: "There can be but one necessarily existent being, for two necessarily existent beings could in no respect whatever differ from each other; that is, they would be one and the same being."
The nature of necessary existence therefore proves the unity of God.
5. The proofs we have thus far presented from nature for the unity of God are abundantly confirmed by the statements of Scripture.
(1.) The passages which declare explicitly that God is one: Deut. 6:4; Mal. 2:10: "Hath not one God created us?" Mark 12:29, 32; 1 Tim. 2:5; Eph. 4:5, 6; James 2:19.
(2.) Those that assert that there is none else or none beside him: Deut. 4:35, 39; 1 Sam. 2:2; 2 Sam. 7:22; 1 Kings 8:60; Isa. 44:6, 8: Isa. 45:5, 6, 21, 22; Isa. 46:9; Joel 2:27.
(3.) That there is none like him nor to be compared with him: Ex. 8:10; 9:14; 15:11; 2 Sam. 7:22; 1 Kings 8:23; 2 Chron. 6:14; Isa. 40:25; Isa. 46:5; Jer. 10:6.
(4.) That he alone is God: 2 Sam. 22:32; Neh. 9:6; Ps. 18:31; 86:10; Isaiah 37:16; 43:10, 12; 46:9; John 17:3; 1 Cor. 8:4–6.
(5.) That he alone is to be worshipped: Ex. 20:5; 34:14; 1 Sam. 7:3; 2 Kings 17:36; Matt. 4:10; Rom. 1:25; Rev. 19:10.
(6.) Those which forbid any one else to be accepted as God: Ex. 20:3; Deut. 5:7; Isaiah 42:8; Hosea 13:4.
(7.) Which proclaim him as supreme over all so-called gods: Deut. 10:17; Josh. 22:22; Ps. 96:4, 5; Jer. 14:22; 1 Cor. 8:4–6.
(8.) Which declare him to be the true God: Jer. 10:10; 1 Thess. 1:9. This Scripture doctrine of the unity of God is not affected by some expressions which at first sight appear to contradict it.
(a) The Bible does not deny that unity where the gods of the heathen are spoken of as their gods: Deut. 10:17, "The Lord your God, he is God of gods and Lord of lords;" Josh. 22:22, "The Lord the God of gods, the Lord the God of gods, he knoweth and Israel he shall know;" Judges 8:33; 9:27; 11:24; 16:23, 24; 1 Sam. 5:7; 1 Kings 11:33; 2 Kings 1:2, 16, and many other passages. Psalm 96:4,
5: "For great is the Lord and highly to be praised; he is to be feared above all gods.
For all the gods of the peoples are idols: but the Lord made the heavens." Jeremiah 14:22: "Are there any among the vanities of the heathen that can cause rain? or can the heavens give showers? art not thou he, O Lord our God?" 1 Cor. 8:4, 5, 6: "Concerning therefore the eating of things sacrificed to idols, we know that no idol is any thing in the world, and that there is no god but one. For though there be that are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth; as there are gods many, and lords many; yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him."
1. Such gods are only so-called gods and exalted to such places by the false conceptions of men.
2. Many of them have solely imaginary existence.
3. Where there is any corresponding existence, they are but creatures of God, dependent upon him for existence and even permission to exercise power and influence.
4. Many of these gods are identified in the New Testament with the devils which Christ cast out, and which were subject to him and his disciples, and who are only the angels or messengers of Satan, and therefore fallen created angels. Acts 17:18. Some of the philosophers who met Paul at Athens said of him, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods," (dæmons).
This passage shows that the word which is constantly used in the New Testament for the devils cast out, was a word properly used by these Greeks as applicable to their gods.
But we have places in which the word is applied by the sacred writers themselves to these gods.
1 Cor. 10:20, 21. "The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that ye should have communion with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils: ye cannot partake of the table of the Lord, and of the table of devils."Rev. 9:20. "And the rest of mankind which were not killed with these plagues, repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, and the idols of gold, and of silver, and of brass, and of stone, and of wood which can neither see, nor hear nor walk."
(b) The word god is also applied to Moses and others. Ex. 4:16. "And he (Aaron) shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and it shall come to pass, that he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou
shalt be to him as God." Ex. 7:1. "And the Lord said unto Moses, See, I have made thee a god
to Pharaoh." John 10:34, 35. "Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law, I said, ye are gods? If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came [and the Scripture cannot be broken]." The reference is to Ps. 82:6, 7, "I said ye are gods, (Elohim,) and all of you sons of the Most High. Nevertheless ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes."
As to these passages referring to Moses, the idea manifestly is that he stood before Aaron and Pharaoh us the representative of God, clothed with his authority and having the right to demand confidence in his utterances and obedience to his commands. But all of this, not because of any partaking of divine nature, but because he was God's ambassador.
As to the passage in the Psalms, quoted by Christ, it is equally manifest that this was a metaphorical use of the words to denote the recognition of exalted dignity and mighty power. In the psalm, from which the words are taken, it is said in the 1st verse, "God standeth in the congregation of God; he judgeth among the gods." This language and the threat that they "shall die like men" in the 6th verse, show that it was applied to men who are only metaphorically spoken of as gods.
The doctrine of the Trinity is not opposed to the unity of God, but only enables us to form just conceptions as to that unity. It presents to us three Persons who are not three gods, but one God,
and, as will hereafter be seen, shows us that the unity of God is to be found in his nature or essence and not in the personal relations in that essence, so that there is but one divine nature or essence, one being, one god, although there are three persons subsisting therein,who, by virtue of that subsistence, are each God.
We are not led by this doctrine of the unity of God, therefore, to adopt the Arian notion that the Father is Supreme God and the Son only a divine being in a subordinate sense. Nor is it proper to accept the Sabellian notion, that God is one person, manifesting himself sometimes as Father, sometimes as Son, and sometimes as Holy Ghost. "Neither does it at all teach tritheistic unity by which these are really three gods, but considered one because they have the same nature, just as three men may be said to be one because of the same human nature." See Gill, vol. 1, pp. 183, 184 from which this is condensed.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 9:57:04 GMT -5
CHAPTER V
SPIRITUALITY OF GOD
HAVING in the last chapter discussed the unity of God, we proceed in this to the consideration of his spirituality. This is the second subject preliminary to that of his attributes. The attempt will be made to prove, not only that God has a spiritual nature, but that he is a pure spirit without outward form or material organization.
I. The one God has undoubtedly a spiritual nature.
1. He is the creator of spirits. But spirit is the highest order of existence and its creator must himself have the nature which belongs to that order.
2. The creation and government of the world give evidence of wisdom, skill, knowledge and purpose, but these are attributes of spirit. God therefore must have a spiritual nature.
3. We arrive at the idea of the perfect being by the exclusion of all imperfection and the ascription of all perfection. But spiritual nature is in every respect a perfection. Therefore we ascribe it to God.
4. The Scriptures ascribe a spiritual nature to God.It is involved in the abundant language about the spirit of God, in which, however, reference is had distinctively to the third person in the Trinity.
It is also presupposed in all the intellectual, moral, and emotional thoughts and acts ascribed to him.
But it is directly asserted in two places: John 4:24, the language of our Lord to the woman of Sychar: "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth."
Again in Heb. 12:9, where fathers of the flesh and of the spirit are contrasted. "Furthermore, we have had the fathers of our flesh to chasten us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits and live?" Compare also Acts 17:24, 25. "The God that made the world and all things therein, he, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is he served by men's hands, as though he needed anything," &c.
II. But when we ascribe spirituality to God, we do not intend simply to assert that he possesses a spiritual nature, but that his nature is exclusively spiritual. By this we mean that he has no material organization, that he has neither body nor members of the body such as we have, neither shape nor form, neither passions nor limitations, but only a spiritual nature.
1. This is evident from his immensity and eternity (infinity in time and space). To have an omnipresent and eternal mode of existence is possible for a spiritual nature, because spirit has not of necessity succession of time and specific limitation of location. But these of necessity belong to matter. It is of necessity that it has a here, and not an everywhere; spirit alone can combine the two, the here and the everywhere. It is also of necessity that matter exists in time; we know that it exists now, that it existed yesterday, that it may exist to-morrow. We know that it necessarily has this succession and difference of time. But with the eternal God there can be no succession of time, and consequently he can have no material nature but must be purely spiritual.
2. It also follows from his independence and immutability.
If God have body, he is capable of being influenced from without, for all matter is thus capable of being influenced, of being moved, divided, added to and diminished. But if thus capable of influence from without he is not independent. Therefore the independent God cannot be material. Again, if he is body, he is mutable, for all matter is capable of change. Therefore the immutable God cannot be material.
3. This may be proved from his absolute perfection. (a) Negatively. From the idea of absolute perfection we exclude all that admits of limitation or change. But body is both limited and changeable. Therefore the absolute perfection of God excludes a bodily organism.
(b) Positively. To absolute perfection we ascribe the possession of intelligence, will and moral perception. But these do not belong to body. Therefore body cannot be either in part or whole the absolutely perfect one.
4. We realize in ourselves, the defects of a material organization, how it confines us, how it causes pain and suffering, how it imposes on us joy in sensual pleasures, how incapable it is of knowledge and power in itself. Hence we naturally disbelieve that in God is to be found an organism so necessarily imperfect. On the other hand we find our spiritual natures to be of wondrous power and capacity, endowed with intelligence, skill and wisdom, capable of knowing right and wrong, and the true and the false, and possessed of liberty of choice, and we therefore ascribe to God the possession of such a nature to an infinite extent, with infinite intelligence, skill and wisdom, and a will absolutely untrammeled from without. In apparent opposition to this doctrine of the pure spirituality of God is a large number of passages, which represent God in or with bodily form. This language is partly figurative, and partly used as an accommodation to human thought, and to the incapacity of human language to express exclusively divine things. Such language is called anthropomorphic, and is generally so obviously such, as to make no false impression, even upon the most ignorant.
The following is a corrected list of the passages as collected in West's Analysis, pp. 17–19.
Those which speak of him as having location: Gen. 4:16; Ex. 19:17–21; 20:21; 33:14, 15.
As having motion: Gen. 17:22; 18:33; Ex. 19:20; Num. 12:5; 23:4; Deut. 33:2; Judg. 5:4; 1 Sam. 4:7; Ps. 47:5; 68:7, 8; Ezek. 11:23;Micah 1:3; Hab. 3:3; Zech. 2:13.
As using vehicles: 2 Sam. 22:11; Ps. 18:10; 104:3; Hab. 3:8, 15; Zech.9:14.
He is said to dwell on the earth:Ex. 25:8; 29:43,44; 1Kings 6:13; 8:12, 13; 2Chron.6:1, 2; Ps. 132:14; Mic. 1:2, 3; Hab. 2:20.
He dwells with man: Ex. 29:45; Lev. 26:11, 12; 2 Chron. 6:18; Zech. 2:10; Rev. 21:3.
He dwells in men: 1 Cor. 3:16, 17; 6:19.
He has face: Gen. 32:30; Ex. 33:11, 20; Deut. 5:4; 34:10; Rev. 20:11;
eyes: 2 Chron. 16:9; Prov. 22:12;
nostrils: 2 Sam. 22:9, 16; Ps. 18:15;
mouth: Num. 12:8; Ps. 18:8;
lips and tongue: Isa. 30:27;
breath: Isa.30:28;
shoulders: Deut. 33:12;
hand and arms: Ex. 33:22, 23; Ps.21:8; 74:11; 89:13; 118:16; Isa. 52:10; Hab. 3:4;
fingers: Ps. 8:3;
back: Ex. 33:23;
feet: Ps. 18:9;
voice: Ex. 19:19; 20:22; Lev. 1:1; Num. 7:89; 12:4; 22:9; Deut. 4:12, 36; 1 Kings 19:12, 13; Ps. 29:3–9; 68:33; Jer. 25:30, 31; Ezek. 43:6.
His voice is spoken of as dreaded: Ex. 20:19; Deut. 4:33; 5:24–26; Joel 2:11; 3:16; Amos 1:2; Heb. 12:19, 26.
He is said to exercise laughter: Ps. 2:4.
He appears to men: Gen. 35:9; 48:3; Ex. 3:2–6; 19:9; 1 Kings 9:2; Job 42:5, 6; Amos 9:1.
His appearance is described: Ex. 24:10; Deut. 31:15; Isa. 6:1; Ezek. 8:1, 2, 4; 43:2; Dan. 7:9, 10; Rev. 4:5.
He is in human form: Gen. 18:1; Ezek. 1:26, 27; Rev. 4:2, 3.
III. The value of true ideas as to the spirituality of God may be seen
from the important consequences which follow from this characteristic of God.
1. It involves concerning the nature of God:
(1.) That he is invisible and intangible, or incapable of apprehension by the bodily senses.
(2.) That he is unchangeable, incorruptible and indestructible.
(3.) That he is simple and uncompounded.
(4.) That he is a living personal being, intelligent, moral, free and active.
(5.) That he is infinite and eternal.
2. Upon it depends in the relation of God to creation:
(1.) His knowledge of all events, and especially of his spiritual creatures.
(2.) His control of all events.
(3.) His purposing all things that shall come to pass.
3. Because of it, he must receive spiritual worship:
(1.) Not that of the body only.
(2.) Nor of the outward form.
(3.) Nor of pretended service.
(4.) But of genuine emotion.
(5.) Because of it, he cannot be represented in that worship by outward forms or images. He is to be approached, not with the bodily senses, but with the communing's of the heart. Hence the second commandment, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." Ex. 20:4, 5.
IV. Spirituality has been by some classified as one of the attributes of God. This has possibly arisen from the twofold sense which the word spirituality has. It is used among men as a description of character, when it means that that character is exalted to an extraordinary sense above the fleshly appetites and passions, and devoted to spiritual affairs. In this sense spirituality would be an attribute of character, and therefore of the person possessing that character. But when spirituality is spoken of with reference to God, it is used in the sense in which man is spoken of as a spiritual as well as material being. It is declarative of God as possessing a spiritual nature in the sense that his nature is that of a spirit. It is, therefore, a simple declaration of what his nature is, and not a statement of an attribute of that nature. It is, consequently, no more to be classed among the attributes of God than is his unity. These two subjects have, therefore, been treated separately and as preliminary questions to
the consideration of his attributes.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 9:58:23 GMT -5
CHAPTER VI
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
THE Attributes of God are those peculiarities which mark or define the mode of his existence, or which constitute his character. They are not separate nor separable from his essence or nature, and yet are not that essence, but simply have the ground or cause of their existence in it, and are at the same time the peculiarities which constitute the mode and character of his being.
As they are not separable from his essence, so they are not to be regarded as so many different powers and peculiarities or faculties, which so belong to God that he is "composed of different elements." Hodge, 1:369. This would take away the simplicity of the divine nature and make it compound and therefore divisible and changeable.
But, on the other hand, they are not simply our different conceptions of God. They have existence independently of his creatures. There is some true foundation in God himself for the distinctions between them, so that, when we speak of God as wise, we do not only say that we conceive of him differently than when we call him just, but we mean that there is that in God which makes it proper that we should conceive of him under the different aspects of wisdom and justice.
CLASSIFICATIONS
Various divisions have been made of the attributes of God.
1. One is into communicable and incommunicable.
The communicable attributes are those which, to a limited degree, he can also bestow upon his creatures. Such are power, knowledge, wisdom, love, holiness, &c.
The incommunicable are those which cannot thus be bestowed, but which, of necessity, exist only in God. Such are self-existence, immutability, and infinity including immensity and eternity.
2. Another division is into relative and absolute. The relative are those which may be exercised towards objects which are without, the absolute, which exist only in connection with God.
3. Still another division is into transient attributes, or such as pass over to his creatures, and immanent, or such as ever remain in God alone.
4. A fourth division is into positive and negative attributes, the positive being those which ascribe perfections to God, and the negative those which deny imperfections.
These four divisions are however identical. The attributes ranked under the communicable are also placed among the relative, and the transient, and the positive, and those defined as incommunicable are classified as absolute, and immanent, and negative.
5. A further division has been made into the natural and moral attributes.
By the natural attributes are meant those which describe the mode of his existence without respect to personal character; by the moral, those which describe his character. Dr. Charles Hodge justly objects to this division because the "word natural is ambiguous. Taking it in the sense of what constitutes or pertains to the nature, the holiness and justice of God are as much natural as his power or knowledge. And on the other hand God is infinite and eternal in his moral perfections, although infinity and eternity are not distinctively moral perfections. In the common and familiar sense of the word natural, the terms natural and moral express a real distinction."—Sys. Theol., Vol. I., pp. 375, 376.
In the discussion of the divine attributes, those which belong to the incommunicable, or absolute, or immanent, or negative class will first be considered. These are simplicity, which denies composition; infinity, which, either as eternity denies limitation as to time, or as immensity denies it as to space; and immutability, which rejects all
possibility of change in God. After that will be taken up, in the order named, the communicable, relative, transient, or positive attributes of power, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, goodness, love, truth and justice. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the simplicity and infinity of God.
THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD
By this we mean,that the nature of God,comprising his essence and his attributes,is simple or uncompounded pure spirit.
It means more than his unity, for the latter expresses only the fact that there is but one being, that is, God. Were God both matter and spirit, or compounded in any other way, his unity would not be affected.
Were there but one man in the world, we should ascribe to him unity, and if there could be but one we should ascribe essential unity. It means more than the spirituality of God, for that includes only that he must be spiritual, and, also, as we have seen, that he should be purely spiritual.
But there is nothing contradictory in the idea, that created spirits might have a composite spiritual nature, composed, for example, of mind, soul and spirit, as three distinct essences, or that a spiritual nature should have a spiritual body, as well as a spiritual soul.
But in God there can be no composition, and therefore his spiritual nature must be uncompounded. Even his attributes and his nature must be in such a manner one, that his attributes essentially in here in that nature and are not capable of separation from it, which really makes them one with that nature.
The reasons for this are:
1. Because composition (or a putting together,) involves possibility of separation. But this would involve destructibility, and changeableness, each of which is inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence.
2. Composition involves a time of separate existence of the parts compounded. If so, then there was a time when God did not exist, because the parts of his nature had not been united, or, when he existed imperfectly, not having yet received to his essential nature the additions subsequently made; all of which is inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence.
3. If the parts have been compounded, it has been done by some force from without, or has been a growth in his nature. They have not been added from without, because God is independent, and therefore cannot be affected from without. Besides all outward form and all else than God had its origin in him, and he existed as God before it.
They have not been a growth in him, for, if so, he is not unchangeable. Any such addition to God or growth in him is also inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence.
In ascribing simplicity to God, therefore, we declare that his nature is so purely or simply one as not to be compounded of separate substances, as matter and spirit, or even of the same substance, in different forms, or of a substance with separable attributes; and we assert that even his attributes are one with his essence, and that he is not only essentially spiritual, but also essentially wise, and good, and holy, and just, and true, and almighty, and omnipotent.
INFINITY OF GOD
When we say that God is infinite, we deny to him all limitation in his nature or essence. We are conscious of the finite nature of our soul as well as of our body; it has limitations as to place, time and capabilities. In arriving at the idea of the perfect being by way of negation, we deny all such limitation in him, and therefore ascribe to him infinity as to time and space, as well as infinite perfection in his mode of existence, in his power, wisdom, goodness, justice, holiness and truth.
The infinity of God as to time is called HIS ETERNITY
By this we mean:
(1.) That he has no beginning nor end.
(2.) That with him there is no succession of moments.
It is difficult to attain any conception of the mode of existence which is thus ascribed to him. It is so different from our own. Yet a brief consideration of what is involved in the nature of God must convince us that the idea which we express by these statements is just and true.
1. As to the statement that he has no beginning nor end. When we say that we shall live forever, we can understand how a life once begun may never be completed.
But it is difficult to conceive of a life which goes back equally forever as one may go forward. The past is always completed, and as completed, must be measurable. That which has been by succession of moments or days must have had some first day or moment with which it began. We can form no other conception of it.
That division of eternity, therefore, which is called eternity a part post we can comprehend; but the complement of it, the eternity a part ante, which is united with it to express infinite duration, is felt at once to be an attempted conception of the mind to express the eternity which we know must be true, and yet which we perceive is inadequately conceived as well as incorrectly expressed. While, therefore, we know that God has had no beginning, we see that his mode of existence cannot have been one in which he has had in the past that ever continuing indefinite duration which
corresponds to what may be ours in the future.
2. When we say that during some period a certain being has always existed and will always exist, we mean that there has not only been no moment in that period when he has not existed and will be none in which he will not exist, but that during that period he has been and will be existent in a constant succession of moments. There is at all times, after the beginning, a past and present, and will be, until the end, a future. One moment passes away, and another succeeds.
But with God there can be no succession of moments.
(1.) Because then he would have had a beginning, which is opposed to his infinity.
(2.) Because then he would not be unchangeable, for that would be true of him to-day which was not yesterday and will not be tomorrow.
(3.) He would not be perfect because something could be added to him from day to day. He would become older. He would have new experiences. Indeed there would be either increase or diminution of his power, wisdom, etc.
The schoolmen attempted to express the eternity of God
This is the conception of eternity which we strive to attain. Our difficulty in doing so is that we can no more conceive of duration without succession than we can of an eternity But we see that in this conception we are not arriving at a thought in itself erroneous, as in the other case, but are simply recognizing the fact that God's mode of existence, as to time, is different from ours. Ours has succession of moments, increase in the length of the period, is not all of it possessed at the same time, has had beginning and might have an end, and has a past and future as well as present. God has no succession, no increase of life, is possessed of the whole of his existence at once, and eternally possessed, has had no beginning, can have no end, and lives in the present only, having no past or future.
This accords with the statements of Scripture. God is always spoken of in the present.
He calls himself I AM. His name Jehovah has been supposed mystically to express this.
The psalmist says: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God." Ps. 90:2.
Thus our Lord, when he would declare his equality with the Father, uses the present tense for each. "My Father worketh even until now, and I work." John 5:17.
So also in like manner he declared his divinity by saying, "Before Abraham was, I am." John 8:58.
A question arises, what then is the relation of time and eternity to each other?
Time is not a part of eternity, for if it were, eternity must have succession, viz.: before time, during time, after time. They are in reality different modes of existence which are unlike each other, time being suited to the measurement of creation periods and creature life. True eternity belongs only to the life of God.
While time, however, is not a part of eternity, it co-exists with it.
Through the divine purpose all its events have been eternally present with God, and as well known and realized by him as though actually existent. And, in the actual existence of time, it has been present actually with God and with eternity, although not constituting a part of eternity.
The nature of these relations we cannot understand. Our ideas are vague, and the language in which we would convey them is incapable of expressing even what we perceive and know. But while this is true, we have no question as to the possibility of better knowledge in the future on this point. The difficulty is in reality no greater than in the
connection between the immensity and omnipresence of God. Yet from the knowledge of the presence of our spirits as compared with that of our bodies, we comprehend the fact of the omnipresence of God with all created things, while the space in which they exist is no more a part of his immensity than is time a part of his eternity.
Corresponding to the infinity of God in respect to time, is his infinity in respect to space, which is called
HIS IMMENSITY
God is not confined to space any more than he is measured by time.
Space must have its limitations because its existence is commensurate only with the universe. Where there is no creation, there can be no space nor time. But creation cannot be infinite, but must have its bounds, impossible as it may be for us to imagine the nonexistence of space. In our mode of existence, space and time are so necessary that we cannot even deny their existence without using words which involve that existence. Thus if we say, "Where there is
no universe, there is no space," the very words "where" and "there" involve the notion of space.
But notwithstanding this, we know that, just as time is the period, so is space the location, in which creation exists.
When, therefore, we speak of God's immensity, we mean more than his filling all space, just as when we speak of his eternity, we mean more than his existing throughout all time.
We can only express the idea by the fiction of infinite space, as in the other, we have done by that of infinite time.
Immensity is the absolute attribute of God to which corresponds the relative one
HIS OMNIPRESENCE
By this word we express the relation of God as present with creation. He is present everywhere. He is present at one and the same time everywhere. His presence is not merely contact, but energy and power.
It is not merely through his knowledge of it, or the exertion of his power upon it, but he fills it with his essence.
He fills it, not as part to part, but the whole infinite deity is entirely, undividedly present, at each point of creation, in each moment of time.
The following valuable questions and answers are taken from the Outlines of Theology, by Dr. A. A. Hodge, p. 141, of the new edition.
"What are the different modes of the divine presence?
"God may be conceived of as present in any place, or with any creature, in several modes;
first, as to his essence;
second, as to his knowledge;
third, as manifesting that presence to any intelligent creature;
fourth, as exercising his power in or upon his creatures.
As to essence and knowledge his presence is the same everywhere and always. As to his self-manifestation and the exercise of his power, his presence differs endlessly in different cases, in degree and mode.
Thus God is present to the church as he is not to the world. Thus he is present in hell in the manifestation and execution of righteous wrath, while he is present in heaven in the manifestation and communication of gracious love and glory.
"How may it be proved that he is everywhere present as to his essence?
"That God is everywhere present as to his essence is proved from Scripture. 1 Kings 8:27; Ps. 139:7–10; Isaiah 66:1; Acts 17:27, 28.
And from reason. (1.) It follows necessarily from his infinitude. (2.) From the fact that his knowledge is his essence knowing, and his actions are his essence acting, yet his knowledge and his power reach to all things.
"State the different relations that bodies, created spirits and God sustain to space.
"Turretine says: 'Bodies are conceived of as existing in space circumscriptively, because, occupying a certain portion of space, they are bounded by space upon every side. Created spirits do not occupy any portion of space, nor are they embraced by any; they are, however, in space definitely as here and not there. God on the other hand is in space repletively, because in a transcendent manner his essence fills all space. He is included in no space; he is excluded from none. Wholly present to each point he comprehends all space at once.' "
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:02:08 GMT -5
CHAPTER VII
THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD
BY the immutability of God is meant that he is incapable of change, either in duration of life, or in nature, character, will or happiness. In none of these, nor in any other respect is there any possibility of change.
1. This is implied in his absolute perfection. Perfection permits neither increase as though he lacks, nor decrease as though he can lose. Change must be for the worse or for the better, but God cannot become worse or better.
2. It arises in like manner from the pure simplicity of his nature. That which is not and cannot be compounded cannot be changed.
3. It is expressly taught by the Scriptures in the following as well as in other particulars. A few passages out of many are referred to in support of each.
(a) They declare him to be unchangeable in duration and life: Gen. 21:33; Deut. 32:39, 40; Ps. 9:7; 55:19; 90:2; 102:12; Hab. 1:12; Rom. 16:26; 1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16.
(b) They affirm the unchangeableness of his nature: Ps. 104:31; Mal. 3:6; Rom. 1:23; James 1:17.
(c) They also assert that his will is without change: Job 23:13; Ps. 33:11; Prov. 19:21.
(d) His character is also said to be immutable, as for example his justice: Gen. 18:25; Job 8:3; Rom. 2:2;
his mercy: Ex. 34:7; Deut. 4:31; Ps. 107:1; Lam. 3:22, 23; Mal. 3:6;
his truth: Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Mic. 7:20; Rom. 3:3; 11:2, 29; 2 Tim. 2:13; Titus 1:2;
his holiness: Job 34:10; Hab. 1:13; James 1:13;
and his knowledge: Isa. 40:13, 14, 27, 28.
The immutability thus set forth in the Scriptures and implied in the simplicity and absolute perfection of God is not, however, to be so understood as to deny in him some real ground for the Scripture statements of emotional feeling in the exercise of love, pity, longsuffering and mercy, or of anger, wrath and avenging justice. We could as well deny some real ground for the attributes of love, justice and truth which are at the basis of these emotions. We must never forget that we know but little, if anything, of the mode of operation of the divine mind. We are sure that we have to think and speak of it erroneously when our thoughts or words involve successive emotions in God or such as have beginning or end. And yet the only way in which change in him in such emotional acts could occur would involve both beginning, and end, and succession. Wherefore, we know that whatever possibility of change in God appears is due only to our own imperfection of knowledge and incapacity to form true conceptions.
It is also true that the unchangeableness of God is not incompatible with such outward activity and relations as exist in connection with Creation, Providence and Redemption. But as this has not been so readily admitted, it may be well to consider more particularly the objections which have been made.
I. It is objected that a change must have taken place in God in the creation of the universe. It is claimed that he must then have formed a new purpose, and must have passed from a state of rest to one of activity.
(a) But this objection is based upon a forgetfulness of the fact, that in him there is no succession, and no change of time from one moment to another. The creation of the universe is no less an outward act than is the time in which it has existence. It appears in time and with time. But with God there is no time and no relation of time, exclusive of time itself. There was not before its creation. There will not be when there shall be no more time in creation. We may not be able to understand how this is, but we know that the fact must be so.
It is on this account that the purpose of God to create was not a new one, formed at one time and not at another. On the contrary, that purpose, and, indeed, his whole will is eternal. Whatever may have given rise to that purpose, does not exclude this fact.
(b) There was nothing outside to influence him. He was moved entirely by his own will. Whether that will was altogether voluntary, or arose from some necessity in his nature, we need not now consider. If it was either the one or the other, in either event it was eternal, for if his nature be eternal, then any necessity of his nature is an eternal necessity, and any purpose he forms, whether of necessity, or voluntarily, must be eternal volition. So much for the objection,
based upon a supposed new purpose.
That from a transition from rest to labor is equally baseless. It supposes labor and toil in God. But the Scripture account of creation, as well as the dictates of reason, forbid this. There was no laborious work of God. There never is; there never can be. His infinite power compasses his infinite will, in the mere wishing.
Neither in the creation nor in the sustentation of the universe is there in God any of that busy, careful thought, and protracted weary effort by which man maintains government or sustains the lives of those dependent on him.
This view of God's creation accords with reason. It alone is worthy of an all-wise, all-powerful, independent and self-existent God.
It is established by Scripture. Heb. 11:3. "By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear."
The whole account of the creation in Genesis, Chap. 1:1, to chap. 2:3, is full of this truth. In every case it is simply, "And God said," &c. Psalm 33:9. "For he spake, and it was done; he commanded and it stood fast."
When it is said that he rested on the seventh day, no more is implied than that he ceased as to further creation; for the sustentation of the universe requires constantly the same exercise of power and will as its creation.
II. It is again objected, that the Scriptures represent change in God, when they speak of him as "repenting" of the acts which he had done. Gen. 6:6. "And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart."1 Sam. 15:35. "And the Lord repented that he had made Saul king over Israel."
Ps. 106:45. "And he remembered for them his covenant, and repented according to the multitudes of his mercies."
Amos 7:3. "The Lord repented concerning this: It shall not be saith the Lord."
Jonah 3:10. "And God repented of the evil which he said he would do unto them."
In reply to this objection, it may be stated that these are merely anthropopathic expressions, intended simply to impress upon men his great anger at sin, and his warm approval of the repentance of those who had sinned against him. The change of conduct, in men, not in God, had changed the relation between them and God. Sin had made them liable to his just displeasure. Repentance had brought them within the possibilities of his mercy. Had he not treated them
differently then there would have been change in him. His very unchangeableness makes it necessary that he shall treat differently those who are innocent and those who are guilty, those who harden themselves against him and those who turn toward him for mercy, with repentant hearts. So far as the first of these passages is concerned, it is simply a protest against the great wickedness into which the race of man has fallen. The Scriptures show that God has had a purpose with reference to such sin, which, from the beginning, contemplated the fall of man and the different stages of wickedness
by which in various ages that fall has been accompanied. These statements differ widely from those which declare love, pity, or anger, for there is no emotion in God correspondent with the outward declaration.
III. Again it has been objected that God must be changeable or he could not answer prayer. It is said if his purposes stand forever and he changes not his will, then there is no place for prayer.
It is unquestionably true that God promises to answer prayer. It is also true that prayers have been answered, and that the course of human events has thus been different from what it would have been had there been no prayer and no answer to it. But the mistake arises from supposing that there has been change in God's purpose or action from what he always contemplated.
The difficulty is not one that affects prayer only; it arises as well in connection with labor, or with any other act, by which, through man, a new force is introduced into the universe.
It proceeds from the fact that man, being a voluntary agent, may act according to choice at any moment of his life. That choice puts his action outside of the mere mechanical movements of the universe. Over these it is admitted that God has absolute control, and that his purpose relative to them has no change. But it is thought, that if man can choose one thing, or another, or can do, or not do, any special act he pleases, then so much of the future being dependent upon and
resultant from his act or volition, God must change his purpose to correspond with that act or volition.
To this it may be replied that, even without explanation, we know that such cannot be the case, for this would take away the independence of God. It would make his volitions dependent upon those of man. If it be therefore true, that man cannot be a free agent, without such mechanical action, on his part, as would leave God free, we know that free agency does not belong to him. But we are so fully conscious of our free agency, that that consciousness becomes to us the highest revelation from God that it has real existence. If prayer then be offered, the only doubt about it, as a power and force, the effect of which does not change, is whether God answers it. And, in his word he has so plainly taught this, as to leave no room for doubt. In what aspect, then, are we to regard prayer? Evidently in this simple way; that it is a secondary cause, which has a place, like all other secondary causes, which, like other such, is necessary to
produce the result, to which God has given means of efficient entrance into the working of the universe, the existence of which has been as fully known and purposed as any other secondary cause, and the presence of which can in no way take God by surprise, nor render any new purpose or action on his part necessary. So far then from changing his purpose when he answers prayer, God is in reality only carrying out that purpose. But even if we be not able to explain how any will or act of ours can be at the same time as fixed and certain with God, as if it were a decree about some mechanical action of the universe, or were his own personal purpose, and at the same time be perfectly voluntary with man, so that man can either will or not will, do or not do, as he may himself choose, we are perfectly sure that it must be so, from our consciousness of ourselves, and our certainty of what is the nature of God.
IV. It is further objected, that there was change in God, in the act of the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity. The objection is met here, because this is the most suitable place in
our course to do so, though the explanation may not be fully comprehended, until we have discussed the Trinity, and the relations of the persons of the Godhead in it.
It is based upon a misconception of the scripture doctrine of the incarnation.
1. It was not the divine nature, which became incarnate, but simply one of the persons subsisting in it.
2. No change took place in the divine nature. The human and divine natures of the Son of God were so related to his person and to each other, that while he was truly God and truly man, possessing every characteristic of each, the two natures remained entirely distinct, each with its own peculiarities and properties. The divine nature was in no degree affected. The Son of God, therefore, was as truly divine after, as before the incarnation.
3. So distinct were these natures, that in becoming man, the Son took not simply a human body, but also a human soul. These were united with the personality with which he subsists in the divine nature, but not with the divine nature itself. Christ lacked nothing to make him as separate from God in his human nature as any other man, except
separate human personality. He united his human nature to himself by subsisting in it in the same personality with which he subsists in the divine nature.
4. The Son has not divine nature separate from the Father and the Spirit, so that we can say his divine nature in the exclusive sense, in which we speak of the human nature of Paul and Peter. Human nature is distributed among individual men, so that each one has his own, and in no wise partakes with another. But the one divine nature is common to the three persons. These statements will show why God has not been changed in the act of incarnation.
(1.) There would have been change, had the human nature been so united to the divine, as to add to it such qualities, properties and conditions as do not belong to God. These may be possessed by a divine person in the human nature he has assumed, for thus is there no change in his nature as God, but they cannot be transferred to the divine nature without making it finite as well as infinite, material as well as spiritual, fallible as well as infallible, mortal as well as immortal. These contradictory states may exist in the one person, but cannot in any such compounded nature.
(2.) There would have been change, had the divine nature become the soul of the human nature. This would have made
that nature subject to human passions and appetites, to human frailties and imperfections, and liable to pain, suffering, and temptation, and to limitation in goodness, knowledge, power and wisdom.
The knowledge therefore of the true doctrine of the incarnation shows conclusively, that in it there has been no change in God.
V. It is alleged that God cannot be without change, because he suffered during the incarnation of Christ.
The argument is that the declarations about Christ's suffering are made, not simply of the human nature, but of both natures combined, and that thus we are taught, that it was not merely man, but God also that suffered.
This position is assumed by some who maintain that Christ had a complete human, as well as divine nature, not a mere human body, but also a rational soul. It is necessarily also the position of those who claim that he had no human soul, but that his divine nature took the place of a rational soul.
The reply to this argument is that the Scripture statements do not teach that the divine nature suffered. This is nowhere said. They teach that the second person of the Trinity, who became man, suffered. But they plainly refer that suffering to his human nature only. They teach us, that in the relations of his natures to his person, he preserved unchanged the properties and qualities which belonged to them separately, and that this was especially true of the divine nature. There were, indeed, some communications from the divine nature to the human, but none from the human to the divine. But while thus distinct, they were united together in a single personality, and by such a union, that whatever might be said to be true of or to be done or to be suffered by either of the natures, might in like
manner be affirmed of the person in whom they were united. It is because of this that Christ, the Son of God, is said to have suffered.
He did this in his human, though not in his divine nature. The scripture declarations that Christ suffered, are no proof that God suffered, or that God can change in this respect. But there are those who do not receive the above statements as an exposition of the teachings of Scripture on this point. They claim, as necessary, an interpretation which asserts suffering of the divine nature.
Those, indeed, who hold that the divine nature is in the place of the human soul, are forced to maintain such an interpretation. It is in reply to both of these that the unchangeableness of the divine nature is presented as conclusive against any such interpretation.
Against their position are adduced the numerous statements of scripture asserting that God does not change, and that he is immutable in his nature, and in his various perfections.
There are also arguments from reason, by which the same error may be refuted. So incontestable are these statements and reasonings that the objectors readily admit that there is no power or being who can change God contrary to his will, and that the idea of enforced suffering is revolting. The possibility of change and suffering in God, they conceive, therefore, to result from his own will and his own voluntary choice. This raises the question of the possibility of voluntary suffering on the part of God.
If this be possible, it must arise in one of two ways; either the nature of God is essentially such as to admit suffering, or the will of God is capable of so changing his nature for a time, as to enable it to suffer.
In the first instance the essence of God itself is supposed to remain unchanged, but to be capable of existing in different states at the dictation of his will. In the other, the essence itself is changed by the will, and made capable of that, which otherwise it could not have.
In the first case God could suffer, because of the contingent conditions of his life liable to the action of his will, just as we can inflict suffering upon ourselves.
In the last case, the nature of God would be so dependent on his will that he could change it at pleasure.
This last view, however, is based upon an erroneous conception of the relation of the will of God to his nature. That relation is not causal. The will does not create the nature nor confer upon it its powers nor exercise a controlling influence upon it. It is the nature that influences the will. It is because he is holy, just, and good, that he wills holiness, justice, and goodness, and wills these in himself, because he alone is the infinitely holy, just, and good. His will, therefore, so far from causative, is only approbative and complacent, and his essence can in no degree be affected by it. If this were not so, the nature of God must be the effect of the will of God as a cause, and must be dependent upon that will. The foundation of all excellence, righteousness and holiness would be, not what God is, but what he happens to will at any one time, and would make him differ again and again should he so will. And such will would be capricious; for in making the will superior to the nature, there is taken away all reason for choice in God to good or ill, or in one direction or another, and he is left, without motive, to accidental or capricious volition only.
Moreover, if God is capable of this kind of change in any respect, he is so in all others, for the power of the will to effect one modification in the divine nature, necessarily involves the power to effect any or all other such.
As the will, therefore, cannot change the essence of God, but is itself controlled by that essence, it is not possible that it can confer the power to suffer, which otherwise God would not have. If, therefore, this power of suffering be not inherent in the divine nature, it can have no existence.
But if this be inherent in the divine nature, it must be a quality necessarily and constantly belonging to the nature of God, and must, therefore, be destructive of the blessedness so fully and eminently ascribed to God in the Scriptures, or it must exist there after the manner of the contingent conditions of our life, because of which we can pass from a state of happiness into one of suffering, and back to happiness again; and its passage from one of these states to the other, must be the result of the exercise of a divine volition.
But with God there can be no such contingent conditions.
1. The very nature of his necessary existence forbids this.
2. The language of scripture "I, the Lord, change not," (Mal. 3:6), and "with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning," James 1:17, is expressly contrary to such a supposition.
3. The contrast drawn in the Bible between God and men in respect to change, is distinctly based upon that contingency in man, to which there is no similarity in God.
4. The truth and faithfulness of God are magnified in the Scriptures by the fact of their exercise where man would thus change, but where God does not, because he is fixed and constant. The passage, "I change not" is presented in a context, where the will of God might be presumed to induce change, and the assertion that this is his nature is made to show why that will would not so affect him.
5. In addition to all of this, such contingent conditions or states are incompatible with the nature of his eternity, which, as being without succession, excludes change; as well as with his simplicity which denies separation between his essence and his attributes, and therefore gives no room for change; while they are absolutely excluded by the perfection of God, which cannot be always asserted of him if the states or conditions of his being can be changed, unless in all these states he could be equally perfect in all respects, which surely cannot be affirmed of the two states of happiness and suffering.[/font][/font]
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:04:21 GMT -5
CHAPTER VIII
THE POWER OF GOD
WE derive our knowledge of power from the consciousness of our
will or purpose to effect an end, and from our experience that we
have accomplished that end.
Over our own bodies our will acts directly, without the intervention
of any means known to us. Thus, when we will to move the arm, the
arm is moved, but whatever necessity there may be of nervous
influence or muscular action, we know of no such connection
between these and our will, save the fact that the will puts these into
operation.
Over other material objects we can only act through our bodies and
other necessary means of contact.
Experience teaches us, however, that mind can act upon mind
without such contact, though the mode in which this is done is still mysterious.
The action of our minds upon our material structure and over other
minds also suggests that mind, by some subtle connection, may act
upon outward matter, as we see, that our minds act upon our bodies.
In this way many of the curious phenomena which have been falsely
used for the proof of the spiritualistic theories of the present day will
probably be accounted for.
But, whatever may be the power of man, it is evident that it is
marked by limitations, not only as to what can be done, but also as to
the way in which it may be done.
In ascribing power to God, however, we must exclude all such
limitation. Not only is he all powerful (almighty), but he needs not
instrumental contact.
But, although this is true, God accomplishes much that he does
through secondary means which partake of the nature of
instrumental contact. Such action, however, is with him not a matter
of necessity, but simply his economic way of doing what he could as
perfectly and as easily do by direct action.
Power in God, therefore, may be defined to be the effective energy
inherent in his nature by which he is able to do all things. The
exercise of that power is dependent upon his will or purpose, and is
limited not by what he can do, but by what he chooses to do.
We ascribe power to God.
1. Because we perceive that its possession is a perfection in us, and is therefore to be attributed to the all-perfect being.
2. Because we cannot account for the existence and phenomena of the universe without ascribing to God the power which has produced them.
3. Because our own sense of dependence assures us that there must be power to create, preserve, and protect us, in him in whom we live and move and have our being.
4. The Scriptures also teach us to ascribe power to God.
(a) In such passages as directly ascribe power to him: Jer. 32:17; Ps. 115:3; Eph. 1:19; 3:20.
(b) By reference to his unlimited works: Jer. 10:12; John 1:3; Acts 17:24.
(c) By declaring that what he does is done by mere will without labor, by his word; as in the whole account of creation in the
beginning of Genesis and in Ps. 33:9.
(
d) By denying the necessity of great means and asserting that what he does can be done with the many or the few: 1 Sam. 14:6;
2 Chron. 14:11.
(e) By figurative or anthropomorphic expressions, as "the hand," "the right hand of God," "the strong hand," "the arm," "the arm not shortened." Ex. 15:6; Num. 11:23; Joshua 4:24; Neh. 1:10;
Job 40:9; Ps. 98:1; Isa. 50:2; 59:1.
God's power may be described as:
I. Absolute, which is equivalent to what he can do, and is measured by his nature.
II. Actual, which is what he exercises, and is measured by his will. It
is what is put in action by him.
Knapp makes a division of absolute and ordinate, making the
absolute that by which he created the world out of nothing, and the
ordinate that by which he continues to create or produce according
to the laws he has established, as by secondary causes, as in the
production of plants, animals, etc. But these are different kinds of
exercise of power, but not different kinds of power.
Our power differs from that of God in three particulars:
1. We cannot do whatever we choose, even if it be right.
2. We cannot do it without intermediate means.
3. We cannot do it at any moment we please, but only when the
circumstances favour.
But, while God is not subject to the limitations which thus affect us,
he also is limited in his power. These limitations, however, are such
as arise, not from without, but from the excellence and perfection of
his own nature. Hence the limitations are concurrent with his will,
which can never desire to do what his nature does not permit.
1. God cannot create a being or world to which his essential incommunicable attributes can be given, viz.: infinity,
embracing eternity and immensity, and self-existence.
2. He cannot create a being whose nature is sinful. The nature he bestows on any creature becomes the law of that creature, so
that for any nature to be sinful, it must have been changed from conformity to the law of its creation.
3. He cannot impose laws which are not accordant with righteousness and holiness.
4. He cannot deal with any of his creatures unjustly.
5. He cannot commit sin.
6. He cannot change his own nature.
7. He cannot change his decrees or purpose.
8. He cannot do impossibilities.
If it be asked why he can do none of these things, the answer is,
because his own nature is to him the law of what he does, as well as
of what he wills and of what he is. He is not just and holy because he
wills to be so, but he wills to be just and holy because he is so. His
will does not make his nature, but his nature controls his will.
An apparent objection to the infinite power of God is the presence of sin in the universe.
The holiness, justice, and even goodness of God render it impossible
that sin can be either created or permitted as something indifferent
to God. He must hate it, and punish it wherever it appears.
Its presence therefore is due either to the fact that he could not
prevent it, or that he has permitted it for some wise purpose.
What that wise purpose is, ought properly to be shown in proof that
the existence of evil is consistent with God's goodness.
That its presence is due to such purpose, rather than to lack of power
of God, appears from the fact that he could have prevented it. This he could have done
1. By not creating beings capable of sinning.
2. By not allowing them to be placed in circumstances which would lead to sin.
3. By sustaining and fortifying them in those circumstances, so as to counteract the temptation and keep them from sinning.
4. And, (as the objection is the rather to the continued existence of sin than its origin,) by the immediate destruction of those who have sinned.
But so far from the presence of sin showing lack of power in God, it has served the more signally to display that power.
1. Over sin itself, in its destruction and punishment.
2. Over its final victims, by causing them to feel and acknowledge the terrible power of his wrath.
3. Over others, by their signal deliverance through his power, not only from the penalty, but from the presence of sin.
4. In the sin itself, by exhibiting that restraining and conquering power, by which God makes evil itself to work out his purposes of good and glory
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:06:24 GMT -5
CHAPTER IX
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
GOD is an intelligent being possessed of knowledge.
This may be proved:
1. From his spirituality; for intelligence is an essential element of spiritual existence.
2. From his perfection; for the perfect one must have intelligence as one of his perfections.
3. From his causal relations to other beings and things.
(1.) As the cause of mental power and action in others, he must
himself be possessed of mind. As the Scriptures aptly inquire,
"He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the
eye, shall he not see?" Ps. 94:9; so may we ask, he that made the
mind, and gave the power of thought and knowledge, shall he be
without intelligence?
(2.) The effects he has produced show that they are the result of
conscious action in the fulfilment of purpose, which he has
formed. His causation is not like that of mechanical or chemical
forces, which operate with blind productiveness or effective
operation towards ends unknown to them, and not
predetermined. This is possible to secondary causes, because
they are the instruments of some other cause, itself intelligent
and purposing. But intelligence and purpose are necessarily
present in him, who is the great first cause, the prime mover and
designer of all else that exists. All the evidences of design in
creation, therefore, prove the intelligence of him who bears to it
the relation of its first cause.
(3.) It is sometimes argued from his omnipresence, but
omnipresence alone would not prove intelligence. His
intelligence, however, having been established, his
omnipresence enables us to determine the extent of his
knowledge.
How does God know? or in what way does he possess knowledge?
1. Not as we gain it, by using faculties fitted to acquire it. There is in
him nothing corresponding to observation, comparison,
generalization, deduction, processes of reasoning, by which we pass
from one step to another, or the contemplation or conjecture of
suppositions or theories by which we account for facts.
2. It is even improper to speak of his knowing by intuition, as is frequently done.
3. All that we can say is that his knowledge is his essence or nature
knowing. It is not something acquired, but something belonging to
that nature itself and identical with it, in like manner as are his love,
and truth, and justice. It is something so inherent in his nature that it
exists exclusively of any means of attaining or perceiving it, which we call action.
4. The knowledge of God, therefore, not being acquired, cannot be
increased. Time does not add to it. Succession of events does not
bring it before God. All the objects of his knowledge are to him eternally present and known.
What then are the objects of his knowledge?
1. Himself, his nature, or essence; the personal relations subsisting in
that essence; all that that nature is, and all that it can appear to be in
its manifestations; all that the purposes of God include, and all that
might be purposed by him, whether to be done or to be permitted.
2. His creation in all its fullness; in its whole extent, whether marked
by magnitude, or minuteness, or variety. The whole universe, with its
innumerable worlds, is ever before him, while not an atom of dust,
nor the most microscopic of sensitive existencies is unperceived thoroughly.
3. Not merely inanimate matter, nor simple animal natures, but all
spiritual beings; he knowing their essences which to them remain
unknown, and having perfect perception of the intents and thoughts
of their hearts. "When Thales was asked if some of the actions of men
were not unknown to God, he replied, 'not even their thoughts.' "
[Knapp's Theology.] An inspired writer has taught us that God knows
us even better than we know ourselves. "Hereby shall we know that
we are of the truth, and shall assure our heart before him,
whereinsoever our heart condemn us; because God is greater than
our heart, and knoweth all things." 1 John 3:19, 20. His knowledge is
not limited to the manifestations and operations of spiritual beings,
but extends to their essences, and includes not only what they are,
but also those tendencies which indicate what they may be.
4. He knows all the past, present, and future of all things, knowing
the future with the same certainty and accuracy with which he knows
the present and past; for that future is already as present to him as
though actually existing with the creatures and time belonging to it,
and is as distinctly perceived as it shall be then.
But more specifically as to his knowledge of future events it may be said:
1. That he knows all events that are certain or fixed. The certainty
that they will come to pass is based upon his decree. He therefore
knows all things that shall come to pass.
2. He knows all events that could possibly come to pass. This is based
upon his infinite knowledge of himself and of all his creatures, by
which all things or events, which could at any time or under any
circumstances occur, are known to him.
In these two classes are necessarily included all objects of knowledge.
Knapp lays down a third kind of knowledge, namely, the knowledge
of contingent events, or events which might take place under certain
circumstances; for example, that God foresees that if James lives
until he is grown, he will commit murder; he therefore determines to
prevent this by removing him from life. The knowledge of the
murder is here claimed to be that of a contingent event. And hence it
is claimed to be another kind of knowledge.
But to examine this. It is readily admitted that the murder does not
come under the classification of things certain or decreed, because it
will not take place. But it does come under the head of things
possible, and between it and all other possible things no distinction
can be made. All possible things are contingent until made certain by
a decree. Every possible thing is only possible in connection with the
circumstances under which it can happen. There is therefore no
distinction between possible things and contingent things, and
consequently no third class is to be added.
The kind of knowledge which he thus speaks of as contingent is
stated by Knapp to be what is called Scientia Media. It is one form
only, in which Scientia Media is presented by those who maintain it.
Another form of Scientia Media is, however, held by some. According
to this, the future event to which it refers is known to God as an event
that will take place, but his knowledge of that fact is attained, not
through his decree, but through his foreknowledge that, under
certain circumstances, a man will pursue one course of action rather
than another.
This kind of Scientia Media teaches:
(1.) The future event as certain.
(2.) That God knows it as such.
(3.) That this knowledge does not arise from his decree.
(4.) But, from his knowledge of the nature of the man, together with
that of the circumstances that will surround him, he knows that he
will act in a particular way.
The only question here is as to the 3d and 4th, for it agrees with the
usual orthodox statement in saying, 1st, that it is certain, and 2d, that
God knows it as such.
But the 3d and 4th assert that this knowledge is the result of a
foreknowledge of God as to how a man will act under certain
circumstances. It is evident, however, that this foreknowledge is
necessarily accompanied by a determination to allow him so to act.
Now the question arises, is this universally the method of God's
action? If it be so, then God has left the world entirely to itself,
without any influence from him. Everything has come to pass, not
because of his will and action, but because he has left the general
laws, under which he has placed the world, to work out their results
without any action or influence on his part.
But this is so manifestly untrue and unscriptural, that it never has
been maintained by any Christian men, and it is by Christian writers
only that the idea of Scientia Media referred to above has been
presented.
It is therefore denied that this is what is meant, and they say that
while God does operate in and interfere with the world, and carry on
his own purposes in certain matters, he does not choose in other
events to exercise any influence, but simply refrains and leaves the
events to work out their own effects; and that the knowledge which
he has of these events is based upon the fact that they will take place
if he does not thus interfere.
The theory thus presented, as will be seen, admits the continued
preservation of all things, with all their powers. This can only result
from God's providential action, and involves all that concurrence
with events on the part of God through which alone they preserve
and exercise effectively the powers he has given them.
This being admitted, then the views held by these parties, stated in
any form in which they could hold them, would involve no additional
fact beyond the distinction, recognized by all orthodox divines,
between the absolute and permissive decrees of God.
But in any event there is a decree, determination, intention, purpose,
or whatever else men may call it,—in the broadest language, a will, or
volition,—to leave these things so to operate. And upon this will or
decree is based his knowledge that these things will be; for without
the knowledge of such a purpose, how could he know that he will not
at some time choose to change the circumstances or prevent their
accomplishment of the event?
It will be seen that in neither of the forms of Scientia Media thus far
referred to is there any serious disagreement from the truth. The
objection to them is more the lack of accuracy and the mistaken
notion that some new idea is involved; or rather the great objection
has been the purpose by which men have been led, viz., a desire to
lay down the distinction of conditional decrees in salvation.
According to these decrees:
(1.) God offers salvation to every man.
(2.) But does not decree his salvation or damnation.
(3.) Yet only decrees his salvation if he believes.
(4.) Or his damnation if he does not believe.
(5.) The knowledge which God is admitted to have had of the event
from the beginning arises from foresight that, under the
circumstances in which the man is placed, he will exercise, or will not
exercise belief.
The Scientia Media is, therefore, introduced to show how an event
can be known as something that will actually take place, and yet as
something not fixed by a decree of God, and consequently known
upon some other ground than because decreed. This we have shown
to be a mistaken conception in the forms already examined.
But a third kind of Scientia Media is by no means as harmless as the
two already presented, although its absurdity is readily seen. It is
given in Dr. J. Pye Smith's first lines of Christian Theology, p. 145, as follows:
"That God foresees all future events, depending upon the will of His
voluntary agents, (i. e., all possible beings and all possible actions of
all possible beings), under a position of antecedents endlessly varied;
and that, then, in every case certain consequents will follow. The
Deity does not certainly know which, in the endless number of
possible antecedents, a voluntary creature will choose and practice;
but he knows what will be the result under every possible variation of
these antecedents. When, therefore, the creature has made his
election and fulfilled his course of action, the Deity may say that he foreknew the whole."
The objections to this scheme are manifest.
(1.) It makes the God, whose purposes we see constantly manifested
to us, a God of no purpose at all. He can have no end; he can only
know that at any time given in the universe, some one end of many
myriads may be the one attained.
(2.) It is contrary to the power to prophesy the actual events which
shall happen at a given time, which God has exercised through his prophets.
(3.) It is opposed to his independence, for it makes him dependent
upon the will of his creatures, and not their actions dependent upon him.
(4.) It is opposed to his perfection, for that perfection forbids the
idea of increase or addition from without; yet, according to this view,
his knowledge is constantly increasing as to what is done by his
creatures. Every moment, that which heretofore has been only one of
many possibilities, becomes a certain event.
(5.) As there can be no reason for God's will not being effective at
least in some respects in man, this Scientia Media, which rests upon
the idea that God ought not thus to operate on the mind, even by a
purpose, must be a misconception. Else how could God bestow
influences upon intelligent creatures which are fitted to affect their
minds, as in the gift of Christ, or of the Spirit. Even the conscience
within ought not to exercise its powers, nor even to exist in man. If it
be said that these would only operate with the free consent of the
party, it may be replied that such is the case with all the influences
arising in connection with God's decrees. Is it said that these are
influences for good only? So also is it in connection with his decrees.
The effective decrees of God, by which he changes in any respect the
will of his creatures, are altogether connected with influences for
good. In all other respects men are left to act as they please. But their
action is known, and known because of God's decree to leave them thus to act.
(6.) That God should exert no influence over his intelligent creatures
also involves that he be excluded from the physical universe. The
very circumstances under which men are supposed to act in Scientia
Media are circumstances arising from things around as well as
within. Neither can he who can control these circumstances be shut
out from the control of those physical events which he knows will
affect the will of a voluntary agent. If it be necessary to responsible
freedom of the will that man shall not be influenced at all, God must
be excluded from the universe; yea, every other being and thing
except man. Every man also must be completely isolated from all
others, even so far that he shall suppose that he owes no obligations
of obedience, and that none shall know his action. These absurd
conclusions might even be further extended.
The passages in Scripture supposed to support Scientia Media do not
sustain it. These are Genesis 3:22; Ex. 4:8; 1 Sam. 23:5–14; Jeremiah
38:17–20; Matt. 11:21, 23; Acts, 27:22, 31.
THE WISDOM OF GOD
Wisdom is that power which enables one to put to practical use the
knowledge and skill which he possesses, to choose wise ends of
action, and to attain these ends by wise means. It is that guidance of
the understanding under which the will determines wisely its
pleasure, and puts forth power to accomplish it.
Wisdom in God is infinite and unerring, choosing always the best
end and the best means of attaining it. It is seen in creation, and in
providence, but is most signally manifested in redemption.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:08:19 GMT -5
CHAPTER X
HOLINESS, GOODNESS, LOVE AND TRUTH
AFTER the consideration of the wisdom and knowledge of God,
which correspond to the characteristics of our mental organism, we
take up that of those attributes sometimes called moral, because they
correspond to those which form our moral character. These are
holiness, goodness, truth and justice.
HOLINESS
Holiness is, however, not a distinctive attribute, but rather the
combination of all these attributes. We may suppose a being in
whom there may be love without justice, or truth, or any one of these
to the exclusion of the other two; but no being can be holy, who does
not combine in himself all of these, and all other moral perfections.
Nor, when we have such a combination, is there anything to be
added to constitute holy character. It is evident, therefore, that
holiness is the sum of all excellence and the combination of all the
attributes which constitute perfection of character.
In the study of these constituents, we first consider
GOODNESS
In one aspect of this word, it is merely equivalent to holiness. If we
look at it as marking the excellence of God's nature, as we often use it
with reference to man, we mean by it simply holiness. Thus, when we
say of any one, he is a good man, we mean to assert the combination
of traits of character, such as have just been pointed out as
constituting holiness. This is the goodness which terminates in God
himself.
On the other hand, the goodness of God may be spoken of as
kindness, benevolence, or beneficence towards others, in which it is
seen to terminate outside of himself. Thus we speak of him, as being
very good to us. Thus the Psalmist says: "Surely goodness and mercy
shall follow me all the days of my life." Ps. 23:6.
It is on account of this ambiguity in this word, that it is best to
consider it, in its first aspect, as merely holiness, and, therefore, as
disposed of in what we have said of that, and to refer it in this second
respect to one of the divisions into which the love of God naturally
falls.
We therefore take up next
LOVE
Of this there are five kinds, which vary according to the object upon
which love is exercised. The attribute in God is the same; but it is in
its exit, or in its termination, that it assumes these different forms.
1. There is the love of complacency or approbation. This is exercised
towards a worthy object in which excellencies are perceived. It is of
the nature of the love of the beautiful, or the good, or the useful in us.
It complacently or approvingly regards, because there is in the object
something worthy of such regard.
This is exercised by God, in its highest degree, in the love of himself,
of his own nature and character, because the infinitely excellent must
be to God the highest object of complacent love.
Were God but one person, in this way only could such love be
exercised. But in the Trinity of the Godhead, there is found, in the
love of the separate persons towards each other, another mode in
which this love of complacency may in this highest sense be
exercised.
Such love is also felt by God for his purposes. As he perceives them to
be just, wise and gracious, he approves and regards them with
complacent love.
But this love extends itself also to the creations, which result from
this purpose.
This is true of inanimate creation. It is perfect, as far as conformed to
his will, and fitted to accomplish his end, and as such God can regard
it and pronounce it good. Thus we find that he did in the creation,
Genesis, Chap. 1:10, 12,
The same record is made, in verse 25, as to the animal creation,
before that of man; and after the creation, and investiture of man
with the dominion over the earth, with its plants and animals, we are
told, verse 31, "And God saw everything that he had made, and,
behold, it was very good."
The complacent love of God, therefore, extends not only to himself
and his will, but to all his innocent creation and even to inanimate
nature.
This love of complacency, however, as it is exercised in its highest
degree towards himself, so also is it exhibited, in the nearest
approach to that, towards those beings who are most like himself,
having been made in his nature and likeness. An innocent angel, or
an innocent man is therefore by nature a joy to God, as is the child to
the father who sees in it a peculiar likeness to himself.
But the guilty cannot thus be loved. Sinful man cannot receive such
love, so long as sinful. Even the penitent believer in Jesus, until the
time of his perfect sanctification in the life to come, and doubtless
even then, has access to God only through Christ, and, of himself,
can in no respect secure the approbation of God.
2. The second kind of love, is the love of benevolence, which
corresponds to the idea of God's goodness towards his creatures.
This is the product of his wishes for their happiness. It is not
dependent on their character, as is the love of complacency, but is
exercised towards both innocent and guilty.
It is general in its nature, not special, and exists towards all, even
towards devils, and wicked men, because God's nature is benevolent,
and, therefore, he must wish for the happiness of his creatures.
That that happiness is not attained, nor attainable, is due, not to him,
but to their own sin.
When the benevolence of God is exercised actively in the bestowment
of good things upon his creatures, it is called his beneficence. By the
former, he wishes them happiness, by the latter, he confers blessings
to make them so.
This is done to the wicked also, as well as to the righteous. It is to this
that Christ refers, Matt. 5:45, "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil
and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."
3. The third form of love is the love of compassion.
This corresponds to our idea of pity. It is benevolent disposition to
those who are suffering or in distress.
This also may be exercised towards the guilty or the innocent, if it be
possible to suppose that guilt and suffering are separable.
It has been very commonly held that they are inseparable. Pain,
suffering and distress have been believed to be the result of sin, and
consequently inseparable from guilt.
But this is a mistaken notion. Man in a state of innocence was made
capable of physical suffering. That capacity was necessary to the
protection of his physical organism.
The lower animals also suffer.
Whatever addition to the capacity of suffering has, therefore, been
made by the fall, and is the consequence of sin, we are not, on that
account, forced to the conclusion that there can be no suffering
where there has been no sin.
The capacity to suffer may so belong to a higher organism, that we
would naturally choose that organism, with that capacity, rather than
a lower one without it. If so God can justly so create us.
If misery, then, may be the lot of the innocent, God's love of
compassion can be exercised toward such.
It can be and is also exercised toward the guilty. We see this in the
forbearance with which he delays their punishment, in his constant
offers of mercy, in his yearnings after their salvation, and most
signally, in the gift of his only begotten Son, "that whosoever
believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life." John 3:16.
4. A fourth form of the love of God corresponds to what we call
mercy.
This can be exercised only toward sinners.
Its very nature contemplates guilt in its objects.
It consists, not only in the desire not to inflict the punishment due to
sin, and the neglect and refusal to do so, but in the actual pardon of
the offender.
It cannot be exercised towards a righteous being, because in him is
no sin or guilt to be pardoned.
It is, however, no new attribute in God, which has arisen because of
the existence of sin, and which is, therefore, an addition to his
attributes.
It is a virtue inherent in his nature, and is especially only one form in
which his love exhibits itself, the same love as that benevolence
which innocent creatures call forth, and the same love which in
another form of complacency has been eternally exercised in the
Godhead.
When we say that this mercy must be exercised in accordance with
the truth and justice of God, we say no more than is true of every
attribute of God. No one can be exercised in such a way as to destroy
another. Every one must be in harmony with the others. Or,
remembering what we have before stated, that these attributes are
not separate faculties, all that is meant in this case, as in all others, is
that God must act in harmony with his nature.
The objects of the exercise of this attribute are all those to whom God
pardons offenses of any kind.
They are not to be confined to redeemed sinners, although this is the
most signal exhibition.
Under the ancient economy, God ruled as theocratic ruler over Israel.
Sins of the nation and sins of individuals in their capacity of citizens
of the nation, were pardoned.
Under that dispensation God occupied to that people the position of
an earthly ruler, and consequently could pardon sins against his
government at will, upon repentance, and upon merely
governmental principles—that is, such as would secure obedience to
the law, and peace and order, and the welfare of the nation. These
were offences against the mere person of the king or the laws of his
state, and not against the fundamental principles of holiness and
righteousness; hence sovereignty and expediency could decide in
each case what might be done, and mercy was exercised and justice
dispensed accordingly.
But this is very different from the case of God, the righteous judge,
the dispenser, not of arbitrary law, but of a law based upon his own
nature and that of man, essential obedience to which is necessary,
not for maintaining government, but for preserving and maintaining
the right and preventing the violation with impunity of eternal law.
In both cases God must act in harmony with his whole nature.
But in that of Israel no obstacle was presented by that nature to the
pardon of individual and national sins against the theocratic king.
Hence mercy was extended, apparently at least, without
compensation to justice.
Yet amid it all, there was, in the sacrificial offerings with which the
people were required to approach God, seeking pardon for both
individual and national political sins, such a typical relation to the
atonement made by Christ as shows that in some way in that
atonement, may, after all, be found the reason why God, even in
those cases, could be just and yet justify the offenders.
5. The fifth form of love is that of affection.
This differs from that of complacency inasmuch as it does not always
demand a worthy object. This is exhibited in the parable of the
"Prodigal Son."
It differs from that of benevolence, inasmuch as its object is not
viewed in general with all others, but is one of special interest.
It differs from that of compassion and that of mercy, because the
object may neither be in distress, nor sinful.
It arises from,
(1.) Mutual relationship; as of the Father to the Son, and of all the persons in the Trinity toward each other; of God to Israel, of Christ to his apostles, his disciples and his church, and of the adopted sons to God the Father.
(2.) From dependence; as of creatures on the creator, and of the redeemed upon the redeemer.
(3.) From ownership; as of God over man of God over Israel, and of Christ over the redeemed. This is illustrated in the lost coin in Luke15:8, 9.
This kind of love originates in each of these ways in man, and, as the
Scriptures show, is also found in God.
It is from this aspect of God's love that proceeds grace, which is to be
distinguished from love, and pity, and mercy.
Love, as we have seen, is the general characteristic, exhibiting itself
in these five different formsMercy is one of these, but is given to the guilty only.
Pity is given to guilty or innocent, who may be in distress, pain or
suffering.
Grace is also given to guilty, or innocent, and does not necessarily
suppose distress in the object, but involves an affectionate interest in
it, arising either from peculiar relation to it, or ownership of it, or
compassion for its dependence.
Grace is undeserved favour to innocent or guilty arising from
affection.
Mercy is undeserved compassion to the guilty only.
THE TRUTH OF GOD
The expression, "truth of God," is ambiguous, and must be
considered under the specific terms which set forth its various
meanings.
I. His Verity. He is True God. By this is meant, the exact
correspondence of the nature of God with the ideal of absolute
perfection. The foundation of that ideal may be indeterminable. But,
whether it is in the nature of God himself, or in his will proceeding
from his nature, or in eternal principles of the fit and the necessary
and the right, which exactly coincide with that nature, God and that
ideal must be perfect counterparts. That ideal can only be partially
comprehended by any of his creatures, because of their
imperfections; but it is known by God in all its supreme excellence,
and his nature must fully correspond to it as thus known. Otherwise
he would not be God.
It is in this aspect of God's truth, that the Scriptures call him the true
God. See 2 Chron. 15:3; Jer. 10:10; John 17:3; 1 Thess. 1:9; 1 John 5:20; Rev. 3:7.
II. His Veracity. By this is meant, God's truthfulness or incapacity to
deceive. It is an attribute of his nature, which, like his power, exists,
and makes him what he is, even though there be no outward relation
to it. By virtue of it, he is the source of all truth, not moral only, but
even mathematical.
In its relation to God's creatures, it is the foundation of their
confidence in the knowledge obtained through the use of their own
faculties, whether by intuition, observation or reason. Whatever
imperfection there is in such knowledge, is perceived to be due to the
creature, and not to God the creator. Upon it is also based belief in
the revelations God makes to man of facts beyond the attainment of
merely human power.
The Scriptures affirm the veracity of God in the strongest terms. In
addition to its assertion in numerous passages, we are told, Ps.
108:4, that his "truth reacheth unto the skies." In Titus 1:2, he is
called "God, who cannot lie."
III. His Faithfulness. This consists in the truth of God viewed in its
relation to his purposes whether secret, or revealed. When revealed,
these become either promises, or threats. But as promises, the
ground upon which these purposes must be fulfilled is, not any
obligation to the creature, for God can come under none, but simply
because of his own faithfulness to his purposes. Hence his
faithfulness demands equally the performance of his threatenings, as of his promises.
This faithfulness is based upon the veracity of his nature considered
above. It is by virtue of that veracity, that God must be faithful; yet
the faithfulness is a new aspect, in which God's truthfulness appears.
This faithfulness is the ground both of hope and of fear. In the
Scriptures it is more frequently presented as a reason for hope and
trust. But it is also the foundation of belief in future judgement and
punishment. The faithful God has been true to his threatenings, as
well as his promises. His faithfulness assures us that he will so
continue.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:10:26 GMT -5
CHAPTER XI
JUSTICE OF GOD
BY justice is meant that rectitude of character which leads to the
treatment of others in strict accordance with their deserts.
The justice of God differs in no respect from this attribute as seen
among his rational creatures; except that his justice must be perfect
while theirs is imperfect, and his must be impartial, while theirs is
partial. These differences, however, exist in the exercise of justice,
and not in the thing itself. They arise from the limited knowledge,
reason, and perception of right and wrong among men, and from the
extent to which they naturally yield to their prejudices and passions.
In the all perfect being, however, justice has none of these
deficiencies, and must be exercised according to its strictest nature,
and in every conceivable form of perfection. To all, therefore, he
must deal out the most absolute justice, whatever they deserve, only
what they deserve, and the full measure of their deserts.
Inasmuch as the justice of God may be considered as it exists in
himself, or as it is manifested towards his creatures, a distinction has
been made in it as viewed in these aspects, into the absolute and
relative justice of God.
By absolute justice is meant that rectitude of the divine nature, in
consequence of which God is infinitely righteous in himself. This
rectitude is essential to him, and existed before there was a creation
in which to exhibit it.
By the relative justice of God is meant that justice, as exhibited
towards, and exercised upon, his creatures in the dispensation of the
universe. It is seen in the nature of the laws he gives, in his
impartiality in dealing with those subjected to them, and in his
maintenance of right and virtue, by the threats and promises he
attaches to them, and his punishment of those who violate them. To
this form of justice is often applied the name of rectoral justice,
inasmuch as it is justice exercised by a ruler, in the form of
government, and by means of laws.
There is a form of justice, known among men as commutative justice,
which consists in giving to each one his due in the barter and
exchange of commerce, or in any other of the mutual relations of life.
As it is based upon the ground of mutual obligation, and, therefore,
is not suited to a being entirely independent of others, it cannot
properly be ascribed to God. The blessings given in consequence of
his promises to man, are not matters of obligation, but of grace. The
only aspect, in which this could be connected with God, would be as
between the Father and the Son, in conferring upon his people those
blessings which the Son had purchased through his sufferings. It is in
this sense that the Scripture says, that God is "faithful and righteous
to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." 1 John 1:9.
In the administration of the affairs of his creatures, God exercises
distributive justice. By this is meant, the rewarding and punishing
his subjects, according to the sanctions of his law. His justice is here
evinced in the maintenance of punishment, if the law be broken, but
not in the bestowment of rewards, since these are given graciously as
further inducements to duty. While, therefore, God gives all the
rewards promised, they are given because promised, and not because
due. These punishments further show forth the justice of God as they
are impartially inflicted.
The ground upon which the offenders against God's law are
punished, is not simply the fact that a law of God has been broken,
but, that, in the breaking of that law, essential right has been violated
and wrong committed. It would be sufficient to authorize
punishment, that the law of the ruler is broken. Still it might appear
that the will of the ruler might remit a punishment due to a mere
violation of his will. But the law of God is based upon the immutable
distinctions between right and wrong, and sin and holiness, as they
exist in the nature of God. Its violation, therefore, is sin. It is a
destruction of the right. Hence, that which impels God to punish, is
not his rectoral character, but his holy nature. It is when justice is
regarded in this respect, that it is called punitive or vindicatory.
But punitive justice is not admitted by all, nor that God punishes sin
in any other respect, than as a violation of his will; nay, it is even
disputed whether he even punishes the violations of his will.
Three questions, therefore, arise here.
1. Does God punish the violations of his law?
2. Does he punish them, because they are mere violations, or because they are sin?
3. Is this done because of anything essential in his nature, or because it is expedient for governmental or other purposes?
Upon these questions there have been several opinions expressed.
1. The Universalists and some of the Socinians deny that God
punishes even the violations of his law. They regard the precepts of
morality and duty set forth in his word as merely intended to guide
us in this life. When this life is ended, there may be no dealing with
man for such violation. They are only for a temporary purpose, and
having accomplished that purpose, will have no further effect. God
looks now only to the good of his creatures, and if the same method
of dealing be extended beyond this life, it will be only for a time, and
only for the good of those who suffer. According to this, these are not
punishments, but chastisements, and God is moved by goodness and not by justice.
2. A second theory is, that the laws given by God are merely
exponents of his will; that the ground upon which he commands is
simply his sovereignty; that, looking at the universe as a world to be
created and to be occupied by his moral creatures, he selected such a
system of laws as seemed to him best to secure the welfare of those
creatures, and that these laws while seeking the happiness, not of the
individuals, but of the mass, are such as are really best fitted to that
end; and that the justice of God is seen in so administering these
laws, by rewarding those who obey, and punishing those who
disobey, as to maintain his government, and thus secure the welfare
of the whole. God punishes sin, therefore, under this system, but he
punishes it, not because of its heinous nature, but because it is best
that men should not sin, and thus the best interest of all is secured by
preventing by punishment the commission of sin. The end he has in
view, therefore, is rather to furnish a spectacle which shall restrain
sin, than to perform an act demanded by the inherent nature of sin.
It is his rectoral justice, therefore, rather than his vindicatory justice,
that is thus shown.
This theory embraces four points.
(1.) God punishes offences or sins.
(2.) The object is thus the better to secure the welfare of his moral creatures.
(3.) The laws of his government are based entirely upon his mere will.
(4.) Consequently he punishes sin, not because of its inherent desert, but because the general happiness of his creatures, and
not his own holiness demands it.
3. The third theory is different in all respects, except the first of these points.
(1.) It agrees, that God punishes sin.
(2.) But it makes his object the maintenance of the right.
(3.) His laws and actions are based upon the immutable principles of right.
(4.) He punishes sin, because, from its nature, it demands punishment from him.
The great difficulty in attaining a correct result in this matter, is that
whatever might have been the origin of these laws, they would have
been the same. Hence, no conclusion can be drawn from the nature
of the laws themselves. It is manifest, that God, in the establishment
of the government of the world for any purpose, will not give to it
laws contrary to his nature.
It does not follow, however, that because the same effect may be
produced by either of these causes, it is, therefore, unimportant to
which of them it is assigned. There may be, and in the present case it
is believed that there are important reasons, why only one cause
should be assigned, and that it should be ascertained to exist in the
nature of God. Matters of great moment, in connection with the
atonement especially, but also with other parts of the plan of
salvation, demand the true answer.
But this fact is not to be allowed to warp our judgement or lead us
away from the truth. It is only mentioned to show the importance of
the subject now under consideration.
As to the first of these theories, it need only be said, that the
objections to it are partly involved in those to the second and that
those peculiar to it, are too plain to need presentation here. They will
more properly be considered in connection with the subject of future punishment.
As to the second, it may be objected:
(1.) "That it makes happiness, and not holiness and virtue, the great end of God. The dictates of nature teach us all plainly, that happiness does not occupy this place." Dr. Charles Hodge: manuscript lecture.
(2.) "It destroys the essential difference between right and wrong, which conscience teaches us." Dr. Charles Hodge: manuscript lecture.
(3.) It supposes, that God might have made a world, in which precisely opposite moral laws might have prevailed by his command; and that thus it would be his duty, in this world to reward, in that world to punish, his creatures for the same action.
(4.) It is opposed to the relation of the true will of God to his nature.
It ascribes the laws of God to that will. It recognizes those laws as
flowing from it alone. They are as God pleased. Now, it is not denied
that they come from the free will of God, and are such as please him.
But they have a higher basis even than his will. That will is
influenced by his nature, and is its exponent. Now, whether that
nature is itself the basis of good and right, or whether good and right
considered as distinct from it in the nature of things simply accord
perfectly with that nature, the result is the same; the will is
influenced by the nature to establish the moral laws for the
government of his creatures according to the immutable principles of
right and wrong.
(5.) This theory is also opposed to the independence of God, who is thus forced to punish sin, not by any law of his own nature, which would still maintain that independence, but from a regard to the government of his creatures, which could not be otherwise maintained. (Altered from Dr. A. A. Hodge's Outlines.)
(6.) The instinctive sense of justice in man testifies to the ill desert of sin. This is the universal testimony of conscience. But conscience speaks for God, and, therefore, testifies to the fact that, independent of the evil to society, the wrong-doer deserves punishment proportioned to his offence.
(7.) Dr. A. A. Hodge, in his Outlines, thus argues this from the love of holiness and hatred of sin in God: "If the reason for God's punishing was founded only in God's arbitrary will, then he could not be said to hate sin, but only to love his own will, or, if his reason for punishing sin rested upon governmental considerations, then he could not be
strictly said to hate sin, but only its consequences." But both conscience and Scripture teach that God does hate sin, and love holiness.
Leaving these considerations as to the second theory, with the statement of these objections, we proceed to establish the third theory by the teachings of Scripture. It will be seen that the
Scriptures represent God as a just God, thus ascribing that character to him; that they do it in such a way as shows that his justice is not simply in his will, but is a part of his nature; that they challenge denial of the position that the acts of God are in accordance with right and justice, and that not of his sovereignty, but because of the absolute justice of his nature; that they present him as actually claiming vindicatory or avenging justice, speaking of his justice as
hatred of sin, and not as a desire to maintain government; nay, that they are constantly showing us instance after instance in which God has exercised that avenging justice, commencing with the ejection of
Adam from Paradise, and culminating in its highest and most signal
example in the sacrificial work of Christ.
It is remarkable that all of this can be established from the Scriptures
in favour of vindicatory justice, and not a passage can be given in
proof that God is only active for the maintenance of his government,
or the mere happiness of his creatures. Indeed, in the Scriptures
everywhere, it is God's glory and dishonor, his holiness and sin, his
love and his justice, that are placed in fearful contrast.
1. Passages in which God is spoken of as having a just character, and in which this is held forth as an excellence in him. How can these be accounted for, if justice and will are the same, or even if justice is no more than the administration of human affairs according to his plan?
While this is done there are no passages in which he asserts his power, or choice, or justice in changing the essential laws laid down for our rule. Deut. 32:4; Job 8:3; 34:10–12; 36:2, 3; Ps. 9:4; 11:7; 33:4, 5; 71:19; 89:14; 92:15; 97:2; 99:4; 119:137, 138; Zeph. 3:5; Rom. 2:2.
2. Passages in which God's claim to this character is vindicated by asserting his justice and his impartiality toward all men. Gen. 18:16– 33; Deut. 10:17; Job 37:24; Eccl. 3:17; 12:14; Ezek. 18:29; Acts 10:34, 35; 17:31; Rom. 2:3–6, 11; 14:12; Gal. 2:6; Eph. 6:8; Col. 3:25; 1 Pet. 1:17; Jude 15.
3. In those passages in which God's justice is spoken of, it is never based upon his will, nor his economy, but,
(a) Judgement is always based upon his righteousness. Ps. 9:8; 50:4, 6; 96:10, 13; 98:9.
(b) His economy among the Jews is commended, not because of its setting forth his will, but because of its justice or
righteousness. Deut. 4:8; Ps. 19:7–9; Ps. 119:138.
4. Passages in which God speaks of his justice as being a hatred of sin. Ps. 5:4, 5; Hab. 1:13.
5. Passages in which God is spoken of as a jealous God, exercising avenging justice. Ex. 20:5; Deut. 32:34, 35, 39, 41–43; Ps. 94:1, 2; Is. 34:8; 66:6; Heb. 10:26–31.
6. Passages in which the dealings of God with his enemies are spoken of, in connection with such words as anger, wrath, fury, &c. Num. 12:9; Deut. 32:22; Judges 10:7; 2 Sam. 22:8; Job 19:11; Ps. 2:5; 7:11; 21:9; 90:11; Is. 28:21; 30:30; Jer. 30:24; Lam. 2:3; 3:43; Ezek. 5:13; 38:18; Hos. 12:14; Nahum 1:6.
7. Passages in which angels are spoken of as ministers of such vengeance. These are not introduced as proof of the justice of God, but simply as parts of transactions, by which that justice is manifested. Num. 22:22–31; 2 Sam. 24:16; 1 Chron. 21:14–16, 27; Ps. 35:5, 6; Rev. 7:1–3; 9:15; 15:1; 16:17.
8. The instances given of the actual exercise of God's wrath are associated, not merely with the idea of producing effect in his moral government, nor with the exercise of his mere will, but as results produced by his emotions against sin, or, in other words, his avenging justice.
Some of these are
(1.) The fallen angels,
(2.) our first parents,
(3.) Sodom and Gomorrah,
(4.) the flood,
(5.) the plagues of Egypt,
(6.) the punishments of the children of Israel in the wilderness,
(7.) the captivity of the Jews,
(8.) God's punishment of heathen nations, because of their wicked instrumentality in the exercise of his wrath
against the delinquent Israelites, and
(9.) the threatened eternal punishment of the wicked.
9. Passages which point out something in the work of Christ as essential before God could pardon sin. Matt. 26:39; Rom. 3:26; 2Cor. 5:21.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:11:31 GMT -5
CHAPTER XII
THE WILL OF GOD
BY the will of God is meant that power inherent in his nature, by
which he purposes and chooses any end or object, or determines its
existence.
I. That God must have this power is evident.
1. Because it is an attribute of personality. A conscious personal being cannot be without will. Every proof that we have, therefore, that God has personal existence, is evidence that he must have will.
2. Will is also a perfection, and must be found in the being of all perfection.
3. The absolutely independent God, who is controlled by, and dependent upon no person nor thing, must have will, which determines his own acts.
4. It cannot be separated from the possession of the power and wisdom seen in the creation of the universe and in all God's outward acts, for, without it, the things which wisdom devises and power executes could neither be devised nor executed.
5. It is essential to the sovereignty by which he rules the universe, for will is the element in which sovereignty consists.
6. Without it there could be no existence whatever, not even of God himself.
II. The objects of that will are all beings that exist, and all events that take place.
1. God must will his own existence and nature. These are objects of
supreme desire. The infinite excellence of that nature, which
furnishes a completely worthy object of his complacent love, cannot
be contemplated without a correspondingly infinite desire that it
should exist, and should be what it is. The will thus exercised,
however, is not causal, as it is towards all other objects. It does not
give existence to God, nor make his nature what it is, but on the
contrary, it is because God exists and has such a nature, that he must
so will.
2. The will of God is also exercised in establishing and maintaining
the personal relations revealed to us as existing in the Godhead. It is
by the will of the Father that he begets the Son, and by the will of the
Father and the Son that the Spirit proceeds. The action of the will
here is causal, although these relations are eternal, and are
characteristic of the Godhead. They are the results of the divine
activity, and, as effects, must find their ultimate cause in the will
which moves to action. The fact that because this is divine will and
action, there can be no priority of time in the will to the act, does not
forbid the causal relation which, because of the eternity of God, must
make cause and effect in him co-eternal.
3. Another exhibition of will in the divine being is connected with the
mutual love of the divine persons towards each other. This love
proceeds from these persons as one form of eternal activity, and is
willed by each to the full extent of its infinite exercise.
4. The will of God is more plainly made known, however, to his
creatures, in his outward activity in creation. This was called into
existence by the word of his power. He willed, and it was done. But
for that will, it had not been. Viewed as a whole, or in its minutest
part, the universe presents everywhere the impress of its maker's
will. To that will is due not only all material, but also all spiritual existence.
5. The will of God is also manifested in his providential care and
government of the universe. In creating it, he has established laws,
both mechanical and spiritual, by which it is regulated. Yet he has
not withdrawn his own presence and power in its continued
guidance and preservation; but is constantly developing, through it
and in it, his eternal purpose.
6. In human affairs, however, the will of God is most distinctively
exhibited in the work of redemption. Let this be admitted as a true
work of God, and, at once, appear the proofs of a far-reaching end,
accomplished by frequent acts of interposition and guidance, in
which concentres and culminates the entire scope of God's outward
activity. The will of God is seen to be the propelling force of his
devising wisdom and executing power in the accomplishment of one
great purpose to which is indissolubly linked all his other acts andnvolitions.
III. A question arises as to this will of God, whether, in its
exercise, he acts necessarily or freely.
It has been answered, that his will is exercised both necessarily and
freely, according to the object of that will.
1. He is said to will necessarily, himself, his holy nature, and
character, and the personal relations in the Godhead. This language
may be admitted, if it be borne in mind, that the necessity here
declared, is not one of fate, nor of outward compulsion. Whatever is
meant by it must be fully consistent with God's free agency. It is a
necessity that arises from his nature, because of which, such must be
the will of God, that he wills himself, his existence, and the relations
of the persons of the Godhead. Such being the nature of the
necessity, it would be better to express it in some way which would
indicate its source and prevent misapprehension. The word
"naturally" would suffice, were it not for its ambiguity in common
use; consequently "essentially" is suggested as expressive of all the
necessity, and at the same time of all the freedom which must
accompany an act of the will proceeding from the very essence or nature of God.
2. As to all else than himself, God wills freely, whether his will has
regard to their existence, or mode of existence, or their actions or the
events which influence or control them. He does his own will, not
that of another. He chooses what, and whom he will create, and the
times, places and circumstances in which he will place those he
creates. He marks out to all his intelligent creatures the paths of their
lives. He uses them for his purposes. Though he gives to them, also,
like freedom of the will, yet is their will subordinate to his, and, with
their actions, is controlled by it. Yet is this so wisely done, and so
truly in accordance with their own natures, as fully to preserve in
them consciousness and conviction of the power of contrary choice,
and of full responsibility for what they choose and do.
When it is said, however, that God wills freely, it is not meant that no
influence is exerted upon his will. It is only intended to deny that his
will is influenced from without. In all his outward acts, as well as in
those within, he is governed by his own nature. That nature, and that
will, must always be in unison. As he is infinitely wise, so must his
will and action be directed towards wise ends in the use of wise
means. His infinite justice forbids that he should will or do anything
contrary to the strictest justice. The God of truth must also purpose
in accordance with truth and faithfulness. His love, too, which is so
gracious a characteristic of God, forbids that he shall will otherwise
than benevolently towards all; securing the happiness of the
innocent, and desiring that even of the guilty, when it can be made
consistent with his justice. The holiness of his nature makes it
essential that, as all perfection, in perfect harmony, is involved in
that holiness, so also must it be found in every purpose which he
forms, as well as in every action by which his purposes are
accomplished. When, therefore, God is said to will freely in all
matters which are without, it is not meant to deny that he is
governed by his nature in all respects, in which that nature ought to
affect his will.
But, even in the volition thus formed, God does not will freely, in the
sense of willing arbitrarily. He is not indifferent as to what he will do.
There is choice, and not arbitrary choice. There are reasons
perceived by him, which induce him to choose one end, rather than
another, and one set of means to that end, in preference to others.
There is in each case a prevailing motive, not necessarily dependent
upon its own force or power, but upon the simple fact, that, in the
midst of the numerous ends and means known to him through his
infinite knowledge, this motive makes this end, and these means best
pleasing to him. The very nature of choice in any being of intelligence
and free agency makes this the method by which the will forms its
decision. There is nothing in the nature of the omniscient and all purposing God,
which forbids that this also should be the method of
his volitions. Our conception of God in this respect cannot be
incorrect, although, as in all instances in which we attempt to arrive
at the perfections of God through those recognized as such in man,
this conception may be very inadequate.
IV. The discussion of the preceding question shows how
truly man, so far as his will is concerned, has been made in
the image of God. It suggests the propriety, therefore, of
setting forth more particularly the points of similarity and
dissimilarity between the will of man and that of God.
1. Some points of similarity may be mentioned.
(1.) In man, will is the element in which sovereignty exists; so also in God.
(2.) In man, will depends upon the understanding, that is, it is
exercised, all other things being equal, in accordance with its
dictates; so also in God.
(3.) In man, the will is essentially influenced by his nature; so also in God.
(4.) In man, the will is controlled by the prevailing motive, which is
made the strongest, because it is that most pleasing to him; so also in God.
2. But there are also points of dissimilarity between these wills.
(1.) God never wills what he cannot do; man often does.
(2.) In God, the will is never influenced from without; in man this is frequently done.
By the outward control in man is not here meant that physical
compulsion by which a man is sometimes said to act against his will;
but those legitimate outward influences from persons,
circumstances, and events, which lead men freely to choose, in
accordance with the laws of the mind.
(3.) In God, the prevailing motive is not only the most pleasing, but,
presumably, the best; in man, it is only the most pleasing, not the
most reasonable and right, nor the most conducive to happiness; but
often the very contrary of these.
(4.) In God there is but one will, or purpose, which comprehends all
his ends and means; he does not will, by successive acts, nor in
successive moments, but simultaneously, and eternally; man wills
successively, one will follows another, and the volition of one man
often succeeds the acts, as well as the volitions, of others.
(5.) The will of God is always accomplished; that of man is often defeated.
(6.) God never changes his will, nor perceives any reason for such
change; man changes his frequently, from caprice, or because of new
information, or because he sees the importance of a better life, or is
carried off by passsion to one that is worse.
V. Various distinctions as to the will of God have been
pointed out, some of which are correct, or at least
admissible, and others incorrect, and objectionable.
The following list is given by Turretine in the fifteenth and sixteenth
questions of his third book. The statements made are in the main
taken from his discussion.
1. The correct distinctions.
(1.) The first distinction is between the decretive and preceptive will of God.
By the decretive will is meant that will of God by which he purposes
or decrees, whatever shall come to pass, whether he wills to
accomplish it himself effectively, or causatively, or to permit it to
occur through the unrestrained agency or will of his creatures. In
either case, however, he has determined, purposed, or decreed,
either to bring it to pass, or to cause, or to permit it to be brought to
pass.
By the preceptive will is meant that which he has prescribed to be
done by others. Such are the laws under which he places his
creatures, or the duties which he enjoins upon them. It is the rule of
duty.
The decretive will must always be fulfilled; the preceptive may be
disobeyed, and therefore remain unfulfilled.
(2.) Nearly corresponding to this first distinction is another into the
will of eudokia, and that of euarestia. As the former was taken from
two Latin, so this is from two Greek words, and these Greek words
are scriptural. The former division was made in connection with
purpose to do; this in connection with pleasure in doing, or desire to
do, or to see done. But the two correspond in the fact that the will of
eudokia, like that of decree, comprises what shall certainly be
accomplished, and that of euarestia like that of precept embraces
simply what it pleases God that his creatures shall do.
It must not be supposed, however, that, because of the meaning
eudokia, (well pleasing,) the decretive will, expressed by this word, is
confined to those volitions of God, in which the happiness and
blessing of man are involved. It was with reference both to evil to
some, and blessing to others, that Christ used it when he said, "Yea
Father for so it was well pleasing in thy sight." Matt. 11:26. The
decretive will of God, whatever its effect upon his creatures, is "well
pleasing" to God.
(3.) A third distinction is between the will of the signum and that of
the beneplacitum.
By the beneplacitum is intended, a will of God which is confined to
himself, until he makes it known by some revelation, or by the event
itself. Any will thus made known becomes the signum. Manifestly
these may differ in several respects.
If the will of the beneplacitum be confined, as it should be, to the
decretive will of God, it will be broader, and narrower, than that of
the signum; broader, because at no time has the whole decretive will
of God been revealed; and narrower, because the will of the signum
must extend, also, to the preceptive will of God, which God
prescribes as duty, and yet does not determine shall be performed. In
some cases, God even gives commands, which are, for the time, a
rule of duty, and, therefore, a part of his preceptive will, and thus
also of this will of signum, obedience to which he actually intends to
prevent. Thus he ordered Abraham by the will of signum to sacrifice
Isaac, which was thus made to his servant a rule of duty, yet, by the
will of beneplacitum, he not only did not purpose the sacrifice, but
intended to interpose to prevent it.
(4.) A fourth distinction is between the secret and the revealed will of
God. Turretine says, "The former of these is commonly referred to
the will of decree, which for the most part is hidden in God; the latter
to the will of the precept, which is revealed, and disclosed in the Law
and the Gospel. Its basis is sought in Deut. 29:29: "The secret things
belong unto the LORD our God: but the things that are revealed
belong unto us and to our children forever, that we may do all the
words of this law." The former is called a great deep and an
unsearchable abyss. Ps. 36:6; Rom. 11:33, 34. The latter is accessible
to all, nor is it far from us. Deut. 30:14; Rom. 10:8. That has for its
object all those things which God wills either to effect, or permit, and
which, especially, he wishes to do concerning each man, and which
are, therefore, absolute and fixed without exception. The latter refers
to those things which belong to our duty, and which are conditionally
set forth. The former is always done, the latter is often violated."
2. The incorrect distinctions:
(1.) That of antecedent and consequent volitions.
By this is not meant one will, or decree, which precedes another in its
logical order in the divine mind, or in its execution by God, as that of
the creation of man, before that of his redemption; nor one will of
the precept, which consists in the prescribed duty, followed by
another which sets forth the consequent rewards and punishments.
Were this so, the distinction would be objectionable only because of
its inaccuracy in transferring to God such methods of our action, or
logical conception, as belong to that succession in our acts and will
which cannot exist in God. It would be only the same kind of
misstatement, of which orthodox theologians are guilty, when under
the form of sublapsarianism, or supralapsarianism, they attempt to
set forth the order of God's decrees. In one form, in which this
distinction is incorrectly made, it is claimed that a consequent will in
God arises after he sees the results of one which is previous, or
antecedent; another that he forms a particular volition, especially
affecting an individual man, following upon a general volition, or
disposition, to seek the happiness of his creatures, or to prescribe a
course by which that happiness may be secured.
To the distinction of antecedent, and consequent volitions, in these
forms, there are many objections.
(a.) It admits succession in the decrees of God, and makes them
many, when they are but one.
(b.) It makes them temporal, when they are eternal.
(c.) Turretine ably argues, that thus contrary wills would exist in
God, who would thus be at one and the same time willing, and
not willing, the same event.
(d.) He also justly states, that the antecedent will thus spoken of,
could be only a mere wishing (velleitas,) and not a will
(voluntas.)
(e.) He suggests that thus the independence of God would be taken away, since he must wait upon man to will, and act, before
he could will.
(2.) A second incorrect distinction is between the efficacious and inefficacious will of God.
This distinction would also be admissible, if by the efficacious will
were meant that of the decree, and by the inefficacious, that of the
precept. But, as introduced, both terms are applied to the will of the
decree. Turretine objects to this application, in the first place,
"because the scripture testifies, that the purpose of God is
immutable, and his will cannot be resisted. Isa. 46:10; Rom. 9:19;
but, if it cannot be resisted, he will surely perfect that which he
intends; secondly, inefficacious will cannot be attributed to God,
unless he is accused either of ignorance, because he knew not that
the event would not occur, or of impotence, because he could not
accomplish the result he purposed; finally, the same reasons which
prove that antecedent and consequent will are not allowable, are also
proofs against efficacious and inefficacious."
(3.) The third of the incorrect distinctions is that of absolute and conditional.
If, by the conditional will, were meant the conditions appended to
the preceptive will of God, in the promises and threats given as
inducements to duty, it would not be objected to. But the object of
those who present it, is to apply it to the decretive will, and to
suppose that God, in his purposes, determines, on certain conditions,
that he will do a certain act, which he will not do if those conditions
fail. Whether these conditions shall fail, or not, is supposed to be
unknown to God, or, if known, yet at least so far undetermined, that
he has formed no purpose whether or not to permit, or to accomplish
them. The purposes of God, thus formed, are not, therefore, absolute
decrees, as are all those concerning what shall actually and
absolutely take place, but are only conditional ones, based upon
some antecedent condition, which must first occur.
This distinction is introduced, chiefly, to show how God can make an
absolute decree about the salvation of mankind in general, and, yet,
not about that of any one man in particular. Absolutely he decrees
the salvation in general of all who believe. But the salvation of each
one is decreed, only upon the condition that he believes. Whether
that faith will be exercised by any one, is not determined by God. Nor
so far as involved in any purpose made by him is it even known to
God.
Such is the theory and purpose of this distinction. The objections
presented against the other two of these incorrect distinctions are
also justly made against it.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:34:50 GMT -5
CHAPTER XIII
THE DECREES OF GOD
THE decrees of God may be defined as that just, wise, and holy
purpose or plan by which eternally, and within himself, he
determines all things whatsoever that come to pass.
I. This purpose or plan is just, wise, and holy. Since it is
formed by God it must have this character. His nature
forbids that anything otherwise shall proceed from him.
Though what he permits may be unrighteous, or foolish, or
sinful, these characteristics belong to it because of others;
while his will, purpose, or plan continues just, wise, and holy.
It is needful that this fact be always remembered.
1. Since, on account of the ignorance of man, there must be much in connection with this subject, which cannot be comprehended; because,
(1.) man's finite knowledge cannot compass the nature, and mode, and reasons of the will, and action of the infinite God,
(2.) because of the difficulty of reconciling the free agency and responsibility of man, with the pre-existent knowledge and purpose of God, and
(3.) because of the perplexities which arise from the existence of sin in a world planned, created and governed by a holy,
all-wise, and almighty God.
2. The same fact should also not be forgotten, because of the natural corruption of the human heart, which makes it
(1.) revolt against the sovereignty of God,
(2.) seek refuge from the condemnation justly due to sin, and
(3.) endeavor to find excuses for continuance therein. It is our duty, therefore,
(1.) to seek to learn all the facts made known by reason and revelation,
(2.) to accept them,
(3.) to recognize them as the testimony of God,
(4.) to admit that our knowledge is still imperfect,
(5.) to believe that further information will still further remove the difficulties,
(6.) to refuse on account of the difficulties to reject what God has actually taught, and
(7.) amid all, to believe that whatever that teaching is, it must accord with justice, wisdom and holy perfection, because it is God of whom these things are affirmed.
II. These decrees are properly defined to be God's purpose or plan.
The term "decree" is liable to some misapprehension and objection,
because it conveys the idea of an edict, or of some compulsory
determination. "Purpose" has been suggested as a better word.
"Plan" will sometimes be still more suitable. The mere use of these
words will remove from many some difficulties and prejudices which
make them unwilling to accept this doctrine. They perceive that, in
the creation, preservation, and government of the world, God must
have had a plan, and that that plan must have been just, wise and
holy, tending both to his own glory and the happiness of his
creatures. They recognize that a man who has no purpose, nor aim,
especially in important matters, and who cannot, or does not, devise
the means by which to carry out his purpose, is without wisdom and
capacity, and unworthy of his nature. Consequently, they readily
believe and admit that the more comprehensive, and, at the same
time, the more definite is the plan of God, the more worthy is it of
infinite wisdom. Indeed they are compelled to the conclusion that
God cannot be what he is, without forming such a purpose or plan.
III. Any such plan or purpose of God must have been
formed eternally, and within himself.
1. It must have been eternally purposed, because God's only mode of
existence, as has been heretofore proved, is eternal, and therefore his
thoughts, and purpose, and plan must be eternal. The fact also that
his knowledge is infinite, and cannot be increased, forbids the
forming of plaus in time, which, as they become known to him,
would add to that knowledge. It is also to be remembered that the
plan must precede its execution, but as time began with that
execution, the plan could not have been formed in time, and must be
eternal.
2. In like manner, also, was it formed within himself. He needed not
to go without himself, either for the impulse which led to it, or the
knowledge in which it was conceived. He had all knowledge, both of
the actual and the possible, all wisdom as to the best end and means,
all power to execute what he devised in the use, or without the use of
appropriate secondary means, and free will to select, of all possible
plans and means, whatever he himself should please, and the
impulse which moved him existed alone in that knowledge and will.
IV. By this plan or purpose God determined all things which it included.
This is manifestly true, even if all things whatsoever were not thus embraced.
To say the least, all the parts of it, as well as the whole, were known
to him. But this knowledge, apart from any decree, determines,
marks out, and fixes the nature, limits, time, sequence and relation
to each other of the whole, and of all the parts. "Things which are
known by God as future, must certainly be future. A determination,
or decree to bring them to pass, and even their actual existence, does
not make them more certain.
But whence is God's knowledge of the futurity of any events, except
from the knowledge of his purpose, to cause or permit them to come
to pass? The knowledge of the futurity of any event, over which any
one has absolute control, is the result of his purpose, not its cause.
And, as God has such absolute control over all things, his knowledge
that they will be, must proceed from his purpose that they shall be. It
cannot be from mere perception of their nature, for he gives that
nature, and in determining to give it, determines what it shall be, and
thus determines the effects which that nature will cause. Nor is it
from mere knowledge of the mutual relations which will be sustained
by outward events or beings, for it is he that establishes these
relations for the accomplishment of his own purposes. To say that
this nature and these relations are from God, and are not from his
purpose, is in the highest degree fatalistic, for it would involve that
they originate in some necessity of the nature of God, because of
which he must give them existence without so willing, and even
against his will. In this way alone could God be said to know, and yet
not to purpose them. His knowledge would arise from knowledge of
his nature, and of what that nature compels him to do, and not from
knowledge of his purpose and of his will involved in that purpose.
This and this alone, would make equally certain and known what will
come to pass, without basing that knowledge upon his purpose; but it
would not only be destructive of his free agency and will, but, from
the nature of necessity, would make the outward events eternal and
prevent the existence of time, and the relation to it of all things whatever.
V. This plan, or purpose, includes all things whatsoever
that come to pass; not some things, but all things; not all
things in general, but each thing in particular.
So interwoven are all these things, that the lack of purpose, as to any
one, would involve the same lack as to multitudes of others, indeed
as to every other connected in the slightest degree with the one not purposed.
This is evidently true as to all subsequent events; but it is equally so
as to those that are antecedent, for these thus connected antecedent
events have been established with efficient causative power, relative
to all their effects. God knows the existence of this power; he has in
fact ordained and bestowed it. He knows also what will be its effects.
With this knowledge, God must, therefore, either allow them to act,
because he purposes that the result shall follow, or he must hinder,
or restrain, or accelerate their action because he would change the
effect. In each case he purposes, in the one to effect, in the other to
permit, and his purpose thus extends to all things. Any limitation of
his purpose involves limitation of his knowledge, and this cannot be
true of the omniscient God.
To such an extent is the force of this realized, that it is admitted by
all, that, in the mechanical universe, and even in the control of the
lower animals, this is true. But the free agency of man, and of other
rational and moral agents, is supposed to prevent God's purposing,
or willing, all things with reference to them. It is said that such
purposing would take away that free agency, and consequent
responsibility.
The Scriptures recognize both the sovereignty of God, and the free
agency, and accountability of man. Consciousness assures us of the
latter. The nature of God, as has just been shown, proves the former.
The Bible makes no attempt to reconcile the two. Paul even declines
to discuss the subject, saying, "Nay but, oh man, who art thou that
repliest against God?" Rom. 9:20. The two facts are plainly revealed.
They cannot be contradictory, they must be reconcilable. That we
cannot point out the harmony between them is a proof, only of our
ignorance, and limited capacity, and not that both are not true. It is
certain, however, that, whatever may be the influences which God
exercises, or permits, to secure the fulfilment of his purposes, he
always acts in accordance with the nature, and especially with the
laws of mind he has bestowed upon man. It is equally true, that his
action is in full accord with that justice, and benevolence, which are
such essential attributes of God himself.
Acting, however, upon the belief that the purpose of God,
accomplishing his will in his rational creatures, is inconsistent with
their free agency, several classes of theologians have presented
theories in opposition to the scriptural doctrine of decrees above set forth.
1. The most objectionable theory is that of the Socinians, who deny
that God can know what a free agent will choose, or do, before he
acts, or wills. They maintain that the will is, at the moment of its
choice, in such perfect equilibrium, that there are no tendencies in
any direction which prevent an absolute freedom of choice. No
knowledge, therefore, of the will itself, nor of the circumstances
which surround its action, will enable any one to say, before it is
exercised, what will be its choice. Its act, therefore, is entirely
undetermined and indeterminable, until the free agent wills. It
cannot even be known beforehand by God himself.
The objections to this theory are obvious.
(1.) It is based upon a wrong conception of the nature of free agency;
for it supposes each act of the will to be an arbitrary choice. But such
arbitrary choice is not found even in God. As regards man, we know,
from consciousness and experience, that his will is influenced by
motives. Indeed, so truly is it governed by the nature of the man, and
the attendant influences, that even we can predict his will and action
in many cases, and only fail to do so perfectly in all because of our
limited knowledge. The omniscient God cannot fail to know
everything that affects the decision, and, therefore, what the decision will be.
(2.) This theory is also opposed to the independence of God. It
supposes him to have made beings of such a nature, that his own
actions and will must depend upon theirs, and that he must await
their decision, wherever it will have any influential bearings on
anything future, before he can know or purpose what he himself will do.
(3.) It is also manifest, from what has been said under the first
objection, that this theory is opposed to the omniscience of God. It
expressly puts a limitation, upon that omniscience, by declaring that
he is limited in his knowledge, at least, so far as not to know
beforehand the decision of the will of his creatures. But ignorance of
this would also involve ignorance of all things in the future, with
which it may be connected. This would, in a world inhabited by free
agents, constitute no small part of all that will occur.
(4.) It is opposed to the instances mentioned in Scripture of the
prediction beforehand by God, even of the bad actions of certain
men. See as to Pharaoh, Ex. 7:3, 4; Hazael, 2 Kings 8:13; Judas, Matt.
26:21; Peter, Matt. 26:34, &c., &c.
(5.) It is opposed to the power of forming habits, which is a matter of
universal experience. Such habits, when known, constitute a source
of information, upon which, to some degree, reliance can be placed
in foretelling what any man will do. A perfect knowledge of his
habits, as well as of all else that influences, would secure infallible
prediction of the choice. God has this perfect knowledge, and if he
cannot foreknow the decision, it must be because it is not true that
habits can be formed which according to the law of habit will
influence and control.
2. Another theory has been advanced by some Arminians, who
maintain that God does not know the free actions of men, not
because he cannot know them, but because he chooses not to do so.
(1.) The first objection to this theory is, that, were it true, it would not
give greater freedom to the will, than does the orthodox statement.
Though this theory honours God more than the former, it is inferior
to it with respect to the object for which it is introduced. If it could be
true as the first theory claims, that so indeterminate is the future will
of a free agent, that even God cannot know it, then that future will
would certainly be entirely under the control of the free agent, and he
would to the utmost extreme be free. His will would be in absolute
equilibrium in the act of choosing. Neither would any motive exist to
influence that choice. It would be thoroughly arbitrary.
But the second theory has not this advantage, for it does not suppose
this condition of equilibrium. In claiming, that God does not choose
to know, what he might know if he should so choose, it admits that
there are the same surrounding circumstances and conditions, and
the same prevailing motive, through foresight of which God could
know if he should so will. But, if this be true, there can be no state of
equilibrium. The certainty of what will occur is as much fixed as
though known to God. It is not his knowledge of these things, and of
their certain result in the act of the will, that makes it certain what it
will be. It is the fact, that these things are such as they are, which
makes it possible for him to know them. If he barely determines to
permit what his knowledge perceives will surely take place, the event
is not made any more certain by that knowledge, than it was before.
Unquestionably, therefore, so far as the permissive decrees of God
are involved, this theory has no advantage over that of the Scriptures.
The same fact is true as to God's effective decrees, for the fact that
God does not choose to know the result, does not prevent his
introduction of active influences towards that result. Because a man
does not know the decision which a judge will make in a case in
court, and does not choose, because of the impropriety of so doing, to
ascertain from the judge what will be his decision, he does not,
therefore, refrain from using all proper arguments to influence the
judge. There can be no reason why God, in ignorance of what will be
the decision, could not exert every influence which would be possible
if that decision were known to him. He could only exert such
influences as, under the circumstances, would be just and right. He
could do this only in accordance with the nature of his creatures, in
strict conformity to the laws of the human mind. Therefore, it may be
affirmed as true, that, even under his efficient decrees, when he
knows the result, his creatures are left as free as they could be, were
that result unknown to him.
(2.) The chief objection, to this theory is, that it is based upon a
wrong conception of the relation of the will of God to his nature. That
will does not confer the attributes of his nature, nor does it control
them, but is itself influenced by them. God knows all things, not
because he wills to know them, but, because, from his nature, he has
infinite knowledge,—knowledge of all things possible, and knowledge
of all things certain. If, by his will, he could refrain from knowing, he
would change his nature. As well speak of a man not choosing to see,
with his eyes open, the objects presented to his sight, as of God not
choosing to know anything, whether that be only something which is
possible, or something which in any way has been made certain.
3. There is, beside the theories already referred to, the ordinary
Arminian theory. This is, that God knows all things that will come to
pass, but does not decree all, but only some of them. The decisions of
free agents are among those things which he is supposed not to
decree.
(1.) The manifest objection to this theory is, that it does not accord
with the statements of the Bible. This will be subsequently shown, by
the passages of Scripture which will be advanced, in proof of the
various points involved in the ordinary Calvinistic theory.
(2.) But a second objection will be found in the fact that this theory
does not thus secure that freedom from certainty in the decisions of
free agents, which is the great reason of the objections to the decrees
of God concerning them.
If by decreeing such decisions, is meant effectively causing them, it is
true that God does not decree all things; for, while he effectually
causes some, he only permissively decrees others. Hence the
objection to the word "decree," and the previous suggestion of the
words "purpose" or "plan."
But, if God knows that any event will occur, and can prevent it, and
does not, it is evident that he purposes that it shall exist, and makes
it a part of his plan.
His knowledge of the futurity of any event makes it as certain as any
purpose he could form effectively to cause it. That knowledge is
perfect and infallible. What he knows will come to pass, must
necessarily take place. Otherwise, he would know a thing as future
which will not be future. His knowledge of it would be false. He
would be himself deceived. To suppose, then, that he knows it as
certain, when it is not certain, is to deny his infinite knowledge, and
to reduce this theory to the plane of one or the other of those
previously mentioned.
(3.) Neither does this theory accomplish another object for which it is
introduced, namely, to secure such a relation of God to any free act of
man as shall take away the influence upon it exerted by his decree.
His decree to permit it, is as hidden from his creatures as his
knowledge that they will so act, and can have no other influence
upon them than that knowledge.
The only apparent advantage is that God is supposed thus not to
interfere with their free agency, so as to destroy their accountability.
But we have seen that, so far as the permissive decree is concerned,
the knowledge of the event is as effective in making it certain, and in
influencing the free agent, as would be any decree, purpose or plan of
God. It is only when the decree is effective, and introduces means for
its accomplishment, that the free agency is affected. In this case, God
does not destroy the free agency, although he exerts an influence
towards the result But that God is thus active, sometimes, as in his
gracious influences upon men, is held as firmly by Arminians as
Calvinists. In all such gracious acts, both parties claim that he is both
merciful and just. Calvinists extend these no farther than do
Arminians, for they deny as strenuously as others, that God acts
effectively to lead men to wicked decisions and deeds. So far as the
nature of God's actions upon free agents is concerned, both parties
agree. But the Arminian theory, in asserting foreknowledge without
purpose, and in alleging that the foreknowledge is all that there is in
God, is contrary to the relations of God's will to his knowledge, as
well as to the statements of Scripture about the decrees of God; and
while it leaves the event equally certain, supposes fully as much
influence over the will of the creature, and has equal difficulty in
reconciling the free agency, and consequent responsibility, with the
inevitable certainty of the event.
The chief difficulty connected with the doctrine of decrees arises
from the existence of sin. According to that doctrine, sin has not
accidentally occurred, nor was it simply foreknown, but it was a part
of the plan and purpose of God, that it should exist. The difficulty is
freely admitted. In this respect the dispensation of God is
surrounded with "clouds and darkness."
The following statements, however, may be made:
(1.) That its being a part of the purpose or plan of God, renders its
presence no more difficult of explanation than that he should have
foreknown its appearance, and not exerted his unquestioned power
to prevent it.
(2.) That, amid all the darkness, we can yet see that God is so
overruling sin as to cause it greatly to redound to his glory and the
happiness of his creatures.
(3.) That even without any explanation of it, we can rest in our
knowledge of the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God.
(4.) That we cannot see how its possible entrance into the world
could have been prevented, consistently with the creation and
putting upon probation of beings with moral natures, endowed with
free will, and necessarily fallible because mere creatures; while the
right thus to put on probation, without such influence as would make
his creatures certainly persevere in holiness, is one which none could
justly deny to God. But that which God could possibly (under any
contingency) permit, cannot, if it has actual existence, militate
against his pure and holy character.
The Scriptural authority for the doctrine of decrees will appear from
the following statements and references, gathered with slight
modifications from Hodge's Outlines, pp. 205–213:
1. God's decrees are eternal. Acts 15:18; Eph. 1:4; 3:11; 1 Pet. 1:20; 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; 1 Cor. 2:7.
2. They are immutable. Ps. 33:11; Isa. 46:9.
3. They comprehend all events.
(1.) The Scriptures assert this of the whole system in general embraced in the divine decrees.Dan.4:34,35;Acts 17:26; Eph. 1:11.
(2.) They affirm the same of fortuitous events. Prov. 16:33; Matt. 10:29, 30.
(3.) Also of the free actions of men. Eph. 2:10, 11; Phil. 2:13.
(4.) Even the wicked actions of men. Acts 2:23; 4:27, 28; 13:29; 1Pet. 2:8; Jude 4; Rev. 17:17. As to the history of Joseph, compare Gen. 37:28, with Gen. 45:7, 8, and Gen. 50:20. See also Ps.17:13, 14; Isa. 10:5, 15.
4. The decrees of God are not conditional. Ps. 33:11; Prov. 19:21; Isa. 14:24, 27; 46:10; Rom. 9:11.
5. They are sovereign. Isa. 40:13, 14; Dan. 4:35; Matt. 11:25, 26;Rom. 9:11, 15–18; Eph. 1:5, 11.
6. They include the means. Eph. 1:4; 2 Thess. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:2.
7. They determine the free actions of men. Acts 4:27, 28; Eph. 2:10.
8. God himself works in his people that faith and obedience which are called the conditions of salvation. Eph. 2:8; Phil. 2:13; 2 Tim.2:25.
9. The decree renders the event certain. Matt. 16:21; Luke 18:31–33; 24:46; Acts 2:23; 13:29; 1 Cor. 11:19.
10. While God has decreed the free acts of men, the actors have been none the less responsible. Gen. 50:20; Acts 2:23; 3:18; 4:27, 28.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:37:11 GMT -5
CHAPTER XIV
THE TRINITY
THE Scripture doctrine of the Trinity is set forth in the abstract of
principles of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in these
words (Art. III.): "God is revealed to us as Father, Son and Holy
Spirit, each with distinct personal attributes, but without division of
nature, essence or being."
The peculiarity of this definition is that it is a mere statement of the
Scriptural facts revealed, while, at the same time, it includes every
point involved in the doctrine of the Trinity as held by orthodox
Christians of all ages. There is no addition to the Scripture facts, but
the complete exhibition which these words make of the doctrine,
shows that it has been correctly formulated from what God has
himself revealed. As he alone can know and reveal what he is, so we
must accept his statements, however mysterious and
incomprehensible may be his revelation.
This definition suggests to us a method of treatment by which, in the
utmost simplicity and Scripturalness, the whole truth on this
important subject may be attained.
I. THE RELATION OF FATHER AND SON
God is revealed to us as the Father; not merely in the general way in
which he is called the Father of all created beings, and they his sons;
nor in that in which he is the Father of those who are his sons, in
virtue of the adoption, which is in Christ Jesus; but the Father as
indicative of a special relation between him and another person
whom the Scriptures call his only begotten Son. There are several
classes of Scripture passages which reveal this.
1. That class in which, in recognition of this relation, Christ addresses
God as "Father." Matt. 11:25, 26; Mark 14:36; Luke 10:21; 22:42;
23:34, 46; John 12:26, 27, 28; 17:1, 5, 11, 24, 25.
2. That class in which Christ speaks of him as peculiarly his Father.
The expression "our Father" is never used by him, except in the
Lord's prayer when he is teaching the disciples how to pray. Matt.
10:32, 33; 15:13; 16:17; 18:10, 19; 20:23; 24:36; 25:34; 26:29, 39, 42,
53; Luke 2:49; 22:29; 24:49; John 5:17, 43; 6:32; 8:19, 38, 49, 54;
10:18, 25, 29, 30, 32, 37; 12:26; 14:7, 20, 21, 23; 15:1, 8, 10, 15, 23;
20:17; Rev. 2:27; 3:5.
3. That class in which the Father is spoken of as sending and as
giving the Son.
This does not include many passages in which Christ is said to be
sent, but only those in which he is referred to as sent by the Father.
John 3:16, 17; 5:37; 6:37–40, 57; 8:16–19; 10:36; John 12:45, 49;
14:24; 17:18; 20:21.
4. A fourth class represents the Father as knowing and loving the
Son. Matt. 11:27; Luke 10:22; John 3:35; 5:20.
5. There is, also, a class in which Christ and the Father are said to be
co-workers, or in which the works of Christ are claimed to be the
Father's witness to him. John 5:17; 10:25, 32, 36, 37, 38.
6. That class in which the Father is said to put special honor on the Son. John 3:35; 5:23, 25, 26, 27.
7. There is yet another class in which peculiarity of relation is shown by such terms, as
(1.) "My beloved Son;" the language is very strong and emphatic, "my Son, the beloved." Matt. 3:17; 17:5; Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22; 2 Pet. 1:17.
(2.) "Only begotten Son." John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9.
(3.) "His own Son." Rom. 8:32. In connection with this, it should be remembered that, in John 5:18, the charge made against Christ by the Jews was that he "called God his own Father making himself equal with God."
8. The statements that the Son alone has seen, and known, and revealed the Father, also show peculiarity of this relationship. John 1:18; 14:6–11; 17:25, 26.
9. The same peculiarity is shown by the manner in which Christ speaks of the works he does by virtue of it. See his Sabbath day discourse after curing the man at the pool of Bethesda. John 5:19–31,36, 37; also, John 14:10, 11.
II. THIS FATHER IS GOD
The relation pointed out above, is one borne by Christ to the supreme God. It is he, whom the Scriptures call God in the true sense of that word, to whom Christ is said by them to be Son to the Father.
1. There are the passages which expressly call Christ "Son of God."
All are here omitted where the name is given by devils, or by the Centurion, or in any other way in which the authority of inspired teaching may not be claimed for its use. Mark 1:1; Luke 1:35; John 5:25; 10:36; 11:27; Acts 9:20; Gal. 4:4;
1 John 4:15; 5:5, 20, 21.
2. There are other passages in which the epithet "God" is ascribed to the Father in this relationship.
John 1:18; 3:16, 17; 5:18; Rom. 1:1–4; 8:31, 32; 2 Pet. 1:17; 1 John 4:9, 10; 2 John 3.
III. THIS SON IS GOD
1. He is expressly called God. It is not denied that this epithet, like
that of Lord, is applied in an inferior sense to others. The mere use of
these titles would not prove that the one to whom they are attributed
has the divine nature. But the manner in which they are applied to
Christ, and the frequency of that application, become, along with the
other evidences presented, an incontestable proof, that he, as well as
the Father, is true God. If they were not ascribed to Christ in the
Scriptures, their absence would be conspicuous and well-fitted to
cast doubt on the other evidence. Matt. 1:23; John 1:1; 20:28; Rom.
9:5; Titus 1:3; Heb. 1:8.
In the above are omitted, as, on various grounds, doubtful. Acts
20:28; 1 Tim. 3:16; and 1 John 5:20. An exegetical study of these
passages will show, even with the text of the recent critics, that they
strongly corroborate the doctrine that Christ is God.
2. Christ is also called Lord. This title is used in both the Old and
New Testaments still more generally than is that of God. An
examination of the texts here quoted, will show that, in a peculiar
sense, only suited to Christ as God, is it applied to him. Matt. 12:8;
22:41–45; Mark 2:28; Luke 6:46; 20:41–44; John 13:13, 14; Acts
10:36; Rom. 14:9; 1 Cor. 2:8; Gal. 1:3; 6:18; Phil. 2:11; 2 Thess. 2:16;
Jude 4; Rev. 17:14; 19:13, 16.
3. He is a peculiar object of worship. The worship paid to him is not
merely that reverential respect offered to kings and others in
authority, but such worship as was refused by the apostles with
horror, because they were mere men (Acts 14:13–15), and against
which, when offered to him by John, even the mighty angel
(Revelation 19:10; 22:9) earnestly protested. All doubtful cases of
worship are here omitted, even that of the wise men (Matt. 2:2, 11) in
which perhaps divine worship was paid. Matt. 14:33; Luke 24:52;
Acts 7:59, 60; 2 Cor. 12:8, 9; Phil. 2:10; Heb. 1:6; Rev. 5:8–14; 7:9–12.
4. He is to be honored equally with the Father. John 5:23.
5. His relations to the Father are those of identity and unity. John 1:18; 5:17–19; 8:16, 19; 10:30; 12:44, 45; 14:7–11; 15:24; Heb. 1:3; Col. 1:15, 19; 2:9; 1 John 2:23, 24.
6. They are equally known to each other, and unknown to all others. Matt. 11:27; Luke 10:22; John 1:18; 6:46; 10:15.
7. He is the creator of all things. John 1:3, 10; 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:10.
8. He upholds and preserves all things. Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:3.
9. He is the manifestation of the Divine Being in this world. John 1:10, 14, 18; 14:8–11; 16:28–30; Col. 1:15; 1 Tim. 3:16;
1 John 1:2.
10. He is greater than all others; greater than Moses, and David, and Solomon, and Jonah, and the Baptist; and not greater than man only, but than all the spiritual intelligences of the universe. Matt. 3:11; 12:41, 42; Mark 12:37; Luke 11:31, 32; John 1:17; Eph. 1:21; Phil. 2:9; Heb. 1:4, 5; 3:3; 1 Pet. 3:22.
11. He is the source of all spiritual blessing.
(a) He gives the Holy Spirit. Luke 24:49; John 16:7; 20:22; Acts 2:33.
(b) He forgives sins. Mark 2:5–10; Luke 5:20–24; 7:47–49; Acts 5:31.
(c) He gives peculiar peace. John 14:27; 16:33. Is not he the one who is called "God of peace?" Rom. 15:33; 16:20; 2 Cor. 13:11; Phil. 4:9; 1 Thess. 5:23; Heb. 13:20.
(d) He gives light. John 1:4, 7, 8, 9; 8:12; 9:5; 12:35, 46; 1 John 1:5–7; Rev. 21:23.
(e) He gives faith. Luke 17:5; Heb. 12:2.
(f) He gives eternal life. John 17:2.
(g) He confers all the spiritual gifts bestowed upon his churches. Eph. 4:8–13.
12. All the incommunicable attributes of God are ascribed to him.
(a) Self-existence.He has power over his own life. John 2:19; 10:17, 18. He has life in himself, as has the Father. John 5:26.
(b) Eternity of existence. John 1:1, 2; 17:5, 24; Heb. 1:8, 10–12; 1 John 1:2.
(c) Omniscience.Matt.9:4;12:26; Mark 2:8; Luke 6:8; 9:47;10:22; John 1:48; 2:24, 25; 10:15; 16:30; 21:17; Col. 2:3; Rev.2:23.
(d) Omnipresence. Matt. 18:20; 28:20; John 3:13; Eph. 1:23.
(e) Omnipotence. Matt. 28:18; Luke 21:15; John 1:3; 10:18; 1 Cor. 1:24; Eph. 1:22; Phil. 3:21; Col. 2:10; Rev. 1:18.
(f) Immutability. Heb. 1:11, 12; 13:8.
13. The judgement of the world is entrusted to him. Matt. 16:27; 24:30; 25:31; John 5:22, 27; Acts 10:42; 17:31; Rom. 2:16; 14:10; 2 Cor. 5:10; 2 Tim. 4:1.
14. Absolute equality with the Father is ascribed to him. This shows that the unity and identity, before referred to, is not of will, but of nature; and that the names, and worship, and attributes of God are not bestowed on any other ground than that he is true God.
(a) Equality in works. John 5:17–23.
(b) Equality in knowledge. Luke 10:22; John 10:15.
(c) Equality in nature. John 5:18; 10:33; Phil. 2:6; Col. 2:9; Heb. 1:3.
It will be seen by the foregoing statements that the Scriptures
distinctly teach the existence of God in the personal relations of
Father and Son, and that each of them is God. No reference has been
made to the Old Testament, in proof of the divinity of Christ. The
New Testament is the most natural source of such instruction,
because it reveals to us the fulfilment of God's purpose in sending his
Son into the world, and teaches us clearly his nature and relation to
the Father. What the nature of this relation of Son and Father is, will
be hereafter examined in the discussion of the eternal Sonship of
Christ, What the Old Testament says of Christ will also be presented hereafter.
There remains, however, to be shown that
IV. THE FATHER AND SON HAVE DISTINCT PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES
This fact is so manifest, from the manner in which the Scripture
speaks of each, as to need but brief discussion.
The mere use of the names Father and Son points out a relation
between two persons. That to each of them is ascribed the attributes
of character, such as love, hate, goodness, mercy, truth, and justice,
which can only exist in, and be exercised by persons, shows separate
personality. Neither, except through distinct personal relation, can
mutual love be said to be exercised, as by Christ to the Father, John
14:31; and by the Father to Christ, John 3:35; 5:20; 10:17; 17:24.
Manifestly, also, there must be two persons, when one is said to
send, and another to be sent; one to give, and another to be given;
one to teach, and another to be taught; one to show, and another to
perceive what is shown; one to receive power, and another to bestow
it; and one to be declared, with respect to another, to be "the
effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance," Heb. 1:2;
and, because in the form of that other, to have "counted it not a prize
to be on an equality with God." Phil. 2:6.
We have here, therefore, not the one God, manifesting himself
sometimes as Father, and sometimes as Son; but a distinction of
persons in the Godhead, in which we are taught that in that Godhead
there exists a personal relation of Father to Son, and Son to Father,
with a distinct individuality and personality of each.
V. THE HOLY SPIRIT A PERSON
The Scriptures designate, by several very similar terms, the third
personality revealed in the Godhead. He is called "the Spirit," "the
Spirit of God," "the Holy Spirit," "my Spirit," "the Spirit of the Lord,"
"the Spirit of Christ," "thy good Spirit," "the Spirit of glory," "the
Spirit of grace," "the Spirit of knowledge and understanding, the
Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of
the Lord," "the Holy Spirit of promise," "the Spirit of truth," and "the
Spirit of wisdom." Christ also called him "the Comforter," and "another Comforter."
The divine Spirit, thus denominated, must either be some power or
influence exerted by God, or a distinct person in the Godhead. It
cannot be simply the spiritual part of God, as is the spirit in man, for
God is not compounded of spirit and body. This is manifest from his
immateriality. Neither can it be in any way a part of his spiritual
nature, as sometimes a distinction is made in man, between his mind
and spirit, or his soul and spirit. The perfect simplicity of God, which
forbids all composition, makes this impossible. It is, therefore, either
God himself exercising some power or influence, or a person in the
Godhead. An examination of the Scripture shows that it is the latter.
1. The evidences of personal action show that the Spirit is not merely a power or influence from God, but is either God himself or a divine person.
(1.) The Scriptures speak of the Spirit as in a state of activity. Gen. 1:2; Matt. 3:16; Acts 8:39. The language in these passages may be anthropomorphic, but the state of activity taught is undoubtedly real.
(2.) They declare that the Spirit teaches and gives instruction.Luke 12:12; John 14:26; 16:8, 13, 14; Acts 10:19; 1 Cor. 12:3.
(3.) The Spirit is also spoken of by them, as a witness of Christ to his people. John 15:26.
(4.) They also assert that he witnesses to believers that they are the children of God, and becomes the earnest of their
inheritance. Rom. 8:16; 2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:13, 14; 4:30.
(5.) He is spoken of as leading the sons of God. Rom. 8:14.
(6.) He is also said to dwell within them in such a way that his presence is that of God. John 14:16, 17; Rom. 8:9, 11; 1 Cor. 3:16, 17; 6:19.
(7.) We are taught that he is grieved. Eph. 4:30.
(8.) Ananias is charged with having lied to him. Acts 5:3.
(9.) Blasphemy against him is the unpardonable sin. Matt. 12:31,32.
(10.) He is spoken of as resisted by men. Acts 7:51.
(11.) Also as vexed by them. Isa. 63:10.
(12.) As striving with them. Gen. 6:3.
(13.) As inspiring men. Acts 2:4; 8:29; 13:2; 15:28; 2 Pet. 1:21.
(14.) As interceding for them. Rom. 8:26, 27.
(15.) As bestowing diversities of gifts. 1 Cor. 12:4–11.
In all these cases there is personal activity, thought, and feeling.
What is thus declared, cannot be true of a mere power, or influence.
The only question can be, whether this person is God, distinct from
any plurality of personal relations, or whether he is another
personality in the divine nature.
2. The Scriptures show that he is a separate person from the Father and the Son.
(1.) It is stated that he proceeds from the Father. John 15:26. A
personal being, proceeding from a person, cannot be that person
himself. The proofs above given, therefore, of his personal action
and emotion, show that this Spirit is another person.
(2.) He is given, or sent by the Father. John 14:16, 26; Acts 5:32, and by the Son, John 15:26; 16:7; Acts 2:33. He that is sent cannot be identical with him that sends.
(3.) He is called the Spirit of the Father. Eph. 3:16; and also the Spirit of Christ, and of the Son. Rom. 8:9; Gal. 4:6, perhaps also 2 Thess. 2:8.
(4.) The Son is said to send the Spirit from the Father. John 15:26; and God is said to send the Spirit of the Son. Gal. 4:6.
(5.) The Spirit is distinguished from the Father, and the Son, in passages which directly connect them with each other. Matt.
3:16, 17; 28:19; John 14:26; 15:26; 16:13; Acts 2:33; Eph. 2:18; 1 Cor. 12:4–6; 2 Cor. 13:14; 1 Pet. 1:2.
(6.) The personality of the Spirit is also ably argued from "the use of the personal pronouns in relation to him," by Dr. Charles Hodge, Sys. Theol., Vol. I, p. 524. Not only are personal pronouns used by the Spirit, and of the Spirit, but there is a departure from grammatical rule, in the use of a masculine pronoun in connection with a neuter noun, unless the masculine
is warranted by the fact, that a person is referred to who may be called "he."
VI. THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GOD
So completely do the Scriptures identify the Spirit with the Supreme God, that the fact of his personality having been established, his essential divinity will at once be admitted. In the discussion of the Trinity, therefore, the point of necessary proof as to the Spirit is his personality, while that as to the Son is his divinity. The abundant proof of the divinity of the Spirit is found:
1. In the passages which call him "the Spirit of God" and "the Spirit of the Lord," as well as those in which God calls him "my Spirit." These are conclusive, in like manner, as is the divinity of Christ from those which call him the Son of God. The titles "Spirit of God," and "Spirit of the Lord," are each used about twenty-five times in the Bible. "My Spirit" is used in reference to God's Spirit in Gen. 6:3; Prov. 1:23; Isa.44:3; 59:21; Ezek. 36:27; 39:29; Joel 2:28; Haggai 2:5; Zech. 4:6;
Matt. 12:18; Acts 2:17, 18.
2. The writers of the New Testament declare that certain things, which in the Old Testament are ascribed to Jehovah, were said by the Spirit. Compare Acts 28:25–27, and Hebrews 3:7–9, with Isaiah 6:9, and also Heb. 9:8, with Ex. 25:1, and 30:10.
3. The sacred writers of the Old Testament were the messengers of God, and spake for him, yet the influence by which they became such is called in the New Testament the Holy Ghost. Compare Luke 1:70 with 2 Peter 1:21; 2 Tim. 3:16, and Heb. 1:1 with 1 Peter 1:11; also Jer. 31:31, 33, 34, with Heb. 10:15–17.
4. The creation of the world is ascribed to the Spirit. Gen. 1:2; Job 26:13; Ps. 104:30.
5. He is said to search, and know even the deep things of God. 1 Cor. 2:10.
6. He is spoken of as omnipresent. Ps. 139:7–10, and omniscient. Ps. 139:11; 1 Cor. 2:10.
7. The divinity of the Spirit is peculiarly proved by his influences over Christ. It having been shown that Christ the Son is God, the connection of the Spirit of God with Christ, though it were only in his human nature, is a convincing proof that the Spirit, which is not a mere power of God, but a person, as we have seen above, must be also God.
(1.) In his birth. Matt. 1:18, 20; Luke 1:31–35.
(2.) Mental and spiritual influences from the Spirit were predicted. Isa. 11:2, and Isaiah 61:1.
(a) And these were fulfilled at his baptism. Matt. 3:16; John 1:33.
(b) At the time of the temptation in the wilderness. Matt. 4:1; Mark 1:12.
(c) In his preaching. Luke 4:14, 18–21.
(d) In his casting out devils. Matt. 12:28.
(3.) This spiritual influence was without measure. John 3:34.
8. The indwelling of the Spirit in the people of God is said to make them the temple of God. Compare 1 Cor. 3:16, and 6:19 with 2 Cor. 6:16, and Eph. 2:22.
9. The Spirit is expressly called God in connection with the falsehood of Ananias and Sapphira. Acts 5:3, 4, 9.
VII. THE THREE REVEALED DISTINCTLY
The scriptural proofs of the personality and divinity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit having now been considered, it is proper to notice a few passages of Scripture in which the Three are revealed distinctly, by being mentioned, or manifested together. [See others under V. 2, (5), p. 132.]
1. At the baptism of Christ are seen the Son, who has just been baptized, and the "Spirit of God descending as a dove," while, from Heaven above, [and therefore from the Father and not from the Spirit, who is thus manifested distinctly from the Father,] is heard "a voice," "saying, this is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Matt. 3:17.
2. An equally plain distinction is set forth in the language of Christ, Matt. 28:19, in which he commanded baptism to be performed "into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." This act of baptism is such as to involve the divinity as well as the personality of the Three, for it is an act of worship such as can be paid to God only; it is a profession of faith in God and his righteousness, which can be due to God only; and it is a pledge of fealty, such as God has plainly taught he will share with no other.
3. In our Lord's last discourse he promises to send "the Comforter," "even the Holy Spirit," "from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceeded from the Father." Here the Son sends, the Spirit is sent, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father. He is also referred to as one "whom the Father will send in my name." See John 14:26, and 15:26.
4. The apostle Paul evidently refers to this same Three, when he writes the Corinthians of "the same Spirit," "the same Lord," and "the same God." 1 Cor. 12:4–6.
5. The benediction, with which Paul closes his second epistle to the Corinthians, also presents unitedly, yet separately, the same Three; certain blessings are invoked, but with no apparent distinction of rank among those of whom they are asked. If there be any prominence, it is given the rather to the Son than to the Father.
VIII. THESE THREE ARE ONE GOD
Our definition states that these Three are revealed as without division of nature, essence, or being. It is not intended to indicate, by the use of these three words, any wide distinction between them.
They are nearly alike. Yet some distinction exists. By nature is meant that peculiar character of being which makes one kind of being to differ from another. Thus we speak of the divine nature, or the angelic nature, or the human nature, or the brute nature; meaning that peculiarity of life, and character, and personal condition, which makes a God, or an angel, or a man, or a brute. By essence is meant, that peculiarity, in the nature itself, which constitutes what is necessary to its existence, so that we cannot say, in the absence of that essence, that such a nature exists. Take away from human nature that which is its essential quality, and it must cease to be human nature. Being is the essence of any nature becoming actually existent in that nature. In God nature and essence must be identical, because everything in the nature of God is necessary to his existence,
and consequently the nature can neither be greater nor less than the essence; indeed they must be the same. Neither can being be separated from the nature and essence of God, though it is not identical with them. The necessity of his actual existence is something inherent in his nature. There could be no such nature without necessarily involving the existence of some person or persons in it
When it is affirmed, therefore, that there is no "division of nature, essence, or being," all that is meant is simply that there is but one God; that such is the divine nature that it cannot be multiplied, or divided, or distributed, any more than God can be thus divided in his omnipresence with all things. The divine nature is so possessed, by each of the persons in the Trinity, that neither has his own separate divine nature, but each subsists in one divine nature, common to the three. Otherwise the three persons would be three Gods. So also, in that divine nature, its essential quality is not divided in its relation through the nature to the persons. Were this so, there would be three separate parts of the divine nature. But that this cannot be, is manifest from the identity in God of nature and essence. That it is not so, is declared by the Scriptures, when they teach that there is but one God. In God there is also but one divine being, because there is but one divine essence and nature. There is but one that can have actuality of existence. The being of person, not being identical with that of nature, a fact which is true of all natures, created or uncreated, the unity of the nature, and of the essence does not forbid
plurality of persons. The Threeness of the persons, therefore, does not destroy the unity of the nature or essence, and consequently, not that of the being of God.
The Scriptures teach everywhere the unity of God explicitly and emphatically. There can be no doubt that they reveal a God that is exclusively one. But their other statements, which we have been examining, should assure us that they also teach that there are three divine persons. It is this peculiar twofold teaching, which is expressed by the word "trinity." The revelation to us, is not that of tritheism or three Gods; nor of triplicity, which is threefoldness, and would involve composition, and be contrary to the simplicity of God; nor of mere manifestation of one person in three forms, which is opposed to the revealed individuality of the persons; but it is well expressed by the word trinity, which is declarative, not simply of
threeness, but of three-oneness. That this word is not found in Scripture is no objection to it, when the doctrine, expressed by it, is so clearly set forth.
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Post by Admin on Aug 5, 2024 10:41:21 GMT -5
CHAPTER XV PERSONAL RELATIONS IN TRINITY
THE Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, as we have seen, presents
three persons occupying mutual relations to each other. There
consequently arise certain questions as to these relations. What is
their nature? What has originated them? When did they begin? In
what respects do the persons differ from each other? Is there perfect
equality between them? If there is any kind of subordination, in what
does it consist?
These questions will be best answered, first by some general
statements applicable to all the relations; next by special
consideration of the Sonship of Christ, and of the Procession of the
Spirit; followed by an examination of the equality, and subordination
of the Son and Spirit.
I. GENERAL STATEMENTS
1. The nature of these relations can be indicated in no other forms
than those set forth in Scripture. They are matters of pure revelation.
The fact of their existence is beyond the attainment of reason. Nor,
after the revelation of the doctrine, has that fact been strengthened
by any philosophical speculations, or its difficulties removed by any
arguments, or illustrations from analogy. [See statements of some of
these in Hodge's Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, pp. 478–482.] We are
constrained to fall back upon the simple Scripture statements. The
only explanations of these, which are justifiable, are such as arise
from recognizing that, as the persons, transactions, and relations are
divine, there must be separated from them all that belongs to human
conditions, and imperfections. But this must not lead us so far as to
deny the reality of these things, or the existence, in the highest
degree, of relations of the nature indicated, of which our best
conception is gained from the terms which are used. Thus no
physical generation, nor any that could begin, or end, or be measured
by succession, can be ascribed to the divine Father. No dependent
existence, nor previous lack, and subsequent attainment of being,
can be true of a Son who is himself God. No communication, nor
reception, of a portion of the divine essence, or nature, is possible
between two divine persons. If the term "begotten" is intended to
teach a communication of the divine essence to the Son by the
Father, it must be one of the whole essence, otherwise there would
no longer be only one God, one divine nature, or essence. So also,
when the Spirit proceeds from the Father, there can be no breathing
out of a part of the divine nature, nor can that breathing begin, or
end, or exist in successive moments of time. These internal acts in
God necessarily conform to that eternity, and unity, of the nature of
God, which exist even in his purposes towards all things which are
without. All human imperfections must be removed. But, this being
done, the Scripture teachings must be accepted with unquestioning
belief that relations, corresponding to these titles, exist in God, and
that they, and the causes assigned for them, are duly expressed by
the language of his word.
2. These relations exist in the nature of God. They are not revelations
to us of what God is not; but of what he is. It is because God is one in
three persons, and because the three persons are one God, that he
thus makes himself known to us. Though it is true that the Father
wills to beget the Son, and the Father and Son will to send forth the
Spirit; yet the will thus exercised, is not at mere good pleasure, but it
results necessarily from the nature of God, that the Father should
thus will the begetting, and the Father and the Son the sending forth.
The will, thus exercised, is not like that of his purposes, in which God
acts of free pleasure, choosing between various purposes which he
might form; but, like that by which he necessarily wills his own
existence. Otherwise, these relations might, or might not, have
existed. But, if this were possible, the Son, and the Spirit, would only
have been creatures of God, however exalted might have been their
nature, or extraordinary their faculties. Theirs would only have been
contingent existence, until made certain by the will of God. None of
the incommunicable attributes of God could have been ascribed to
them. In no sense could they have had self-existence, or eternity of
existence, or independent existence, or immutability of nature.
When, therefore, we find the Scriptures assigning such attributes to
any other persons than the Father, we have conclusive evidence that
the divine nature of these persons is perfectly equal to that of the
Father; and when it is also asserted, that God is but one, and yet that
each of the three is God, we are plainly taught, that all have the same
undivided divine essence, or nature. That of the Son, or of the Spirit,
is identical with that of the Father. It is not simply a similar nature,
but even numerically the same. Were it otherwise, there would be
three Gods. If, however, this be true, the relations belong to the
nature of God, and are not something superadded to that nature. The
simplicity of God is a proof of this. It could only be in a God
compounded of nature, and relations, that the relations would not be
in, and of, that nature itself.
3. These relations must also be eternal. The nature being eternal, so
also must be the relations which are in, and of that nature. Moreover,
if not eternal, they must have had a beginning, and there must have
been a time when they did not exist. But this argues changeableness
in God, in virtue of which he, who once was one person only, has now
become three. It is no reply to this, that the expressions "begotten,"
and "proceedeth from," involve the idea of the antecedent existence
of him who begets, and from whom there is procession. For these are
terms of human language, applied to divine actions, and must be
understood suitably to God. There is no greater difficulty here than
in other cases in which this principle is readily recognized. We
cannot speak of the eternity of the life of God, without using
language which implies beginning, and succession. Neither can we
think of his eternal purpose, except as numerous determinations
formed and thought out in successive moments, and following upon
God's infinite knowledge; which, by placing before him all things
possible, has presented various objects and plans from which he has
chosen. Nor yet can we talk of his presence divested of the ideas and
language that belong to space, nor conceive of his immensity without
the fiction of infinite space. This has not been done even by the
inspired authors of the Scriptures. Dealing, therefore, with the terms
expressive of the divine relations, it is natural, and right, that we
treat them after the same fashion, and divest them of those ideas of
time, and succession, which are known to have no place in God.
When this is done, nothing forbids the belief that, as these relations
are in and of the nature of God, they are eternal.
4. So far as true divinity is involved, the persons must be absolutely
equal. As each possesses the undivided divine essence, so neither
can, as God, be superior, or inferior to the others. No difference in
the mode, or order of subsistence in that essence, can make an
inequality in the divinity of either of them, inasmuch as that
subsistence makes each of them partakers of the same essence, and
undividedly of all of it. Even if there be inequality relative to each
other as persons, because of the respective relations, this would no
more require one to be an inferior God to the others, than the three
separate persons make necessary such a threefold distinction in the
divine nature, as to constitute them three Gods.
These general statements will shorten and simplify the separate
discussions as to the Sonship of Christ, and the Procession of the
Spirit. So far as these have elements in common, a statement and
explanation of these points in each case is rendered unnecessary.
They are also more plainly exhibited, as to both the relations, than
they could be separately. Moreover, we have in them answers to most
of the questions suggested at the beginning. The nature of the
relations is perceived to be properly indicated by the Scripture
language which expresses them and to be such as belongs to the
essence and nature of God. They have originated in that essence,
acting through the person of the Father, and the persons of the Son
and the Father. The perfect equality in that divine nature has been
seen. It remains simply to inquire in what respects they differ from
each other, and whether with the equality, relative to the divine
essence, there co-exists any inequality of person, or any kind of
subordination. These points will be appropriately presented in the
separate discussions of the Sonship of Christ, and of the Procession
of the Spirit, which discussions will, also, throw still further light
upon the questions already answered.
II. THE ETERNAL SONSHIP OF CHRIST
In the previous lecture it was shown that Christ is Son of God in a
sense peculiar to himself. The Father called him, at his baptism, "My
beloved Son;" and he is spoken of by the sacred writers as God's
"only begotten Son," and "his own Son."
The Scripture proofs were also presented, that this Son is not only
called "God;" but possesses all the incommunicable attributes of
God, together with such unity and identity with the Father, as make
him truly God; that he is equal with the Father in his works, and
knowledge, and nature; and, that not only to him are all the acts of
creation, providence, and judgement to be ascribed, but that he is to
be honoured, and worshipped equally with the Father, he being
indeed the manifestation in the world, of the divine Father, "the
image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15), in whom "dwelleth all the
fulness of the Godhead bodily," (Col. 2:9) "being the effulgence of his
glory, and the very image of his substance." Heb. 1:3.
These proofs of this eternal Sonship may be strengthened by further
reference to the Scripture teaching both as to the nature and eternity
of the relation.
1. That the relation is one of nature, is additionally shown.
(a) By passages, which declare that the Son is so "from God," and "in
God," as to have perfect knowledge of him. John 1:18; 7:29; 16:27–
30; 17:25. He is here spoken of as proceeding from God, not merely
being sent as a messenger. The claim asserted, is one of intimate
fellowship in and participation of the divine nature. It is made of him
in the capacity of God's Son. Consequently it betokens a sonship of
nature, not one of mere office, or name.
(b) By such passages as contrast the divine and human natures,
ascribing the divine nature to the Son. Rom. 1:3, 4; Phil. 2:5–11.
(c) The divine nature of the Sonship is plainly taught by John in the
1st chapter of his gospel. "The only begotten Son," which "is in the
bosom of the Father," who alone has "seen God" and "declared him,"
5:18, is "the Word" that "became flesh, and dwelt among men," 5:14,
and yet, which was not only "in the beginning," but "was with God,"
and "was God." If the Word and the Son are identical, the divine
nature ascribed to the Word is truly the divine nature of the Son.
2. Of the eternity of this relation, we may also find further proof.
(1.) Christ's existence before birth in this world is taught.
(a) In such passages as show that Christ, of his own will, assumed this life. John 6:38; Phil. 2:7; Heb. 2:14, 16; 10:5, 9.
(b) Such as show peculiar coming into the world. John 3:13; 6:33, 38, 62.
(c) Where it is said, that he had seen and known the Father; which implies a previous state of existence. John 6:46.
(d) Such passages as declare, that he, the Son, was sent into the world by the Father. See p. 126, 3.
(2.) His existence when creation occurred, is announced in John 1:3, 10; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:10.
(3.) The Scriptures also declare that he was in the beginning, before all things, when time began, which was, therefore, eternal existence. John 1:1; 17:5, 24; Col. 1:17; Heb. 1:10.
(4.) They expressly state that it was eternal. 1 John 1:1–3.
In the general statements above, it has been argued that the
relations, borne by these two persons, are to be learned only from the
Scripture revelations, and that these are to be modified in no respect,
except by removing from them whatever is necessary to make them
conform to divine transactions. It was also urged that all the divine
relations being in and of God, who, with all his plurality of person, is
but one God, these relations are in the same undivided divine
essence, and, consequently, belong to the nature of God, and must be eternal.
In applying these statements and the scripture proofs to the relation
of Father and Son in God, we arrive at the doctrine commonly called the Eternal Sonship of Christ.
By this is meant, that paternity, and filiation in God are, not mere
names for something which does not exist, nor for some relation,
different from that of father and son, to which these titles were first
applied in connection with Christ's creation, or birth, or resurrection,
or exaltation; but are realities which exist eternally in his nature, and
are as properly described by the names which express them as are his
attributes by the various terms of wisdom, power, truth, justice and love.
No attempt is made by those who accept this doctrine to state the
nature of this generation. Some are even content to suppose that
nothing more may be meant than to express by sonship what would
be the result of such a relation. As human sonship is accompanied by
earnest love between father and son, and implies likeness of
character, and similarity of nature; so they have been willing to rest
at this point, and accept the divine sonship, as meaning no more
than the existence of perfect likeness, and infinite mutual love. But,
manifestly, if nothing more than this be meant, the Father might
equally be called Son, and the Son Father. The Scriptures, on the
contrary, indicate that the likeness is the result of the relation, and
not that the terms of the relation are given because of the likeness. It
is not the resemblance of Christ to the Father, which is set forth as
the reason he is called the Son, but it is because he is the Son that this resemblance exists.
But, even if these titles could be ascribed because of the likeness, we
still have to account for the use of the peculiar word "begotten." This
is evidently intended to tell us something of a great mystery. It
proclaims some kind of activity in the divine Father, and passivity in
the Son. We cannot tell what it is, but it at least resembles, in some
way, that impartation of nature which occurs in the act of human
begetting, and conveys to us the idea of the communication of the
essence of God by the Father, through this act, to the Son. The
continued unity of God shows that it is a communication of the
whole essence, in which, however, the Father still continues to
subsist, while imparting to the Son subsistence also in the same.
Such impartation must partake of the nature of the "Eternal Now" in
God. It never began and will never end, it has no succession, no past,
and no future. It is the ever present, having no reference even to a
past, or to a future. It is such a generation as constitutes eternal
Sonship, and Fatherhood.
Many have rejected this doctrine because of misconceptions as to the
nature of an Eternal Divine Sonship.
1. They have objected to the idea of Sonship itself.
(1.) They have urged that Sonship implies inferiority, and, therefore,
that the Son cannot be truly God equal with the Father.
But how can we know what is and what is not possible in this matter
with God? If the Scriptures assert the Divine generation, and the
equality of the Son and the Father, why should any deny their
consistency with each other?
After all, however, does sonship imply inferiority of nature? There
may be subordination of rank, or office. But surely there is none of
nature. Even human sonship results from the impartation of the
same nature by the father; not the same numerically, but the same in
kind, and degree, the same partitively. The son of any man partakes
alike, and equally, with his father, in human nature. The divine
communication differs from the human in not so dividing the nature
that two gods result, as in human generation do two men.
That sonship may imply inferiority of official rank and personal
relation, is readily admitted. But it does not always do this. Such
subordination of person, indeed, seems to be taught of the Son of
God to his Father. But it is equality and sameness of nature, not of
office, which makes the Son truly God. He is such, because he is a
true subsistence in the Divine essence. He does not cease to be such
because the Father is officially greater than he, nor even because the
Father bestows, and the Son receives the communication of the divine essence.
(2.) It has also been objected that Fatherhood implies priority of
existence, and that this is impossible towards another divine person.
But this is based upon a forgetfulness of the nature of eternal acts.
Though we may not be able to explain how they are so, we
nevertheless know that, in such acts, there is no beginning nor end,
no first nor second, no antecedent nor consequent, indeed, no
succession of any kind. Were it otherwise, God would exist in
successive moments. He would have had a beginning. He would form
new purposes, and would increase in knowledge from day to day.
Arguing from the nature of eternal acts in God, we, therefore, judge
that the eternal generation of the Son is not a single act, which was
accomplished at a definite moment in the divine nature; but one ever
continuing. With God there may be such definitely completed acts,
when they are performed outside of himself, as in creation; but, not
when they are purely within. Such an act must be ever continuing,
and completed only in the sense of its being always perfect, though
not ended. Even the expression "continuing" is imperfect so far as it
involves the idea of successive moments in God. It is only "ever
continuing" as viewed by man. Sonship in God, therefore, does not
imply priority of existence. Even in man paternity and filiation are
co-existent. One becomes a father, only, when another becomes his
son. Priority of existence is necessary, as a mere accident of human
birth, because of the necessity of growth, and maturity in a man
before he can become a father. But, even here, the sonship and
fatherhood exist at the same moment. In God, however, priority,
even of the existence of one person before another, can have no
place, since he is self-existent, and eternal, who never began to be,
and whose perfect maturity is not attained by growth or increase.
(3.) Again it is said, "If Christ is Son, if he is God of God, he is not
self-existent and independent. But self-existence, independence, etc.,
are attributes of the divine essence, and not of one person in
distinction from the others. It is the triune God, who is self-existent,
and independent. Subordination, as to the mode of subsistence, and
operation, is a scriptural fact; and so also is the perfect and equal
godhead of the Father, and the Son, and, therefore, these facts must
be consistent. In the consubstantial identity of the human soul, there
is a subordination of one faculty to another, and so, however
incomprehensible to us, there may be a subordination in the trinity
consistent with the identity of essence in the godhead." Charles
Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1, 474.
2. There are objections also made to the eternity of this relation.
They are based upon scripture statements, and are, on that account,
even more worthy of consideration.
It is well to remember, however, that Christ is revealed to us, in the
Scriptures, as one person in two natures, by virtue of which he is
frequently called the Theanthropos, or Godman. The doctrine of his
person will be hereafter discussed. It is sufficient here to state that,
while the two natures are distinct, and preserve their respective
attributes and qualities, yet, because of the one personality in both
natures, whatever belongs to the person as person may be attributed
to either nature. Thus the Spirit is not only called the Spirit of Christ,
"but also the Spirit of Jesus." Acts 16:7. Inasmuch, then, as the
sonship expresses a mere personal relation in the godhead, the title
Son of God may be applied to Christ in mere human relations. That
this is sometimes done, does not then destroy the force of its much
more frequent application to him in his divine nature, and especially
of such an application, when it is accompanied by the ascription to
him of divine titles, attributes, acts, and worship, together with
assertions of equality, identity, and unity with the Father.
"Bishop Pearson, one of the most strenuous defenders of eternal
generation, and of all the peculiarities of the Nicene doctrine of the
Trinity, gives four reasons why the Theanthropos, or Godman is
called the Son of God.
(1.) His miraculous conception.
(2.) The high office to which he was designated. John 10:34, 35, 36.
(3.) His resurrection according to one interpretation of Acts 13:33. 'The
grave,' he says, 'is as the womb of the earth; Christ, who is raised
from thence, is as it were begotten to another life, and God, who
raised him, is his Father.'
(4.) Because after his resurrection, he was
made the heir of all things. Heb. 1:2–5. Having assigned these
reasons why the Godman is called Son, he goes on to show why the
Logos is called Son. There is nothing, therefore, in the passages cited
inconsistent with the church doctrine of the eternal sonship of our
Lord." Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1, 476.
1. The first objection to the eternity of the sonship, is that the title
"Son" is given because of his birth.
This is based upon Luke 1:35. "And the angel answered and said unto
her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the
Most High shall overshadow thee: wherefore also that which is to be
born shall be called holy, the Son of God."
Upon this passage it may be remarked, as the foundation of all just
interpretation, that no relation to the Holy Ghost, which constitutes
a personal relation in the Godhead, can refer to the Sonship, because
this relation is one of Christ to the Father, and not to the Holy Ghost.
Some other reason, then, than the act of the Spirit in his conception,
must be found for the ascription here of the title "Son of God."
Again, it must be recognized, that the title "Son" is not here
prophesied of in connection with the divine nature of our Lord, but is
declared of that "which is to be born," which was undoubtedly his
human nature, or himself in his human nature.
One interpretation of the passage affixes to the term "Power of the
Highest" a personal sense, explaining it as a title of the Divine Logos.
According to this, it is the overshadowing and permanent abiding of
the divine Son, in union with the human nature conceived under the
influence of the Holy Ghost, which will cause that "holy thing" to be
"called the Son of God." Instances are quoted of the use of "Power" in
a divine sense from Philo, and other Jewish writers. The early
Christian fathers are stated to have applied generally the word
"power" to the divine nature of Christ, and many of them are quoted
as maintaining this interpretation of this passage. Acts 8:10, and 1
Cor. 1:24 are referred to as illustrating this use of the word power.
If this be the interpretation, then, it is the coming of the Eternal Son
upon this human nature, and his presence with it, that causes it to be
called the Son of God.
This is, therefore, perfectly consistent with both the requirements
before mentioned as necessary to the true interpretation. The Spirit
is not associated with the ascription of the title Son of God, and that
title is appropriately given to the human nature, and yet the eternity
of the divine Sonship is not affected. If this use of the word "Power"
can be fully verified, no valid objection can be made to the
interpretation. Treffry gives very strong proof that it is so used.
If, however, we should adopt the more generally received
interpretation, which supposes that "the power of the Highest" is
either descriptive of the Holy Ghost, or of the divine power which
accompanied his coming upon Mary, there will still be no difficulty in
ascribing the title Son of God to the presence of the Eternal Son, who
in his divine personality "became flesh, and dwelt among us." John
1:14. Such an explanation of the title would still be consistent with
his relation, both to the Father and the Holy Ghost. The text would
then still teach that the title Son of God is to be given to Christ as
man, in like manner as that of Lord, because we have not here a mere
human person, but simply a human nature, in which the divine
Person, the Son, subsists without ceasing also to subsist in the divine
nature. As that divine Person, and not the divine nature, is the Son,
so also the divine Person in his human nature, and not that human
nature, or a mere man is called Son of God. The title, therefore,
though given to him as man, arises not from his birth, but from his eternal Sonship.
The Holy Ghost is, therefore, set forth here merely as the originator
of the human nature of Christ. That nature is from God, not acting
through the divine essence, which is never affirmed of God in any of
his acts, but through a person in the Godhead, according to the usual
mode as revealed to us, and as exhibited in creation, providence and
redemption, and even in the eternal acts within the Godhead. The
Scriptures make known no influence, nor action of the Spirit on the
Son in his divine relations. On the contrary, the Son acts through the
Spirit, but not the Spirit through the Son. But the instances of the
influence of the Spirit on the human nature are abundant. At his
birth, Luke 1:35, at his baptism, Matt. 3:16, in leading him to be
tempted, Matt. 4:1, in the working of his miracles, Matt. 12:28, in his
return from temptation "in the power of the Spirit into Galilee," Luke
4:14, and in his giving commandments through the Holy Spirit to the
Apostles, Acts 1:2, we have express mention of this influence. Was it
not to this that the author of Hebrews referred, "A body didst thou
prepare for me?" Heb. 10:5.
(2.) Again it is objected, that Christ did not become Son of God until
the day of his resurrection.
Two passages are quoted in favour of this objection.
1. That in Rom. 1:4. "Who was declared to be the Son of God with
power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead."
The word translated "declared" in this passage means "determined,"
"marked out as." It has no reference to a new ascription of title. All
that is taught is that the resurrection of Christ plainly and distinctly
evinced that "Jesus Christ, our Lord" (v. 5) is "Son of God." Of this
fact, the resurrection from the dead of him who had constantly
claimed to be the Son of God, is an unquestionable proof.
(2.) The other passage is Acts 13:32, 33. This reads in the King James
version, "And we declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise
that was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us
their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus again;" as it is also
written in the second psalm, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee."
Upon this objection, Dr. Charles Hodge justly says: "Here there is no
reference to the resurrection. The glad tidings, which the Apostle
announced, was not the resurrection, but the advent of the Messiah.
That was the promise made to the fathers, which God had fulfilled by
raising up, i. e., bringing into the world the promised deliverer.
Compare Acts 2:30; 3:22, 26; 7:37; in all which passages where the
same word is used, the 'raising up' refers to the advent of Christ; as
when it is said, 'A prophet shall the Lord God raise up unto you from
among your brethren, like unto me.' The word is never used
absolutely in reference to the resurrection, unless, as in Acts 2:32,
where the resurrection is spoken of in the context. Our translators
have obscured the meaning by rendering it, 'having raised up again,'
instead of simply 'having raised up,' as they render it elsewhere."
We might, then, rest the reply to this objection upon the denial that
the Sonship is spoken of as given in connection with the resurrection.
But, on the other hand, we might admit it to be thus given, and yet
the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship would not be affected. For, so
long as we may justly confine any such declaration to the
Theanthropos, it might still be true that to the Godman the name
could thus be given, and yet, all the teachings of Scripture relative to
the eternity and nature of the divine sonship remain true. The truth
is, that it would be more difficult to establish positively that the title
Son of God ever was bestowed upon Christ, in consequence of any
event connected with his humanity, than that it is confined to him in
his human relations. At least, it is manifest from the Scriptures that,
if ever applied to this divine person because of his birth, or
resurrection, that was not the first period of such application; for the
title is given to him in connection with the acts of creation, and he is
said to have been before all things, their creator, in whom they
consist, as the one who laid the foundations of the world, the
existence of which is perishable, while his is eternal.
(3.) A further objection is made by Arians, and others who deny the
proper divinity of Christ, and claim that he is but a creature. These
assert that the title Son of God was given to Christ by virtue of his
creation. The obvious reply to this objection, is to produce the
Scripture teachings which prove the true deity of the Son, especially
such as assert that he is God and Lord, and to be honoured, and
worshipped, and that he performs all the divine acts of creation,
providence and redemption, and has all the incommunicable
attributes of God, together with perfect equality, exact resemblance,
absolute unity, and sameness of nature with the Father.
The passage in Col. 1:15, has been claimed in support of this
objection; Christ being there called, according to the King James
Version, "the first born of every creature." But the true rendering is
"the first born of all creation," and it is so translated in the
Canterbury Revision. There is a similar passage in Rev. 3:14, where
Christ calls himself "the beginning of the creation of God." The word
translated "beginning" in this passage, means also "the origin." It is
also used for "the first place, or power, the sovereignty." The "first
born" in the former passage, is the same word used in Heb. 1:6, and
there translated "first begotten." The "first created" would have been
differently expressed in the Greek. The fact that this is a begotten
Son, and not a created being, and that he is not said to be born at the
time of Creation, but before it, actually shows that the eternal
generation of the eternal Son, which took place before all things, is
here spoken of. Such pre-existence is plainly taught in the context of
Hebrews, but it is directly asserted in that of Colossians.
III. THE PROCESSION OF THE SPIRIT
The relation of the Spirit, in the Godhead, differs from that of the
Son in several respects. What is the ground, or reason of this, it is
impossible to state. The Scriptures give no information upon this
point. We must be content, therefore, simply to point out what they
reveal upon this subject.
1. An obvious distinction is made between the names given to the two
persons. While the one is called the Son, the other is called "the
Spirit," and other names of like import, as stated p. 130, V. That
these names are indicative of some specific difference, may be argued
from the fact that they are never interchanged. The Spirit is never
called the Son, nor is the Son ever called the Spirit. When it is
remembered, that these names describe persons subsisting in the
same divine essence, this fact becomes very significant of some
peculiar distinction between them in the mode of such subsistence.
The word "πνεῦμα," which is the designation in the Greek original,
means spirit, breath, or wind, and seems to indicate some influence,
or power which proceeds from God, not impersonally, but with a
personal relation in the Godhead. The work of the Spirit, in the
creation and government of the world, in the inspiration of the
sacred writers, in the miraculous conception of, and gracious
influences upon the human nature of Christ, and in the regeneration
and sanctification of the people of God, points him out as the
outwardly operating power of the Godhead in this world.
2. A distinction is also revealed, between these persons, as to the
mode of action by which they proceed from the Father. The Son is
said to be generated, the Spirit is simply said to proceed. The relation
of the Spirit to the divine Father has been generally expressed by the
term "Procession." This is admissible, if it be recognized as a term
merely declarative of such a procession from the Father as is not
exclusive of a procession also of the Son. This expression is applied
to the Spirit upon the authority of Christ, who calls him in John
15:26, "the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father." But
our Lord uses a similar word as to himself, though not the same, in
John 16:28, "I came out from the Father, and am come into the
world." The disciples use this last word in John 16:30. The verb in
these two passages means sometimes "came out," and sometimes
"went out," and, in the latter signification, is precisely equivalent to
the other verb, which in a different tense appears in John 15:26.
From the "proceeding from" of the Spirit, therefore, cannot be
argued a difference in his mode of procedure from that of the Son.
The terms applied to both are general, and cannot express a
difference. Procession, therefore, may be asserted of both the Son
and the Spirit. The mode of the procession of the Son is specifically
designated by the generation which is asserted of him. That of the
Spirit appears likewise to be pointed out by the name given to him.
He is the breath of God, which fact, already expressed in his name,
was taught by our Lord when, on the evening of his resurrection, he
breathed upon his apostles, saying unto them: "Receive ye the Holy
Ghost." John 20:22. It is not unlikely, however, that the human
breath of the Theanthropos was, on that occasion, used as a symbol
of the divine outbreathing of the Spirit by the divine Son. This may
be well assumed as true, if, indeed, the Spirit proceeds from the Son,
as well as from the Father.
This outbreathing of God is even more difficult to interpret, and the
nature of the relation thus indicated even more incomprehensible
than that of the generation of the Son. In this, therefore, as in that,
we must be content to accept the statement, just as it is revealed,
being only careful to separate from it all ideas inconsistent with acts
of God. This would exclude everything like a physical breathing, or
several acts of breathing, at various times, which may be successive.
The procession of the Spirit, must, therefore, be regarded as eternal
action, completed, only because perfect, and continuing, only in the
sense of not ended.
It seem therefore proper, that we should regard the peculiarity of the
mode of the procedure of both these persons, to be indicated by the
names given respectively to each. The term "procession" may be
especially appropriated to the Spirit only, because, in his case,
"Spirit" does not as distinctly point out the mode of procedure, as
does Sonship, in that of the Son.
The preposition, with which the verbs are compounded in each of
these three passages of John, is the same, and shows a procession
from within God. Wherever the terms "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of
Christ" appear, the simple genitive is used without a preposition, but
this same preposition is found with the genitive of God, in 1 Cor. 2:12
and Rev. 11:11. In this latter passage, however, the Holy Spirit is
probably not meant. The procedure is, therefore, taught as being
from within God, which shows that the coming from, and the going
forth from, are both in and of the Divine nature, and are not to be
limited to such action as occurs when an ambassador is sent from a
king, or one man simply proceeds from the presence of another.
3. Western Christendom, in opposition to Eastern, has maintained
that there is also a distinction between the relations of Son and
Spirit, as to the source. The procession of the Spirit is said, by the
East, to be from the Father only, as is the generation of the Son; but
by the West, to be from both the Father and the Son.
Eastern Christians have urged that the Scriptures only actually
declare procession from the Father. It must be acknowledged that
this is true, inasmuch as there is but one passage of Scripture which
speaks of his Procession (John 15:26), the language of which is
"which proceedeth from the Father." But in 1 Cor. 2:12 the Spirit is
said to be "of God," which may mean of the Father alone, or, as of
God, so of the Son also. The Spirit is also spoken of as the Spirit of
Jesus (Acts 16:7) and of Christ, and of the Lord, and of the Son (Gal.
4:6), as well as the Spirit of the Father, and the Spirit of God. Our
Lord also declared, that he would send the Spirit. More than this, the
action of Christ, when he breathed upon the disciples, and said,
"Receive ye the Holy Ghost," (John 20:22,) is very significant, and
strongly indicates the procession of the Spirit from him. See also Acts
16:7. This act of Christ, however, may have been no more than giving
the Spirit to his disciples, without intending to teach any procession
from himself. The breathing, which in any event was symbolical, may
have been so only of the divine act of the Father, from whom alone
the Spirit may truly proceed. In this event, may we not also believe
that the relation to the procession of the Son differs from that of the
Father? Would it not be a more exact statement of the Scripture
teaching to say, that the Son, or Christ, sends the Spirit, and gives the
Spirit, which is his, because the right to bestow it is his, either
essentially, or as given him in his office as Messiah, and that the
Spirit thus sent proceeds from the Father? In this event the Father
would be the source of the procedure, and the Son the agent in
sending it forth. Is not this bestowment on the Messiah, of this right
to send the Spirit, suggested by Christ's declaration, "If I go not
away, the Comforter will not come unto you," (John 16:7,) as well as
by the language, "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not
yet glorified." John 7:39. These points are presented for
consideration, while it is admitted that the assertion, that the Spirit
proceeds also from the Son, is less objectionable than the denial. The
Scriptures seem to leave it so doubtful, as to forbid any positive
statement about it. But the preponderance of evidence is in favour of
a procession from both Father and Son.
IV. SUBORDINATION BETWEEN THE PERSONS
The absolute equality of each of these persons, as God, has already
been pointed out; and the possibility of inferiority, in other respects,
was then intimated. There are some scriptural statements which
seem to indicate this. Christ said expressly of himself, "The Father is
greater than I." John 14:28. He also not only taught that the Father
had sent him, but compared with that his own sending of his
disciples, (John 17:18,) and declared that he came, not to do his own
will but that of him that sent him, (John 6:38); that he came not of
himself, (John 7:28); that he spoke not of himself, but that the
Father had given him a commandment, what he should say, and
speak, (John 12:49;) that his teaching was not his own, (John 7:16,)
that the word they heard was not his, but the Father's, (John 14:24;)
that he had given and spoken the words given him by the Father,
(John 8:26; 17:8,) that the Father had given him to do the work he
had accomplished, (John 17:4); that he could do nothing of himself,
but what he saw the Father doing, (John 5:19); that the Father was
with him, and had not left him alone, (John 8:29,) and that the
Father had sanctified (consecrated) him, (John 10:36.) Peter also
preached to Cornelius "Jesus of Nazareth, how that God anointed
him with the Holy Ghost, and with power," and that he performed
beneficent and miraculous acts because "God was with him." (Acts
10:38.) Christ also denied the goodness of any but God, (Matt. 19:17;
Mark 10:18; Luke 18:19,) and as to the day of judgement, asserted
that "of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in
heaven, neither the Son, but the Father," (Mark 13:32, ["but the
Father only," Matt. 24:36] and, that to sit on his right hand, and on
his left, was not his to give, but that these positions shall be given to
those for whom it is prepared of his Father, (Matt. 20:23; Mark
10:40.) We are told also of his prayers to God, of which the
remarkable statement is made, that "in the days of his flesh," he
"offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears
unto him that was able to save him from death, and having been
heard for his godly fear." (Heb. 5:7.) Christ also speaks of the power
he had overall flesh, as given him by the Father, (John 17:2,) and
Paul in Eph. 1:17, 20, assigns his exaltation over all things, and as
head of the church, described in vv. 19–22, to "the Father of glory."
While it is said that the Father "put all things in subjection under his
feet," we are told that "he is excepted, who did subject all things unto
him," (1 Cor. 15:27,) that "then cometh the end, when he shall deliver
up the kingdom to God, even the Father," (v. 24;) and "when all
things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself
be subjected to him that did subject all things unto him, that God
may be all in all," v. 28. The climax of these statements is reached,
when we find that not only did Paul say that "the head of Christ is
God," (1 Cor. 11:3,) and call the Father "the God of our Lord Jesus
Christ, the Father of Glory," (Eph. 1:17;) but our Lord himself spoke
of him to Mary Magdalene as "my Father and your Father," and "my
God and your God." John 20:17.
An examination of these, and all similar statements in the Scriptures,
shows they are in no respect inconsistent with the perfect equality of
the persons as to the divine nature.
1. Almost all of them have reference to Christ, as man; or as the Son
in his relations to his human nature; or as Messiah, securing for his
people eternal life, and bestowing it upon them, or ruling over the
universe, and the church.
2. This explanation may be thought by some insufficient to account
fully for the subjection of the Son referred to in 1 Cor. 15:28, or for
the superior greatness ascribed to the Father in John 14:28. But, if
so, we are only taught an inferiority of one person in the Trinity to
another, as a person. Nothing indicates that it is of one of them as
God, to another as God, or of the Godhead of one to the Godhead of
another. It is only of the Son to the Father, and not of God the Son to
God the Father. The subsistence of each of the persons in the same
divine nature may still remain true, as well as that partaking of all of
it by each, which makes all equally God.
3. The personal inferiority which is thus made possible, so far as it is
natural, is due doubtless to the difference in the modes of
subsistence in the divine essence. The Father thus subsists
independently of the will, or the action of any other person. He is
thus simply God; not originated, not begotten, not proceeding from.
The Son is originated, his filiation is willed, though necessarily, by
the Father, and he is begotten, and is, as the Athanasian creed
asserts, "very God" of "very God." The Holy Spirit is also originated;
he is not however begotten, but proceeds from the Father, or from
the Father and the Son. His procession is also willed, though
necessarily, and he, likewise, is "very God" of "very God." In this
mode of subsistence, therefore, inferiority of the person of the Son to
the Father, and of the Spirit to the Father and Son, may be said to
exist. Without any superiority as God, therefore, the Father may be
said to be greater than the Son, because of the personal relations in the Trinity.
4. But there is also a subordination of office or rank still more plainly
taught. By virtue of this, the Father sends the Son, and the Father
and Son send the Spirit. This could exist between persons in all
respects equal to each other, both in nature and relation. In God,
however, it is probable that the official subordination is based upon
that of the personal relations. It corresponds exactly with the
relations of the persons, from which has probably resulted their
official subordination in works without, and especially in the work of redemption.
The order of this subordination is plainly apparent from the
scriptural names and statements about the relations. The Father is
unquestionably first, the Son second, and the Holy Spirit third. This
is their rank, as well because of the mode of subsistence, as of its
order. Hence they are commonly spoken of in this order, as the First,
Second and Third Persons of the Trinity.
V. "THE INHABITATION OF THE PERSONS."
"As the essence of the Godhead is common to the several persons,
they have a common intelligence, will, and power. There are not in
God three intelligencies, three wills, three efficiences. The Three are
one God, and, therefore, have one mind and will. This intimate union
was expressed in the Greek church by the word 'περιχώρησις,' which
the Latin words inexistentia, inhabitatio, and intercommunio were
used to explain. These terms were intended to express the scriptural
facts that the Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son; that
where the Father is, there the Son and Spirit are; that what the one
does, the others do." * * *
"This fact—of the intimate union, communion, and inhabitation of
the persons of the Trinity—is the reason why everywhere in Scripture
and instinctively by all Christians, God as God is addressed as a
person, in perfect consistency with the Tri-personality of the
Godhead. We can, and do pray to each of the Persons separately; and
we pray to God as God; for the three persons are one God; one not
only in substance, but in knowledge, will, and power. To expect that
we, who cannot understand anything, not even ourselves, should
understand these mysteries of the Godhead, is to the last degree
unreasonable. But as in every other sphere, we must believe what we
cannot understand; so we may believe all that God has revealed in
his word concerning himself, although we cannot understand the
Almighty unto perfection." Charles Hodge, Sys. Theol., vol. 1, pp.
461–462.
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and, that to sit on his right hand, and on